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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses civil-military relations in North-East England during an 
extended eighteenth century that begins with the Glorious Revolution and ends 
with the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars. The study will focus on the 
relationship that developed between soldiers and civilians by analysing a number 
of themes including recruiting, billeting and garrisoning, the maintenance of 
public order and the role of soldiers in local crime. By looking at this type of 
daily interaction it is possible to gain an understanding of how the actions of the 
army, and the reactions of society, affected civil-military relations. Through this 
process the study attempts to discover whether the army was prone to lewd and 
violent behaviour that terrorised local communities and consequently resulted in 
poor relations with the civilian population. This thesis argues that despite the 
relative unpopularity of the army, and its occasional involvement in criminal 
activity and violence against civilian society, civil-military relations in the region 
were never overwhelmingly frictional or confrontational. The main sources of 
tension actually arose out of the burden placed on the civilian population by their 
financial, logistical and constitutional commitments to the army. At the same time 
the army's role in opposing civil unrest, and enforcing local and central 
government policy, undermined its relationship with local communities. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
`Our God and soldiers we like adore, 
Ev'n at the brink of danger, not before, 
After deliverance, both alike requited, 
Our Gods forgotten, the soldiers slighted. ' 
Francis Quarles (1592-1644) 
I. Opening Remarks 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse civil-military relations in the North East of 
England during an extended eighteenth century, running from the Glorious Revolution 
to the outbreak of hostilities with Revolutionary France. In particular, it examines the 
relationships between the region's civilian populace and the military by looking at 
soldier-civilian interaction, and placing administrative and government structures into 
a supporting role. Within this framework it will observe a number of activities that 
brought the army into direct contact with the local population. These include the 
maintenance of public order, recruitment, desertion, garrisoning and billeting and 
criminal activity. The thesis will then look at how such interactions impacted on the 
evolution and maintenance of civil-military relations within the region. 
To place the army within the context of British society in the eighteenth century is 
difficult, and to determine the relationship and reputation it enjoyed amongst the 
civilian population of England is equally challenging. So much is taken on faith, and 
so little has been done to accurately measure the validity of these beliefs at the most 
fundamental levels. Likewise, the eighteenth-century British army has been much 
maligned by the interpretations of contemporary observers, resulting in a popular 
stereotype of the army as a dangerous collection of Britain's social flotsam. Did 
James Wolfe speak the truth when describing his men as `vagabonds that stroll about 
2 
in dirty red clothes from one gin-ship to another... dirty, drunken insolent rascals'? ' 
Was the British army nothing more than `a parcel of mercenaries, fawning, lewd 
dissipated creatures, the dregs and scum of mankind. '2 Or was there more to the army 
and its dealings with British civilian society, and especially the civilians of the North 
East? If the above observations were true then the very nature of civil-military 
relations in North-East England would be deeply affected. 
While directed at developing an understanding of civil-military relations in a local 
context, this work is part of a wider scholarly trend that has seen military history 
regain some of the attraction that it has lost in the previous thirty to forty years. To 
some extent the emergence of social history as a major force helped to marginalise 
military history from the mainstream. Lawrence Stone refers to this period as the 
`rush to social history'. While he credits this phenomenon with the opening of new 
fields of enquiry, he also links it to the neglect of other subject areas. Initially, few 
strong linkages were seen between military and social history, despite the appearance 
of numerous nascent `war and society' studies from the early 1980s. Nevertheless, 
historians from many disciplines have come to recognise that there are strong 
relationships between military and social history. 
These connections became increasingly apparent in the 1980s as studies of state 
building and the controversial theories of the `military revolution' and the `fiscal 
military state' emerged. 5 Many military, political and social historians are now 
attempting to shed fresh light on the old interpretations and methodology of military 
history, while more intensely examining the role that conflict and armed forces played 
within the societies they served. As a result, experts in this field have realised that 
war and military matters have far-reaching political, economic, cultural and social 
1 Quoted in: J. A. Houlding "Fit for Service" The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981) 268. 
2 Ibid., 267. 
3 `Introduction' in: Lawrence Stone (ed. ), An Imperial State At War. Britain From 1689 to 1815 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 1. 
4 Ibid. 
s The concept of the military revolution was first expressed in 1955 during a lecture by Michael Roberts 
at Queen's University Belfast. Geoffrey Parker helped to open the debate on the subject. Geoffrey 
Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); The first large-scale work on the `Fiscal-Military State' was 
undertaken by John Brewer, Sinews of Power. War. Money and the English State. 1688-1783 (London: 
3 
implications. Furthermore, the roles of military power and armed forces are becoming 
central in the debates relating to early-modern state formation and the development of 
governmental and monarchical authority. 
Not surprisingly, recent military history has, in part, been influenced by the approach 
taken by many social historians. Those analysing war and military affairs are now 
comfortable focusing on the role of the `rank-and-file', civilian society and popular 
institutions within their studies. This `new history', as Peter Burke describes it, does 
not rely primarily on the description of `high politics', the view from above and a 
focus on the narrative. 6 It contrasts nicely with the `top-down' approach of some 
military history, where battles, logistics, organisation and famous military leaders are 
afforded more attention. 7 As mentioned earlier, this thesis will employ a `bottom-up' 
methodology in its analysis of civil-military relations in the North East. It will focus 
on the role of the army in the daily life of the civilian population. 
II. Why A Regional Study? 
One might question the merits of conducting a regional study of an institution that is 
national, and even international, in scope. It might also be asked what benefit can a 
thesis, which looks at a microcosm of British society, be to the wider debate on the 
nature of civil-military relations in eighteenth-century England? Importantly, a local 
study does not necessarily have to justify itself within a national scope, although it is 
helpful if it does at least lead the reader to ask questions about other regions within the 
country. An example of this type of investigation is the study of early-modem 
Whickham by David Levine & Keith Wrightson. 8 These historians use a 
geographically limited study to analyse the development of a single town during a 
period of increased industrial and social development. In doing so they highlight what 
Unwin & Hyman, 1988). 
6 Peter Burke "Overture: The New History" in Burke (ed. ), New Perspectives on Historical Writing 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
7A well-known example being Sir John Fortesque, History of the British Army 4 vols. (London: 1899- 
1906). 
8 David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, Whickham 1560-1765 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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may have been a wider trend within the region and nation as a whole. If nothing else 
Levine and Wrightson exposed a new area for social historians to investigate. 
As my research evolved it became apparent that the historical stigmatism, which has 
labelled the eighteenth-century North East of England as remote and alien from the 
more developed regions to the south, was simply not true. 9 An increasing body of 
work has illustrated that the North East was a dynamic region with important 
economic and military significance for the entire country. In turn, large population 
centres like Newcastle and Berwick played roles within this peripheral region similar 
to that played by London in the Home Counties and the nation as a whole. As such 
they acted as the focal point for regional political and economic business and 
administrative activity. Furthermore, and as the next chapter will clearly illustrate, the 
region had a rich variety of characteristics that set it apart from other districts in 
England. 
Another factor underpinning the choice to utilise the North East for this study was the 
realisation that it provided fresh ground for an investigation into the nature of civil- 
military relations. In fact detailed historical analysis of this subject, within the context 
of the North East, is almost non-existent for early-modem Britain. As a topic regional 
civil-military relations tends to appear as short cameos in texts that deal with the issue 
in a much wider context. 1° There is also an equally important opportunity to add to 
the written history of the North East. Much exists but a great deal of it is the product 
of publications from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which does not approach 
the topic with modem historical methods. " While it would be foolish to dismiss such 
sources out of hand, there is a need to expand upon the up-to-date research that 
utilises referenced archival sources. In the past two decades this imbalance has been 
gradually redressed with the publication of several monographs, and a number of 
9 Gwenda Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law 
Enforcement in North-East England 1718-1800. (London: UCL Press, 1998) 9. 
10 An example of this is John Childs, The Army of William III. 1689-1702 (Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1987) 23. 
11 Examples of such works include: John Fuller, The History of Berwick upon Tweed (Newcastle: 
Frank Graham Ltd., 1973) which was originally published in 1799; Jeremiah William Summers, The 
History and Antiquities of Sunderland Vol.! (Sunderland: Joseph Tate, 1858); and John Sykes, Local 
Records. Vol. 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) originally published in 1866. 
articles dealing specifically with the history of Northumberland and Tyne and Wear. 
12 
While it appears that the North East is undergoing a revitalisation of its historical 
popularity, there is still a great deal of room for additional research. 13 
III. The Historiography of Civil-Military Relations 
The recent explosion of writing concerning `war and society' and civil-military 
relations covers a large time frame, from the medieval period up to the present day. 
For the early-modern period there are a number of excellent monographs on the 
subject. 14 While these books are essential to the greater understanding of European 
developments in this era, far less has been written on these concepts within the 
context of an individual state. 15 One element of this type of study is the analysis of 
the army's role in the domestic business of the state, and how that affected its 
relationship with the general populace. France, Germany and Russia have been the 
subject of studies focusing on this, but there is room for additional research. 16 
12 Examples of recent monographs are: David Brenchley, A Place By Itself: Berwick upon Tweed in 
the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997); Robert 
Colls & Bill Lancaster (eds. ), Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modem history (Chichester: Phillimore & 
Co. Ltd., 2001); David Levine and Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. 
Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); McCord, Norman & Richard 
Thompson, The Northern Counties From A. D. 1000, (London: Longman, 1998) and: Gwenda 
Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, which is the only major published 
work on law and order in North-East England during the eighteenth century. 
13 A good illustration of this growing interest in the North East's early-modern history is illustrated 
by increased postgraduate work in the area. A recent example is: Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent 
Crime in the North East. c. 1650-1720, (Ph. D. Thesis, University of the Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001). 
14 Examples include: M. S. Anderson, War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime 1618-1789 
(London: Fontana Press, 1988); Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe 1770-1870 
(London, 1982); Jeremy Black, European Warfare 1660-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1994). Despite its 
title this book does deal with the social context to some limited extent; There is also John Child's, 
Armies and Warfare in Europe 1648-1789 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Andre 
Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe 1494-1789 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 
1979); Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London: Routledge & 
Keegan Paul, 1987); J. R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (London: Fontana, 
1985); Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early-Modern Europe 1495-1715 (London: Routledge, 1992); 
Stephen Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture. " Armed 
Forces and Society, 6 (1980) 527-552. 
15 Alan Forrest, Conscripts and Deserters. The Army and French Society During the Revolution and the 
Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) and by the same author Soldiers of the French 
Revolution (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1990); John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the 
Tsar. Army and Society in Russia 1462-1874 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Peter H. Wilson, War, 
State and Society in Württemburg 1677-1793 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
16 Writing on civil-military relations in continental Europe includes: Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier 
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage Books, 1957); 
6 
Unfortunately, similar material on Britain is not abundant, despite being one of the 
foremost military powers of the period. 
To say that there is a complete dearth of material concerning the relationship of the 
British army and society in the eighteenth century would be misleading. In fact there 
are numerous studies offering differing approaches in their analysis of the subject. '? 
They are supported by a sizeable quantity of material that explores the institution of 
the British army and the contiguous structural, organisational, operational and political 
developments that affected it during the eighteenth century. 18 There are also a 
reasonable number of doctoral and master's theses that look at issues such as 
recruiting, administration and other related subjects. 19 Therefore, much is known 
about the way in which the army performed and functioned on the battlefield, how it 
John A Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siecle. The French Army. 1610-1715 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) as well as "How War Fed War: The Tax of Violence and Contributions During 
the Grand Siecle, 1610-1715. " Journal of Modem History, 65 (2) (1993) 286-310; Peter 11. Wilson, 
"German Women and War 1500-1800. " War in History, 3 (2) (1996) 127-160; and by the same author, 
"Violence and the Rejection of Authority in Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Case of the Swabian 
Mutinies in 1757. " German History, 12 (1) (1994) 1-26. 
'7These include: H. V. Bowen, War and British Society, 1688-1795, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688-1783 
(London: Unwin Allen Ltd., 1989); Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the 
Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), particularly chapters 2&3; 
John Childs, The Army. James II, and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); 
and The British Army of William 111,1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987); 
Andrew Coleby, "Military-Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689. " The Historical Journal, 29 (4) 
(1986) 949-961; J. E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997); Arthur N. Gilbert, "Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth-Century England: An 
Assessment. " Journal of British Studies 17 (1978) 41-65; Victor E. Neuberg, "The British Army in the 
Eighteenth Century. " JSAHR, 61 (1983) 38-47. 
18 Corelli Barnett, Britain & Her Army 1509-1970. A Military. Political and Social Survey (London: 
Penguin Press, 1970); Scott Claver, Under the Lash. A History of Corporal Punishment in the British 
Armed Forces (London: Torchstream Books, 1954); Alan J. Guy, Economy and Discipline: Officership 
and Administration in the British Army 1714-1763 (Manchester: Manchester University Press); John 
Hattendorf, England in the War of Spanish Succession. A Study of the English View and Conduct of 
Grand Strategy, 1702-1712 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987); H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army 
of the Eighteenth Century (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977); R. E. Scouller, The Armies of 
Queen Anne. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Also by the same author: "Recruiting: A 
Familiar Problem. " Army Quarterly 71 (1955) 105-112, and: "The Mutiny Acts. " JSAHR, 50 (1972) 
42-45; 
19 Examples include: Keith Bartlett, The Development of the British Army During the Wars With 
France 1793-1815 Ph. D. Thesis (Durham University, 1998); I. F. Burton, The Secretary at War and the 
Administration of the British Army During the War of Spanish Succession Ph. D. Thesis (University of 
London, 1960); S. D. M. Carpenter, Patterns of Recruitment of the Highland Regiments of the British 
Army. 1756-1815. M. Litt. Thesis (University of St. Andrews, 1978); James Hayes, The Social and 
Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763 M. A. Thesis, University of 
London, 1956; J. L. Pimlott, The Administration of the British Armv 1783-1793. Ph. D. Thesis 
(Leicester University, 1975); G. A. Steppler, The Common Soldier in the Reign of George III. D. Phil. 
Thesis (Oxford University, 1985); J. R. Western, The Recruitment of the Land Forces of Great Britain 
disciplined its men and how regiments were organised, administered and recruited. At 
the same time less is known about how the British army interacted on a daily basis 
with the civilian population. 
One theme that is popular within many of the studies of war and society (or civil- 
military relations) within Britain is the description of direct interaction between the 
civilian and soldier as part of a wider institutional framework. 20 In many ways this 
follows the premise laid out by Samuel Huntington, that civil-military relations is the 
principal institutional component of state military security policy. 21 There are 
numerous examples of this approach to the analysis of civil-military relations. John 
Brewer's The Sinews of Power is one of the most widely known books concerning the 
role of war and the military in the development of the English state. 22 It is very much 
focused on the establishment of such relations through an analysis of national 
economic and political institutions. A more recent example is H. V. Bowen's War and 
Society 1688-1815 which, like Brewer, approaches the topic using a macro-economic 
focus, stressing the effects of the national economy on relations between army and 
society. 23 
These studies tend to see global, continental and state developments as the driving 
force behind the formation and maintenance of civil-military relations. Most of these 
texts recognise such connections as resulting from interactions between local and 
national governing bodies. For example, Brewer asserts that English foreign policy 
and concurrent economic developments were central to the development of civil- 
military relations within eighteenth-century Britain. 24 While this is certainly true, the 
formation of civil-military relations is not the exclusive preserve of the national 
government and its agents. Thus, there is a need to address this fact by adopting an 
alternative methodology that analyses that part that parochial events played in the 
formation of civil-military relations. This is not abandoning the broader themes and 
1739-99. Ph. D. Thesis (Edinburgh University, 1953). 20 An Example of a source that relies on a less institutional approach is: Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid Georgian England (New Jersey: Rowman and Letterfield, 1978). 
" Huntington, Soldier and the State, 1. 22 Brewer, Sinews of Power. 23 Bowen, War and Society; A further example is: Dwyryd Wyn Jones, War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988). 
issues discussed above, but rather exploring an important `flip-side' to the evolution 
of relationships between the army and the people. At the same time it could be said 
that this thesis is, to a limited extent, separating the distinction between two types of 
civil-military relations. One is the preserve of government, officers and the formation 
of state policy. The second, more parochial type, is the relationship focusing on 
civilians, soldiers and the implementation of state policy upon the domestic 
population. 
There are several works that have attempted to explore this alternative view of the 
formation of civil-military relations in a comprehensive way. However, these fall 
largely outside the eighteenth century. For instance Andrew Coleby's `Military- 
Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689', which is probably the closest in 
methodology to this thesis, ends its investigation in the year after the Glorious 
Revolution. 25 Lois G Schwoerer's "No Standing Armies! " has a short chapter on the 
eighteenth century, but its main focus is on the tempestuous events of the seventeenth 
century and how they affected public attitudes towards the issue of a standing army. 26 
Moreover, there is a greater emphasis on the era surrounding the outbreak of the 
French Revolutionary Wars and the conflicts with Napoleon. This is due in part to the 
unprecedented scope and complexity of these wars and their massive impact on 
military organisation. 7 This means that there is an opportunity, if not a need, to 
explore the nature of soldier-civilian interaction during a formative period in British 
history. 
IV. Themes and Issues. 
It is important to consider some of the major themes that will be dealt with in the 
24 Brewer, Sinews of Power. 
25 Andrew Coleby, "Military-Civilian Relations. " Additional examples include: Frederick S. Allen, 
"Towards a theory of Civil-Military Control in England 1670-1680. " Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 40 (1962) 95-102; Silvia R. Frey, "The Common British Soldier in the Late 
Eighteenth Century. " Military Affairs, 43 (1979) 117-131. 
26 Lois G. Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies! " The Antiarme Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981). 
27 Again see: Bartlett, The Development of the British Army; J. E. Cookson, The British Armed Nation 
1793-1815. 
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following chapters. One of the principal difficulties in dealing with a subject as 
complex and inter-disciplinary as this is trying to find a way to analyse and explain 
topics without unnecessary repetition. Thus, the material within this thesis has been 
divided into a number of specific thematic topics, such as rioting, crime, desertion and 
recruitment. However, there are a number of more general themes that place the 
analysis of civil-military relations in its wider context, helping to establish a general 
analytical framework. 
One such theme is the reliability of the army in a domestic context and in its role as a 
protector of the government, society and property. For this reason the following 
chapters use the term `reliability' not in relation to the army as a war-making entity, 
but as a tool of social regulation and the keeper of public order. Any discussion of 
British ground forces on foreign battlefields is best left to the many examples already 
in print. 8 Therefore, only the reliability of army units operating in the North East will 
be measured, through the tasks for which it was responsible: anti-smuggling 
operations, riot control, domestic defence and garrison duty. 
Another issue, which will appear throughout this study, is the division and contrast 
between civil and military spheres of interest and control. Such distinctions may 
cover a number of related topics including law, administration, the constitution and 
politics. Many politically influential groups in England feared the growth of 
absolutism, or at least the development of monarchical despotism. Thus after 1688 
Parliament made more vigorous attempts to ensure that many key mechanisms of state 
control and power were firmly placed in the hands of the civil authorities. 29 Naturally, 
this included increased control over procedures often thought to be the strict purview 
of the military such the recruitment and billeting of troops. Despite this the army was 
left to scrutinise and administer much of its own business including the dispensing of 
military justice. The way in which these two spheres interacted was essential to the 
formation of civil-military relations in the North East. For example, the confusion 
Z$ A comprehensive treatment is: David Chandler & Ian Beckett (eds. ) The Oxford History of the 
British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
29 Some see eighteenth-century Britain as a distinctive case in the reduction of military repression by the 
state. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power. Vol.!!: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 
1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 408. 
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that surrounded the army's obligations under the common law caused some friction 
between the military and local civilian authorities well into the eighteenth century. 30 
Linked to this is the relationship and jurisdiction between the national government and 
regional authorities. It is also important from the viewpoint that the co-operation 
between the centre and provincial elites was the nexus of Britain's maintenance of a 
constitutional government and its resistance to the growth of military absolutism. 31 
As the army was an institution of the British state, bureaucrats in London were its 
ultimate administrators. On the other hand this study stresses the role of the army 
within North-East England, where local administration also played a key role. In a 
country as decentralised as eighteenth-century Britain, day-to-day authority over the 
army was often left to local magistrates and community leaders. Therefore, the 
separation of the military between martial and civil authority on an institutional level 
is mirrored in the shared responsibility of governance at national and county level. 
The best example of this can be seen in the preservation of public order. Ultimate 
control over the domestic use of the army lay with the Secretary of State in London. 
Nevertheless, magistrates were entrusted with direct and complete authority over 
troops who assisted them in maintaining and restoring order. 
The most important of the themes, and one that will be central to the whole focus of 
this study, is the nature and form of public resistance to the army. When attempting to 
measure civil-military relations in the way that this thesis does, gauging the level and 
character of public resistance to the action or inaction of the army is very important. 
Again, as with the issue of reliability, this reaction was often generated through the 
role that the army played in the maintenance of public order, and assisting the 
government's domestic policies, such as tax collection, anti-smuggling operations and 
impressment. However, unlike the previous topic, this theme is also connected to 
processes and structures that existed within the army itself, including methods of 
recruitment, billeting and military justice. 
30 For more on this see Chapter 5. 31 Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early-Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) 157. 
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V. Terms of Analysis. 
The next task of this chapter is to outline and more clearly define several terms that 
will be employed in the investigation of the various topics that follow. This is an 
essential condition as many teams in the writings of the period have ill-defined 
parameters. Even civil-military relations, the central theme of this work, can be 
interpreted in several different ways. As mentioned above, many works on `civil- 
military relations' or `war and society' look at the subject from an administrative point 
of view. In particular, how army organisation related to government control, or how 
the army affected national and local government structures and relations. For 
example, Samuel Huntington sees `civil-military relations' as focusing on the 
relationship between the officer corps and the state, in its role as the ultimate authority 
over the army. 32 It is also his assertion that this relationship created the conflict 
between functional and societal elements. 33 On the other hand John Brewer looks at 
`war and society' as the relationship between Britain's ability to carry out its military 
enterprises and the development of socio-economic institutions to support such 
endeavours. 4 These included the creation of the Bank of England and a more rigid 
and invasive tax collection system. 35 
This thesis does incorporate elements of these approaches. However, civil-military 
relations as it is defined here, refers to the relationship that existed between members 
of the armed forces and the local population of the North East of England. In other 
words, it elects to adopt a more parochial viewpoint. Through the analysis of several 
themes such as law and order, recruitment, desertion, billeting and crime, the inter- 
relationship of civilians and soldiers is observed to gain some understanding of the 
nature of civil-military relations in the region. However, it would be wrong to suggest 
that there is no place for the relationship between elements of the national and local 
government. Since the army was largely governed and regulated by ministers and 
senior officers in London it is integral to understanding the way in which the army 
32 Samuel P. Huntington, Soldier and the State. 33 Ibid., 3 
34 Brewer, Sinews of Power. 35 Ibid. 
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conducted itself in the region. Nevertheless, this is a geographically limited study so 
such discussions will only be applied as they relate directly to events within the North 
East. 
In terms of setting the chronological boundaries of this study a `long' eighteenth 
century has been employed stretching from the Glorious Revolution to the start of the 
French Revolutionary Wars. There are a number of important reasons for doing this. 
First, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked a turning point in the constitutional 
history of England. The 1689 Bill of Rights forever altered the constitutional position 
of the army as much of the control over it was taken out of the hands of the King and 
placed with Parliament. 6 This gradual "civilianisation" of the military infrastructure, 
and the constitutional limitations placed on its domestic role, would have lasting 
effects on civil-military relations at all levels. The outbreak of the French 
Revolutionary Wars in 1793 is a good place to close this study. The turmoil 
engendered by the fight against the radicalism of the French Revolution, and later 
Napoleon, represented a period in which the British Army underwent large-scale 
changes, not only in its size and organisation, but also in its administration and 
political role. Also, the increasing separation of the army and society in this period, 
led to a distinct internal evolution within the culture of the army. 37 Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, the period after 1793 has been covered widely in a number of recent 
works. 8 
Geographically, the `North East', as it relates to this thesis, will encompass the 
present-day boundaries of the county of Northumberland. As a result this study will 
incorporate those parts of northern Northumberland that, in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, belonged to County Durham. This includes the village of 
36 For the changes in the constitution during and after 1688 see: Sir David Lindsay Kier, The 
Constitutional History of Modem Britain Since 1485 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1969); Lois G. 
Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1981); 
Mark A. Thompson, A Constitutional History of England. 1642-1801. Vol. 4. (London: Methuen & 
Company, 1938); and E. N. Williams (ed. ), The Eighteenth-Century Constitution: Documents and 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
37 For more on this see Chapter 2. Additionally there is: James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914. 
Their Architecture and Role in Society (London: English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 1- 
2; and chapter 2 of Brumwell, Redcoats, 113-7 38 The most recent examples include: Keith Bartlett The Development of The British Armv; J. E. Cookson The British Armed Nation. 
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Tweedmouth and some of the country around Berwick and the border with Scotland. 
The population centres of Sunderland and South Shields; which also belonged to 
County Durham, are included where they have a direct impact on the events of 
Northumbria and Newcastle. This is particularly true of civil unrest involving 
keelmen and miners. Further, Berwick-upon-Tweed is included, despite its relative 
autonomy, due to its strategic importance to the region, and the presence of a 
permanent manned garrison within its walls. 9 The North East's importance to 
domestic defence as well as its remoteness, relatively light population density and 
distance from the capital makes it a very interesting place to conduct an analysis of 
civil-military relations. 
The term `army' refers to the regular ground forces of the British military 
establishment. The militia was essentially a separate military organisation that was set 
outside the purview of the army, except in times of war, when parts of it were 
embodied into the regular forces 40 This work will not seek to exclude the role of the 
militia but rather it will deal with the two institutions as individual entities. Similar 
guidelines will relate to the Volunteer Companies, Fencibles and other part-time 
domestic security forces. The marines, or soldiers destined for the `sea service', will 
be dealt with as separate from the regular land army. This approach will be taken 
despite the fact that the army and navy shared authority over these units at different 
times in the eighteenth century. Invalids are considered to be part of the auxiliary 
forces despite their direct connection to the regular military establishment 
41 
However, since Invalids were a common feature of the military establishment in the 
North East, and were made up of former regular soldiers, their role will be 
incorporated within the discussion of many topics. For example, their role in local 
criminal activity will be analysed alongside that of regular troops. Bodies of troops 
such as the artillery and engineers, which possessed some form of autonomy from the 
army proper, will be mentioned as part of the regular army where it is deemed 
39 Tynemouth and Newcastle often had detachments of the regular army present, however Berwick is 
the only centre in the region that was continuously manned by regular troops throughout the century. 
For more on the distribution of forces in the region please see Chapter 2 below. 
ao The formative work on this subject is: J. R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1956). For an example of militia embodiment in action see PRO 
WO 5/91/89. 
41 Invalid companies were formed from Chelsea Hospital out-pensioners deemed fit for garrison duty. 
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appropriate. Members of the Board of Ordnance will be included in cases where their 
actions impacted on the local community in which they operated. 
VI. Sources 
The wide thematic scope of this thesis has meant that a great variety of archival 
sources have been consulted at both a national and local level. Not surprisingly their 
quality and availability are as varied as the topics covered within chapters that follow. 
The main aim of this brief section is to describe the various merits and problems with 
these documents. Any specific discussions of archival sources as they relate to 
particular topics or themes will be dealt with within the relevant chapters 42 
The most obvious example of the varying quality of archival records can be observed 
in the holdings of national and regional archives. In the majority of cases the holdings 
of the Public Record Office in Kew are well preserved and very comprehensive. This 
is especially true of the War Office papers (WO) and other classes relating to the 
administration of the army. The correspondence of the Secretary at War is almost 
totally complete for the entire period covered by this thesis and was widely consulted 
during my research. Most importantly, the War Office In-Letters (WO 1) and Out- 
Letters (W04) provide a wealth of information, not only on the national picture, but 
also on events in the North East. Likewise, the papers associated with the Secretaries 
of State (SP), and later the Home Office (HO), are very detailed and clear throughout 
the period. The Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD) was particularly helpful in 
locating relevant information, especially on the issue of criminals serving in the 
military. There are some sources, such as those related to the Assizes of the Northern 
Circuit (ASSI 45), which have suffered from the ravages of time. When they are 
complete these records provide a detailed and interesting insight into eighteenth- 
century crime. However, in the early part of the century there are large periods when 
sources for the North East no longer exist in any meaningful form 43 
Berwick and Newcastle both had invalid contingents in garrison during much of the eighteenth century. 42 For a full reference of the sources referred to below please see Section 1 of the Bibliography. 
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The main problem in researching the history of North-East England during the 
eighteenth century is the state of the archival sources in local record offices, and in 
particular, their lack of depth. This is especially true of the records for Newcastle held 
at the Tyne and Wear Archives Service (TWAS). While nineteenth-century records 
are voluminous, large sections of the archival record for the period under study in this 
work are severely lacking or even completely non-existent. Part of this problem may 
be due to a historical event discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. In 1740 a serious 
riot in the city resulted in the Guildhall being attacked and some of the city's records, 
being destroyed by the angry crowd. Not surprisingly the town records before 1740 
are very poor with the exception of those papers relating to the keelmen (394/3-26) 
and the town's Calendar of Common Council Book (MD/NC/2/4-7). The latter of 
these gives an insight into the daily issues that occupied the town's leaders. 
Unfortunately, whilst having complete records from 1699 to 1799, the council books 
do not go into the type of detail one would like. A serious hole in the Newcastle 
source material comes in papers relating to the town's quarter sessions. While the 
Court and Order Books (NCX/CT/1) are in an acceptable condition they provide very 
little detail of cases apart from names and lists of court and jury members. Most 
problematic are the papers of the Quarter Sessions themselves (QSINC/35-104) which 
are in an advanced state of decay for much of the early part of the eighteenth century. 
While they improve slightly as the century progresses, the papers rarely provide more 
than an anecdotal insight into the criminal cases and other business heard in 
Newcastle's courts. As a result trying to extract any. detail from them is extremely 
difficult. 
A similar situation is apparent in other archives throughout the North East, although 
the problem is generally not as bad as in Newcastle. Again the records from the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries appear to be the worst affected. In most 
cases the quality of the documentary record improves later into the eighteenth century. 
Berwick upon Tweed's archives have arguably the best collection of documentary 
evidence for the period, but there are also large gaps here. 44 In particular, there are 
43 A more detailed examination of the relative merits of the Assize papers can be found in Chapter 5. as The Berwick upon Tweed Record Office (BTRO) is a branch of the Northumberland Records Office 
which has offices at Morpeth, Berwick and Gosforth. 
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considerable sections of the town's guild records (GB 1-2) and quarter sessions papers 
(C8) which are missing, either lost or destroyed with the passage of time. In the 
Northumberland county archives at Morpeth there are good collections of quarter 
sessions records for most of the century (QSB) although the detailed records are 
lacking after 1742. As a result one is forced to refer to the less detailed Order and 
Indictment Books (QSO, QSI). 
Despite these shortcomings there is a respectable amount of existing primary material 
that was consulted in the researching of this thesis. However, it is important to 
remember that the condition of the local archival material has impacted upon the 
chapters that follow. This is especially true of the depth of material available. Ideally 
one would have wished for a complete and abundant historical record for the region, 
but this is not possible. Nevertheless, this study does its best to utilise the records 
available in its analysis of civil-military relations in North-East England between 1688 
and 1793. 
VII. Outline of the Thesis 
The next chapter will aim to place the thesis in a broader context by exploring the 
social, economic and political conditions within the North East between 1688 and 
1793. In addition, it will explore the nature of the administrative and governmental 
relationship that existed between the state bureaucracy in London and the region's 
political and legal authorities. Additionally, a brief section will discuss the evolution 
of the army during this period. In conducting a study that encompasses over one 
hundred years it is important to acknowledge that the army and its men will have 
changed during this time. Finally, there will be a discussion of the military presence 
in the North East during the eighteenth century. This will include, amongst other 
things, an analysis of troop concentrations and disbursements in the region, as well as 
a discussion of local military infrastructure. It will also look at how the army's 
presence in the North East changed during the course of the century. 
Chapter Three will focus on the opposing processes of recruitment and desertion. The 
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initial focus will be on the role that local government had in the recruitment and 
impressment of social-marginals (vagrants, criminals and debtors) into the armed 
forces. Furthermore, it will analyse the social cost of recruiting to the region as well 
as the abuses present within the recruiting system. Beyond this, public resistance to 
various forms of recruitment, and its effects upon local civil-military relations, will be 
investigated. This section will observe the public's reaction to recruitment and will 
question if such resistance differed depending on whether the methods were voluntary 
or compulsory. In terms of desertion the chapter will focus on the civilian reaction to 
deserters and the authority's attempts to recapture men who had fled the ranks. There 
is also a need to discuss whether or not the public actively attempted to assist 
desertion and tried to protect deserters from recapture. 
Chapter Four looks more closely at the army's conduct and role while garrisoned in 
the region's barracks and civilian billets. It will be important to look at the process 
and legal framework of billeting to establish what was expected of officers, soldiers 
and civilian officials whilst in quarters. Following on from this the analysis will be 
expanded to look at the direct impact that the presence of soldiers had on civil- 
military relations. In particular, there will be an analysis of how soldiers contributed 
to bastardy, legitimate births and marriages in the places where they were quartered. 
Beyond this the origins of tensions between the region's towns and the army will be 
explored. Next the nature of local public resistance to the billeting process will be 
discussed. 
Chapter Five deals with the subject of crime, criminal activity and its links to civil- 
military relations. The chapter will attempt to identify the level at which soldiers 
participated in crimes against civilians and how this may have impacted upon the 
public's view of the army. The nature and types of these infractions will be dealt with 
in more detail to establish whether soldiers were prone to particularly types of crimes 
such as rape and murder. Before this there will be a brief discussion of the 
characteristics of crime within the North East during the eighteenth century. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the common law's jurisdiction over soldiers who 
committed crimes against civilians and private property will be looked at briefly. 
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Chapter Six deals with a theme that is central to understanding the role of the army in 
eighteenth-century England, the maintenance of public order. The army was the only 
true institution of law enforcement in the country for much of this period. Therefore, 
the chapter will examine the need for the army and militia in this role, as well as the 
constitutional framework and legal restrictions placed on such duties. There will be a 
brief discussion of a number of the duties performed under this guise, including the 
escorting of prisoners and tax collectors, and the combating of smuggling. From here 
the thesis will discuss what may have been the military's most essential police role, 
the suppression of civil unrest. Included here is an analysis of the nature and 
characteristics of civil unrest in the North East. Combined with this is an overview of 
the procedures and conditions for calling out the troops in such a situation, as well as a 
look at the jurisdictions of the civilian and military authorities in riot situations. 
Finally, the region's major riots will be assessed, paying particular attention to the role 
played by the army or the militia. From this it will be possible to determine the 
impact that rioting, and anti-riot duty, had on civil-military relations. 
Chapter Seven is a brief case study of the themes discussed in other chapters in this 
thesis, and how they apply to Newcastle and Berwick, during the 1745 Jacobite 
rebellion. It will show that the sudden influx of thousands of soldiers into the region's 
towns and hinterlands did not lead to a crime wave, the outbreak of mass hysteria, or 
even widespread opposition to their presence. Neither did it create any considerable 
tension between the two groups. Rather the local population did their best to 
accommodate the soldiers and assist them in their business. However, it will be 
stressed that this overwhelming goodwill was not the result of the regional 
population's single-minded love of the army, but rather a symptom of widespread 




The Region and the Army in the Eighteenth Century 
"Surely this place is ripe for Him who `came not 




This thesis is an examination of civilian-military relations in North-East England 
during the eighteenth century. While both the civilian population and the army were 
essentially separate entities in their own terms, they existed together as increasingly 
co-operative parts of the interwoven tapestry of the English state system. As a result, 
these two seemingly disparate groups exerted a growing level of influence on each 
other on a number of levels. For this reason it is essential to place the subject matter 
of this thesis into wider contextual frameworks, and in particular to investigate the 
various social, economic and political landscapes of the North East. By doing this the 
reader will better understand the local constructs that exerted influence over the role 
of the army in North-East society, as well as the course and development of relations 
between these two groups. 
Beyond this it will be helpful to look at the actual physical presence of the army in the 
region, including the administrative and logistical system that supported it. This 
discussion will also aim to gauge. how the presence of the army changed as the century 
progressed and whether this had any significant influence on the region. Since the 
army was an organisation of the central government it is essential to analyse the 
relationships that existed between the state bureaucracy in London and the political 
and legal authorities within the North East. At the same time, since this thesis covers 
1 Geoffrey E. Milburn, The Travelling Preacher. John Wesley in the North East 1742-1790 (Newcastle: 
Wesley Historical Society, 1984) 9. 
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a period of 105 years there is a need to investigate how the army changed as an 
institution during this time. 
H. Central and Local Government Relationships 
British governance in the eighteenth century was unusual, caught between the 
modernising influences of parliamentarian rule, and the traditional restrictions of the 
early-modern European state. While some Englishmen enjoyed a rare amount of 
democratic freedom and individual rights, real power was still held by the traditional 
elite, and for much of the eighteenth century the franchise was limited to a minority of 
landholders and merchants. However, it was also the era of increasing 
professionalism in the civil service. No longer was the administration of the 
government left to a small number of politicians. While they continued to hold the 
majority of important appointments, these men were increasingly supported by a 
growing legion of paid administrators and clerks. This expanding bureaucracy 
assisted in spreading the authority of the central government throughout Britain, and 
facilitated the executive's ability to deploy vast resources in what John Brewer has 
referred to as `national aggrandisement. '2 
In some respects eighteenth-century England can be considered a centralised state. 
There was no region where the authority of the central government and its 
representatives was not present. Every county had assize courts, quarter sessions, 
customs agents, poor law administrators and a host of other legal and bureaucratic 
state structures. However, this centralisation was not as pervasive as that being 
exercised in states such as France. Lawrence Stone has argued that while the British 
state had strong centralising mechanisms, such as a powerful single legislative body, 
the political authorities in London were increasingly reliant on the co-operation of 
regional political and legal grandees. By mid-century most regional law enforcement 
2 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power. War. Money and the English State 1688-1783 (London: Unwin & 
Hyman Ltd., 1989). Brewer provides an analysis of how military pressures assisted in the creation of a 
modern state bureaucratic system. 3 Lawrence Stone `Introduction. ' In: Lawrence Stone (ed. ) An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 
to 1815 (London: Routledge, 1994) 8. 
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and administration was done by local propertied men and not through officials 
appointed by London. These parochial appointees helped to run the courts and the 
constabulary, assisted in the administration of the poor law, oversaw the repair of 
roads and bridges, and levied rates to meet county expenses. 
This movement of responsibility to the regions was not premeditated, but rather 
evolutionary. Joanna Innes has illustrated that, as the eighteenth century progressed, a 
reconfiguration of the British government's ministries took place. This had the effect 
of disengaging these institutions from the traditional machinery of local government .5 
The most important of these was the declining role of the Privy Council, whose role in 
determining social policy was increasingly devolved to the emerging ministries such 
as the Treasury, the Admiralty and the Secretaries of State. 6 As a result new central- 
local interactions developed which left local government in control of many daily 
social issues such as vagrancy, crime and poverty. 7 This was especially true of the 
growing importance of local magistrates in the administration of Britain. 
More relevant to this study is the role that magistrates and other local leaders played in 
the domestic operations of the British army. This is particularly true of army and 
naval recruitment, impressment, riot control and billeting. As the following chapters 
will illustrate, this role was partly a continued assurance of civilian primacy over the 
armed forces in a century when the army found it hard to achieve widespread 
acceptance within society. 8 Parliament was determined that the state would not return 
to the situation it experienced under James II where the rights of the individual had 
been gradually eroded in favour of military expediency. In the minds of many 
Englishmen allowing such a lapse would leave the door to absolutism unbolted. The 
aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, and the subsequent creation of the Bill of 
Rights, had fostered an atmosphere in which regional leaders quickly reinforced their 
'A very detailed, if somewhat dry, treatment of local government can be found in: Sidney & Beatrice 
Webb, The Parish and the County (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1906). 
5 Joanna Inns, `The Domestic Face of the Fiscal Military State. Government and Society in Eighteenth- 
Century Britain. ' In: Lawrence Stone (ed. ), An Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815 
(London: Routledge, 1994) 96. 
6 Ibid., 96-8. 
7 Ibid. 
a The main pillar of this new found control over the armed forces was cemented in the 4th and 6th 
clauses of the Bill of Rights of 1689; E. N. Williams, The Eighteenth-Century Constitution (Cambridge: 
22 
position as the nexus of British domestic political and legislative authority. 
Indeed, in terms of local government the eighteenth century was the era of the 
magistrate. By mid-century these men exercised a great deal of local power and 
influence .9 However, 
it was not their job that assured them prestige and influence, but 
rather their place in local society which secured their employment as magistrates. 
While they were not usually members of the political elite they were still men of 
property or income. Regardless of their social status magistrates, or Justices of the 
Peace as they were also known, were the men on whom the government in London 
relied for the transference of Parliamentary and ministerial power to the regions. In 
many ways they were the agents of the law and local defenders of the constitution. In 
this role these men were tasked with ensuring that the masses never threatened to 
overturn the ruling oligarchy. While the magistracy enjoyed a level of parochial 
freedom to act, their authority was not unlimited. Ultimately, the government in 
London maintained some control over this dispersed system. Magistrates were 
answerable to the Court of Kings Bench in London and local political leaders required 
the permission of ministers before they took action on a number of issues including 
employing soldiers for riot control. In terms of legal representation, London still tried 
all serious crimes through the various assize courts that travelled about the country. 
However, beyond this much of the local business was left to the counties and the 
centre exercised little co-ordinated oversight. 10 
III Change Over Time: The Evolution of the British Soldier and the British 
Army- 
Since this study analyses civil-military relations over a period of more than a century, 
it is important to observe the ways in which the army changed in this time. The 
institution that existed in 1688 was noticeably different from that which fought against 
Cambridge University Press, 1960) 28. 
9 The role of Justices can be found in: Norman Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1984). Additionally, a detailed explanation of the role of the 
Justices in the enforcement of the law can be found in Chapter 5. 
10 Prest refers to Hanoverian administration as `polyarchic. ' Wilfrid Prest, Albion Ascendant. English 
History 1660-1815 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 157. 
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revolutionary France. At the same time there were strong similarities. This evolution 
affected the role of the army as well as its administration, the constitution of the rank- 
and-file, and the way it was regarded by society. Therefore, the purpose of this 
section is to briefly outline the major changes that took place within the army during 
the eighteenth century. While it aims to be comprehensive it does not aim to deal with 
every detail of a rapidly growing field of historical enquiry. Rather it attempts to 
analyse those areas of change that either underline or question popular perceptions of 
the army. 11 
In terms of constitutional and administrative changes the events of 1688 marked 
something of a revolution in the way the army was controlled. The removal of James 
II from the throne finally allowed parliamentarians to create a government that had 
substantial powers over the monarch. The most important of these changes came with 
the legislature's enhanced authority over the armed forces. The main pillar of this 
new control was cemented in the 4th and 6th clauses of the 1689 Bill of Rights. These 
declared that the new king and any future monarch were forbidden from levying 
money for royal use without parliamentary control. More importantly they could not 
maintain a standing army in times of peace without the strict consent of the 
Commons. 12 It was a basic premise of the revolutionary settlement that Parliament's 
direct control over the size and pay of the army would help to swing its loyalty away 
from the monarch. Furthermore, the existence of the army was no longer within the 
purview of the throne but with the representatives of the body politic. 13 
This increased secularisation of control over both the army and navy can be observed 
in the evolution of the office of Secretary at War. Although in existence from 1676, it 
was not until after the Glorious Revolution, and particularly during the reign of Queen 
Anne that office holders did much to extend the political and administrative authority 
of the office. 14 This evolution was by no means consistent or rapid and the process of 
11 Certain changes that are specific to topics within the thesis itself will be dealt with in the chapters that follow. 
12 E. N. Williams, The Eighteenth-Century Constitution, 28. 
13 The monarch continued to exercise a high level of control and influence over the army, especially 
when it came to foreign policy and tactical matters. 14 I. F. Burton, The Secretary at War and the Administration of the British Army During the War of Spanish Succession (Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1960); R. E. Scouller, `Queen Anne's 
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developing the post of Secretary at War continued ceaselessly throughout the century. 
In time the Secretary at War became responsible for many duties including the 
domestic movement of troops, ordering soldiers to assist civilian authorities in riot 
control and anti-smuggling operations, organising disbursements of army pay, co- 
ordinating recruitment and disbanding operations, discipline and drawing the annual 
estimates for the army establishment. Equally important was the fact that the 
Secretary played a central role in communications with civilians about the conduct of 
the army. 15 In many ways he was the most important arbiter of civil-military relations 
in the country and, as will be demonstrated in later chapters, often did much to defuse 
tensions between the army and civilians. By the beginning of the conflict with 
revolutionary France the Secretary at War was one of the most powerful and 
influential members of the military establishment, as well as a full Cabinet minister 
assisted by a growing staff of clerks. 16 
Another of the evolutionary changes that took place in the army between 1688 and 
1793 relates to the type of men who were being recruited into the army. Recent 
scholarship has suggested that as the eighteenth century unfolded the land forces 
became increasingly representative of British society. Stephen Brumwell has shown 
that the composition of the mid-Georgian infantry largely mirrored that of the 
workforce. '? It consisted of men from a broad cross-section of working class society, 
from skilled and semi-skilled tradesmen to agricultural workers, labourers and 
impressed vagrants. 18 This process seems to have continued for much of the 
remainder of the eighteenth century. By the time of the French Revolutionary War 
nearly 80% of the men joining the army in urban areas such as Middlesex had 
definable trades, while the other 20% described themselves as labourers. 19 
Secretaries at War. ' Army Quarterly, 57 (1949) 215-220, and by the same author but very similar: 
'Secretaries at War to Queen Anne. ' JSAHR, 38 (1960) 3-10. 
15 Examples can be found in Tony Hayter (ed. ), An Eighteenth-Century Secretary at War. The Papers of 
William Viscount Barrington (London: The Bodley Head, 1988). 
16 For an account of the rise of this office after the American War see: J. L. Pimlott, The Administration 
of the British Army 1783-1793 (Ph. D. Thesis, Leicester University, 1975). 
" In particular. Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Army and War in the Americas 1755-1763 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 79; and: "Rank and File: A Profile of One of 
Wolfe's Regiments. " JSAHR 79 (Spring 2001) 3-24, which focuses on the 58th Regiment of Foot. 'a In 1759 35% of the 58th Regiment of Foot's constituents were labourers or husbandmen, while the 
majority of the remaining 65% had some identifiable trade. Brumwell, 'Rank and File. ' 11-15 19 Listed trades included weavers, cobblers and tailors. AN Gilbert, `An Analysis of Some Eighteenth- 
Century Army Recruiting Records. ' JSAHR, 54 (1976) 46. 
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This evolution of the British army's rank-and-file coincided with the government's 
gradually declining reliance on army impressment and the recruitment of criminals 
and debtors. ° The press for soldiers was utilised quite intensely during the War of 
Spanish Succession and was an important tool in supplying the army with 
manpower. 21 However, as the century progressed its use became more sporadic. 
22 
Impress acts were imposed annually during the War of Austrian Succession and at 
times during the Seven Years War. 23 However, after 1763 impressment for army 
service was used just one more time. This final press act came into force in 1779, and 
when its mandate expired in 1780, army impressment passed into history. 
24 This flew 
in the face of continued and even intensified naval impressment throughout the 
century. The decline of the army press was the result of a combination of interrelated 
factors which included a growing antipathy on the part of army officers and the public, 
as well as a realisation that the return on impressment was poor considering the level 
of public and political resistance it engendered. 25 It is also possible that the 
susceptibility of many trades to the continuously precarious nature of the eighteenth- 
century economy may have contributed to an improvement in voluntary enlistment. 
26 
In many ways service in the army continued to be a way of escaping socio-economic 
and domestic problems. 7 Of course demographic growth within Britain played a role, 
providing a larger pool of men for the various forces to recruit from. 28 Finally, British 
supremacy at sea, coupled with the defeat of the Jacobite cause in 1745 and reliance 
on a reformed militia, helped to secure domestic security for much of the period 
20 A brief discussion of the use of criminals as soldiers can be found in Chapter 3. 
21 Impress acts were put into force in every year from 1704-11. Arthur N Gilbert, `Charles Jenkinson 
and the Last Army Press, 1779. ' Military Affairs, 42 (1978) 7. 
22 For impressment during the early part of the eighteenth century refer to: Godfrey Davies, `Recruiting 
in the Reign of Queen Anne. ' Historical Research, 18 (1950) 146-59; Arthur N Gilbert, 'Army 
Impressment During the war of Spanish Succession. ' The Historian, 38 (1976) 38-47; Nicholas Rogers, 
`Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour in Eighteenth-Century Britain. ' Slavery and 
Abolition, 15 (2) (1994) 102-13. ' 
23 Richard Middleton, `The Recruitment of the British Army 1755-62. ' JSAHR, 67 (1989) 226-38. 
24 See: Gilbert, 'Last Army Press. ' 7-11. 
25 Ibid., 7-10. 
26 Bramwell, `Rank and File. ' 14. 
27 David Kent, "'Gone for a Soldier": Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion in a 
London Parish. ' Local Population Studies, 45 (1990) 31. 
28 For a very detailed analysis of the British population in the eighteenth century refer to: E. A. 
Wrigley & R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871 A Reconstruction 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1981). 
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between mid-century and the Napoleonic Wars. 29 
It is possible that the decline in the use of the `sweepings of the street' played a role 
in 
the growing, if grudging acceptance of the existence of a standing army in the 
eighteenth century. 30 It is generally accepted that in the late seventeenth century this 
institution was widely mistrusted and despised. However, as the century progressed 
society, and many political observers, became more comfortable with its presence. 
31 
Although this did not eliminate the anti-army rhetoric completely and the land forces 
continued to cause anxiety in many quarters. This acceptance may have also been due 
in part to the increasing public awareness of British military organisations. 
An ever-expanding wartime army, combined with the growth of the peacetime 
establishment, more invalid companies and the emergence of a substantial militia 
force after 1756, meant more uniformed men living within British society. Peak 
wartime numbers were regularly in excess of 100,000 from the Seven Years War 
onwards. 2 Similarly, the end of a conflict often saw a small increase in the army 
establishment from pre-war levels. 3 The home establishment increased from almost 
13,000 early in the aftermath of the Spanish war to a more constant 18-20,000 by the 
1720's 34 However, in periods of protracted conflict there could be as many as 40- 
50,000 soldiers in England, not including an equal number of militiamen. 5 This idea 
of the increased presence within society rubs against the theories of Ian Beckett who 
believed that the regular army was generally isolated from the public. 6 This was 
29 This does not discount the invasion fears that arose during the Seven Years War. 
30 A leading figure in the discussions on the resistance to a British standing army is Lois G Schwoerer, 
"No Standing Armies! " Anti-army Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins Press, 1974); 'The Role of William III in the Standing Army Controversy, 1697-1699. ' The 
Journal of British Studies, 5 (2) (1966) 74-94. 
31 This process is discussed in Chapter 3 in relation to the change in public attitudes that enabled the 
building of a network of barracks in the late nineteenth century. 
32 Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 97- 
9. 
33 The exceptions are the end of the Nine Years War and the War of Spanish Succession. There was 
also a brief decline after the American war but this quickly rectified itself. The peacetime establishment 
rose from 18,851 in 1715 to 28,399 by 1749,31,773 by 1764 and 56,859 in 1792. The figures here are 
based on the establishments given in L. D. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97-9. 
34 For the domestic establishment refer to Appendix A. 
35 There are 21 years after 1714 when the home establishment was above 35,000 men (see Appendix 
A). 
36 For a discussion of the public visibility of the militia and other auxiliary forces see Ian FW Beckett, 
`The Amateur Military Tradition in Britain. ' War and Society, 4 (2) (1986) 8-9. 
27 
certainly not true for many parts of the North East, where for much of the century the 
presence of soldiers was not unusual. 
The lack of separation between soldiers and civilians, due to the shortage of purpose- 
built barracks, had an important impact on local civil-military relations. Because 
soldiers spent most of their time in public houses and other billets, and were often in 
one garrison for a long period of time, their connections with elements of mainstream 
society were fairly regular. 37 While billeting contributed to the tensions and 
resentment that temporarily undermined civil-military relations it also engendered 
growing familiarity with soldiers amongst civilians in certain areas. In France the 
widespread utilisation of barracks helped to isolate the army from society and 
contributed to the perception of the soldiery as second-class citizens. 8 However, even 
in communities where there were barracks, such as Berwick after 1719, the high 
concentration and almost constant presence of soldiers had a similar effect. Despite 
this familiarity a soldier's conspicuous uniform and unusual way of life also ensured a 
continued level of distinctiveness from civilians. 39 In turn this may have contributed 
to some of the continued problems that existed in the relationship between the army 
and North-East society. 4° 
The slow increase in the size of the British army's peacetime establishment had a 
further subtle effect. It meant that there was a gradual rise in the absolute number of 
`long-service' soldiers in the British Army. 41 While the number of `professional' 
soldiers grew, it was limited to those regiments with enough seniority to escape 
complete reduction after the close of hostilities. Similarly, the growth in the British 
standing army was never close to the peacetime forces maintained by the major 
continental armies such as France. Nevertheless, in the context of Britain it was 
important. The professional soldiers provided the backbone of the standing army. 
They were more indoctrinated in the culture of military service and identified more 
37 See Chapter 4. 
38 Colin Jones, `The Welfare of the French Foot Soldier. ' History, 65 (1980) 207. 
39 John Childs, `War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century. ' War and Socie 
, 15 (2) (1997) 5. 40 I refer to the characteristics of confrontations between soldiers and civilians. See Chapters 5 and 6 
for more detail. 
41 Soldiers serving in peacetime usually enlisted for `life' and those wartime recruits electing to stay on 
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readily with the esprit de corps that came with a life in the military. 
42 Stephen 
Brumwell's research indicates that service in the army, either long or short-term, 
could foster a sense of community amongst the troops based on the idea of `brother 
soldiers. ' 43 He suggests that this had much to do with the close living conditions and 
shared experiences of soldiers, which would be particularly relevant in theatres of 
war. 44 
It is important to reiterate that the growth of the `full-time' army was laggard and 
restricted. For much of the century the vast majority of soldiers remained wartime 
volunteers who enlisted for a contractually limited period of time. 45 As such, the army 
largely remained a force which John Childs has described as being brave and effective 
on one hand, but intrinsically amateur and weak on the other. 46 The overwhelming 
amateurism of the British private soldier meant that a great preponderance of the army 
failed to subscribe to ideas associated with the profession of arms or loyalty to service. 
Similarly, most soldiers do not appear to have been motivated by a sense of 
patriotism. 7 This is borne out by the fact that in large part soldiers who deserted or 
stood up to army authority did not do so out of regard for their professional integrity 
or as a form of resistance to an accepted military code. 
More commonly, soldiers defied army discipline in defence of their rights, to'oppose 
perceived injustices to themselves, or to bring attention to a breach in their terms of 
service. 48 The mass indoctrination of men into a cogent British martial culture, and 
the related patriotic association with company and regiment, was a slow process that 
had its origins in increased physical separation of soldier and civilian during the years 
after the end of a conflict had long terms of service imposed. 
42 This process was not matched by the growth of a professional officer corps, especially in the reigns of 
James II and George I& II, although its progress should not be overstated. John Childs, The Army. 
James II. and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980) 27,39; James Hayes, The 
Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763, (M. A Thesis, 
University of London, 1956). 
43 Brumwell, Redcoats, 113-5,119-20. 
as Ibid. 
45 This tended to be a stated number of years (often 3) or the duration of a war, whichever was less. 46 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987) 37. 
"This included long-serving soldiers as well. Brumwell, Redcoats, 117. 
48 Ibid., 100-4,128-136. 
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after the French Revolution. 9 This process was assisted by a growing interest 
amongst British authorities to subject troops to stern military ideals 
S0 However, this 
would not become a serious force within the British army until well into the 
nineteenth century. 
IV. The North East in the Eighteenth Century: The Regional Context 
The eighteenth century was the period in which the foundations for the future 
industrial success of north-east England were set. By the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries the region would become one of the most important industrial 
areas in Europe. Despite the image of Tyneside as the cockpit of the industrial 
revolution, DJ Rowe has stated that as late as 1750, much of the region was `sparsely 
populated, culturally backward. '51 However, the region appears to have been an 
eclectic mix of progressive and conservative elements. Parts of the region were very 
isolated and continued to utilise social and economic structures that harked back to the 
late medieval period. Transport and communications in these localities remained poor 
throughout much of the century enhancing the disconnection from modernising 
influences. On the other hand there were other places, especially those in and around 
major population centres, which were dynamic, cultured and innovative as well as 
being economically and socially advanced. Most obvious of these is the city of 
Newcastle upon Tyne, which at the time was the largest and most prosperous town in 
the north. 52 Nevertheless, even smaller towns such as Berwick were taking advantage 
of their location on the North Sea to improve their place in early-modern Britain. 
At the centre of much of this growth was the country's insatiable demand for coal. 
Mining for this resource had been ongoing since at least the thirteenth century and 
within 100 years the output of local collieries was a significant element of the trade in 
49 The Pitt barrack-building programme of the 1790's increasingly separated the soldiers from the 
softening influences of civilian life. James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914. Their Architecture 
and Role in Society (London: English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 D. J. Rowe, `The North East. ' in:. F. M. L. Thompson (ed. ) The Cambridge Social History of Britain 
1750-1950. Volume I: Regions and Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 418. 
52 By the end of the century it would be one of the top ten towns in England. E. A. Wrigley, `Society 
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Newcastle. 3 By the eighteenth century this industry had expanded considerably, 
focused on the Tyne and Wear valleys and their immediate hinterlands. Such was the 
impact of coal mining on the local area that it was noticed and reported by a number 
of contemporary sources. So conspicuous was this business that on his epic tour 
throughout Great Britain, Defoe could not help but notice its staggering scale. While 
on the road north to Newcastle he viewed `the inexhausted store of coals and coal 
pits, ' as well as `the prodigious heaps, I might say mountains, of coals, which are dug 
up at every pit, and how many of those pits there are. '54 
The continued health of this industry in the North East became crucial to the well 
being of London, which by the eighteenth century consumed one-sixth of national coal 
production 55 This factor created a strong link between the capital and the rapidly 
expanding North East. 56 Newcastle, as the powerhouse of the coal trade, saw a huge 
jump in exports over the century. The coal industry on Tyneside has, unusually for 
the period, been characterised as a highly centralised and organised sector that relied 
primarily on `large-scale productive units 57 Justification for such a claim can be seen 
in the scale of coal being shipped from the river. In 1685 235,000 `Newcastle 
chaldrons' were sent coastwise from the Tyne 58 By 1780 this number had jumped to 
366,000 chaldrons, and at the start of the nineteenth century coastal exports from the 
Tyne valley hit 585,000 chaldrons. 59 Even more meteoric was the rise of Sunderland 
as a coal exporting port. While not producing the same amount of coal as her 
competitor to the north, the growing Wearside town, which had exported only 62,000 
chaldrons in 1685, was shipping 322,000 by 1800.60 It is estimated that the entire 
North-East region, including County Durham, saw its total coal production increase 
and the Economy in the Eighteenth Century. ' In: Lawrence Stone, An Imperial State at War. 78. 
53 David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Makingof and Industrial Society. Whickham 1560-1765 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 2. 
54 Defoe, A Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932) 
250. 
55 J. V. Beckett, Coal & Tobacco. The Lowthers and the Economic Development of West Cumberland 
1660-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 38. 
56 It is estimated that by 1826 London was importing 94% of its annual 2,000,000 tonnes from the 
North East's coalfields. Norman McCord and Richard Thompson, The Northern Counties From A. D. 
1000 (London: Longman, 1998) 201. 
57 Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, viii. 
58 A Newcastle chaldron is equivalent to 53 cwt. 
59 Jeremy Gregory & John Stevenson, Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth Century 
(London: Longman, 2000) 277. 
60 Ibid. 
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from 1,290,000 tonnes in 1700 to nearly 4,450,000 tonnes by 1800.6 1 By comparison 
Joyce Ellis has estimated that coal shipments from the Tyne rose from just under 
600,000 tonnes in 1699 to over 1,600,000 tonnes by the end of the eighteenth 
century. 62 If this was true, then by 1800 more that 10% of national coal production, 
and nearly 36% of North-East production, was emanating from Tyneside. 
Supplying the labour for this growing sector of the economy was a large workforce of 
miners, keelmen and sailors. It has been estimated that in 1800 almost 10% of the 
`economically active population' of Newcastle and Durham was engaged in the coal 
industry or related service industries. 3 At the beginning of the century a population 
of approximately 1,500 keelmen lived in a close-knit community based around the 
cramped Sandhill district near Newcastle's busy quayside. 64 The keelmen and miners 
were a highly motivated and organised labour force. They displayed a level of 
communal protectionism that one would associate with the more radical elements of 
twentieth-century trade unionism. Of consequence to this study is the fact that 
throughout the entire period this characteristic ensured that they played a leading role 
in much of the popular and labour unrest that gripped the region. -Furthermore, the 
presence of such a large body of trained sailors made the Tyne and Wear valleys a 
focus for the naval impress service. This meant that interactions between soldiers and 
those working in the coal industry were regular, confrontational and occasionally 
bloody. 
The coal trade proved to be a powerful economic driver. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that it helped to create a number of `spin-off industries that focused largely 
on sustaining and supporting the mining and shipment of coal. This can be attested to 
by the opening of Arthur Byram's Berwick shipyard in 1751 and the establishment of 
a local branch of George Lock's Newcastle rope-making firm in 1752.5 Similar 
61 Nationally coal production was 2,985,000 and 15,045,000 tonnes respectively. McCord and 
Thompson, The Northern Counties, 199. 
62 Joyce Ellis, `The `Black Indies. ' The Economic Development of Newcastle, c. 1700-1840. ' In: Robert 
Coils & Bill Lancaster (eds. ) Newcastle upon Tyne. A Modem History (Chichester: Phillimore & Co. 
Ltd., 2001) 5. She states that fewer than 4% of the ships clearing customs on the river were not 
carrying coal. 
63 Rowe, `The North East. ' 424 
64 P. M. Horsley, Eighteenth-Century Newcastle (Newcastle upon Tyne: Oriel Press Ltd., 1971) 228. 
65 David Brenchley, A Place By Itself. Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon 
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industries prospered in North and South Shields, Howdon and upriver at Newbum. 
While these enterprises emerged as a result of the coal trade they eventually 
established themselves as key industries on Tyneside, not wholly reliant on the coal 
industry for economic security. The reliance of coal owners on the sea stimulated not 
only the shipbuilding industry but shipping in general. From early in the eighteenth 
century Newcastle was ranked 4`h as a port and commercial centre behind London, 
Bristol and Norwich. The sheer volume of shipping that was coming in and out of the 
Tyne attests to this. In 10 days during September 1734,579 ships sailed into the Tyne 
and approximately 500 sailed out. 66 Local merchants may have owned much of this 
fleet. As early as 1709 Newcastle's indigenous business community could lay claim 
to ownership of 11,500 tonnes of shipping. This represented more than 4% of all 
national shipping, a figure that was on the increase throughout the century. 67 Much of 
the trade invested in these vessels was aimed at London, but there were prominent 
Newcastle merchants who traded extensively with the Baltic and even as far away as 
the Mediterranean. 
The availability of coal also assisted in the expansion of coal-using industries. 
Ironworks and chemical manufacturing plants in the region all benefited from the 
readily accessible supplies of coal. The large amounts of sand ballast being deposited 
in Newcastle helped to create a viable and prosperous glass-making industry. 68 
Similarly, salt production emerged as a major regional industry early in the century. 
In 1716 the 170 salt pans located in North Shields accounted for 15% of national salt 
output. 9 At the same time the Tyne valley was a major lead-mining centre, while the 
hinterland around Newcastle was one of Britain's leading iron and steel 
manufacturing regions. Despite all of this development, there is a debate as to 
whether the North East was actually industrialising as quickly as the rest of the 
country. For example, Tyneside was the leading centre for steel in the early 
eighteenth century, but by 1750 it was on the decline and was quickly surpassed by the 
Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 26. 
66 Ellis, 'The Black Indies. ' 2. 
67 Ibid. 
68 It is estimated that in the later seventeenth century Newcastle produced 40% of the national output of 
glass. M. Barke and R. J. Buswell (eds. ) Historical Atlas of Newcastle upon Tyne (Newcastle upon 
Tyne: Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic, 1980) 15. 
69 Ellis, `The Black Indies. ' 7. 
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emergence of Sheffield. Similarly, the salt industry was experiencing trouble as early 
as 1730 and was in free-fall decline by the latter half of the century. It is apparent that 
despite the changes brought about by the emergence of the coal industry the region 
could not maintain its dominance in certain areas. 
70 
As already stated, Rowe has observed that at the beginning of the industrial revolution 
the region was remote and possessed very poor links with other, more dynamic parts 
of the country. 71 This may have retarded the industrialisation of the region and 
prevented the rise of certain `industrial' manufacturing such as weaving. Regardless 
of this, the Tyne valley was home to a dynamic economy in the eighteenth century. In 
fact Joyce Ellis believes that as early as 1700 Newcastle was one of the most advanced 
economic regions in the country and was among the most important of the expanding 
sectors in the national economy. 72 She has also argued that despite its importance to 
the region, Newcastle was not dominated by the coal trade. 
73 The evolution of a 
diverse commercial system, based on sea and coastal trade, influenced future 
economic development throughout the region. This led to other eighteenth-century 
commentators making note that the city `next to Bristol, may be called the greatest 
trading town in England, ' and because of this it was `large, populous and rich. 74 In 
fact during this period Newcastle was widely known for its production of grindstones, 
textiles and earthenware as well as commodities linked to agriculture such as glue, 
hides, tallow and butter. Beyond this Newcastle was also becoming an increasingly 
important export centre for American tobacco brought to Britain through Whitehaven. 
In a similar way the town also evolved as the nexus for the import and distribution of 
luxury items and other consumer goods. 
While at first one may think that all of this paints a picture of a highly successful and 
dynamic town, it must be remembered that the local population was still heavily 
dependent on the rate of trade on the Tyne. Despite the fact that many humble men 
70 The argument against the region as a cockpit of the industrial revolution can be found in D. J. Rowe's 
`The North East. ' 418-26. 
71 Ibid., 418. 
72 Joyce Ellis, `A Dynamic Society: Social Relations in Newcastle upon Tyne 1660-1760. ' in: Peter 
Clark (ed. ) The Transformation of English Provincial Towns (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1984), 
190-227. 
73 Ibid., 193,196. 
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were able to prosper and amass limited amounts of wealth during their lives, 
Newcastle was known for the large number of poor inhabitants that graced its streets. 
As Ellis explains, the nature of the local economy had created an uneven distribution 
of wealth, which meant that some of the lowest sectors of society were extremely 
vulnerable to the fluctuations in coastal trade, on which a great deal of their 
employment was based 75 Regardless of the diversity of Newcastle's economy a 
reduction in demand for coal in London, as well as bad weather and war, could cause 
widespread unemployment and serious economic hardship 
76 Related is the fact that 
much of the river trade, which employed so many people, was seasonal in nature thus 
exacerbating the financial problems of the lower classes. 
77 Further complicating 
matters, many keelmen were unable to work past the age of forty having been crippled 
by years of backbreaking labour. This meant that many towns such as Newcastle and 
Sunderland possessed large numbers of unemployed men who often imposed 
themselves on the limited resources available from local parish poor rates. 
78 The 
unfortunate result of this widespread poverty was a ready market for lewd and 
disorderly houses, which in turn bred drunkenness and violence. 79 This was the 
environment that would greet soldiers when they marched into the region. 
The situation in the region's major towns was complicated by rapid increases in their 
populations. However, this also helped to spur the growing wealth and economic 
power of the region as a whole. Industrial development and the associated decline of 
medieval and early-modern cottage industries, coupled with massive enclosure 
programmes, helped to drive many towards the towns. E. A. Wrigley argues that this 
trend was further enhanced by the increased efficiency of British agriculture, which 
freed a greater proportion of its population than its continental rivals to engage in 
industry and other non-agricultural jobs. 80 In the North East this equated to a marked 
70 J. Macky and J Brome as quoted in Joyce Ellis, `The Black Indies' 1. 
75 Ellis, 'The Black Indies. ' 13. 
76 Poor winds for sailing in 1740 pinned much of the merchant fleet in the Tyne and helped contribute 
to the outbreak of rioting in that year. 
77 Ellis, 'The Black Indies. ' 14. 
78 This is particularly true of the keelmen in Newcastle where large numbers are listed on the poor rates 
for the Parish of All Saints in central Newcastle. C. M. Fraser &K Emsley, Tyneside (Newton Abbott: 
David and Charles, 1973) 63. 
79 Fights and assaults, often caused by drink, were characteristic of Newcastle's unruliness. For more 
on this please see Chapter S. 
8° E. A Wrigely, `Society and Economy. ' 76-77. Wrigley estimates that one-third of adult population 
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increase in the population and geographical size of many towns. As Newcastle and 
Sunderland quickly became the centres for major industries such as coal, and their 
ports expanded to cope with the growing coastal trade, so did their populations. 
Newcastle witnessed a considerable demographic increase during the first three- 
quarters of the eighteenth century, from just 16,000 people in 1700 to over 33,000 by 
1775.81 Sunderland's expansion was even greater, as its population grew from only 2- 
3,000 people in 1660 to 16,000 by 1775.82 This represented an 800% increase in 
populace in 115 years. Even Berwick, often thought of as a parochial borderlands 
outpost, experienced a similar trend to the region's larger towns. It had a population 
of 7,187 in 1801, compared with only 2,400 before 1685.83 
Such increases in population, while not as extensive as cities like Manchester and 
Liverpool, were in line with many other English towns such as Bristol, Plymouth and 
Portsmouth, all of whom witnessed population increases of 100% or more between 
1690 and 1792. Of equal importance is the fact that the demographic expansion in 
these conurbations far outstripped the average national population growth. 84 This 
emphasises the rapid rate of migration to cities and towns. It has been estimated that 
in the second half of the eighteenth century 70% of the rise in the overall proportion of 
Europe's population living in towns was due to the growth of towns in England 
alone. 85 However, this rapid increase was not mirrored in the hinterlands around the 
region's major towns. Northumberland had 112,724 inhabitants at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century but this number had grown by only 15% to 139,011 by the 
was engaged in agriculture by the end of the eighteenth century as compared to two-thirds in France. 
76-77. 
81 David Holmes & Daniel Szechi, Age of Oligarchy. Pre-Industrial Britain 1722-1783 (Barlow: 
Longman Publishing, 1993) 346-9. Please note that the population for 1775 includes Gateshead; The 
census of 1801 places the population of the city of Newcastle itself at 29,294. M. Barke and R. J. 
Buswell (eds. ), Historical Atlas of Newcastle, 19; Gregory and Stevenson put the population of 
Newcastle at 15,000 in 1700 and 33,000 by 1801. Gregory & Stevenson, The Longman Companion to 
Britain in the Eighteenth Century, 290. 
82 Ibid., 290,349. As is similar to the figures for Newcastle, Stevenson and Gregory have a population 
of 3,000 in 1650 and 24,000 in 1801. 
83 David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 5&31. 
84 The accepted standard in terms of English population estimates is: E. A. Wrigley & R. S. Schofield, 
The Population History of England 1541,533-4. It is estimated that the population in England was 
4,896,666 in 1688 but had reached 7,936,885 by the start of the war with revolutionary France, an 
increase of nearly 62%. For further debate on the interpretation of population numbers and growth in 
England and Wales during this period see: J. Habakkuk, 'English Population in the Eighteenth 
Century. ' The Economic History Review 6 (2) (1953) 117-133. 
85 E. A. Wrigley, 'Society and the Economy. ' 80. 
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middle of the century. 86 In 1801, when the first census was conducted, 
Northumberland's population was listed as just 162,115.87 Therefore, in the 
eighteenth century the population within the county rose just over 30%, much slower 
than the national average. 88 If many of the region's inhabitants were moving to 
Newcastle and similar centres then this may explain the relatively low growth rate in 
the countryside. 
Despite a possible migration to major population centres, and the growing importance 
of mining and manufacturing, agriculture remained the most significant job sector 
throughout the region well into the nineteenth century. Even E. A. Wrigley, who 
champions the idea that there was a decline in the percentage of the population 
engaged in agriculture, admits that the actual number of men involved in agriculture 
increased well into the nineteenth century. 89 However, economic development in the 
eighteenth century pushed changes in the methods and focus of agriculture in the 
region. There was a gradual move away from subsistence farming towards a more 
commercial `capitalist' agriculture 90 By the mid-eighteenth century the North East 
had acquired a reputation for progressive agriculture but this process was slow and 
unevenly distributed 91 It remained a fact that much of the region was for the most 
part `closer to subsistence agriculture' than anything else. 
2 Nevertheless, yields 
increased, especially in robust grain crops not widely utilised in other parts of the 
country such as oats and rye. 3 This was at a time when yields in traditional grain 
crops were rising nationally. In Berwick the exportation of agricultural products, first 
to London and then to the Baltic, became increasingly important to the town's 
economy as the century progressed. This trade was mirrored in Newcastle, where 
shipments of grain were not uncommon during the century. 94 Furthermore, the strong 
coastal coal trade, based as it was on Tyneside, helped to finance a vast return trade in 
86 DJ Rowe, 'The North East. ' 422. 
97 Ibid. It is likely that a sizeable portion of this increase was due to expansion of smaller towns such as 
Alnwick, Morpeth and Hexham. 
88 As mentioned in note 42 above the rise has been estimated at nearly 62%. 
89 E. A. Wrigley, ' Society and the Economy. ' 82. 
90 Ibid. 
91 McCord & Thompson, The Northern Counties, 175. 
92 Rowe, `The North East' 418. 
93 The reliance of the local diet on `unwheaten' bread may have been one of the reasons for the lack of 
food riots in the region. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
94 A considerable number of grain merchants were located on Newcastle's quayside. TWAS 394/15, 
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foodstuffs. 95 More often than not this helped to balance poor production in parts of 
the region where subsistence agriculture remained. The combination of innovative 
farming practices, non-reliance on traditional grain crops, and the strong import 
market for foodstuffs helped to assure food supplies in Newcastle and the surrounding 
region 96 
Religiously, the region was a mix of Catholic and Protestant, with a strong 
Presbyterian tradition existing in Berwick and its hinterlands. Notwithstanding this 
blend of beliefs, after 1688 the majority of people stood firmly behind the Protestant 
succession. James 11 had been incredibly popular in Newcastle due in large part to his 
religious principles rather than his religious practices, and his coronation was 
celebrated widely. 97 It could be suggested that the region's support for a monarch 
who was closely associated with the spectre of Catholic absolutism could not possibly 
imply support for the Protestant cause. However, it appears that the initial belief in 
James quickly diminished once people began to suspect that his tolerance for 
dissenters might be an attempt to re-establish Catholicism. 98 After the Glorious 
Revolution there was little widespread support for the Catholic or Jacobite cause and 
the influence of Papists in the region was in decline. This is reinforced by the fact that 
there was an almost total lack of support shown by the local population towards the 
Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745.99 Nevertheless, there were some lingering 
Jacobite sympathies amongst some of the region's aristocratic families in the early 
part of the century, but this was crushed in the wake of the 1715 rebellion. Not until 
the late eighteenth century, with the immigration of sizeable numbers of Catholic Irish 
to the region, would this branch of Christianity regain lost ground. '°° 
Despite a short period in which the Stuart monarchy attempted to increase its 
influence and royal control in the region, it was the established local elite who held the 
preponderance of local political power for much of the century. These groups, having 
Papers Relating to the Tyne Keelmen, 24 June 1740. 
95 Ellis, 'The Black Indies. ' 6. 
96 how this effected the instance of food rioting will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6. 97 R. J. Charleton, AHistory of Newcastle upon Tyne From the Earliest Records to Its Formation as A 
City (Newcastle upon Tyne: William H. Robson, 1894) 77 
98 Ibid. 
99 The 1745 rebellion will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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lost some of their power to James II, managed to regain much of their authority over 
municipal institutions and the local economy after the Glorious Revolution. 101 As the 
eighteenth century progressed, and the region moved further under the influence of 
commerce and trade, so did its politics. For the greater part of the eighteenth century 
the control of the politics and administration of Newcastle came increasingly under 
the influence of the rich established merchant families within the town, such as the 
Blacketts, Fenwicks and the Ridleys. 102 Also many of the members of the town's 
governing `corporation' were coal owners or shippers. This created a political culture 
in which the interests of business were paramount, and the ruling elite could use their 
power to control or persuade what was often an unruly and demanding workforce. 103 
Despite this apparent power, such an environment gave rise to continuous strikes and 
labour unrest. In Berwick a similar trend was apparent. During the eighteenth century 
the town was governed by thirty-three men, fourteen of who came from just four 
prominent local families with considerable business interests in Berwick. ' 04 Further, 
decisions concerning the town were often taken through the Guild which was open to 
all freemen of the town but dominated by the burgesses, who tended to be prominent 
local merchants and businessmen. 
V. The Army's Presence in the Region: The Military Context 
The North East, while being mainly rural and sparsely populated, was essential to the 
defence of eighteenth-century England. 105 This was especially true in the first half of 
the century when the Jacobite threat to the security of England's Protestant monarchy 
was very real. During the 1715 and 1745 uprisings Newcastle and Berwick were seen 
as key to the defence of England in the face of the invading Jacobite armies. '06 
10° McCord and Thompson, The Northern Counties, 164. 
101 Fraser & Emsley, Tyneside, 51. 
102 Ibid. 
103 For a discussion of this see Nicholas Rogers, `Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour, ' 102-13. 
104 The families were the Stow's, Forster's, Burn's and Watsons who between them held the mayoralty for 49 years. Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 51. 
105 Even before this, in 1688, James II recognised the need to secure the North East against a possible 
Dutch invasion. PRO WO 4/1/108, Secretary at War to Duke of Newcastle, 1 November 1688. 106 In 1745 Newcastle was seen as being so strategically important that Wade's army of nearly 15,000 
men was encamped on the town moor. R. J. Charleton, A History of Newcastle on Tvne, 82-85. Other 
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Historically, the region had always been the first line of defence against invasions 
from a factious and rebellious Scotland. This is illustrated by the fact that Berwick 
upon Tweed changed hands 13 times between the English and Scots up to 1482, when 
it eventually fell into the permanent occupancy of the English. 
The violent history of the border region fuelled Berwick upon Tweed's rise as one of 
the most important early-modem military centres in England. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that during the reign of Elizabeth the town was afforded vast sums of money 
to complete its extensive trace italienne fortifications. This role was entrenched in the 
eighteenth century with the construction of purpose-built barracks in 1719, which 
were used to house the large garrison of troops stationed in the town throughout the 
century. 107 Not until 1745, when the rebellious Stuart cause was decisively 
undermined at the battle of Culloden, would the region's strategic importance decline. 
However, this did not wholly eliminate the military significance of the North East as 
wartime often brought the fear of invasion. 108 As the eighteenth century progressed, 
this new security threat was combined with a growing economic significance focused 
on the vital supply of coal to London and the presence of a vibrant shipbuilding 
industry. Furthermore, the region's strong ties to river-borne and sea-borne trade 
meant that it developed a huge reserve of men with vast amounts of maritime 
experience. As a result of this the city of Newcastle and the districts around it 
(Sunderland & South Shields) were amongst the country's top suppliers of men for the 
navy during the century's endemic wars. 109 
The region's military power was focused on three main strategic points. The first of 
these were the defences at the head of the river Tyne, centred on the dilapidated castle 
at Tynemouth. This bulwark not only acted as a barracks but also as a key observation 
examples of this role can be garnered from Frank McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745 
(Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983). 
107 It has been noted that the barracks at Berwick were the most extensive built in the early half of the 
eighteenth century; James Douet, British Barracks 1600-1914,20. 
108 Invasion fears were so strong in 1759 that the government ordered the North Yorkshire Militia to 
Northumberland to provide domestic security. PRO WO 4/757/109,3 July 1759. 
'°9 Pitt's 1795 Quota Act (35 Geo. III, c. 9) gave the region (Newcastle, Sunderland & South Shields) the 
highest naval manpower quota outside of London. Norman McCord, "The Impress Service in North- 
East England During the Napoleonic War. " Mariner's Mirror, 54 (1968) 163; In the short space of time 
from November 26,1776 to July 17,1778 the impress service at Newcastle collected 1,728 men for sea 
service. PRO ADM 1/1497-1503. Captain's Letters, B Series, 1776-82. 
40 
point. ' 10 Despite its prime location the facilities were heavily outdated and in an 
advanced state of decay by the early part of the century. As early as 1702 residents of 
North Shields were complaining of the poor state of Tynemouth's fortifications. "" 
However, it was not until the early stages of the Seven Years War that the value of 
Tynemouth as a location for the stationing of troops was recognised. In 1758 the 
Board of Ordnance began a programme to improve the fortifications around the old 
castle and monastery, as well as reconstructing and extending purpose built barracking 
facilities for 1,000 men. 112 
However, it appears that despite the efforts of the Board of Ordnance the renovated 
barracks remained poorly utilised. In his 1769 appraisal of the facilities David 
Wedderburn, a Lieutenant Colonel in the 22"" Regiment of Foot, noted that 
Tynemouth was large enough to hold an entire regiment, but the `buildings, the 
bedding and the other furniture are spoiling for want of being used. ' 13 He observed 
that `there is no part of Great Britain where a regiment can be in barracks at such a 
small expense as at Tynemouth' due to the cheap price of coal and other supplies. 14 
Just as relevant was the belief that any force could easily `march from Tynemouth to 
Newcastle, almost as soon as it is possible to assemble it in this large scattered 
town. " 15 More importantly the Lieutenant Colonel felt that the soldiers housed under 
one roof would `be in better order' than those quartered in the dispersed billets of 
large towns like Newcastle. 116 This, in Wedderburn's opinion, made Tynemouth an 
ideal place for a regular garrison. The next year, partly as a result of this report, the 
War Office agreed that Tynemouth should become part of the regular garrison 
establishment within the north of England. ' 7 Therefore, from 1770 it was the 
intention of the War Office to have at least one full regiment at Tynemouth at any 
110 Dedicated housing for soldiers was in existence at Tynemouth since at least the late sixteenth 
century. Douet, British Barracks, 5. 
111 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1987) 174. 
112 John Sykes, Local Records Vol.! (Stockton-on-Tees, Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 221. 113 PRO WO 1/990, David Wedderburn (Lt. Col. 22"d Regiment) to Lord Barrington, Secretary at War, 
20 August 1769. 
1 14 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 




The fortifications in and around Tynemouth Castle were supplemented by a number of 
associated military installations. Most important was the Spanish Battery which sat 
directly at the mouth of the Tyne on the north shore, giving it total command of the 
approaches to the river. ' 19 Just upriver from the Spanish Battery, Clifford's Fort 
offered housing for small numbers of troops. In co-operation these three structures 
formed the core of Tyneside's defences, and were key to ensuring the safety of one of 
Britain's most important ports. 
The second location was the formidable castle on Holy Island. The strategic 
importance of this island led to it being targeted and captured by Jacobites in 1715, 
before being liberated by a combined force of soldiers and volunteers from 
Berwick. 120 On the other hand it proved to be a convenient place for troops from 
Europe to land in order to oppose the more threatening Jacobite rebellion in 1745.121 
Similarly, in times of war Holy Island was occasionally used as a place for regiments 
to embark for service in Europe. 122 Finally there were the impressive fortifications 
surrounding Berwick upon Tweed which in the eighteenth century was the only 
heavily fortified town on the East Coast specifically designed to resist bombardment. 
Unfortunately, like many other key military sites in the region it too was in a 
considerable amount of disrepair. During the 1745 rebellion Berwick's huge 
defensive walls were described as `a heap of ruins' by the man entrusted with its 
defence. 123 As mentioned previously, the building of the barracks, planned to hold 
600 men and 36 officers, reinforced the military importance of this small coastal town 
after 17 19.124 Beyond these three main sites, sizeable garrisons were regularly 
stationed in the city of Newcastle while smaller units were billeted in many of 
"a Despite this there were times during the remainder of the century when, for various reasons, 
Tynemouth housed less than a regiment. 
"9 This fortification was also upgraded by the Board of Ordnance at the same time as the establishment 
of barracks at Tynemouth; Sykes, Local Records, 221. 
120 BTRO GB/9/1,9 November 1715. An entertaining narrative of Holy Island's seizure can be found 
in Sykes, Local Records, 137. 
121 PRO SP 36/72/103,22 October 1745. In particular five companies of Lord Ligioner's Regiment of 
Foot, 12 gunners and seven battalions of Invalids. 
122 An example of such orders can be found PRO WO 4/9/35, Secretary at War to Lord Mark Kerr, 13 
June 1709. 
123 PRO SP 36/72, Colonel Handasyde to the Secretary of State, 19 October 1745. 
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Northumbria's towns and villages such as Morpeth, Hexham and Alnwick. South of 
the river in County Durham, troops were regularly stationed in Gateshead, Sunderland 
and South Shields. 
It is often impossible to state exactly how many soldiers were in any one place at any 
given time, as garrison levels were rarely consistent. Regiments could spend up to a 
year in some garrison towns, while others might be in a village or town for a matter of 
days or weeks. In addition to this, various militia units helped to garrison many of the 
northern towns from the inception of the Militia Act in 1757. As early as 1759, units 
of the Yorkshire militia were regularly stationed within major towns such as 
Newcastle and Berwick. This force helped to provide domestic security, freeing up 
more regular troops to fight overseas. 125 This meant that at several points during the 
century, and increasingly more so during the latter stages of the century, the regular 
forces in the region could be augmented by between 400 and 500 militiamen. 126 At 
the same time it is important to remember that for a variety of reasons no two 
regiments ever contained exactly the same number of troops, even if their 
establishments might be similar on paper. 
In July 1735 the numbers of officers and men actually registered in the regiments of 
foot within Britain varied from the 737 men in Colonel Hamilton's Regiment of Foot 
to the 850 troops present in Lieutenant General Paston's battalion. 127 One regiment 
replacing another would therefore certainly mean that the number of troops in that 
locality would change. Moreover, while it is accepted that there was almost always a 
company of Invalids at Tynemouth and normally one at Berwick, the numbers of men 
in these could vary from 52 to upwards of 100. Likewise, from 1768 Newcastle was 
placed on the list of towns that was to have a permanent military presence as part of 
the domestic establishment. ' 28 From this date Newcastle had a more consistent 
military presence within the town. Finally, regiments were sometimes quickly 
124 Douet, British Barracks, 20. 
125 Elements of the North and West Yorkshire militia were at Newcastle from 1759 to 1761; Sykes, 
Local Records, 226,228,230. 
126 This is especially true of the early 1790's when the North Yorkshire militia was almost continuously 
stationed in Newcastle and the surrounding region. 127 PRO SP 41/9/179, State Papers Military, 1735. 
128 This consisted of one regiment of foot at any given time. PRO W04/83/316-19,327,343. 
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marched out of their garrisons to deal with local emergencies such as riots and 
invasion threats. As such troop levels could vary throughout the year. 
Despite this, one can get a general understanding of the distribution of land forces 
around the region. Table 2.1 is a summation of the army's presence in the region at 
periods throughout the century when sufficient records are available. It looks at years 
in which specific numbers of regiments or companies can be traced to the region. 129 
The numbers next to the units are approximations based on the figures given in the 
War Office records for the domestic establishment in that particular year. These 
numbers are only estimates and do not necessarily represent the fact that during the 
year some of the soldiers may have been moved from the area or joined by additional 
troops. 
It is possible that there were always troops in many of these places and that their 
numbers were slightly higher than is estimated here. Furthermore, the table does not 
include the permanent residents of the various garrisons who include the governor, his 
aides, gunners and other support staff. For much of the century this did not represent 
anything more than a handful of men. In 1716 the largest garrison staff was the 12 
men stationed at Berwick which included the Governor, Lt. Governor, Town Major, 
Chaplain, Surgeon, Master Gunner and six regular gunners. 130 By 1793 numbers had 
changed little with only 15 men staffing Berwick. 131 It must also be remembered that 
the units at Berwick were responsible for assigning a small detachment of its troops to 
garrison Holy Island that is not listed separately. Finally, militia units, often present in 
great numbers in Newcastle and Morpeth during the latter half of the century, do not 
appear in the table. Despite these omissions the figures provided below allow the 
observer a decent if somewhat spasmodic picture of troop concentrations in the North 
East. 
129 It does not include years when it is known that regiments are present, but the number of companies is 
unknown. For example it is known that in 1787 the 23d Regiment of Foot was present in Berwick as 
one of its soldiers was accused of theft there. However, as the number of troops is not known, the year 
has been excluded. BTRO C 15/16,29 August 1787. 
130 PRO WO 24/82, Establishments for His Majesty's Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces in Great 
Britain, 1716. 
131 Ibid., 24/574, Establishments, 1793. 
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For example War Office papers indicate that eight companies of foot soldiers were 
stationed in Berwick in 1709.132 By cross referencing this with the tables for domestic 
establishments it is possible to estimate that at this time the town was accommodating 
approximately 664 officers and men. ' 33 At its lowest point the town had just a single 
company of invalid soldiers based there, but this was exceptional. In 1719 there was 
an exceptionally large concentration of troops in the region. This includes a regiment 
of dragoons at Hexham, three regiments at Newcastle and one regiment of foot at 
Berwick. 134 Additionally, a company of 56 invalids was stationed at Tynemouth. )35 
While it is unlikely that these units were at full strength, nearly 2000 soldiers were 
stationed in the region during 17 19.136 This is very different from the relatively low 
numbers of troops in the North East in 1723. Then the garrison consisted of a full 
regiment of foot at Berwick (655 men) and a single company of 52 invalids at 
Tynemouth. 1 37 
Throughout the century the number of soldiers stationed in the region seems to have 
hovered between 500 and 1,000. However, there are a few instances in which the total 
rises above this. On six occasions the number of troops in the region greatly exceeded 
1,000 men. These are 1719,1736,1741,1746,1761 and 1783. What is noticeable 
about this trend is that in most cases the presence of large number of soldiers occurs 
during the start or end of one of the century's conflicts. During 1719 the War of the 
Quadruple Alliance was winding down and an unsuccessful attempt by the Spanish to 
land in Scotland increased security concerns within the region. 1741 marks the period 
in which the British army was preparing itself for direct intervention in continental 
Europe and in 1746 large numbers of troops employed in the opposition of the 
previous years Jacobite rebellions were still present in the region. The Seven Years 
War witnessed a dramatic expansion in 1761 as well as widespread unrest in the North 
East, while 1783 represents the conclusion of Britain's disastrous adventure in 
colonial America. 
132 PRO WO 4/8/239, Secretary at War to the Governor of Berwick upon Tweed, 9 April 1709. 133 PRO WO 24/49, Establishments, 1709. In this year a regiment of foot is estimated to have 
approximately 830 men at full strength (ten companies of 83 each). 134 PRO SP 41/5/55, List and Quarters of His Majesty's Forces in Great Britain, 9 May 1719. 135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., The exact number is 2,043 (four regiments of foot at 44S each + one regiment of dragoons (207) and 56 invalids). 
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From the numbers in Table 2.1 it is also possible to estimate what proportion of the 
domestic army establishment was housed in the North East during the century. What 
is instantly obvious is the proportion could fluctuate greatly throughout the period, but 
no specific trends emerge. Normally, only 3-6% of the domestic establishment was 
charged with garrisoning the region, even in a year such as 1740 when serious unrest 
plagued Newcastle, Gateshead, Durham and Sunderland. At times throughout the 
century regional troop concentrations could be very low. In 1747,1748,1756,1757 
and 1759 the proportion of the domestic army based in the area is less than 20%. 
Interestingly, these are all years of conflict when the domestic establishment had 
ballooned through the raising of new regiments and augmentation of existing units. 
Therefore, in these years the apparent reductions in concentrations are not necessarily 
representative of a major reduction in the absolute numbers of troops in the region, but 
of an increased military force within the country as a whole. 
Further analysis of Table 2.1 illustrates the fragmented way in which regiments were 
disposed throughout the region. The breaking-up of regiments into their constituent 
companies and the spreading of these units about the region was a hallmark of military 
quartering in the eighteenth century. Dispersing units in this way resulted from the 
fact that many communities possessed insufficient billets to house whole regiments or 
even companies. This problem was particularly acute in the first half of the century 
when permanent barracks were scarce. ' 38 As the century progressed it was also seen 
by the War Office as a way to get the best possible geographical coverage for the men 
it had available. As a result it assisted local and national leaders in their efforts to 
combat smuggling and public disorder. This scattering approach meant units of a 
regiment could often be quartered considerable distances from each other in a region 
that was geographically vast and, outside major towns, sparsely populated. In 1704 
Carpenter's regiment had six of its companies split between Berwick, Hexham, 
Haltwhistle, Beltingham, Newcastle, Gateshead, Hull, Darlington and Stockton. 139 At 
the same time two companies of Lord Lucas's Regiment of Foot were stationed at 
137 Ibid., 41/5/185, List and Quarters of His Majesty's Forces in Great Britain, 11 June 1723. 
'38 During this time Berwick, Tynemouth and Holy Island were the only barracks between Edinburgh 
and Hull and Scarborough. Douet, British Barracks, 15. 
139 PRO SP 41/3/15, Quarters of Her Majesty's Forces in England, 24 June 1704. 
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Berwick while the rest of the regiment was scattered in far flung places such as 
Tilbury, Sheerness, Carlisle and Hull. 140 In 1759 the War Office issued instructions to 
35 infantry and cavalry detachments throughout England, giving them permission to 
expand their quarters to neighbouring towns and villages such was the need for 
billets. 141 
It is clear that while the level of military manpower in the region was by no means 
consistent, the North East often hosted reasonable numbers of soldiers in relation to its 
population. Similarly, many places in the region had an almost permanent military 
presence throughout the century. The army was not a curiosity in the region and local 
inhabitants were used to having soldiers living amongst them. This is especially true 
of Berwick, which rarely had fewer than 300 troops in it. It was not unusual for 
soldiers (both regular and invalid) to count for 5% of the town's entire population. 
However, at times throughout the century nearly 20% of the town could consist of 
military personnel. This concentration was due mainly to Berwick's unique position 
as a permanent garrison town. Despite this it is important to remember that Newcastle 
and Tynemouth were rarely without troops. Tynemouth may have had considerable 
garrisons if one considers that this village probably had a modest population 
throughout the period. 142 This was especially relevant after 1768 when the small 
coastal village officially became a permanent garrison community. 
140 Ibid. 
141 PRO WO 4/59/249, Barrington to Lt-General Conway, 10 November 1759. Letters were sent to 
regiments based in Newcastle. 
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Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: 
Recruitment, Desertion and the Press Gang 
`if any servants have severe masters, any children 
have undutiful parents, if any servants have too little 
wage, or any husband too much wife... ' 
Sgt. Kite, Act 1; Scene I 
The Recruiting Officer' 
I. Introduction. 
Like all armies throughout history, manpower was a key element in Britain's ability to 
fight the endemic wars of the eighteenth century. The regularity of conflict, coupled 
with the increasing number of bodies required, and the expanding geographical scope 
of warfare in the period, created a great need for volunteer and impressed recruits. 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that for much of the century the 
peacetime standing army was purposefully kept at low levels. This created a furious 
expansion of forces when conflict did erupt. Considering the substantial numbers of 
men required for the army, navy, militia and the forces of the East India Company, it 
was amazing that a country with a population that varied between 4.9 and 7.9 million 
people during the century, could maintain such a successful and expansive global 
presence. 2 While some of this progress was the result of large numbers of foreign 
levies being employed from other European states and principalities, the British army 
was still mainly reliant on British recruits. 3 Nevertheless, these factors meant that 
recruiting parties and press-gangs were a regular and intrusive part of life in English 
provincial towns. As one would expect this was no exception in the North East. 
' Peter Dixon (ed. ), George Farquhar, The Recruiting Officer (Manchester. Manchester University 
Press, 1986). 
2 E. A. Wrigley & R. S. Schofield, The Population History of England 1541-1871. A Reconstruction 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1981) 533-4. The actual numbers listed in the text are 4,896,666 in 1688 and 
7,936,885 in 1793. 
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On the other hand the propensity of some soldiers to desert their colours could 
undermine the effectiveness of these very same forces. Desertion was the scourge of 
army officers and political leaders throughout Europe. One officer in Ireland 
estimated that as much as one-twelfth of that establishment deserted every year. 
4 So 
serious was the problem that as a military crime it was punishable by death or severe 
floggings. In some cases a real fear existed that if desertion was not checked it had 
the potential to seriously jeopardise the cohesion of the armed forces and ultimately 
compromise battlefield effectiveness. However, it was not just a phenomenon that 
afflicted units stationed abroad or within theatres of war. Many soldiers fled their 
regiments while stationed in Britain, creating a great deal of work for local 
administrators and legal officials. Despite this Arthur Gilbert has illustrated that 
desertion from regiments in Britain, even in times of war, was much lower than in 
regiments actually serving overseas in theatres of combat. 5 He also notes that 
desertion rarely approached the attrition rates that regiments faced from disease, 
discharges and deaths. 6 Regardless of this desertion was still a serious problem within 
eighteenth-century England. 
This co-existing relationship between the recruitment and desertion of troops was a 
major component of civil-military relations in the North East. Such activities provide 
an ideal opportunity to analyse the level of support and resistance that local 
inhabitants displayed towards various forms of recruiting and to deserters from the 
forces. As will be shown below, resistance to normal methods of recruitment does not 
appear to have been widespread. Nevertheless, this did not lead to a flood of men 
enlisting in the ranks of the army. At the same time opposition increased in local 
communities when the military and local officials employed coercive methods of 
recruitment. 
3 For an analysis on the German levy system see: Peter H. Wilson, `The German 'Soldier Trade' of the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Reassessment. ' International History Review 18 (4) (1996) 
757-92. 
4 PRO WO 1/611/1-8,47, In Letters and Papers-Government Departments, 1787-1793. This was far 
outstripped by the desertions occurring in 1787 when it was reported that as many 1,200 of the 7,000 
private soldiers abandoned their colours. 
5 Arthur N. Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted From the Eighteenth-Century British Army. ' Armed Forces 
and Society 6 (1980) 558. He states that in 1758 desertion within England accounted for just 3.9%, and 
in 1759 3.4% of the total establishment. 
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II. Recruitment and Competition for Manpower in Context. 
During the eighteenth century Britain's pool of available manpower was under 
considerable pressure for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the size of the 
regular army rose consistently during periods of conflict. At the height of the War of 
Spanish Succession there were nearly 145,000 men on the army establishment. 
However, during the early stages of the French wars an army establishment of 337,189 
soldiers was required. 7 Even the number of soldiers strictly based in Britain during 
peacetime went from a low of 7,878 in 1700 to nearly 18,000 in the period 
immediately before the eruption of the French Revolutionary Wars. 8 This represents 
increases of 132% and 128% respectively and does not include the massive expansion 
of the domestic garrison during the century's many conflicts. 9 At the same time the 
population of Britain increased by approximately 62%. 
It is easy to observe that the increasing manpower requirements of the army 
outstripped demographic growth in the general population. However, these totals do 
not include the additional pressures created by increases in the navy and the 
augmented militia that came into existence during 1757.10 Additionally, these state 
institutions were forced to compete for men with other smaller forces such as the 
private army operated by the East India Company. From 1698 the company's new 
charter empowered it to raise, train and muster a military force to protect its factories 
and economic interests in India. " Although this army remained small for much of the 
6 Ibid., In 1758 and 1759 these rates were 16.2% and 20.8% respectively. 
7 L. D. Schwartz, London in the Age of Industrialisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992) 97-9. It must be remembered that a proportion of these men were foreign levies and auxiliaries. 
8 PRO WO 24/23,549-563, Establishments of Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces, 1700 and 1788-91. 
For a complete list of the numbers of troops in the country throughout the century please see Appendix 
A. 
9 For example, during the formative years of the War of Austrian Succession the domestic establishment 
was between 35,000 and 36,000 troops as new regiments were raised to fight the war. Please see 1741 
and 1742 in Appendix A, PRO WO 24/195,204. 
10 In the same period the men listed as `bourne' by the navy went from 20,916 in 1701 to 96,000 in 
1795, an increase of more than 350%. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97-99; At full 
strength the new militia was to consist of 56,000 men. 
11 Huw V. Bowen, `The East India Company and Military Recruitment in Britain, 1763-71. ' Historical 
Research 59 (139) (1986) 78. 
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eighteenth century, the increase in military conflict in and around the Indian sub- 
continent from the 1740's saw the number of men under arms increase from just 3,000 
men in 1749 to 26,000 in 1763, and 64,192 by 1771.12 Despite using large numbers of 
native Sepoys the East India Company presented a further drain on British manhood. 
The regular opposition of the British army to bills allowing the Company to recruit at 
home supports this fact. 13 There was also the additional strain of supplying the Navy. 
Because it tended to recruit from the seafaring community, this impacted 
tremendously on coastal ports such as Newcastle, Sunderland, Tynemouth and North 
and South Shields. 
This combination of factors, coupled with the unpopularity of military service, meant 
that it was not unusual for the army to be well below its optimum strength, both in 
peacetime and during periods of war. Arthur Gilbert has estimated that in 1779, at the 
height of the American Revolutionary War, the army was 10,000 men short of its 
listed strength. 14 To some extent this explains the desperate attempts that the 
government sometimes utilised to fill the ranks. 15 This great need was reflected in the 
use of impressment, the hiring of substantial numbers of foreign levies during times of 
conflict, and the periodic enlistment of debtors and criminals into the ranks. 
III. The Structural Framework of Recruiting and Impressment. 
The recruiting of the army was a complex process, which was heavily reliant on co- 
operation between the military and local civil and legal officials. As was the case 
with most of the army's domestic operations in the eighteenth century, the 
government in London was keen to ensure that some form of civilian control was 
exercised over the raising of recruits for both the army and the navy. As has been 
alluded to in Chapter 2, part of this arose out of the need to protect the rights of the 
12 Ibid., 78-9. 
13 Ibid., 85-6. 
14 Arthur N Gilbert, `An Analysis of Some Eighteenth-Century Recruiting Records. ' Journal of the 
Society of Army Historical Research 54 (1976) 39. 
15 So severe was the problem of manpower in North America during the Seven Years War that 131 
French soldiers who surrendered at Louisburg were recruited into British regiments there. Stephen 
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civilian population from possible misdeeds on the part of recruiters. This broad remit 
meant that local magistrates and other local legal authorities were responsible 
for the 
oversight of the entire recruitment process. In this role their presence was required to 
ensure that every recruit met minimum standards of physical stature as set by the 
various recruiting acts. At the same time they were expected to witness the taking of 
oaths which formally signified the recruits acceptance of the army's authority and 
marked their transformation from civilian to soldier. Magistrates were also 
responsible for ensuring that recruiters refrained from underhand tactics while 
conducting their business. In such cases they had the power to conduct hearings into 
accusations of malpractice in the recruiting process and to release those civilians 
adjudged to have been improperly enlisted. 
The rules and conventions governing the army press were similar to those associated 
with normal army recruitment. However, in terms of their involvement in 
impressments, the role of the magistrate was equally important and central to the 
success of any press. They were part of the impress commissions, which had total 
control over all aspects of the process. They vetted the men brought in by the press 
and investigated accusations of wrongdoing. At the same time it was incumbent on 
the army personnel involved in this duty to maintain close relations with the local 
political and legal authorities if they hoped to receive the necessary co-operation. In 
fact a press could not even begin until a local justice of the peace issued warrants to 
constables allowing them to apprehend men who met the terms of the various press 
acts. 16 Additionally, the constables or other civilian officers were required to be 
present during any attempt to press a man into service. For this service the relevant 
army officer would have to pay the parish or town officials a set amount for every man 
received. 17 This differed somewhat from normal recruitment practices, which up until 
the taking of the oath, tended to be a personal interaction between the potential recruit 
Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 60. 
16 For a good discussion of the conduct of army impressment during the beginning of the eighteenth 
century please see: Arthur N Gilbert, `Army Impressment During the War of the Spanish Succession. ' 
The Historian 38 (1976) 689-708 
17 Ibid., 690; Brumwell, Redcoats, 63. The rates were 10 shillings for the 1704 Act and 20 shillings in 
the 1757 Act. 
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and the recruiting party. During impress operations civilian authority was present at 
every point of the process. 
Successive parliamentary acts permitting army impressment set clear parameters as to 
what types of men could be seized. A press act was not a blank cheque that allowed 
officers and local officials to sweep the streets. It was aimed at a very specific 
demographic group within society and normally those at the lowest rung of the social 
ladder. It was focused on those members of society who placed a disproportionate 
economic burden on local society. This included the homeless, the unemployed, 
debtors and criminals. A typical example of the limitations placed on the army press 
can be observed in Northumberland's midsummer quarter sessions records from 1707. 
At these Richard Oriss was presented to the justices and upon examination it was 
found that `he hath not any place of billetment and lawful calling or employment nor 
visible means for his maintenance or livlihood. "8 Asa result of meeting this 
criterion, Oriss was delivered over to Captain William Wanless of Brigadier 
Handasyde's Regiment of Foot. 19 Such considerations meant that employed and 
respectable civilians had little chance of being forced into the ranks of the army, 
although as will be shown below, this did happen on occasions. 
IV. The Recruitment of Criminals, Vagrants and Debtors. 
The issue of whether the ranks of the army were rife with criminals and other socially 
undesirable people has been dealt with briefly in Chapter 2. What that analysis 
illustrated was that as the century progressed the reliance on impressment declined 
and as a result, the proportion of criminals, vagrants and debtors also declined. At the 
same time the army appears to have become more representative of British society. 
Despite this fact the use of the North East's criminals, vagrants and debtors as recruits 
can shed light on a number of important interactions in the relationships between local 
and central government and the army. The opportunity for local officials to sweep the 
streets and gaols of vagrants and criminals must have proved tempting. It would have 
'a MRO QSB 26/17,16 July 1707. 
19 Ibid. 
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removed many poor and idle souls from the community, reduced expenditure on the 
poor, and eased recruiting pressures on more productive members of society. On the 
other hand, hosting an army rife with reprobates and other social-marginals would 
create considerable problems for civilian and military authorities, possibly even 
increasing tensions between the army and the local population. 20 
In terms of recruiting criminals, the War of Spanish Succession saw the most intense 
use in the eighteenth century. 21 It is estimated that in 1708 alone as many as 1,493 
criminals were delivered over to 57 infantry battalions22 While this may seem like a 
large number it still accounted for just 1.6% of the 91,188 men on the British 
establishment. 23 Later in the century the number of pardons related to military service 
drop considerably. In the 17 years between 1747 and the end of the Seven Years War 
just 234 men were pardoned, on condition of their enlistment in the military, and all 
but two of these enlisted after 1755.24 At its highest level in 1761,107 men were 
enlisted into the army representing just 0.10% of the estimated 105,221 men on the 
army establishment that year. 25 Furthermore, Stephen Conway's study concludes that 
just 769 criminals were granted similar pardons between 1775 and 178326 These 
figures represent just 1% of the 73,310 men enlisted for service between September 
1775 and September 1780 27 
More importantly for this thesis, is the fact that an overwhelming majority of convict 
soldiers were assigned to units serving outside England. Of 26 felons identified as 
20 The actual issue of the level of soldier criminality will be dealt with in Chapter S but this issue has a 
direct bearing on that discussion. 
2'The major work on this matter is Stephen Conway, `The Recruitment of Criminals Into the British 
Army, 1775-81. ' BIHR 58 (1985) 46-58. Another brief treatment is J. R. Western, `Military Service as 
Punishment. ' JSAHR, 32 (1954) 89. I have utilised Conway's sources and methods to expand this 
analysis to cover the period 1747 to 1763. The detailed results can be found in Appendices B and C. 22 John Childs, 'War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century. ' War and 
Socie 15 (2) (1997) 9. 
23 This was still only 3.7% of the 40,274 actual `effective' soldiers in the land forces in 1708. L. D. 
Schwartz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 97. 
24 187 criminals (or nearly 80%) were specifically told to register in army regiments. See Appendix B 
for an annual breakdown. 
25 PRO SP 44/88, State Papers Domestic-Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants 1761-1767; The 
establishment level for 1761 is taken from Gregory and Stevenson, The Longman Companion to Britain 
in the Eighteenth Century (London: Longman, 2000) 196; The numbers given in this volume are identical to those compiled in L. D. Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 98. 26 Conway, `The Recruitment of Criminals. ' 49. 27 Ibid., 50. 
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being allowed to enlist in the army between 1704 and 1709,23 were sent to regiments 
stationed abroad. 28 Likewise, between 1747 and 1763 nearly 73% of the men who 
were told to enlist in the army were directed to regiments serving overseas. 29 In total 
51 were instructed to join `any regiment abroad' and the other 86 were sent to Jamaica 
to join the 49`h Regiment of Foot 3° Conway has shown that a similar percentage 
(nearly 77%) of those assigned to specific regiments during 1775 and 1781 were sent 
abroad . 
31 This analysis illustrates that criminals accounted for only a fraction of the 
whole establishment, and just a handful of those actually serving in England at any 
time during the century. 
In a purely local context, it is very difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number 
of criminals who were pardoned on condition of their enlistment in the army or navy. 
There is a lack of detailed archival evidence in the region where one could find copies 
of petitions sent to the Secretary at State, requesting such consideration. Even the vast 
majority of cases contained in the State Papers Domestic do not list the specific place 
of origin or residence of the petitioner. For this reason any attempt to build a list of 
men from the region entering the service is almost impossible. However, the numbers 
on a national level are so small that only a very tiny number of the criminals could 
have come from the North East. This could be refined even further when one 
considers that the region was relatively lightly populated compared to counties to the 
32 south. 
Despite a lack of evidence pointing to specific criminals being brought into the army, 
local administrators and legal grandees appeared to have supported the recruitment of 
vagrants and the unemployed. This was part of a wider trend, particularly in 
Northumberland, where officials operated an overt policy of trying to rid the county of 
28 PRO SP 41/3-4. There is no mention of any regiment or general destination for the remaining 3 men. 29 See Appendix C. These totals include only those men pardoned on condition of joining the Army 
and excludes those given the choice between the Army or Navy or told to enlist in `Ilis Majesty's 
Service' 
30 Ibid., The 49'h regiment was the largest single taker of convict recruits, accounting for nearly 63% of 
all men sent to overseas regiments, and close to half of all the criminals sent into the army during this 
period. 
31 58.33% were sent to the West Indies, Africa and India, and 18.94% were transported to units in 
America. Conway, `Recruitment of Criminals. ' 53. 32 For a discussion about relative populations in the eighteenth century see Chapter 2. 
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vagrants, vagabonds, rogues and gypsies. 
33 The press of idle and itinerant men was 
being employed widely from the opening of the eighteenth century. As early as 1705 
men who were considered to be `levyable within the meaning of the act of Parliament' 
(for the impressment of idle men), began to trickle into the army. 34 On the second day 
of January 1705 an order went out to Justices asking them to prepare for the onset of 
the recruiting season, with the hope of filling the ranks of the army before the 
commencement of the next campaign season. 35 Not long after this, five `idle' men 
were seized by constables in Northumberland. Three of these were to be enlisted in 
the army and the other two as marines. 6 In addition to this a further 30 men had been 
collected by the petty constables of Glendale near Wooler, but as will be discussed 
below they apparently escaped their capture and fled for the border with Scotland. 7 
Over the next few days a further eight men from the region were presented to Captain 
William Carr of the Earl of Orkney's Regiment of Foot. 38 In fact a list within the 
Northumberland quarter sessions records for early 1705 seems to indicate that by 12 
February 1705, Captain Can may have taken delivery of as many as 66 impressed 
men. 39 All but two of these, John Tilley and John Angus who went to Colonel 
Villiers stationed in Tynemouth, seem to have been intended for Orkney's regiment 40 
This indicates a concerted attempt by the authorities of Northumberland to bring the 
idle population into the army's service. However, it is not clear whether any of these 
men include the 30 mentioned above who fled their impressment for Scotland. 
Despite this setback the press seems to have worked well as in 1707 the Secretary at 
War noted that there were upwards of 140 impressed men awaiting transportation at 
Tynemouth Castle. 41 Two years later sizeable numbers of vagabonds were being 
transported `to the next adjacent constable in Northumberland' for assessment at the 
33 This attitude towards social-marginals persisted until about 1750. Gwenda Morgan and Peter 
Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law Enforcement in North-East 
England 1718-1800 (London: UCL Press, 1998) 217. 
34 MRO QSB 21/10,14 February 1705. 
35 Ibid., 21/7,2 January 1705. 
36 Ibid., 21/8,9 January 1705. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 21/9-50,14-27 January 1705. 
39 Ibid., 21/60,12 February 1705. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gilbert, `Army Impressment' 702. 
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next quarter sessions. 2 After this initial burst of activity there is only sporadic 
mention of men being impressed into the army during the remainder of the conflict. 
This trend continued into the War of Austrian Succession. In the early stages of the 
conflict archival records show local officials making a concerted effort to move large 
numbers of vagrants to towns that were staging quarter sessions and assize meetings. 
Records of the midsummer quarter sessions from 1741 make note of a group of 223 
men being transported, during May and July, from Hexham to Carlisle and from 
Morpeth to Newcastle. 43 Later in the same year there are a number of entries noting 
the continued transport of large groups of idle men about the county. One of these 
was the 212 vagrants who were `conveyed by John Reagan and Michael Anderson 
from Morpeth to Buxton from Midsummer sessions 1741 to Minters sessions 1741, 
being 29 miles. '44 
While it does not specifically mention that these large parties are being moved for the 
reasons of military recruitment, a series of historical and archival clues makes this a 
possible explanation for such movements. First, parliamentary legislation passed in 
1741 allowed both the navy and army to recruit vagrants into their respective services. 
Secondly, the conveyance of considerable numbers of vagrants only begins to appear 
in archival sources with the onset of the War of Austrian Succession. At the same 
time, the end of the conflict marks an end to records of these sizeable movements. 
Furthermore, the experiences of other regiments during the century illustrates that 
significant numbers of men were being impressed in wartime. In 1756 Charles 
Otway's 35`h Regiment of Foot received nearly 500 impressed men, doubling its size 
before it sailed to America 45 In this context it seems more believable that the 
aforementioned numbers may have been impressed men. 
Although there are no specific archival examples of men being taken by the army 
press during the Seven Years War or the American War of Independence, 
impressment was still being widely used in the region. Orders to the 56 `'' Regiment of 
42 TWAS MD/NC/2/3/166,22 September 1709. 
" MRO QSB 83/13,15 July 1741. 
44 Ibid., 84/3,11 October 1741. 
45 Brumwell, Redcoats, 64. 
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Foot in Newcastle during 1756 explicitly show that this unit was accepting pressed 
men. 6 Similarly, in early 1757 officers commanding elements of Beauclerk's 
regiment in Morpeth were ordered to draw their necessary recruits from the 
increasingly large pool of impressed men being held at Carlisle. 47 So successful had 
the press been in Carlisle that the commissioners running the operation feared the 
`very dangerous consequences from the large number of pressed men [held] there, for 
they [had] no sufficient place of confinement. ' 48 In Berwick the impress 
commissioners were prevented from meeting as they had been mistakenly omitted 
from the existing recruiting act 49 Nevertheless, once this problem had been rectified 
it did not take long for the press to fill the gaols again. In fact, by late 1757 serious 
recruitment congestion in the region led the Secretary at War to issue orders 
stipulating that from 8 December the impressment of men was to stop in all parts of 
northern England with the exception of Newcastle upon Tyne 50 This glut of recruits 
would not last and the use of the army press would be reintroduced intermittently for 
the remainder of the war. 
During the American Revolutionary War the impressment of men into the army was 
also being used in the region. 51 This is attested to by the orders sent to Newcastle and 
other towns in December 1779 asking for the impress commissioners to meet in the 
new year. 52 However, the official end of army impressment in 1780 meant that its 
impact during this war was much less significant than similar activities earlier in the 
century. Nevertheless, early in the conflict, the naval impress was also gathering in 
men at a furious pace. Between November 1776 and mid-July 1778 Captian Bover's 
press gangs had farmed 1,122 men, representing nearly 65% of all local men enlisted 
into the navy in that period. This included 193 individuals in one seven day period 53 
46 PRO WO 4/1012/25, Secretary at War to Rt. Hon. Lord Charles Manners at Newcastle, 12 April 
1756. 
47 Ibid., 4/1012/47, Secretary at War to Officers Commanding the Companies of Lord George 
Beauclerk's Regiment at Morpeth, 3 February 1757. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 4/1012/41,18 January 1757. 
50 Ibid., 4/1012/87,8 December 1757. 
31 The first national army impress act was approved by Parliament in February 1779. Gilbert, `Charles 
Jenkinson and the Last Army Press, 1779' Military Affairs 42 (1978) 8. 
52 PRO WO 3/26/37,5 November 1779. 
53 PRO ADM 1/1497-1503. Captain's Letters, B Series 1776-1782. A total of 1,737 men were enlisted 
in the navy including 526 volunteer seamen, 60 volunteer landsmen and 29 men delivered to the press 
gangs by the civilian authorities. 
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between 201h and 27 `h March 1778 when a hot press' led to exemptions being 
suspended 54 
Like army impressment, the use of debtors as soldiers appears to have been relatively 
popular during the earlier part of the century. Parliament first introduced acts for the 
`relief of poor persons for debt or debtors' in 1695.55 This was followed by a more 
intense utilisation of such legislation during the War of Spanish Succession. These 
acts allowed male debtors to escape debt and debtors prison in exchange for 
enlistment in the army or navy. This legislation evolved into an important pillar of 
army recruitment policy, particularly during Queen Anne's reign. 
6 Unlike the 
impressment acts however, debtors were not compelled to serve in the army or navy. 
Rather they had to apply to the authorities to be considered under the provisions of the 
acts. As was the case with criminals, this category of `offender' accounted for a very 
small proportion of those entering the army. Geoffrey Davis estimates that criminals 
in the army outnumbered debtors, and if one considers the numbers of criminals given 
above, the proportion could have been negligible. 7 This argument is countered by 
Arthur Gilbert who believes that nearly 60,000 debtors were in the ranks during 1716, 
as opposed to 2,076 in 1779, although the former total appears a bit optimistic. 58 
More noticeably Gilbert's calculations show a similar trend to that of criminals in the 
army, in that their numbers declined significantly as the century progressed. 
The earliest record of debtors going into the army comes in 1696 when seven men 
were released from Newcastle's gaol to join Sir John Jacob's Regiment of Foot. 59 
The next archival reference to the widespread recruitment of insolvent debtors comes 
during the War of Spanish Succession. In 1702 George Watson, who owed a debt of 
£13, agreed to join Colonel Sanderson's Regiment of Marines stationed at Hull 60 At 
the same quarter session Henry Newton, Robert Amsley and Thomas Hagerston all 
sa Ibid., 1/1498,27 March 1778. 
ss John Childs, The British Army of William III, 1689-1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1987) 114. 
56 For a more detailed study of recruitment from 1702-1714 please see: Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in 
the Reign of Queen Anne. ' Historical Research 18 (1950) 146-59. 
57 Ibid., 150-1. 
58 Gilbert, `Analysis of Army Recruiting Records. ' 42. 
59 Childs, The British Army of William III, 114. 
60 TWAS QS/NC/1/3,9 September 1702. 
64 
agreed to `go a soldier' in the same regiment. 1 Within two years at least 33 
Newcastle men had decided to take up arms rather than be imprisoned for their debts. 
In Northumberland during 1702,35 debtors had petitioned the local authorities to join 
the army since the legislation had come into effect. 2 The real surprise here is not that 
insolvent debtors were taking the opportunity to eliminate their debts, but rather the 
ages of some of the men involved. Watson and Hagerston were 31 years of age at the 
time of their enlistment, while Amsley was 44 and Newton was 46.3 The latter two 
recruits clearly did not meet the age limitation set within the act. M These individuals 
illustrate how serious manpower shortages could tempt some officials and army 
officers to conveniently ignore the height and age limitations placed on recruits by 
government legislation 65 
Interestingly, the lists indicate that only two regiments were the beneficiaries of the 33 
Newcastle debtors enlisted in the army up to 1704, and of these recruitment was 
limited to one company in each. 66 Captain George Ord's company in Colonel Thomas 
Sanderson's Regiment of Marines enlisted 11 men, and Captain Mitchell Mitford's 
company within Lord Paston's Regiment of Foot took 22 debtors. 67 Unfortunately, 
sources that record debtor enlistment within Northumberland do not provide similar 
information and as a result one cannot determine which regiments men were assigned 
to 68 However, it would not be overly presumptuous to assume that some, if not a 
large majority, also went into Paston's and Sanderson's regiment as they were actively 
recruiting in the region during this period. 
The analysis of debtor recruitment highlights another tantalising trend that 
compliments the enlistment of criminals. This is the large proportion of debtors that 
appear to have been sent to regiments outside Britain. An order from the War Office 
giving instructions for the distribution of debtors lists just one regiment known to be 
61 Ibid. 
62 MRO QSB 17/100-53,4 July 1702. 
63 TWAS QS/NC/1/3. 
64 The age limit was 40 years of age. Davis, `Recruiting, ' 150. 
65 A discussion on how recruitment standards varied in wartime, as they relate to the army in America, 
can be found in: Brumwell, Redcoats. 
66 TWAS QS/NC/1/3. 
67 Ibid., 31 May-26 July 1704. 
68 MRO QSB 17/100-53,4 July 1702. 
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in England at the time. 69 Ironically, this was Lord Paston's regiment, which was in 
the process of raising itself in 1704 and had enlisted at least 22 debtors from the 
region between 1702 and 1704. Beyond this navy ships also took debtors to fill their 
crews, and as a result, removed them from the country. In 1706 Captain Matthew 
Teal, `commander of Her Majesty's Ship Strombolo', received eight such men into his 
care. 70 
Unexpectedly, the large-scale enlistment of such men into the armed services stops 
almost abruptly at the end of 1704. In 1705 there is only one enlistment, that of 
Anthony Cargill who signed with Captain Mitford to escape his substantial debt of 
£62,1S. 7 1 For the remainder of the conflict there is little mention of local debtors 
entering the armed forces. The same trend is found in Northumberland where the glut 
of petitioners in 1702 is followed by a few scattered and isolated cases. Furthermore, 
with the end of the war in 1714, the use of debtors in the army ends and does not 
reappear in any of the records for the remainder of the century. 
V. Recruiting Efforts in the Local Community. 
Despite the role of the recruiting officer in bringing units up to strength, the regional 
communities, and especially the town councils, played an equally important role in the 
recruiting process. Without a co-operative effort by the civilian authorities the army 
could not have expected to raise the numbers of men that it did. In effect, local 
civilian officers assisted the parties of military personnel in establishing their 
recruiting `practices'. As has been discussed above sheriffs, justices of the peace and 
constables performed a number of varied tasks that were essential to the physical 
procedures of the recruiting process. However, local councils provided another vital 
piece of assistance that came in the form of financial aid to the army and navy. In a 
limited way this helped to counter the public's generally unenthusiastic regard for 
military service. 
69 PRO WO 4/3/23, Henry St. John to Bench of Justices of Southwark, 23 May 1704. 
70 TWAS QS/NC/1/3. This list of men was originally presented to the quarter sessions held on 24 July 
1704. 
71 Ibid., 17 January 1705. 
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Army service, especially in times of war, was an extremely dangerous occupation that 
carried with it the undesirable possibility of great hardship, soul-breaking discipline 
and even death. At the same time there was an extremely good chance that enlistment 
would result in service far from home and the real chance of the regiment being sent 
overseas. Another major factor that contributed to poor army recruitment in the 
eighteenth century was the pay of the private soldier. For much of the period it 
remained at a constant eight pence per day, despite the spasmodic nature of the 
economy and inflation during this period. 72 The idea of raising pay and improving the 
living standards of soldiers was not a major priority. 73 When one considers that in 
1710 a labourer in England could command a daily wage of between 14 and 15 pence 
per day, and a skilled craftsman 20 to 22 pence, the eight pence a day available to 
soldiers appears paltry reward. 74 This is even more apparent when deductions or 'off- 
reckonings' are taken into consideration. Thus soldiers remained at the bottom of the 
socio-economic ladder hovering precariously above `cottagers, paupers and 
vagrants. '75 Nevertheless, it must also be recognised that despite problems with pay, 
military service continued to be a popular way for men to escape various economic, 
social and domestic problems. 76 
The army and navy always offered a form of `signing-on' bonus to all volunteers in 
the hope that it would encourage enlistment. During times of peace, when the need 
for manpower was slight, these disbursements were relatively small. On the other 
hand, during wartime such recruiting money could be considerable. In 1703 the 
recruiting bonus stood at 40 shillings for every volunteer. 77 Even impressed men were 
offered money once they had accepted their fate. 78 In itself this might not seem a 
72 Brumwell, Redcoats, 57-8. 
73 Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted. ' 555. 
74 David L. Smith, A History of the Modern British Isles 1603-1707 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1998) 419. Agricultural labourers in County Durham were earning about six to eight pence per 
day in the 1750s. David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. Whickham 
1560-1765 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 242-6. 
75 As quoted in Brumwell, Redcoats, 58. 
76 Stephen Brumwell, 'Rank and File: A Profile of One of Wolfe's Regiments. ' JSAIIR, 89 (Spring 
2001) 14-5; David Kent, "'Gone for a Soldier. " Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion 
in a London Parish. ' Local Population Studies, 45 (1990) 27-42. 
77 Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne. ' 154. 
78 Men impressed in Newcastle in 1705 were being offered 20 shillings if they joined voluntarily once 
apprehended. MRO QSB 21/59,27 January 1705. 
67 
large sum. However, to many idle farm workers, general labourers and those carrying 
debts it would have represented a relatively handsome inducement. Regardless, such 
rewards did little to stimulate interest in military service amongst the civilian 
population. Aware of this problem, and willing to assist the recruiters, local 
authorities often used public money or set up subscriptions to offer additional pots of 
cash to lure potential recruits. These `bounties' were either advertised separately or as 
direct supplements to the money already offered to civilians for their enrolment in the 
forces. 
Despite almost constant warfare throughout the early part of the century, the town 
councils of the North East did little to encourage army recruitment through financial 
bonuses. This was not true of bounties for naval service, which were in use 
throughout the period, if not on a consistent or regular basis. 79 Nevertheless, the sheer 
necessity for men during the Seven Years War meant that the assistance of local 
communities was required more than ever. Therefore, it is no surprise that the 
commencement of the Seven Years War in 1756 also saw the beginning of an increase 
in the issuing of bounties for army service in the region. 
Even before the beginning of the European stage of the conflict, Berwick, which 
earlier in the century had largely refrained from offering bounties, began to advertise 
such incentives widely. In April 1756 the town council ordered that any men wishing 
to volunteer for service in Lord Charles Manners' Regiment of Foot for the term of 
three years, or until the cessation of hostilities, would receive one guinea `over and 
above the money given by such [recruiting] officers. 80 This money was to be paid 
from the corporation's own treasury. Similar bounties quickly followed in 1757,1758 
and 1759.81 The 1759 bounty was to be funded through a public subscription of 100 
guineas. Specifically, it offered an award of three guineas to any man who was not 
already enlisted in the militia if they volunteered for service in Colonel John 
Crawford's Regiment of Royal Volunteers or Colonel John La Fluselle's 66`h 
79 This was due in large part to the strategic importance of the navy throughout the century, as well as 
the key role that the region's coastal towns played in naval recruiting. 
80 BTRO GB 1/17/215,8 April 1756. 
81 Ibid., 1/17/215,265,426. 
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Regiment of Foot. 82 As was the case in Berwick, it was not until the Seven Years 
War that the governing corporation of Newcastle made serious exertions to issue 
bounty money. However, from this point there is a clear effort by the local leaders to 
engender much more enthusiasm for joining the army's ranks. From 1759 various 
endowments were issued and advertised by the corporation in order to assist the 
recruiting agents based in the town. 83 
In August 1759, in what the corporation termed `this time of imminent danger', a 
large subscription was set up at the Newcastle Bank to facilitate the enhancement of 
the regular enlistment money. 84 Matching the inducement given by Berwick's 
council, the regulations stipulated that any able-bodied men who enlisted in the 60h 
Regiment of Foot or in the Regiment of Royal Volunteers, within six weeks of the 
declaration, would receive two guineas in addition to the normal bounty money. 85 so 
eager were the local authorities to make a success of the subscription that they ordered 
the city's chamberlains to place £15 of the town's money into the bank. 86 After this 
however, army recruitment bursaries disappear from the town's records only to 
resurface during the American War of Independence. Upon the outbreak of hostilities 
in the colonies, Newcastle's council once again issued calls for money from the 
community to bolster recruitment. 87 In 1775 the council even ordered that the town 
donate £50 to a subscription used to aid soldiers serving in America. 88 Ominously 
foreshadowing the costly conflict to come, this endowment was also aimed at 
supporting the families of men killed in action. 89 Such efforts continued late into the 
war. In the summer of 1782 the corporation supplied 100 guineas to the mayor `to be 
applied by him in such a manner as he shall think best, as a bounty to encourage 
recruits to enter into His Majesty's land service. '90 
82 Ibid., 1/17/426,4 September 1759. 
83 TWAS MD/NC/2/5,1743-1766. 
84 Ibid., 2/5/336,28 August 1759. This imminent danger may have been the threat of invasion. 85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
$7 Ibid., 2/6,1766-1785. 
88 Ibid., 2/6/240,20 December 1775. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 2/6/369,13 July 1782. 
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Recruitment bursaries do not appear to have been used to any great extent before the 
Seven Years War, and their use ends after the American war. The bounties offered in 
Newcastle during 1782 were the last of their kind in the region 91 Even before this 
date naval recruitment had clearly become the local government's main focus for 
investment. In Berwick army recruitment bounties disappeared much earlier (1759). 
These too were largely replaced by inducements to join the navy. However, unlike in 
Newcastle there was also a concerted effort to supply money to help pay for 
substitutes for those of Berwick's burgesses who had been balloted into the militia. 
92 
From 1759 there is only one further attempt to supply the public with money for the 
army, but it had nothing to do with recruitment. Rather it was similar to the initiative 
by Newcastle officials to assist men already serving in foreign theatres of war. In late 
1793 Berwick's ruling council agreed to create a subscription of £50 which was to be 
used to buy shoes for soldiers fighting against France on the continent. 3 
Not surprisingly, the relative values of bounties and the number of subscriptions given 
to the navy were much greater than those gifted to the army. This is to be expected, as 
the nature of Tyneside's labour pool meant that it would always be more intimately 
connected with naval service. As Norman McCord has noted, by the end of the 
French Revolutionary Wars, Tyneside (including Sunderland) accounted for the 
largest number of naval recruits in the country outside of London. 94 Sometimes these 
rewards could be very generous, as was the case with the bounty issued by the 
corporation of Newcastle in 1776. It offered to pay two guineas on top of the £5 for 
an able seaman and £2,10s for ordinary seamen being awarded by the navy. 95 This 
was exceeded by the guild of Berwick who in 1779 generously offered £5,5s for able 
seamen and £3,3s for ordinary seamen. 96 However, the continued presence of press 
gangs in the region throughout the century illustrates that these generous recruitment 
bounties were not adequate to feed the Navy's voracious appetite for men. 
91 This includes the years directly after the outbreak of war with revolutionary France. 
92 Example of these can be found in 1759 and 1785; BTRO GB 1/17/446,5 October 1759 & GB 
1/20/384,6 May 1785. 
93 Ibid., 1/21/338,22 November 1793. 
94 Norman McCord, `The Impress Service in the North East During the Napoleonic Wars. ' Mariner's 
Mirror 54 (1968) 163-180; MRO QRQ 373/1/2-3, Navy Quota Act Returns. 
95 TWAS MD/NC/2/6/258,29 November 1776. 
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As the century progressed and the pressures on manpower continued, officials in the 
region's major towns began to make some effort to assist military recruitment. The 
relative success or failure of bounties as an inducement for enlistment is hard to 
measure with any precision. There are no existing records to indicate how many men 
took up the offer of extra money. Despite the omnipresent need to enhance the 
financial attractiveness of army service, monetary inducements were not employed 
widely until after the onset of war in 1756. Unfortunately these bonuses, while 
helpful, do not appear to have overcome the chronic problems of under-recruitment 
and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the region's civilian population to volunteer 
for military service. 
VI. The Social Cost of Recruiting. 
Periods of concentrated recruitment could have negative impacts on local 
communities. These derived from the indirect costs of pulling such a large number of 
relatively fit men out of the local population. Such costs were not necessarily 
financial in nature, but often engendered themselves in pleas for money to local 
governments and the quarter sessions. Men were sometimes taken from their families 
at very short notice, and in their absence the remaining members of the family unit 
could suffer severe hardship. Similarly, the death of a husband and father while in 
service could leave behind an impoverished family struggling to pay for essentials 
such as food and shelter. Although such hardship appears to have had a deeper effect 
on the families of impressed men, social deprivation could also be occasioned by 
voluntary enlistment into the army. 
On some occasions these social problems were the result of men absconding from 
their kin in favour of military service. David Kent has shown that there is a direct 
correlation between men deserting their families and the periods in which the country 
was at war. He states that cases of familial desertion rise significantly in times of 
war, and then drop when peace breaks out. 97 This trend is explained simply by the 
96 BTRO GB 1/19/309,28 June 1779. 
97 David Kent, "'Gone for a Soldier"' 30. 
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fact that during times of war there is an increased presence of recruiting parties in the 
In effect this cities, thus providing the husband with more opportunity to abscond 
98 
offered men who possessed `the inability to manage their affairs' a chance to escape 
commitments and other pressures. 99 
Unfortunately, determining the true social impact of recruitment within the North East 
is very difficult. The lack of a contiguous body of archival information makes any 
analysis problematic. 1°° Records from London appear to be voluminous and well 
maintained. However, there is little remaining in the local archives of Newcastle, 
Berwick, or Northumberland relating to eighteenth-century poor law, bastardy and 
settlement examinations. 101 Additionally, there is little in the way of secondary 
publications which have managed to preserve the records on the scale of what is 
available for London. 102 Despite this it is possible, through an analysis of 
Northumberland's existing quarter sessions records, to shed some light on the nature 
of the problems that civilians and the local government faced during periods of 
. 
intense recruitment. 
What is important to note is that the majority of existing petitions for relief from 
military families came during or soon after periods of war. Existing local records do 
not indicate any applications for poor relief in times of peace that are not directly 
related to men being recruited or impressed during a period of conflict. A lack of such 
entreaties during peacetime could be the result of the relaxed and overwhelmingly 
volunteer based recruitment environment that existed at these times. Sadly, as 
mentioned above, petitions for the poor relief caused by husbands who abandoned 
their families in peacetime are largely unavailable in the North East. What archival 
material does exist indicates that cases were not overwhelmingly concentrated in any 
98 Ibid., In times of war, desertion of a family in favour of army service could account for as much as 
25% of all poor relief examinations, while in times of peace it could be as little as 5%. 
99 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd., 1998) 90. 
100 For a general discussion of the poor law in the region see: Peter Rushton, 'The Poor Law, The Parish 
and the Community in North-East England, 1600-1800. ' Northern History 25 (1989). 
101 A similar problem is encountered in Chapter 4, as Newcastle's records for cases of bastardy are 
extremely poor. 
102 An excellent example of this, and one which I wish historians of the North East had similar access to 
is: Tim Hitchcock & John Black (eds. ) Chelsea Settlement and Bastardy Examinations. 1733-1766 
(London: London Records Society, 1999). 
72 
particular part of the century, although a small cluster occurs between 1704 and 1713. 
Similarly, it shows that the impact of impressment may have been a serious problem. 
Most of the petitions in this period are from families whose patriarch had been 
impressed. Furthermore, 50% of all petitions throughout the century clearly identify 
impressment, while only a few specifically mention volunteers. 
The case of John, Mary and Margaret Waite is typical of petitions to the local 
authorities. These three were orphans whose mother had died in childbirth not long 
after their father had been pressed into the army in April 1707.103 Luckily for them 
Jane Harris, a poor woman from Byker, had taken them in but could not support them 
without assistance from the parish. ' 04 In the same year it was reported to the local 
magistrates that Robert Nuthanke of Nafferton had been `taken away to be a soldier' 
despite having a young daughter and a heavily pregnant wife. ' 05 This had eventually 
led to the woman and her children becoming destitute. At the same meeting of the 
quarter sessions yet another civilian was pressing the local authorities for charity. 
Elizabeth Scott reported that she had no income and was unable to support her seven 
small children since her husband drowned while serving as a Marine. 106 In January 
1710 Margaret Steward petitioned the county for financial assistance, stating that she 
had been reduced to a `very mean and despicable condition' since her husband had 
been `forced illegally away into the Queen's service. ' 107 
Likewise Nicholas Whitfield had solicited the magistrates to afford him some 
financial support. During January 1713 this young man stated to the Christmas 
quarter sessions that his father had been pressed `a soldier into our Majesty's service, ' 
while Whitfield was still `an infant of tender years'. 108 He went on to explain that for 
the previous two years he had been supported by the charity of Mr Thomas Soulsby of 
Allendale. 109 However, Soulsby was threatening to turn Whitfield out of the house 
because he could no longer afford to support him. If this was to happen Whitfield 
103 MRO QSB 29/12,7 October 1708. 
104 Ibid. 
los Ibid., 26/44,16 July 1707. 
106 Ibid., 26/41,16 July 1707. 
107 Ibid., 31/23,11 January 1710. 
108 Ibid., 37/17,15 January 1713. 
109 Ibid. 
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feared that he would starve to death. l 10 At the 1741 midsummer quarter sessions in 
Morpeth, Elizabeth Todd, whose husband was recruited as a volunteer into the army 
in 1737, petitioned the magistrates for financial support. "" She testified to the fact 
that she had been left providing for a seven-year-old boy, but believed she could not 
`afford to live due to the prices of food and provisions. ' 112 Ann Stephens, the wife of 
a Scottish soldier in Brigadier Handasyde's Regiment of Foot, found herself in a 
similar situation to that of Elizabeth Todd. ' 13 She too had been made nearly destitute 
by her husband's recruitment, having to support three children. 114 At the time of her 
petition she did not know the whereabouts of her husband. In April 1741 Stephens 
was apprehended in the parish of Hartbourne as `a rogue and vagabond' and 
transported to Castle Garth in Newcastle, her claimed place of legal settlement. ' 15 
Forced resettlement was not unusual in cases where poverty-stricken military families 
were asking the town or parish administrators for welfare. In 1709 officials at 
Berwick reported that Jane Hume, the poor wife of a soldier, had come to the town 
with a child that had been born at Tynemouth in Northumberland. ' 16 She was ordered 
to take the child back `to the Parish of Tynemouth whence it came. '117 Similarly, in 
1760 Newcastle's quarter sessions ordered the wife and three children of the soldier 
Michael Anderson to be escorted from their lodgings in Newcastle to their suspected 
official place of settlement in the parish of Ryton, County Durham. "8 Such was the 
concern over the potential burden that might be imposed by this family that the 
officials in Ryton filed a formal protest against this action. ' 19 Regional administrators 
were keen to ensure that the families of soldiers who were appealing for support were 
residents of the immediate locality. When Nicholas Whitfield applied to the 
Northumberland magistrates in 1713, his sponsor Thomas Soulsby had to confirm that 
1 10 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., 83/20,15 July 1741. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 83/27,15 July 1741. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 BTRO QSB 8/1/10,10 October 1709. 
117 Ibid. 
118 TWAS QS/NC/l/7,16 April 1760. 
119 Ibid. 
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the young man was a native of Allendale before his case would be considered. 
120 
Likewise, if the appellants were found to be outsiders those same authorities were 
more than willing to return them to their legal place of settlement. 
121 
The illegal settlement of paupers, vagrants and their families was a major concern for 
many local leaders and magistrates. In towns such as Berwick and Newcastle this 
accounted for a large proportion of court business. 122 Regional authorities were not 
prepared to spend hard-pressed county and parish funds supporting people who were 
not native to their particular locality. This attitude appears to have been applied 
equally to petitions for poor relief from both military and civilian non-resident 
families. 123 It does not necessarily mean that civil leaders were not aware of, or 
prepared to help, those affected by conflict. 
VII. The Abuses of the Recruiting System. 
The eighteenth-century recruiting party had a notorious reputation as being an agency 
bent on taking men into the army by any means available to them. The example of 
George Farquhar's play The Recruiting Officer stands out in this respect. 124 It would 
be wrong to suggest that Farquhar's characters, and their evil deeds, were completely 
the work of fantasy. As was the case with many public shows at the time, this play 
was as much social commentary as it was entertainment. It must also be remembered 
that Farquhar actually produced the first draft of this work while on recruiting duty 
with his regiment in Shrewsbury. 125 Therefore, some of it must have been based on 
incidents he witnessed in the course of his duties. He wrote of various underhanded 
120 Although Whitfield applied for assistance at the Christmas sessions in January 1713, Soulsby gave 
his attestation on Whitfield's residence at the midsummer sessions at Ilexham. MRO QSB 37/17,15 
January 1713; QSB 36/20,16 July 1712. 
121 Numerous examples of this can be found in the quarter sessions records for the town of Berwick 
upon Tweed, which was particularly fastidious about the removal of paupers, vagrants and morally 
loose women. BTRO C 8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 1694-1815; BTRO C 15/14-15, 
Recognizances, 1702-1799. 
122 Gwenda Morgan & Peter Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 20. 
123 Again I refer to the records for Berwick upon Tweed. 
124 Farquhar, The Recruiting Officer. 
125 Ibid., 6. Farquhar was a Lieutenant in Orrey's Regiment of Foot based on the Irish establishment. 
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methods for getting men to enlist including bribery, drink and flattery, as well as plain 
trickery and deceit. 
If they had been widespread, such abuses would have placed great stress on civil- 
military relations in the region, such was the distaste for these activities in the general 
public. Despite instilling considerable powers in the hands of the local judiciary to 
oversee recruitment it could not stop the misadventures of the recruiting party, and 
abuses of the system did occur. Powerless to prevent the actual improprieties, 
magistrates still had the ability to redress the balance. Before any potential soldier 
was officially enlisted the magistrate could hear complaints and utilise his power to 
release men from their enlistment if they found that the accepted procedures and 
guidelines had not been followed. 
A popular preconception of recruiting abuse is that of the recruiting officer taking 
advantage of inebriated men, or getting them drunk, so they were easier to enlist. The 
historian Arthur Gilbert even supports this image by remarking that some recruiting 
agents had become very adept at slipping an unsuspecting man the King's shilling 
while he was drunk. 126 Further, in his defence of the 1703 Press Act, Bishop Burnet 
stated that the practice of getting volunteers by making men drunk was endemic. 127 
The utilisation of alcohol in recruiting was even encouraged by some serving officers 
according to Geoffrey Davis. He uses the example of Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Blackadder who publicly stated that liquor was a key factor in good recruiting and 
believed that `sobriety itself is here a bar to success. '128 On the surface it appears that 
the underhanded use of alcohol to get men to commit to military service was popular. 
In fact, if one believes the previous statement made by Gilbert, it was practically an art 
form amongst recruiters. It is hard to imagine that the provision of drink and the 
manipulation of drunkenness did not play a role in recruitment when one considers 
that alcohol abuse has been described as an epidemic in the eighteenth-century British 
'26 Arthur N Gilbert, `Why Men Deserted. ' 554. 
127 Geoffrey Davis, 'Recruiting in the Reign of Queen Anne. ' 154. 
128 Ibid., 155. 
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army. 129 Nevertheless, local records indicate that it was overzealous recruiting and 
impress officers who were the major problem. 
The largest block of direct evidence pointing to a substantial level of recruiting abuse 
comes from the activities of army press officers during the War of Spanish 
Succession. In this period, when the press acts were used regularly and extensively 
for the army as well as the navy, there were a considerable number of recruiting 
irregularities in the area. ' 30 In some circumstances it appears that a few officers were 
prepared to push the legal envelope and commit blatantly illegal acts in order to get 
men into uniform. This is clearly illustrated in the case of Alice Richardson of 
Newcastle. 
In September 1704 she wrote directly to Henry St. John, the Secretary at War, to 
complain about the impressment of her husband. She stated unequivocally that her 
spouse had `been-forced into Her Majesty's service, ' and made clear reference to the 
`several unwarrantable practices of Captain Mitford. i131 It was noted that Mitford was 
an officer in Lord Paston's Regiment of Foot and had been charged with co-ordinating 
recruiting and impressment for that unit. 132 In the same year he had overseen the 
delivery of a number of debtors and impressed men into his own Company. '33 In fact 
Mitford was something of a regular fixture on Newcastle's recruitment scene during 
the period. However, it also appears that he may have been one of the more 
unsavoury and unscrupulous recruiters in the region. 
In 1706 Mitford was once again the focus of another investigation into serious 
recruitment irregularities, this time in Northumberland. Anthony Forrester testified to 
the Easter session at Morpeth that a press gang consisting of Mitford, Ralph Watson 
and another man entered his house in Wylam and violently seized John Bone, 
129 Paul E Kopperman, "The Cheapest Pay": Alcohol Abuse in the Eighteenth-Century British Army. ' 
Journal of Military History, 60 (3) (1996) 445. 
130 Army press acts were passed in every year between 1704 and 1711 which represented the most 
continuous use of coercive army recruitment in the entire century. Gilbert, 'The Last Army Press. ' 7. 
131 PRO WO 4/3/73, Henry St. John to Mayor of Newcastle upon Tyne, 27 September 1704. 
132 Ibid. 
133 TWAS QS NC/1/3. 
77 
wounding him in the chest in the process. 134 According to the plaintiff, Bone could 
not have been subject to the army press as he had a legal calling. Forrester stated 
emphatically that Bone was the manager of his malting house, which was now under 
threat of closure because of the man's impressment. 135 However, this was not the 
only problem faced by the recruit and his employer at that time. Forrester had 
obtained a warrant forcing Watson and Bone to be examined by the justices over this 
incident, and duly presented it to the Lieutenant. Despite this, Mitford refused to 
release Bone, fuelling fears that he intended `to carry away the said John Bone with 
force and violence out of this country into Ireland or some other place beyond the 
seas. ' 136 Unfortunately, there is no further record of what became of John Bone or his 
captors, but what this incident illustrates is the lengths that some officers would go to 
in collecting recruits. 
A more ominous irregularity was committed against the husband of Jane Mercer of 
Belsay. While on his way to Newcastle, he and another man were impressed into the 
army by two sergeants named Robert Dodsworth and James Johnson. 137 Mrs. Mercer, 
incensed by the actions of the soldiers, demanded that her husband and the other man 
be taken before the magistrates in line with the normal practice `so that they might be 
examined properly and determined if they fit the category of the said act. ' 138 
Dodsworth refused to do this. Mercer also testified that Dodsworth had said that the 
men would go where he went and that `he would steal them away if possible so as that 
she [Jane Mercer] should never see them again. ' 139 The sergeant appears to have 
made good his threat as the quarter sessions were informed that since the incident 
Mrs. Mercer had not seen her husband and had no idea as to his whereabouts. 140 This 
was precisely the reason why there was a requirement that all impressed men be 
presented to the local magistrates or press commissioners. 
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In March 1757 the Secretary at War, Lord Barrington, was forced to intervene directly 
in a case at Berwick. The problem began when a local Member of Parliament named 
Mr Lister wrote to Barrington, also a Berwick MP, stating that the army had 
impressed one of his tenants, Stephen Booghen. 14' The gentleman pleaded with 
Barrington to order that the unfortunate man be discharged from the service as he was 
worth a personal fortune of £200.142 Despite the misjudgement of the recruiting 
officer, Mr Lister was not willing to see the armed forces go short of a man, and was 
agreeable to finding a substitute to replace the loss of Booghen to Beauclerk's 
regiment. 143 This plea for assistance to the country's most senior military 
administrator appears to have worked. Lord Barrington, usurping the jurisdiction of 
the magistrates, wrote directly to the commanding officer of Beauclerk's 2"d battalion 
instructing that Booghen be released back to his landlord. '44 
The civilian government's limited ability to protect it citizens from illegal 
impressment is reinforced by the extraordinary case of John Bright. In a petition for 
financial aid Bright, a resident of Rothbury, revealed how he had been impressed into 
the army while on his way to his native Holland. 145 The incident must have gone 
unnoticed and it is possible that he was pressed once he had arrived on the continent. 
If the press had been conducted legally within England a magistrate would have most 
certainly prevented Bright's enlistment, as he possessed documented proof that he had 
a `lawful calling' which exempted him from the press. 146 This did not happen and 
Bright was spirited away to serve in a theatre of war where he was shot and suffered 
several other injuries, resulting in him losing most of the sight in his eyes. 147 
As the above examples illustrate, the power and reach of the civilian authority was not 
omnipresent, and it was possible for illegal recruiting practices to take place. On rare 
occasions the very authorities entrusted with ensuring that the process was run in a 
legal and fair way committed these irregularities. In March 1708 the Secretary at War 








sent a robust letter to the Commissioners of Recruits in Cumberland who had sent two 
unsuitable pressed men to Newcastle to join a company of Colonel Caulfield's 
Regiment of Foot. 148 It had been reported that the men were 60 and 50 years of age 
and were `both seemingly infirm and unfit for service. ' 149 The Secretary at War left 
no doubts about the official position on such unsavoury practices. He commanded 
that the Cumberland officials ensure that such men were not entered into service in the 
future. 150 This case shows that even magistrates and tax commissioners could exceed 
their mandate from time to time. 
It was not simply abuses of the army recruiting system for which army personnel 
could be held responsible. On numerous occasions throughout the century members 
of the land forces were drafted in to assist the naval press. As was the case with 
impressment for the land service, members of the army occasionally committed 
abuses in the execution of their duties. The clearest example of this occurred in 1706 
just north of North Shields. David Thompson of Island Hall testified at the Easter 
quarter sessions that at around midnight on the 28`h of March, Captain George Ord 
and a number of soldiers had broken into his house brandishing swords and pistols. '5' 
They violently seized Mr Thompson's servant Phillip Barns, as well as a local skinner 
named Archibald Ainsley and George Towns, a lame seaman. Most importantly, they 
had done so without the presence of any civilian authority and without the 
presentation of the necessary warrant. The impressed men were bound and eventually 
taken to North Shields where they were placed aboard HMS Dunwick, which was 
anchored off Tynemouth. 152 So serious was the accusation that a warrant was issued 
to Captain Ord to appear before the quarter sessions to answer for his actions. 
Unfortunately, the account of that appearance no longer exists in the quarter sessions 
records. Nevertheless, it shows how far outside the legal boundaries some officers 
and men were prepared to go in their recruitment activities. Captain Ord did not 
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suffer any long-term punishment for his actions as the next year he was recorded as 
having taken delivery of impressed men at Tynemouth. '53 
The abuses that the authorities dealt with were not limited to the methods employed 
by recruiting parties or press gangs. On rare occasions they were also forced to 
intervene in complaints about the actual procedures for enlistment. In February 1705 
John Henderson, who had been a target of the press, presented himself before the 
justices as a volunteer. ' 54 He had done this to avoid being pressed and to gain the 
benefit of a 40 shilling bounty paid to all volunteers. However, the officer present 
was loath to grant Henderson his prize, refusing repeated demands for the money 
owed to him. ' 55 Somewhat aggravated by the officer's attitude, the magistrate took 
the view that it was proper that the man not be obliged to fulfil the requirements of 
enlistment if the army were not prepared to honour their commitments. 156 Henderson 
was dismissed from service, and absolved not only of his commitments as a volunteer, 
but also given exemption from any impressment in the future. 157 
What becomes apparent when one looks at the numerous examples of recruitment 
irregularities in the North East is the concentration of incidents during the early part of 
the eighteenth century. More surprising is the absence of complaints levelled against 
what could be described as the `traditional' recruiting party. There is no mention in 
local archival sources of men being tricked into enlisting by wily or unscrupulous 
recruiting officers. Neither are there any cases of men being enticed to sign-up after, 
being supplied with copious amounts of alcohol. This is not to say that such things 
did not happen, especially, in light of gaps in the region's legal records. Nevertheless, 
existing archival sources only provide examples of irregularities by the army impress 
service. In fact a majority of the existing documentation points to repeated 
irregularities committed by officers involved with the impressment of men during the 
War of Spanish Succession. Some of the reported transgressions were simply 
misunderstandings or cases of overzealous behaviour by members of the press. 
153 Ibid., 26/53,23 April 1707. 





However, others were simply outright cases of kidnap or blatant disregard for the rule 
of law. 
VIII. Public Resistance to the Recruiting Party and the Press Gang 
It would appear that army recruiting parties did not encounter much in the way of 
widespread public resistance when they `set out their stalls' in the towns of the North 
East. On the other hand the army and navy presses were often met with stubborn 
resistance throughout the eighteenth century. 158 However, resistance to recruitment 
did not end with the `regular' service's press gangs. Militia recruiters, who for the 
most part were members of the regional civilian government, periodically found life 
as tough as their counterparts in the regular forces. The introduction of a reformed 
militia in 1757 was met with widespread and often highly organised hostility. In 1760 
Hexham witnessed the bloodiest yet most under-reported case of opposition to the 
Militia Bill. 1$9 There appears to have been an undercurrent of public angst against 
forms of compulsive recruitment. 
This public anxiety of impressment, and the active and moral opposition it created, 
was not strictly a product of endemic eighteenth-century warfare. The process of 
pressing the `sturdy poor' during the conflagrations of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries was widespread and caused tension between the military and civilians. 160 
This was especially true during the Civil War when public tension increased 
dramatically as nearly 100,000 men were pressed into service at the height of 
ploughing seasons. 16' Additionally, people's horses and wagons were frequently 
pressed into service, often without the necessary remuneration. The dislike 
engendered by these army presses were alleviated to some extent by the Restoration of 
158 An example of this widespread resistance can be seen in the orders by the Secretary at War to army 
commanders in April 1711 instructing them to supply military assistance to `Civil Magistrates doing 
their duty in putting the Act of Parliament for Recruiting the Land Forces... ' should they meet any 
`tumultuous Riots' that may arise as a result. PRO WO 4/12/17, Granville to Sir John Gibson, 7 April 
1711. 
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1660 which aimed to move away from the militarisation of government that was 
becoming more common on the continent. 162 Despite this it is easy to understand how 
such strong feelings of antagonism could be easily reawakened when the army 
reintroduced these vigorous and intrusive methods of recruitment in the early 
eighteenth century. 
Arthur Gilbert has stated that distrust of the army was so widespread that activities 
such as impressment only helped to fuel civilian resistance. 163 He also claims that the 
press was so unpopular and ideologically offensive to local officials that they would 
actively attempt to undermine the process. 164 This could even include influential 
members of the community attempting to intimidate constables responsible for 
carrying out the pressing of men. 165 Such was the problem of public resistance to the 
army press that in 1706 the government gave justices the power to issue a £5 fine to 
anyone found guilty of disrupting or resisting the impress service. This measure did 
little to end the chronic interference of the general public and in 1708 the fine was 
increased to £10.166 Despite the claim of general antipathy in the nation as a whole, 
this does not appear to have been the prevailing view amongst officials in the North 
East. The main resistance to army impressment came from ordinary people, although 
this was in no way widespread, organised or endemic. 
A motivating factor in the public's opposition to the press in the North East can be 
found in the concentration of attempts to enforce such measures. Press acts were 
always applied evenly across the country and for this reason the towns and cities of 
the North East often found themselves simultaneously subject to both an army and 
navy press. For example, in March of 1756 orders were sent to Lord Charles 
Manners' Regiment of Foot quartered at Newcastle and Gateshead to `receive such 
impressed men as the Commissioners and your Officers shall judge to be such as are 
intended to be entertained as Soldiers in His Majesty's service. '167 Even then the 
men were being recruited to serve as marines, many of whom would spend much of 
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their time aboard ships of the Navy. 168 At the same time naval press-gangs were 
moving into the area in an attempt to bolster manpower aboard the country's 
fighting ships. The pressures that this created were bound to spill over and ignite 
some anger. 
In the summer of 1704 Robert Bambrough, a constable near Stannington in 
Northumberland, personally experienced the distaste the public had for the army 
press. He was given a warrant by three local justices to apprehend John Howe as a 
likely candidate to serve in Lord Paston's regiment. 169 This was done, and 
Bambrough took his captive to Stannington for transport to Morpeth, where the man 
was to be sworn to the colours. Fearing that the recruit might try to make his escape, 
the constable enlisted the aid of the local population to guard him. 170 Unfortunately, 
the three men charged with assisting Bambrough in watching Howe flatly refused to 
`aid or assist' the constable. '7' As a result the pressed-man was able to make his 
escape. 
Many of the attempts to impede the civilian and military authorities in their impress 
duties were not as passive as the above incident. At the Christmas quarter sessions of 
1706, held in Morpeth, a more aggressive episode was reported. A constable by the 
name of Joseph Reed, and Lieutenant Wilson of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, had 
encountered stubborn resistance in their attempt to press Mark Charlton. He was an 
idle man from the village of Gunnerton. 172 Wilson and Reed, accompanied by a petty 
constable, were prevented from entering Charlton's dwelling as his brother Edward 
had blockaded himself and Mark in the house. Edward then picked up a large rock 
and threatened death to either man if they should attempt to take his brother away to 
the army. 173 At that point a group of women appeared and began to verbally abuse the 
recruiters. One of them, Elizabeth Crichton, denied that Mark Charlton was an `idle' 
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man as he had been employed as her servant for more than one year. 174 Despite the 
fact that neither Wilson nor Reed believed this attestation, they were forced to 
withdraw from the area for fear of their safety, and of inflaming the local population's 
passions. Interestingly, John Shaftoe, the petty constable who was with them at the 
time, was charged with failing to execute his office. This may have indicated his 
unwillingness to assist the constable and the lieutenant in the face of such stem public 
resistance. 175 
The next month two petty constables from Morpeth were attacked by a group of 
women who facilitated the escape of a recruit they were escorting to gaol. '76 One of 
the constables, Edward Brown, was even pulled off of his horse and severely beaten 
by the mob. 177 The following year an impressed man named Thomas Davis was 
rescued by another group while he was being conveyed to Captain Ord at Tynemouth 
Castle. While passing through North Shields the constable attending the pressed man 
was stopped by a local man named Benjamin Reed, who demanded to see the warrant 
for the delivery of Davis. '78 After producing the document Reed irreverently declared 
that `the majesty was a fool and the Captain [Ord] another and they might both kiss 
his arse. ' 179 At this point Reed refused to let the lawman proceed any further, and 
under the serious threat of violence from the group of civilians, the constable was 
forced to leave his captive at North Shields and retreat back to Newcastle. ' go 
An even more violent incident occurred in the winter of 1708. Constable William 
Hudson had apprehended a man he knew had fled to Hexham, who fitted the 
description of the existing army press act. ' 81 While conveying him out of the town 
Hudson was attacked by Elizabeth and Edward Byers who were accompanied by a 
group of unknown people. 182 The constable was unable to fend off the gang of 
civilians and the recruit was rescued and spirited away. Only a few months later 
174 Ibid. 
'7s Ibid. 
176 Ibid., 24/72,20 February 1706. 
'77 Ibid. 
178 Ibid., 26/52,23 April 1707. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid., 29/88,12 January 1709. 
182 Ibid. 
85 
another constable named Thomas Richardson faced a similar fate. While attempting 
to apprehend James Dalglish under the provisions of the recruiting act he was 
confronted by a local woman named Mary Ogle. 183 With her accomplices, and a show 
of physical force, she managed to rescue Dalglish from Richardson's custody. 
184 
The hostility of some civilians to the press was matched by the disinterest amongst 
some military officers for their duties in this area. This seems especially true of 
wartime impress activities after 1755. After this date there are several 
communications between the War Office and officers of regiments serving in 
Newcastle commanding them to ensure that officers attend the meeting of the press 
commissions. During April 1756 Lord Charles Manner, the commanding officer of 
the 56th Regiment of Foot stationed in Newcastle, was encouraged by the Secretary at 
War (Lord Barrington) to ensure that his absentee `officers do attend the meeting of 
the Commissioners. ' 185 Only a few months later a similar problem arose. In 
November Colonel Beauclerk's regiment was due to receive a group of pressed men. 
However, the Secretary at War was forced to write to Beauclerk to report that 
Newcastle's commissioners had stated that `their meetings were considered 
ineffectual for want of officers to receive such men as were ready to be turned over to 
them. ' 186 While there is no conclusive evidence to indicate this to be a general 
problem it does appear that problems were widespread in Beauclerk's regiment. In 
addition to the incident mentioned above, the Secretary at War noted that he had 
received complaints from several commissioners in Northumberland, Westmorland, 
Cumberland and Durham, where parts of the same regiment were quartered. ' 87 This 
warning does not seem to have been widely received. In January 1756 Lord 
Barrington again wrote to commanders in Newcastle, Durham and 13 other English 
towns giving them express orders to make it their `particular business' to ensure that 
officers attended the meetings of commissioners and accept delivery of the men 
selected for their regiments. ' 88 
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This problem appears to have been compounded by the fact that the officers, apart 
from not always being present, sometimes refused to accept the men given to them 
when they did attend. Again Beauclerk's officers were at the centre of such a dispute 
during November 1751, having refused to take the men offered to them by the 
authorities at Newcastle. 189 There is no reason to suspect that the recruits in question 
suffered from any dysfunction or ailments as they had been judged fit to serve as 
soldiers by the magistrates. 190 Nevertheless, the officers made their judgement on the 
pretence that `they [the men] did not come up to the Recruiting Instructions given by 
their Commanding Officers. "91 This incident may have been the result of the 
discomfort that some senior officers had with the standards set for impressed men. 
The reminder to Colonel Beauclerk to ensure that his officers `accept recruitment 
standards of the Act and do not give their own instructions, preferences or standards 
to their officers' illustrates this. 192 
IX. Desertion 
As was alluded to in the introduction of this chapter, desertion like recruitment, was 
an important phenomenon in the eighteenth-century British army. Not only did the 
army have to make huge efforts to fill the ranks with men but equally strenuous efforts 
were required to keep those same men from fleeing their units. Every year hundreds 
of British soldiers abandoned the colours compounding the army's chronic manpower 
problems. This was especially true in times of war when a vicious circle emerged in 
which recruits became acutely scarce even as the rate of desertion increased. 
Additionally, it had serious financial and resource implications, not only for the armed 
forces, but also for local and central government officials. 193 Officers were forced to 
replace the natural wastage created by war and disease, while at the same time 
188 Ibid., 4/1012/37, Secretary at War to Commanders of His Majesty's Regiments, 6 January 1756. 
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spending precious resources pursuing deserters in co-operation with local government 
bodies and legal officials. Regardless of the effort and cost, apprehending those 
`absent without leave' did not necessarily mean getting them back. Many were 
executed, transported, forced to serve in overseas regiments, or even crippled by the 
harsh corporal sentences imposed upon them. For officers, and especially those in 
command of a regiment, regular desertions could be financially catastrophic. '94 
The reasons why men deserted the British army in the eighteenth century are as varied 
as the reasons why other men enlisted. It would be misleading to generalise that the 
main factor for such behaviour was the overriding need to escape from the brutality 
and strict discipline of martial life, or a rejection of a military `ethos' or soldier's `way 
of life'. 195 Stephen Brumwell notes that the most frequent reasons for desertion 
appear to be misjudgement brought on by drunkenness or fear of punishment for some 
misdemeanour. 196 However, other reasons for desertion are grounded in more 
practical concerns. For many soldiers escape from the army was often directly linked 
to a soldier's conception of personal justice, fairness and contractual obligation. 197 
Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, many regular soldiers seem to have 
possessed a keen awareness of the terms and conditions under which they had enlisted 
and were prepared to defy army authority and discipline in defence of their 'rights'. 198 
There were numerous incidents of soldiers deserting as a result of ill treatment, lack of 
pay, or poor conditions. 199 On the other hand Arthur Gilbert, while sharing some of 
Brumwell's conclusions, believes that a large number of desertions occurred as a 
result of impressment or from men being wrongfully recruited? °° John Childs even 
believes that the `prodigious' desertion of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
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centuries was part of an `under-legislated society' where people regularly absconded 
from civilian commitments as well. 201 
A picture of the problem as it existed in the North East can be observed in War Office 
and local archival records. In only four months between 12 August and 30 November 
1757,162 deserters were caught throughout the country. 202 Ten of these men were 
caught while in the `northern district', which included Cumberland, Westmoreland, 
Northumberland and Newcastle. 203 A similar number of men deserted from regiments 
actually based in the North East at the time. Six of these came from General 
Bocland's Regiment of Foot based in and around Newcastle. 204 Another two soldiers 
were originally members in Holmes' Regiment of Foot also quartered at Newcastle. 
The remaining two were from Berwick, one from Beauclerk's Regiment of Foot and 
another from a regiment of invalids stationed in that town. 205 From these records it 
does appear that soldiers managed to get a fair way from their units before being 
captured. Only three of the deserters were captured while still within the North East. 
Joseph Burnell, the enterprising invalid from Berwick, managed to get as far as 
Birmingham before being caught and handed over to the military authorities. 06 
Further evidence from the records for Berwick upon Tweed illustrates the number of 
deserters being captured in the region. Between 1766 and 1790,49 men were 
presented to the council or were being held in the town's gaol awaiting trial or waiting 
to be shipped to London for appearances before the General Court Martial207 While 
this may seem a great deal it must be remembered that this represents a 24 year period 
and in only seven of these years did Berwick's gaols contain more than 2 deserters. 208 
The scale of the problem was not due to a lack of determination on the part of the 
military authorities to discipline those found guilty of desertion. Punishment was 
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often extremely harsh. Soldiers convicted of desertion could expect to face sentences 
of between 300 to 500 lashes, although in extreme cases a man may have been 
sentenced to more than 1000 lashes. 209 Such severe penalties could cripple, maim and 
even kill men. Surgeons were kept in attendance to judge if the victim could handle 
more punishment and on occasions convicts were brought out of hospital several 
times to take the next instalment of their chastisement. 210 Even if they did not die, the 
soldier's services were often lost to the regiment for a long period of time while they 
recovered. 
There are some indications that the brutality meted out to deserters eased as the 
century progressed. Court martial records show that the majority of men convicted of 
desertion between 1729 and 1735 had their sentences carried out as judged. 2t' 
However, over time the proportion of men whose punishments were substantially 
reduced or completely remitted increased. Of the 129 soldiers tried for desertion 
between 1746 and 1757,27 men had their sentences reduced and 50 were pardoned. 212 
Even the number of men being executed was in decline. 213 Nevertheless, it was very 
rare for a soldier to be pardoned outright and all those ordered to die for their crimes 
were punished one way or another. For example, of the 20 men handed death 
sentences between 1746 and 1757,7 were executed while 13 had their punishments 
pardoned on condition that they served in regiments overseas. 214 
For the unlucky deserters who faced death, many of their executions were carried out 
in full view of the public. This was done to make examples out of the transgressors 
and deter further desertion, as much as to actually punish the deserter. 215 A number of 
these open demonstrations of military justice took place in the towns of the North East 
throughout the century. In 1746 Alexander Anthony, a soldier in General 
209 PRO WO 71/20-2, General Court Martial proceedings, 1746- August 1757; PRO WO 71/65, 
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Cholmondley's regiment, was shot in front of a large crowd on Newcastle's town 
moor for deserting and then enlisting in the French service. 216 In the same year an 
Irishman and Welshman were publicly executed in the town of Berwick for leaving 
the King's forces and enrolling themselves in the `Pretender's' army. 217 The next year 
George Maccan, a soldier in General Guise's regiment at Berwick, was executed by 
firing squad for deserting on four separate occasions. 218 Not only was the onerous 
Maccan a serial deserter but he was also described as being `much addicted to 
stealing. )219 William Bland, who had absconded from General Bocland's Regiment of 
Foot while quartered in Newcastle, was also shot on the town moor in February 
1758.220 It would appear that Mr Bland had deserted in order to rectify the financial 
difficulties that had befallen his family as a result of his recent impressment. 221 The 
next year Jeremiah Bell was executed at Sunderland for `repeated desertion' from 
Colonel La Faussille's Regiment of Foot. 222 One can only speculate that such public 
displays only helped to reinforce the army's reputation for brutal justice and 
discouraged many potential recruits. 
While the reasons for deserting were numerous, so was the point in their service when 
men chose to desert. Some did not even make it to their regiments after having taken 
the oath of service and accepting the `royal shilling'. This was especially true of those 
pressed into service. Arthur Gilbert has estimated that nearly 15% of all men pressed 
into the army would never reach their regiments, and that a large proportion of these 
deserted. 223 It seems as though this situation may have lasted throughout much of the 
century, or at least until the end of army presses in 1779. So bad was the problem 
amongst pressed men that in late 1779 Charles Jenkinson, the Secretary at War, 
believed impressed men were untrustworthy and their service should be concentrated 
in the West Indies where escape was difficult. 224 
215 Brumwell, Redcoats, 106. 
216 John Sykes, Local Records, Vol. I (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 184. 217 Ibid., 183. 
218 Ibid., 185. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Gilbert, 'Why Men Deserted. ' 562. 
221 Ibid.; Sykes, Local Records, 221 
222 Newcastle Courant, 4319,30 June 1759. Sykes records the date as 25 June 1758 but this seems 
unlikely in the face of the existing newspaper report. 
223 Gilbert, 'Army Impressment. ' 698; and 'Why Men Deserted. ' 554-5. 224 Gilbert, `The Last Army Press. ' 10. 
91 
The archival records for the North East record very few impressed men deserting from 
their regiments or the impress gangs themselves. 
225 Those cases that survive tend to 
be concentrated at the beginning of the century when army impressment was most 
widespread. 226 There is one extreme example from 1706 when a group of 30 recently 
pressed men deserted their recruiters en masse at Wooler in Northumberland. 
227 The 
local justices were fairly sure that the men had removed themselves to Scotland they 
`being so nigh hand the boundary of Scotland. '228 Two other examples occurred 
during 1708 when impressed soldiers by the names of George Ridley and Thomas 
Reveley escaped from their regiments and, after some local resistance, were 
apprehended. 229 More men could have been involved as Reveley was part of a group 
of deserters known to be hiding in the region. 230 Further examples of this activity 
exist but they will be discussed later as they directly relate to the subject of public 
support for desertion. 
There are also a number of instances where men absconded between the point of 
recruitment and delivery to their units. Unlike the cases of impress desertions these 
are spread throughout the century. For example, in 1755 Thomas Crookhall was held 
for desertion at Cockermouth in Cumberland, and was eventually `delivered to the 
officer who enlisted him. 231 Several decades later William Whitfield deserted from a 
recruiting party attached to the 1s` Regiment of Foot Guards based in Brentford, 
Middlesex. 232 The enterprising renegade managed to evade the authorities for several 
weeks before being identified and captured in Berwick. 233 The town's gaol was home 
to other men such as Whitfield. In 1782 David Martin escaped recruiters from the 3fl 
Battalion of Royal Artillery while they were in Warkworth234 Not long after this 
Robert Blackadder admitted to absenting himself from the 78 `h Regiment (while 
225 There is a possibility that a fuller examination of the WO 4 series (Out-Letters Deserters) may 
highlight additional examples but for the most part this resource simply lists the deserters name and 
regiment and/or place of confinement. 
226 The exception to this was William Bland mentioned above. 
227 MRO, QSB 21/8,9 February 1705 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid., 28/30,19 June 1708; 28/70,14 July 1708. 
230 Ibid., 28/70,14 July 1708. 
231 PRO WO 4/594/20, Out Letters (Deserters), 1 November 1755. 
232 BTRO C/15/15, Settlement Records, Examinations, 18 March 1779. 
233 Ibid. 
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actually based in Berwick) on the very same day he enlisted . 
235 Finally, in August 
1790, John Newton was being held as a deserter in Berwick after fleeing his recruiting 
party when it stopped in Newcastle under Lyme. 236 
One interesting trend that arises from an analysis of the detailed records held at 
Berwick is the propensity of some men to re-enlist themselves in one or more 
regiments after their initial desertion. Of the 49 men held for desertion in Berwick 
between 1766 and 1790 eight fit this category. 237 Typical of this type of deserter were 
two men detained in Berwick during 1766. William Pound had been brought before 
members of the quarter sessions by another soldier named James Edward, accused of 
being a deserter. 238 During a voluntary examination Pound admitted that he was `late 
a private in 34th Regiment of Foot commanded by Lord Frederick Cavendish. '239 
Further questioning revealed that the deserter had joined that regiment two years 
earlier but had absconded from his post eight months later. Despite having freed 
himself from service, Pound decided eight months later to enlist himself again as a 
private in General Boscawen's Regiment of Foot. 240 
The second man, Thomas Casely, had a history of desertion very similar to that of 
William Pound. He was also presented to the authorities in Berwick by a fellow 
soldier, on this occasion a private named John Povey. During his examination Casely 
described his enlistment as a private in the 1St Regiment of Foot Guards in 1761, and 
his eventual rise to the rank of sergeant. 41 Regardless of his relative success Casey 
deserted the Foot Guards in October or November 1765.242 Not long after he enlisted 
with Boscawen's regiment while at Gloucester, and was still serving in this unit when 
he was delivered to Berwick's legal officials. 243 While these are the two most 
complete accounts, William Pound and Thomas Casely were not alone in their 
234 Ibid., C/15/16,7 November 1782. 
235 Ibid., 26 December 1787. 
236 Ibid., 6 April 1790. He deserted from the 3`d Foot Guards after he had been recruited in Manchester 
during early July 1790. 
237 This represents 16.3% of all men held in this period. BTRO, C/15/15-16, Settlement Records, 
Examinations 1760-1790. 
238 Ibid., C/15115,22 May 1766 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid., 9 June 1766. 
242 Ibid. 
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deception. Two years later George Ross was accused of deserting from the 25`h 
Regiment of Foot 244 He described how he had deserted from the regiment in 1756, 
five days after his recruitment, only to immediately enlist with the 71St Regiment of 
Foot in the Scottish town of Dingwall. 245 However, one man proved to be more 
brazen than the rest. Thomas Brooks was a marine who had been accused of deserting 
the Portsmouth Division of Marines. 246 During his examination it became apparent 
that he had also deserted from the both the 6`h and 22nd Regiments of Foot 247 
While it is almost impossible to say exactly why men would desert and re-enlist there 
are a number of possible explanations. Stephen Brumwell has indicated that 
considerable numbers of discharged soldiers volunteered for further service because of 
necessity, disillusionment with civilian life, or even because they missed the soldier's 
life. 248 On occasions discharge from the army isolated some soldiers from the sense 
of `home' or `community' that they had become familiar with in their former 
regiments. 249 There is no reason why this could not have also been a factor for those 
deserters who later re-enlisted, but proving this is difficult. It is also important to 
remember, as illustrated earlier, that some desertions could have been the result of 
dissatisfaction with officers or conditions of service. Therefore, it may be the case that 
some men deserted and then looked for a `better' experience in a different regiment. 
There is also the possibility that repeated enlistment and desertion was the result of 
unscrupulous or opportunist men using recruitment bounties as a form of income. 
It was not only new recruits who deserted when given the chance. In an ironic twist 
there are a limited number of instances in which soldiers deserted from their 
regiments while actually serving in recruiting parties. In 1774 John Thomas, a private 
soldier in the 66h Regiment of Foot quartered at Berwick, was charged with desertion 
from the 60th Regiment of Foot. 250 As it turned out Thomas had volunteered with the 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid, 25 April 1768. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid, 14 July 1769. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Brumwell, Redcoats, 81-2. 
249 Ibid., 119-20. 
250 BTRO C15115,20 April 1774 
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60th in 1764 and had been shipped to New York where the regiment was stationed . 
25i 
Eight years later he was given the opportunity to return to his homeland as part of a 
regimental recruiting party. Not wanting to return to the Americas, he deserted three 
months later while on duty at Exeter. 252 Similarly, in 1786 Joseph Mulley deserted 
from his post as a drummer in the 23rd Regiment of Foot, while on a recruiting 
assignment in Morpeth. 253 
For those inclined to desert from the army, serving in a recruiting party must have 
provided a particularly attractive opportunity. These small groups of men were often 
based a long distance from their regiments, especially if it was stationed overseas. 
Additionally, it would have been difficult for officers to keep men from wandering 
off, as very often they did not possess the resources to continuously guard all members 
of the recruiting party. This is very different from those who deserted from a 
regimental encampment or their billets. In these cases there would have been formal 
patrols and guards, and thus a higher risk of being caught while attempting to escape. 
Public support for desertion or deserters was present within the North East although it 
appears to have been limited in its scope. It tended to manifest itself in two distinct 
forms. The first of these were attempts by civilians to incite soldiers to give up the 
British army or to desert and join the enemy. In 1706 an unnamed Newcastle resident 
was charged with `soliciting John Phinney a soldier in Captain Hall's Company to 
desert. '254 Unfortunately, the reasons behind Phinney's attempt to sow discontent in 
the soldier's mind are not known, as the details of the case have been lost.. While such 
activity was not foreign to the towns of the region, surviving records indicate that it 
was not widespread. Much more serious were the attempts by civilians, or enemy 
agents, to solicit British soldiers away from their colours and into the service of 
foreign armies. During September of 1739 Robert Given was tried before the assizes 
with attempting to enlist British soldiers based in Northumberland into the French 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid., 14 January 1786. 
254 TWAS QS/NC/1/3,4 May 1709. 
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army. 255 He was accused of giving a sergeant from Colonel Howard's regiment a 
piece of gold to abandon the King's service and go over to the French. 256 
The second form of support for desertion was the overt public support for, or defence 
of, soldiers who had already deserted from their regiments. Most commonly civilians 
protected deserters from recapture by the government authorities. A few went as far 
as to rescue men who had already been apprehended by local law enforcement 
officials. In the winter of 1708 a group of men, including local constables and 
William Leighton, a soldier in Brigadier McCartney's Regiment of Foot, went in 
search of a fellow soldier by the name of George Ridley. 257 He had deserted from the 
regiment not long after being pressed. The group soon tracked down and recaptured 
Ridley near Millcrag. Leighton and his party took him to the house of a local man 
named Ridley Havelock, where they were refused any co-operation. 258 In the absence 
of any assistance they carried on, hoping to convey the deserter further. Not long after 
this the men were stopped on the road by Ann Havelock, Jane and Margaret Ridely 
(the wife of the deserter and her sister), and six other women including Mary 
Havelock (wife of Ridely Havelock). Then, in what appears to be an act of familial 
protectionism, the arresting posse was `violently assaulted and beat' while George 
Ridley was rescued and spirited away. 259 
In the same year David Sutton was tasked with apprehending some deserters known to 
be `lurking' about the village of Lucker. 260 Sutton and his fellow constables 
eventually located one of the men, known as Thomas Reveley, and took him into 
custody. Despite having drawn their swords, a group of the deserter's friends, 
including six women and three men, attacked Sutton and his colleagues with sticks 
and rocks, forcing them to retreat. Additionally, the warrants to apprehend other 
deserters and to impress idle men were confiscated and destroyed by the crowd. 261 
255 PRO ASSI 45/21/4/18b, 23 September 1739. 
256 Ibid. 
257 MRO QSB 28/30,19 June 1708; The annual Mutiny Acts stated that soldiers could only apprehend 
deserters if accompanied by a constable, peace officer or other civilian official. PRO WO 4/88/293,25 
April 1771. 
258 MRO QSB 28/30,19 June 1708 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid., 28/70,14 July 1708 
261 Ibid. 
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During the fracas one of the gang members decried the constables for their actions, 
stated his disgust at the warrant and expressed utter disdain for the recruiting acts of 
Parliament. 262 Not only was this an instance of public support of deserters, it also 
illustrates the contempt and open hostility that some members of society carried for 
the laws that allowed impressment into the army. 
Assisting deserters did not necessarily have to manifest itself in the type of physical or 
violent opposition that saved George Ridley from recapture. In 1711 John Wilson and 
Robert Thompson were reported as having absconded from Colonel Kirk's Regiment 
of Foot. 263 Robert Hart, a Sergeant from the regiment, was sent in search of the men. 
His investigation led him to Horseley and the home of Thomas Thompson, Roberts' 
father. 264 In the house, Hart found two coats and a waistcoat of regimental clothes 
concealed in a firkin. When questioned, Thomas Thompson confessed that he had 
lent a coat and waistcoat to his son and John Wilson before they had left for 
Newcastle. 265 
The above examples illustrate the prominent role played by family and friends in the 
support and protection of deserters. There is an indication that family connections and 
community support, if available, could be important to individual soldiers in their 
attempts to avoid capture. Friends, sympathetic bystanders, and especially family 
members, were prepared to commit themselves to various levels of obstruction in 
order to aid their kin and friends. This appears to have been particularly common in 
situations where the soldier had deserted impressment. Civilian acquaintances and 
family members were prepared to oppose the authorities in order to prevent these men 
from being returned to a service into which they had been forcefully recruited. The 
previous examples highlight that such action could be extremely aggressive and even 
violent. This was especially true when civilians were attempting to prevent the 
recapture of deserters by the authorities. The characteristics inherent in this type of 
resistance seem to mirror civilian opposition to the practice of impressment within the 
region, although the occurrences are much less frequent. 
262 Ibid., It is almost certain that he was referring to the Army Impress Act of that year. 





Issues concerning recruitment and desertion were central to Britain's ability to 
prosecute the numerous wars that populated the eighteenth century. Consequently, the 
mobilisation of manpower was a major component of military activity within the 
North East throughout the period. Press gangs carrying men off, and recruiting parties 
beating the drum for volunteers, were common sights in the region. 
266 At the same 
time army officers regularly worked closely with local political and legal officials in 
order to facilitate the recruitment process and to retrieve deserters. On the other hand, 
those same magistrates exercised a considerable level of autonomy from the military 
when arbitrating and investigating recruitment irregularities. All of this activity was 
experienced by the local civilian population, and as such heavily influenced the course 
of civil-military relations within North-East communities. 
Leaders within the North East appear to have done much to assist army recruitment 
during the century. During the early part of the century, and in particular the War of 
Spanish Succession, they played a key role in helping to co-ordinate and collect 
vagrants and debtors. They were also central to the eventual enlistment of these men 
into the forces. While on the surface it would seem that the region contributed 
significantly to these efforts, the lack of depth in local primary sources makes it 
difficult to determine the exact numbers of men who were pressed into service. 
Furthermore, local business and political interests were often central in attempts to 
provide civilians with cash inducements to join the army. Although these did not 
come into existence until later in the century, and were never as lucrative or common 
as naval enlistment bounties, they were an important indication of the local elite's 
support for recruitment. 
Although the exact numbers of deserters and impressed men is hard to determine in a 
strictly local context, gauging public reaction and resistance to these phenomena is 
266 As noted in Chapter 2 the use of impressment for the army declined as the century progressed but 
naval impressment continued and even increased in intensity. 
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much easier. The presence and activities of traditional recruiting parties seems to 
have generated little in the way of protest, scandal or discord. On the other hand 
impressment and desertion generated a more passionate and dangerous response in 
many local communities. This was especially true in the early part of the century when 
army impressment was at its most intense in the region. On occasion members of the 
public obstructed constables from carrying out their duties, and even attempted to 
rescue recently impressed men and captured deserters. It was not unusual for this 
direct action to manifest itself in acts of violence and intimidation. What is interesting 
to note is the level of familial and community protectionism inherent in this form of 
resistance. Those doing the rescuing or obstruction were often directly related or 
known to the person being rescued or protected. 
It is important to recognise that this hostility does not necessarily indicate a rebellious 
tendency within the local community, nor is it proof of a popular undercurrent of 
distaste for the army. Rather, resistance seems to have been an attempt by local 
people to protect associates and family members from being forced into military 
service and to prevent the recapture of those who deserted after impressment. 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Billeting and Garrisons on Civil-Military Relations 
`We have ruined half the public houses on 
the march; because they have quartered us 
in villages too poor to feed us without 
destruction to themselves. ' 
Lieutenant Colonel James Wolfe 
20`" Regiment of Foot, May 1756' 
I. Introduction. 
Throughout the eighteenth century considerable numbers of troops were stationed in 
Britain to provide domestic security. 2 Due to the inadequate provision of purpose- 
built garrisons the billeting of soldiers upon landlords and innkeepers was a key 
feature of the `home establishment'. Certainly, billeting was a major component of 
the army's garrison planning in the North East, and particularly in the town of 
Newcastle, which did not have barracks built until very late in the eighteenth century. 
The garrison experience, and billeting in particular, generated regular contact between 
soldiers and civilians, as well as officers and local leaders. As such it had huge 
implications for civil-military relations in the region. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to analyse the influence these contacts had on the army and the communities 
of the North East. 
1 Quote taken from: J. A. Houlding, 'Fit For Service. ' The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 39. 
2 For a breakdown of the domestic establishment see Appendix A, and for estimated troops 
concentrations in the North East refer to Table 2.1. 
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First however, it is important to define the parameters of this chapter. This is 
particularly true of its approach to the subject of soldier criminality. While crime 
did 
occur amongst soldiers in billets and barracks, it will not be discussed at any length 
in 
this chapter. Legal issues such as murder, rape, theft and assault will be dealt with in 
Chapter 5. The only forms of criminal behaviour that will be handled in this chapter 
are those reliant upon a certain level of extra-curricular and co-operative interaction 
between the troops and the civilian population. Such crimes, which include bastardy, 
gambling and illegal drinking, tended not to involve the civilian as `victim' but more 
as accomplice or willing participant. Similarly, it will make no attempt to deal with 
military crimes such as drunkenness on duty, disobeying orders or desertion. 
The issue of billeting soldiers proved to be a very contentious one, not just in the 
eighteenth century, but also in the period well before the Glorious Revolution. 
English preoccupations with the rights of both the citizen and private property meant 
that any system requiring the population to house soldiers would lack general 
approval. 3 This resistance had a long and tested history. In particular, the experience 
of the Civil War and the period of Cromwell's reign created increased opposition to 
the process. A high level of trepidation associated with billeting was also linked to 
the constitutional debate concerning the existence of a standing army. 
James II's attempts to establish an expanded standing army, and his tendency to 
circumvent laws concerning the housing of soldiers, led to the 1689 Bill of Rights 
stating that the wayward king had disqualified himself from the throne for, among 
other things, `quartering soldiers contrary to law. '4 However, neither the Bill of 
Rights, nor the formalisation of the Protestant settlement in 1701 could kill off the 
issue. The debate over billeting and the building of barracks would continue to be a 
focus of contention for decades to come. In this way much of the `terror' and fear of 
the billeting system in the eighteenth century was actually a socio-political residue 
from the previous century. As the eighteenth century progressed this was eventually 
3 For a good case study of opposition to billeting in the seventeenth century, and the problems it could 
cause, see: Lindsay Boynton, `Billeting: The Example of the Isle of Wight. ' English Historical Review 
74 (1959) 23-40 
4 The Bill of Rights 1689, as reproduced in: E. N. Williams (ed. ), The Eighteenth-Century Constitution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) 27. 
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diluted by administrative and constitutional reforms within the army and the 
government. It was the eventual recognition of increased civilian control over the 
army, and the settling of the constitutional position with George III's coronation, that 
led to a marked decline in unease towards the billeting process. 
5 Unfortunately, as 
this anxiety lifted it was replaced by a growing and persistent fear of the cost of 
establishing barracks. The result was that sheer need, occasioned by a shortage of 
purpose built barracks, meant billeting was used widely throughout the eighteenth 
century, not least in the North East. 
It has been estimated that at the beginning of the eighteenth century only 5,000 men 
could be held in military accommodation. 7 Even as late as 1792 barracks existed in 
just 43 towns, garrisons and fortresses, capable of holding only 21,000 men. 
8 This 
was coupled with the fact that the number of troops needing accommodation rose 
noticeably during the eighteenth century. 9 Despite such a dearth of facilities a 
comprehensive barracks building programme was only implemented with the outbreak 
of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1793. This was largely motivated by a new 
belief that barracks could, as William Pitt put it, "operate as a preventative to the 
seduction of the army. "0 A genuine fear existed that, if not physically separated from 
civilian society, the army might be infected with a revolutionary zeal similar to that 
which proved so costly to France's monarchy. By the end of the war with Napoleon, 
Britain possessed purpose-built lodgings that could hold over 146,000 infantry and 
artillery gunners as well as an additional 17,000 cavalry troops. " 
S H. V. Bowen, War and British Society 1688-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
50; James Douet British Barracks 1600-1914. Their Architecture and Role in Society, (London: 
English Heritage & The Stationary Office, 1998) 43. 
6 Douet, British Barracks, 42. 
7 R. E. Scouller, `Quarters and Barracks. ' Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 98 (1953) 91. 
8 Reginald Hargreaves, `Bivouacs, Billets and Barracks. ' Army Quarterly 85 (1963) 239. Berwick, 
Tynemouth and the very limited facilities at Holy Island were the only barracks in the North East at this 
time. 
9 This can be observed by looking at the table of domestic establishments in Appendix A. 
10 As quoted in: Clive Emsley, `Political Disaffection and the British Army in 1792. ' Bulletin of the 
Institute of Historical Research 68 (188) (1975) 230. 
11 Hargreaves, "Bivouacs, Billets and Barracks. " 239. Ten of these properties were located in the 
North East at: Newcastle, Chester-le-Street, Morpeth, North and South Shields, Whitburn, Claedon, 
Fulwell, Monkwearmouth, Sunderland, Tynemouth, Seaton Sluice, Berwick and Holy Island. At 
their greatest extent the region's new network of barracks could hold upwards of 4,000 men: John R, 
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Ironically, the continued existence of billeting was due in large part to long-held and 
widespread opposition to the very barracks that Pitt sought to establish in 1793. It was 
an ingrained fear amongst many in Britain that sequestering soldiers in barracks would 
help to detach the army from civilian society, strengthen its loyalty to the King, and 
thus leave the door to absolutism open. An observer of Berwick's new barracks 
summed up these sentiments perfectly when he noted that `English Liberty will never 
consent to what will be seen as a nest for a standing army. ' 12 This observation was 
made despite the fact that he acknowledged how such buildings `would be a vast ease 
to the inhabitants in most great towns if they had them. ' 13 The continuation of this 
attitude was clearly illustrated in 1786 when plans to expand Portsmouth's barracks 
were defeated in the House of Commons partly because of fears that they would 
become `seminaries for soldiers and universities for Praetorian Bands. ' 14 
Despite the above comments, such opposition does not appear to have been prevalent 
in Berwick. The town largely welcomed the building of its barracks from 1717 as a 
solution to the problems arising out of widespread billeting. 15 Similarly, little 
opposition was raised over the repair and expansion of Tynemouth's barracks from 
1758. The general population appears to have been much less concerned about the 
constitutional impropriety of barracks, as witnessed by the numerous requests for the 
building of barracks in places like Chester and Carlisle. 16 Nevertheless, for much of 
the century consensus on how to house soldiers was difficult to find. Educated 
political observers opposed barracks, most of mainstream civilian society strained 
against the costs and inconveniences of billeting, and almost everyone opposed the 
use of private houses to quarter soldiers. In the end political and economic reality 
sustained the anti-barrack argument for much of the century, assuring the prevalence 
of billeting in many English towns. 
Breihan, "Army Barracks in the North East in the Era of the French Revolution. " Archaeologia 
Aeliana S`h Series, 28 (1998) 165-75. 
12 As quoted in: Douet, British Barracks, 41. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Richard Glover, Britain at Bay: Defence Against Napoleon 1803-1814 (London: Longman, 1973) 
105. 
'S They had been petitioning the government for such a facility from early in the century. BTRO GB 
1/15/25,4 October 1717; GB 9/11/37-8, November 29 1710. 
16 Berwick's application was the only one approved. Douet, British Barracks, 42. 
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While billets were more abundant than barracks in the eighteenth-century North East, 
calculating the actual number available throughout the period is hard to determine. 
Fortunately, a national survey conducted in 1686, which now exists in Public Record 
Office (War Office) files, sheds some light on the picture during the late seventeenth 
century. '? Despite its relatively small population and its remoteness, the region 
appears to have been well appointed in this area. The survey concluded that there 
were nearly 6,160 beds available in the four northernmost counties of England. 
'8 Not 
surprisingly the largest allocations of space occur in Newcastle and Carlisle with 634 
and 413 beds respectively. 19 However, even the most remote communities had space 
available, if only for a handful of troops. A good example of this is Holy Island, 
which had just sixteen beds and stabling for 17 horses. 
20 As has already been shown, 
the lack of purpose-built barracks and the geographical spread of available billets led 
to a piecemeal billeting of soldiers in many areas? ' Thus, personal contact between 
soldiers and civilians was not limited to the large population centres. Even small 
villages like Wooler, Warkworth, Amble and Tweedmouth had some form of 
experience with the military. 
II. The Process of Billeting 
The assigning of quarters in a town or village was a process almost wholly controlled 
by civilian officials rather than military officers. 22 While this framework had been 
well established by the beginning of this study, it was not until 1703 that justices of 
the peace were formally empowered with an element of control over the housing of 
troops amongst the civilian population. 23 It was believed that such a process would 
help to guarantee the sanctity of private property and the payment of bills. Despite the 
17 The entire survey is available at the Public Record Office as: PRO WO 30/48, Miscellanea, Various. 
'$ Ibid., This includes Westmorland, Cumberland, Northumberland (including Newcastle) and Durham 
as many of the sites listed are now part of Northumberland County. 
19 Ibid., 30/48/139-43,33-7. 
20 Ibid., 30/48/139-43. 
21 Refer to Chapter 2. 
22 The drive to increase civilian control of domestic military matters is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 2. 
23 William III first issued proclamations making magistrates responsible for quartering soldiers in public 
houses in 1689. John Childs, The Army of William 111 1689-1702, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1987) 91. 
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imposition of strong civilian controls the system was still imperfect, and at times 
remained highly unpopular amongst the population of the North East. 
Before the arrival of a body of troops, local magistrates would normally be advised by 
army officers that they were to organise and house soldiers. The magistrates, largely 
in co-operation with a town's constables, were then responsible for dividing the town 
into troop or company sized districts. While doing this they would have to take into 
account the number of soldiers to be quartered and the distribution of public houses 
within the community. 24 Constables were tasked with ensuring that billets were 
assigned in a manner where distribution was fair and even so an undue burden did not 
fall on one district or one socio-economic group. 25 Once this process was completed 
the military officers were then instructed to ensure that their men were housed in 
accordance with the billets allocated to the regiment by the chief magistrate. 26 
Beyond assigning rooms, the justices were charged with setting prices and rates for 
food, accommodation and other services. 7 Similarly, the magistrates and constables 
played a key role in the eventual dispersal of the men from their quarters, as well as 
the often contentious issue of settling accounts with local innkeepers and businesses. 28 
The behaviour of soldiers in public quarters and barracks was strictly governed by 
military law and codified in the annual `Rules and Articles' issued every year. 29 
These regulations dictated that all soldiers must conduct themselves according to 
civilian and military laws while in quarters or on the march. 30 They further stipulated 
that officers were responsible for ensuring that any soldiers causing damage to their 
quarters, or extorting money or abusing landlords, were brought to justice and 
reparations made to the injured party from the offender's pay. 31 In addition, orders 
24 H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army in the Eighteenth Century (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 
1977) 49. 
25 Childs, The Army of William III, 92. 26 Ibid., 91. Officers and soldiers could not select their own billets. 27 Ibid., 92; Douet, British Barracks, 16,37. These reasonable prices were usually set at meetings of the 
quarter sessions but in 1690 the new Mutiny Act laid out prices for the whole country. 28 The payment for quarters and subsistence was the ultimate responsibility of the commanding officers. 
Scouller, `Quarters and Barracks. ' 92. . 29 Examples of these for most years of the eighteenth century can be found at the Public Record Office 
under the following reference: PRO WO 72/2. 
30 PRO WO 72/2, Rules and Articles for the Better Governing of His Majesty's Forces, 1722. 
Specifically Article 28. 
31 Ibid., Article 32. 
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were issued throughout the century to remind officers and soldiers of their common 
duty to their hosts, reaffirming the prominence of civilian authority in the guise of the 
magistrate. 32 They outlined the magistrate's power to investigate and report any 
infractions by the troops against civilians, while enshrining the magistrate's role as the 
sole arbitrator of relations between military personnel and civilians. 
3 Apart from the 
obvious necessity of ensuring that discipline and military cohesion did not deteriorate 
in quarters, the regulations were a way to reassure the public, who were wary of 
soldiers and the billeting system. Part of the reassurance came in the form of 
guarantees that quarters and provisions would be paid promptly to the supplier. 
34 
Again, intent and actual results differed in this respect, as will be observed in greater 
detail below. 
III. Sex and the Soldier: Bastards, Babies and Brides 
Sexual politics were a consequence of the military presence in the North East of 
England during the eighteenth century. The British army was a strictly male preserve 
and as such the ranks were composed of a mixture of single men, absentee husbands, 
and married men who were often long distances from their wives and families. 35 
There were also those who were fortunate enough to be accompanied by their wives 
and children. 36 As such, there were a myriad of different relationships, both 
acceptable and sordid, that developed between soldiers, local women and members of 
what has been termed the `Cyprian Corps. '37 For this reason it is important to observe 
whether the relations soldiers had with North-East women affected civil-military 
relations in any meaningful way. 
32 PRO WO 30/19, A Declaration Requiring All Officers and Soldiers to Observe Strict Discipline and 
for Payment of Their Quarters, 17 March 1707. In particular, the orders noted that the chief magistrate 
or other civilian officer would have assurances from the respective officers of the soldiers' good order 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 For a good discussion of men deserting their families in London to join the army see: D. A. Kent, 
"`Gone for a Soldier": Family Breakdown and the Demography of Desertion in a London Parish 1750- 
1791. ' Local Population Studies 45 (1990) 27-42. 
36 However, this group was often limited in numbers as the army attempted to limit the presence `camp 
followers. ' 
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One of the most pressing concerns for local civilian authorities, as well as those 
commanding garrison forces, was soldier's involvement in bastardy. Such a situation 
was intolerable for the leadership of any town. Bastard children, and their mothers, 
were potential burdens upon the meagre social welfare funds available to most 
communities. 38 Additionally, the issue of morality played an important factor in 
local 
opposition to bastardy. This was especially true in Berwick, whose strong 
Presbyterian principles made such conduct wholly reprehensible. 
39 For example, in 
1707 Elizabeth Manning of Berwick was accused of `continuing in the notorious and 
scandalous sin of fornication, ' which resulted in her having four illegitimate 
children 40 This dislike of immorality, coupled with the general opposition to 
economically burdensome bastard children, especially those fathered by a transient 
military population, was bound to cause tensions in towns with a large and regular 
military presence. 
Berwick, where bastardy appears to have been a particularly serious problem, is a 
good place to conduct an investigation of this phenomenon. However, there are some 
issues concerning the records within Berwick that must be addressed before 
continuing. 1 The main concern relates to the fact that the quarter session papers list 
many women who appear to be with illegitimate children but are not actually brought 
before the court. They are simply listed as being an `inmate' within a house and 
normally a name is not provided. 2 Such examples cannot be included because there 
is no guarantee that these women are not named in later quarter sessions 
examinations. Additionally, in many cases the women concerned have not provided 
the names or occupations of the fathers, or the authorities did not record it. As will be 
37 This is a term used to describe the prostitutes of Berwick upon Tweed in: Jack Bainbridge, `Berwick 
upon Tweed's Cyprian Corps. ' North-East Labour History Bulletin 30 (1996) 37-50. 
38 For more on the implications of the military on local welfare funds, specifically as it relates to 
recruitment, see Chapter 3. For a discussion of bastardy in the early-modem Durham coal-field refer to: 
David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. Whickham 1560-1765 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991) 302-6. 
39 David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick Upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon 
Tweed, Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 137. 
40 BTRO C8/1, Quarter Sessions Books, July 1694-April 1727; It is suggested that the high level of 
infanticide in Whickham may have been a result of fear over the severe prosecution for bastardy. 
Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 306. 
41 For bastardy I refer to: BTRO C8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 1694 to 1793; C15/14-16, Quarter 
Sessions Settlement Records, Miscellaneous Examinations, 1700-1794. 
42 There is a suggestion that in other regional towns inmates may have been those tried for prenuptial 
fornication. Levine & Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 303-4. 
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explained below, trends in the occurrences of bastardy means that it may be possible 
that some of these anonymous men could have been soldiers. A further problem 
arises from the fact that the town's settlement records are very patchy before 1700 
43 
Therefore, in order to establish more accurate numbers only those cases where women 
are listed by name or charged with `having a bastard child' are included in the 
following discussion. 
It is important to remember that bastardy could be as much a result of failed 
relationships as couplings between soldiers and prostitutes. It has been shown that 
illegitimacy rates could be influenced by trends in the economy and even the transient 
nature of the eighteenth-century labour market. 4 However, David Brenchley has 
established that the presence of the army in Berwick created an increased demand for 
`bawdy houses' and whores that helped to add to the rate of bastardy amongst local 
girls 45 Because of this, prostitution was relatively serious problem in the town 46 
This may have engendered itself in the attempts by the town's leaders to suppress and 
close many of the disorderly houses that sprang up throughout the century. The 
authorities wanted to avoid exactly what had occurred at the house of Eleanor Mourir 
who was known to have entertained `several soldiers and idle women at unreasonable 
times at night. A7 As will be noted below this may have also been the reason for the 
harsh treatment afforded to prostitutes. 
The end of the seventeenth century seems to have been the high point for bastard 
children begotten by soldiers, with the town's records listing numerous women as 
`being with the child of a soldier. A8 In fact between 1694 and 1695 five women were 
charged with this offence. 49 However, the problem did not end with the turn of the 
century, persisting at various levels for much of the eighteenth century. During the 
entire period of this study soldiers and officers of the army and invalid companies 
43 BTRO C15/14-16. 
44 Levine and Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society, 302-4. There is also evidence that large 
numbers of common-law households may have contributed to illegitimacy rates. as Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 40-1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 BTRO C8/1,15 June 1705. 
48 Ibid., 21 January 1694. 
49 Ibid., C8/1. 
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were named as fathers to 14 of the 152 bastards reported to the town's leaders. 50 
From these calculations it is apparent that troops stationed in Berwick accounted for at 
least 9.2% of the total number of bastard children born in the town. This number 
could be higher if one considers the possibility that in some of the cases where no 
professions or names are attributed to the fathers, military personnel might have been 
to blame. 
Table 4.1: Bastard Births by Military Personnel in Berwick, 1694-179351 
Year Number of 
Military Bastards 
Type of Soldier 
1694 2 Both army soldiers 
1695 3 All army soldiers 
1734 1 Army officer 
1745 1 Army soldier 
1751 1 Army soldier 
1752 1 Army officer 
1757 2 Invalid soldier(1) 
Invalid officer (1) 
1764 1 Army soldier 
1769 1 Army soldier 
1774 1 Army soldier 
The impact that the building of barracks in the town had on bastardy is marked. 52 
Before the completion of the barracks in 1719 army soldiers accounted for 5 of the 47 
bastards born, or 10.64%. This is slightly higher than the 9.2% of all illegitimate 
births attributed to soldiers in Berwick between 1688 and 1793. However, the 
opening of the new barracks meant that the majority of troops were increasingly 
sequestered from the general public. In the remaining 74 years after 1719 there are 
105 women charged with having bastard children, or who make claims to the town's 
50 For a breakdown of these instances please see Table 4.1. S1 Sources: BTRO C8/1-4,4a Quarter Sessions Books July 1694-April 1805; C15/14-16, Quarter 
Sessions Settlement Records, Miscellaneous Examinations, 1700-1794. 
52 Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. He generally agrees although he does not think the difference was 
significant. 
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examinations. Just nine of these are directly attributed to military personnel. 
53 This 
represents a modest reduction to 8.6% of the total illegitimate children brought to the 
attention of the local authorities in this period. While the proportions for the period 
before and after the opening of the barracks vary to some extent, the difference is not 
very significant in absolute terms. 
A much more noticeable trend, that illustrates the impact of the barracks, can be 
observed when one looks at the actual intensity of bastardy. While the period 1694- 
1719 averaged just less than 0.2 military bastards per year, the 74 years between 1719 
and 1793 averaged only 0.12 births of this type per annum. In these terms there would 
needed to have been approximately six more military bastards reported in the latter 
period to equal the rate of the 25 years before barracks were built. This change is even 
more marked if one considers only members of the army and excludes the invalids 
who tended to remain quartered amongst the population throughout the period. 54 The 
statistics for the period before 1719 remain the same, but in 1719-1793 regular 
soldiers and officers in garrison regiments were responsible for only 6.6% of all 
bastards, an annual rate of 0.09 births per year. 
From this it would appear that while bastardy continued in the town, the frequency of 
soldiers' direct involvement in this social problem decreased once they were placed in 
barracks. Interestingly, the movement of the troops from easily accessible billets to 
the more controlled environment of the barracks coincides with a general decline in 
the intensity of bastard births in Berwick as a whole. Again, in the first 25 year 
period, total cases averaged 1.88 per year while after 1719 that rate fell to 1.41 per 
year. 55 This statistical trend hints at the possibility that soldiers may have been 
responsible for some cases where their occupation or identity was not noted in the 
town's records. 
In the majority of cases (85.7%) it was rank-and-file soldiers who were charged with 
fathering bastard children or those likely to be born bastards. Notwithstanding this, 
53 See table 4.1 above for all instances of bastardy. 
54 Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 140. Invalids are responsible for two bastard births in 1757. 
55 This includes bastards born to men not listed by name in the town's records. 
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accusations of paternity were not strictly limited to non-commissioned officers and 
private soldiers. In 1734 Colonel Hutchinson of the Scots Grays was accused of being 
the father of an unborn bastard child. 56 Hutchinson refused to accept this charge 
believing that George Preston, a quartermaster for the same regiment, was the actual 
father. 57 He stated that Preston was very familiar with the girl, and even accused him 
of pressing the girl to take drugs in order to terminate the pregnancy. 
58 At the same 
time Hutchinson believed that the woman making the accusations could have been 
doing so out of convenience. Similarly, during 1752 a local woman named Phillis 
Brown attributed her illegitimate baby to an officer in General Guise's regiment 
59 
Regardless of these isolated cases it is important to note that there is very limited 
evidence of officer's involvement in Berwick's bastardy problem. 
Unfortunately, the detailed accounts from Berwick are not replicated for other 
regularly garrisoned communities in the North East. Therefore, it is much less clear 
what is happening with regard to bastard children in other parts of the region. In 
Newcastle and Tynemouth there is a paucity of source material as complete as the 
quarter sessions books of Berwick. Most noticeably, settlement records for Newcastle 
and much of Northumberland (which included North Tyneside and Tynemouth) are 
almost non-existent before 1800. Nevertheless, it is still possible to get a general, if 
less lucid view of the situation on the banks of the Tyne. This is done by examining 
the existing baptismal records for Newcastle's All Saints and St Nicholas's parishes 
and Christ Church parish in Tynemouth. 60 
In All Saints parish during the years 1688-1724,1738-46 and 1755-85, there were 114 
bastards listed. 1 In the neighbouring parish of St Nicholas, 27 bastards were recorded 
for the years 1689-1755 and 1774-85.62 Soldiers were specifically named in only six 
56 BTRO C 15/14,9 October 1734. The name of the woman is obscured by damage to the document. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 BTRO C8/3,2 October 1752. 
60 While soldiers were posted in most Newcastle parishes the location and populations of All Saints and 
St Nicholas meant they bore the brunt of billeting. 
61 TWAS MF/250, Baptisms-All Saints Parish 1688-1785. 
62 Ibid., MF/263-4, Baptisms-St Nicholas Parish, 1688-1755,1755-1785. St Nicholas parish was 
considerably smaller and less populated in this period than its larger neighbour. 
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of the 141 total recorded cases, all of which come between 1708 and 1747 63 This 
means that at 4.25% of the total identifiable cases of illegitimate children, All Saints 
and St Nicholas's parishes had less than half the rate of military bastardy that existed 
in Berwick. " The sharp difference between Newcastle and Berwick could be due to a 
number of factors. One of these was that, while central to the army's billeting effort 
in the city, the two parishes were neither as densely nor as regularly populated with 
troops as Berwick was, particularly in the first half of the century. 65 This may have 
been assisted by the practice of dispersing sizeable forces assigned to the city between 
a number of posts including Tynemouth barracks, Gateshead, Sunderland, Morpeth 
and other surrounding villages. As such, there tended to be fewer soldiers within the 
more populous central parishes of the city when compared to the permanent garrison 
at Berwick. Even when Tyneside became a part of the regular garrison rotation in 
1770 the troops were mainly housed in the recently renovated barracks at 
Tynemouth 66 
The case for Tynemouth is even more extreme than that of Newcastle. Here one can 
observe no records of bastard children being fathered by soldiers. 7 This absence of 
soldiers in the first half of the century might be partly explained by the fact that until 
1754 baptismal records for Christ Church parish elect to omit the profession of the 
father. Even after 1754 there are no soldiers or officers connected with the 26 
bastards recorded in the parish up to 1792 68 Equally important, there is no marked 
decline in the regularity of illegitimate births after the start of major renovations to the 
barracks at Tynemouth Castle in 1758, or after the buildings came into regular use in 
1770.69 This trend does not fit well with the experiences of Berwick. 
The army was involved in cases of bastardy in the North East's smaller rural 
communities but this never approached the level experienced in larger population 
centres. In large part this was a result of the relatively light presence of troops in these 
63 This breaks down to four and two military bastards respectively for All Saints and St Nicholas 
parishes. 
It is important to note that this is in relation to the cases that can be identified. 
63 See Table 2.1. 
66 For more in this see Chapter 2. 
67 TWAS MF/920-1, Baptisms-Christ Church Parish, Tynemouth, 1607-1804. 
68 Ibid., MF/921, Baptisms, 1733-1804. 
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areas. One of the very few examples of this problem, as it existed in rural 
Northumberland, came early in the eighteenth century. In January 1712 George 
Richardson, a soldier who was quartered in the small town of Warkworth, was 
reported to the Northumberland quarter sessions as having left behind him a bastard 
child there . 
70 This situation was complicated by the fact that the child's mother died 
after Richardson had left the village with his unit, leaving the child an orphan. 7' As if 
this were not enough the woman's brother, John Hezellop of Sighill, had illegally 
seized the deceased mother's possessions that the county magistrates had deemed 
would be used to `help for the maintenance of the said child. '72 
The examples of Northumberland, Newcastle and Tynemouth give the impression that 
the situation in Berwick was exceptional. While the state of existing archival records 
affects the above analysis, it is clear that Berwick was experiencing something of a 
crisis, particularly in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This might 
have been the result of Berwick's role as `the most overcrowded military town in 
Britain' at a time when quartering in other areas of the region was sporadic. 73 
Berwick's large, and often sedentary population of soldiers, coupled with the tight 
geographical confines of the town, led to an explosion of illegitimate parturition that 
was reduced only with the opening of a large permanent barracks in 1719. The 
problem in Berwick is exemplified by the regularity with which women were brought 
before the town's council and local assize meetings. 
At the same time soldiers and civilians do not appear to have been treated in a similar 
manner. Archival records indicate that soldiers were very rarely brought to task for 
their role in fathering children outside wedlock. This is not to say that the men were 
unknown to those in power. In most civilian cases the name of the father was 
common knowledge to the parish recorder or the authorities presiding over the quarter 
sessions. However, in Berwick 66% (10 of 15) of the soldiers accused of bastardy are 
69 Ibid. 
70 MRO QSB 35/15,16 January 1711/12. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Douet, British Barracks, 42 
113 
not listed by name, while in Newcastle parish baptismal records list the names of all 
six soldiers who were identified. 74 
Surprisingly, punishments handed out to many women found guilty of illegitimate 
births do not appear, on the whole, to have been severe. This was even the case with 
women guilty of producing numerous bastards such as the notorious Mary Storey. 
She was presented to Berwick's quarter sessions with no fewer than five bastard 
children between 1694 and 1708, the first of whom was from a soldier. 75 Despite her 
repeated transgressions, the records do not indicate any punishment other than 
chastisement by the quarter sessions. On the other hand, those found to be having 
illicit sexual liaisons with soldiers outside wedlock received the most severe 
treatment, regardless of whether or not they had produced illegitimate children. In 
July 1764 Anna Moncriese, who had been charged and found guilty of `living in 
fornication with a soldier', was whipped from her holding cell in Berwick's tollbooth 
to the town's Scotchgate. From here she was expelled from the town and ordered 
never to return on the pain of similar punishment. 6 Similar fates were also thrust 
upon Anne Cockburn and Elizabeth Elliot in 1707 and 1710 respectively, both of who 
were accused of being `taken in bed with a soldier. '77 
It is possible that these women were part of the town's active sex industry, which local 
leaders were eager to curb. Prostitutes, and especially those with bastard children, 
suffered particularly unpleasant fates. In December 1730 a drunken paramour named 
Margaret MacDonald was accused by the quarter sessions in Berwick of having the 
illegitimate child of a soldier. 79 She was placed in a set of stocks for one hour and 
then, with her child in tow, was turned out of the town. 79 As is to be expected, there is 
no record of any action being taken against the soldier. 80 It is conceivable that 
MacDonald and others were removed from the town due to the fact that they were not 
originally from Berwick. Civic leaders would not want to give financial support to the 
74 BTRO C8/1-4,4a; C15/14-16; TWAS MF/920-1; MF/263-4. 
7S The years of these births are 1694,1698,1702,1707,1708; BTRO C8/l. 76 Ibid., 7 July 1694. 
77 Ibid., 2 February 1707 and 17 July 1710. 




bastard children of women from outside their jurisdiction. 8 Such was the experience 
of Jane Hume. She originally came to Berwick with her bastard child who had been 
born at Tynemouth. In 1709 the town's leaders accused her of prostitution and 
promptly ordered the woman and her child to return immediately to Tynemouth. 
82 
Bastards were not the singular result of relationships between soldiers and women. 
Marriage and legitimate births were also not infrequent. Douet has noted that the 
combination of low pay and the sedentary nature of garrison life led many soldiers to 
`form local family relationships. '83 However, as with bastardy, the availability and 
quality of sources limits one's ability to analyse the true nature of such relationships 
between soldiers and local women. While it is possible to trace legitimate births and 
marriages through parish registers, it is very difficult to determine exactly who was 
from where, as well as who was local and who was not. For example, in Carlisle the 
registers of St. Cuthbert's parish record that John, the son of Joseph Dickinson, was 
baptised on 27 May 1752.84 While Joseph is listed as being a private soldier in 
General Guise's regiment, the question still remains whether he was stationed in the 
town or was a local resident who had joined that particular regiment. In this particular 
case it is easier to draw the conclusion that Dickinson was almost certainly not from 
the town. The reason for this assertion is based on the fact that four soldiers from the 
same regiment are attributed with births in Newcastle's St. Nicholas parish in 1752.85 
It is clear that during this period the regiment was stationed in the north of England as 
part of its garrisoning rotation. Unfortunately, not all cases are as easy to investigate 
as this. 
Another factor complicates matters in this area. During this period it was not unusual 
for a proportion of the wives of soldiers to travel about the country with their 
husbands. Apart from their marital role they also provided many services to the 
company such as cooking, cleaning and repairing equipment and clothes. Lists of 
married soldiers quartered in Carlisle exist from the latter part of the eighteenth 
81 For more on this as it relates to recruitment please see Chapter 3. 
82 BTRO C8/1,10 October 1709. 
83 Douet, British Barracks, 1. 
84 CCRO PR/79/2,27 May 1752. 
85 TWAS MF/263. 
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century. These show that an infantry company of 80 to 100 men could have as many 
as 36 married privates and non-commissioned officers. 86 The number of women 
accompanying a regiment varied greatly, but as the example above illustrates, at times 
it could be considerable. It would not be unthinkable that some of these women could 
become pregnant and give birth while living in a garrison community such as 
Newcastle or Berwick. Similarly, it is possible that a soldier and his wife might have 
had their baby baptised in the local parish church. Therefore, entries in the region's 
baptismal records do not necessarily indicate that the mother is local. This is not to 
say that one cannot use existing parish records in Newcastle and Tynemouth to find 
interesting trends relating to births and marriages. 
During the period between 1745 and 1747 five of the eight military births in St 
Nicholas parish in Newcastle were attributed to soldiers in Brigadier Colmondeley's 
regiment stationed in the city. 87 Likewise, in 1771 and 1772 the fathers of all 
registered births by army personnel in the baptismal records for Tynemouth's Christ 
Church parish were members of the 17`' Regiment of Foot. 88 Almost immediately 
after this the baptisms are mainly accredited to the offspring of soldiers from the 19`h 
Regiment of Foot. 89 Again, back in Newcastle, the baptismal records are dominated 
by troops from the 48`h Regiment of Foot in 1781 and 1782.90 Even in Berwick the 
trend follows a similar path with the majority of all baptisms related to a single 
military unit, with the occasional mention of another regiment. 91 This tendency within 
the records would indicate that many of the recorded births involving the army were 
attributable to soldiers serving in regiments having marched into the town from 
outside the region. Unfortunately, the origin of the mother is difficult to determine. 
A similar dilemma arises when analysing the marriages of soldiers and trying to 
determine if they wed local women. Again, one can return to the parish records held 
in Tynemouth to exemplify this issue. Almost all of these records simply state the 
86 CCRO CA/2/459,464, A list of married men in Captain Cole's and Captain Earles's Companies. 
87 TWAS MF/263. 
88 TWAS MF/92 1. 
89 Ibid. 
90 TWAS MF/264. 
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date of the marriage, the name of the man and woman, and on occasions the man's 
profession. Similarly, in All Saints parish in central Newcastle the records only 
provide the individual's names, with a notation next to groom stating `a soldier. ' On 
rare occasions a regimental designation is entered next to the name of the man, but 
this is not regular enough to generate any meaningful information. The recorders in 
the parishes of the North East do not appear to have been as keen to record details as 
some of their colleagues in other parts of the country. For example, the keepers of 
Moresby parish near Whitehaven developed an innovation in their records that, while 
somewhat useful to this study, would have been more valuable had it been standard 
practice across the Pennines. From 1782 the entry `from the parish' appears next to 
some of the groom's names. '92 This illustrates that in Moresby there were definitely 
local men who were soldiers marrying local women. Woefully there are only three 
names on the list between 1783 and 1793.93 Nevertheless, David Brenchley believes 
that the high level of military weddings in Berwick reinforces the fact that local 
women were marrying soldiers from the garrison. 94 
Once again existing parish records show that many marriages appear to be focused 
around men from particular regiments at a particular point in time. Unfortunately, the 
best examples are not found in the North East but in Cumberland. The soldiers of 
General Guise's regiment, who were responsible for the vast majority of military 
related childbirth in Newcastle in this period, also accounted for ten of the 11 army 
marriages in the parish of St. Cuthbert's between 8 December 1751 and 1 September 
1752.95 Predictably, after September 1752 the preponderance of marriages belonged 
to men in Lord Pultney's regiment which was the next regiment to arrive. 96 In 
Berwick the trend established for Carlisle seems to continue for the early part of the 
century. 97 Although there is limited information available for Newcastle, existing 
material points very cautiously to similarities in what was occurring across the 
91 MRO PR 116, Military Marriages, Burials & Baptisms From Holy Trinity, Berwick-upon-Tweed 
1572-1812. Compiled by Frederick Furness, 1991. Copies of this are held at the Northumberland 
County Records Offices in Morpeth (MRO) and Berwick (BTRO). 
92 CCRO PR/73/7. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. Ile says that on average 20-25% of marriages involved members 
of the garrison. This was eclipsed in the period 1750-4 when they accounted for 32%. 
95 CCRO PR/79/2. 
96 In particular, I refer to the period from 3 December 1752 until 28 April 1753: CCRO PR/79/2 
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Pennines. In September 1740 a soldier in Howard's Regiment of Foot named James 
Chambers is recorded as marrying a local woman in the parish church of All Saints. 
98 
One month earlier Thomas Milhaven from the same regiment had married the spinster 
Mary Southerby in the same church 99 It is known that this regiment was stationed in 
Newcastle during 1740 to combat the June food riots, and that elements of it remained 
in the town for some time thereafter. 1°° Beyond a few additional examples little can 
be discerned from these sources. 
Regretfully, this shortage of detailed records fails to answer three fundamental 
questions. Are these local men who have taken the opportunity of a fortunate 
homecoming to wed their sweethearts? Were they new recruits to a regiment 
stationed in the town, who were marrying partners before they were to march off on 
their new careers? 101 Equally, are they soldiers who have come to the region, met a 
female partner, and then wed before marching on to new quarters? Even Brenchley's 
conclusion that the high proportions of military marriages indicated relationships 
between the garrison and local women, while highly likely, is difficult to substantiate 
elsewhere due to the condition of the records. 102 
Luckily the actual rate of wedlock in the region's towns throws some interesting light 
on the possible motivation of local marriages involving soldiers. All Saints parish in 
Newcastle is particularly enlightening. Although these records lack the requisite 
detail to be of use in other areas, they have a good collection of surviving general 
material. 103 Furthermore, this parish was the focus of much of the billeting and 
garrisoning within the city. What is immediately noticeable is that the outbreak of war 
had a marked effect on the rate at which soldiers appear in the parish marriage 
registers. Between 1688 and 1738 there are only a handful of soldiers listed in the 
several thousand marriages for All Saints parish. ' 04 However, with the onset of the 
97 MRO PR 116. 
98 TWAS MF/250-1. 
99 Ibid., August 1740. 
100 For more on this incident see Chapter 6. 101 Could these new recruits be getting married so their lovers could accompany them as soldier's wives 
when they marched out of the region? 
102 Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 141. Please see above. 103 TWAS MF/250. 
104 Ibid. 
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War of Austrian Succession the number of occurrences where soldiers marry increases 
sharply. Soldiers are recorded in 44 of the parish's 1,182 marriages, representing 
nearly 4% of all cases of wedlock during the war. 105 Surprisingly, there is not a 
sudden drop-off of military weddings after that date, but rather a level rate up to the 
start of the Seven Years War. 106 
Following the trend of the Austrian war, the percentage of marriages again rises 
sharply between 1756 and 1763. In a period four years shorter than the previous war 
there were 60 soldiers married in 906 parish weddings. 107 This is an increase to 6.6% 
of all recorded parish marriages. However, unlike at the end of the War of Austrian 
Succession the rate of marriage does not remain constant, returning to something 
similar to that which had existed between 1739 and 1755.108 Again, with the outbreak 
of hostilities against the American colonies a familiar course can be charted. In the 
two years leading up to the war there is only one example of a soldier marrying 
locally. 109 After 1776 the numbers begin to pick up, with 53 occurring by 1783.1 10 
This again averages out to 6.6 such unions every year. One would expect a rise in the 
rate of soldier marriages as a greater proportion of men entered the ranks of the army 
during wartime. Despite this, the rate of increase in Newcastle is surprising. Again, 
problems with the source material means it is difficult to determine whether these men 
where soldiers from outside the region marrying local women or local men who were 
getting married after enlisting with a regiment based in the region. 
105 Ibid., 1739-48. 
106 Ibid., 1749-55. More specifically there are 36 marriages involving soldiers out of a total of 810 
which equates to an average of 4.4 per year. This is very similar to the period 1739-48. 
107 Ibid., 1756-63. 
108 Ibid., 1764-5. 
109 Ibid., 1774-5 
10 Ibid., 1776-83. 
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IV. Other Forms of Tension and Conflict 
The daily presence of the army in many of the region's towns created numerous 
political, administrative and logistical conflicts. There are many documented cases in 
which the army and civic leaders transgressed established legal and relational 
boundaries in their dealings with one another. However, a great deal of this discord 
was not linked to the behaviour of soldiers, but to more fundamental issues such as the 
jurisdiction of garrisons and the rights of officers and men within the town. Tension 
of this sort was, for the most part, non-violent and non-criminal in nature. 
Additionally, both the civil and military authorities appeared eager to utilise the 
various political and administrative channels available to them in order to resolve 
disagreements and prevent further antagonism. 
Berwick, with its unique position as the largest permanent garrison in the north during 
the eighteenth century, was a breeding ground for such disagreements. With a wide 
variety of military structures in the town including guardhouses, defensive walls and 
after 1719, permanent barracks, it is not surprising that many of the conflicts that 
erupted between the army and the town resulted from issues related to the utilisation 
and maintenance of military buildings and property. 
An example of how the improvement or renovation of the town's defences could 
cause civil-military conflict can be observed between the summer of 1740 and late 
1741. It was at this time that a row erupted in the town concerning the location of the 
new guard house, ordered built by the Board of Ordnance. In June 1740 a local man 
named Mr Fenwick protested to the Berwick's guild council about Captain Rouwer 
who was a military engineer assigned to the town's garrison. "' The complainant 
accused Rouwer of illegally seizing a building that belonged to him located on a piece 
of ground known as Shelly Walls. 112 The guild ordered the mayor and magistrates to 
draw up a letter demanding an explanation from the engineer. The reply was simple; 
Rouwer had been given permission from the Board of Ordnance to build a new main 
111 BTRO B 2/4/33-126,213,8 June 1739. 
112 Ibid., 2/4/33,79,8 June 1739 and 17 October 1740 respectively. 
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guard. 113 He had decided the best location for it would be on aforementioned Shelly 
Walls in the centre of town, where the bowling green house had stood. It seems that 
the membership of the council did not take kindly to Rouwer's keen sense of initiative 
and forbade any more building until a committee could be formed to suggest a better 
place to build the guard. Furthermore, the group was directed to send a letter to their 
Member of Parliament, ironically the future Secretary at War Lord Barrington, to 
protest against the situation. 114 
The town did not object to the construction of the new guardhouse but they believed 
that the Board of Ordnance and Captain Rouwer were being presumptuous. This was 
exemplified by the fact that the guild was prepared to grant the Ordnance an 
alternative plot of land on which to build the structure and to cover the expenses for 
levelling that land. ' 15 The council wanted to make certain that wherever the 
guardhouse was built, it was the most convenient location for the town and did not 
prejudice trade or civic relations. It was not until December of the following year that 
the matter was resolved when the mayor received a copy of a letter from the Duke of 
Montague to another Ordnance engineer named Mr. Gatton. 1 16 The letter commanded 
Gatton to `take down the wall on the high street lately built for a guard and to remove 
the stones and materials to such part of the town as will be most agreeable to the 
inhabitants. ' 117 Montague also ordered the engineer to ensure that any land used for 
military buildings, including this one, was obtained legally in the future. 118 
This is a good example of the tensions that arose out of the day-to-day business of the 
military. It also illustrates the way in which problems between the civilian and 
military authorities could be redressed. The incident itself does not appear to have 
affected the relationship between the town and the men of the Board of Ordnance 
posted to the garrison. In fact Captain Rouwer's direct involvement in the controversy 
over the new guardhouse does not seem to have impacted on his role within the town, 
113 Ibid., 2/4/67,2 July 1740. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 2/4/126,15 December 1741. 
116 Ibid., 2/4/125-6. 
117 Ibid. This was eventually the alternative plot of land granted by the guild at a high point on the 
town's high street. The building still exits there today. 
'a Ibid. 
121 
nor on the respect that the council had for his abilities as a military engineer. During 
the midst of the guardhouse debacle, Rouwer approached the town to suggest that they 
remove part of a hill near the Shore Gate as it would `injure the town's defences' 
should a war erupt with France. ' 19 Without any mention of Mr. Fenwick's complaint, 
and the subsequent conflict, the town council agreed immediately to this. 
120 In terms 
of scale, the guardhouse incident of 1740 and 1741 was a minor irritation. 
Smaller affairs between the town and the garrison helped to strain civil-military 
relations for short periods of time throughout the eighteenth century. Again, these 
tended to revolve around disagreements over the land close to the barracks. In 1758 
the garrison's engineer, Francis Gatton, who had been involved in the botched attempt 
to build the new guardhouse in 1740, was presented to the quarter sessions 
for suffering a large midden contracted by the soldiers of the guard 
to lie across the conduit at the head of the mainguard opposite to 
John Howitson's house, and neglecting to carry the same away to 
the great nuisance of the neighbourhood. 121 
However, the most serious confrontation between the garrison and the town occurred 
thirty years later, and once again involved military construction prompted by the 
Board of Ordnance. 
In April of 1787 Ordnance engineers began to enclose parts of the parade ground 
directly outside the front gates of the barracks. Civic leaders were horrified by this 
unannounced action and `sensible to their [the town's] title to the parade, ' were very 
fearful that there was a plan to enclose the entire area. 122 At a hastily arranged 
meeting with Mr. Dowse, who was the senior engineer for the garrison, the mayor 
demanded that they stop this enclosure until their protest to the Board of Ordnance 
was dealt with. 123 Unfortunately, Dowse could not see clear to halt the operations, 
119 Ibid., 2/4/107,5 June 1741. 
120 Ibid. 
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which led the guild council to order that `the bailiffs do go immediately and pull down 
such erections as are already or may hereafter be made for the enclosure of the 
parade. i124 Such was the serious nature of this action that the corporation indemnified 
the bailiffs for any action they might be forced to take, and recognised their power to 
call on any assistance they felt necessary to accomplish this task. 125 This was a clear 
case of the civilian government taking firm action to enforce its authority within the 
town in the face of what they felt was a blatant transgression by the military. 
Again, as in the earlier incident concerning the guardhouse, the authorities in London 
took the lead in an effort to contain the situation and maintain good relations with the 
civic leaders of Berwick. In early May the Master General of the Ordnance, the Duke 
of Richmond, responded to information provided by Lt. Colonel Dunford, the 
commanding officer in the North-East district. In a letter to the town council he 
expressed his distaste at Mr. Dowse's refusal to stop construction long enough to 
allow the town's concerns to be dealt with in his office. 126 However, he was equally 
disappointed that the Berwick authorities had acted 
in so violent and precipitate a manner as immediately to take upon 
yourselves to do yourselves justice when your right (if it is one) 
could not have suffered by the short delay of writing the letter you 
had first proposed. 127 
Despite this, and to assure some semblance of political peace in Berwick, Richmond 
agreed that he would defer to the Crown to establish who actually owned the parade. 
Should ownership of the parade be awarded to the town, then he agreed to hand it over 
to their administration. On the other hand, if the crown were to rule in favour of the 
military, the town would have to immediately repair the damage they had done to the 
wall. Buoyed by this the council announced the formation of a committee to prove the 
town's ownership of the land. 128 The subsequent argument that a charter issued to 
Berwick by James I established their claim to the parade appears to have been 
124 Ibid. 
'25 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., 1/20/534-7,7 May 1787. 
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successful. The council's complaint was upheld and the parade was never 
enclosed. 129 Despite the serious nature of this conflict, it does not appear as though it 
lingered long in the minds of those parties involved. From the summer of 1787 
nothing more was ever heard of the incident in local or military records. 
Near the end of the century the garrison's engineers were once again exerting tension 
on the relationship between the town and the army. In 1791 Captain Caddy, the 
garrison engineer, had denied soap-boiler David McCoull access to Palace Green 
where he usually laid his soap ashes. 130 At the same time it became apparent that 
Caddy had also laid a conduit through the green without the permission of the guild . 
131 
The corporation was sure, as with the case of the parade enclosure in 1787, that the 
land was theirs and that the garrison had no right to deny citizens its use or to build on 
it without their permission. Two weeks later, the commission that was formed to 
determine ownership of Palace Green reported back stating that the town's charter 
clearly gave the corporation jurisdiction over that place. 132 Caddy was called before 
the mayor and informed of this development, at which time he simply agreed to rectify 
the situation once he was given such orders from the Board of Ordnance. 133 
Not all problems arose from building projects sponsored by the Board of Ordnance. 
In October 1749 an argument broke out between the garrison adjutant, Major Draper, 
and Berwick's administrators. Draper ordered that the house on the town's bridge, 
which was used by the toll collectors, be shut up and attempted to prevent the `toilers' 
from using the house unless they agreed to pay a rent to the garrison. 134 The 
corporation reacted strongly to this development, believing that `Major Draper [had] 
no such power. '135 The leaders ordered the bailiffs to meet with Major Rogers, who 
was the garrison adjutant in Draper's absence, to resolve this matter. At the meeting 
the town's representatives demanded that the building be handed back over to the 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., 1/20/537,7 May 1787. 
130 Ibid., 1/21/115-6,6 May 1791. 
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civilian authorities. ' 36 It appears that this was not the last time the house on the bridge 
would cause a problem. In October 1765 the Grand Harriers complained that the toll 
collectors were once again being refused the use of the premises. 137 Like the conflict 
in 1749, the town demanded that Major Rogers hand over control of the house to the 
town's collectors. Eventually the matter was permanently resolved and no further 
confrontations occurred. The army recognised that their claim to jurisdiction over the 
house was tenuous, and control passed back to the town. 138 
Another cause of tension throughout the century that soldiers were directly complicit 
in was the proliferation of illegal drinking and `unruly' houses. An example of this 
activity can be observed in 1695 when three groups of soldiers and non-commissioned 
officers were apprehended in Berwick charged with retailing alcohol without a 
license. 139 This appears to have been a fairly widespread operation involving several 
houses in three different areas of the town. 140 What is interesting is the prominent role 
of non-commissioned officers in the illegal retailing of liquor. The vast majority of 
those involved tended to be sergeants with a few corporals and private soldiers added 
into the mix. Of the 13 military men charged with the offence at Berwick's quarter 
sessions between 1695 and 1707 all but three were sergeants. 14' The other interesting 
thing to note is the high level of civilian participation in this illicit trade. The soldiers 
relied on access to civilian houses in order to function. In 1707 Sergeant Hall was 
charged with retailing ale without a licence at the home of a Mrs Temple, while in the 
same year Sergeant Baird and Sergeant Morris were charged with a similar 
transgression at the homes of local inhabitants. 142 It also appears that family members 
of the troops got involved on occasions. In 1712 James Suddis was accused of 
entertaining a sergeant's wife `who sells ale and beer without a license. ' 143 
The town's motivation for cracking down on such activity is rooted in three concerns 
The first was that members of the guild, as well as local magistrates, did not want 
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unregulated alcohol to become readily available to troops. Officers and civilians alike 
were aware of the problems and dangers this could create. Of equal importance was 
the economic impact of this underground economy. As will be noted below, for much 
of the century the alehouses and inns of the town were under considerable pressure by 
having to house troops. If these same soldiers chose to drink in private houses the 
publicans would suffer even more. 144 Naturally, this concern was not exclusive to the 
fact that alehouses `pay taxes and also quarter soldiers. ' 145 The final concern was the 
knowledge that alcohol played a large role in promoting violence between troops and 
some civilians. '46 
The building of the barracks seems to have had some effect on such behaviour. After 
1719 there is only one case where a member of the garrison was charged with offences 
related to the illegal retailing of alcohol. This occurred in 1744 when three sergeants 
in Brigadier General Blakeney's regiment were accused of keeping alehouses without 
the town's consent. 147 Similarly, the profusion of disorderly houses, while a problem 
throughout the century, was much more prevalent in the period before the barracks 
were constructed. 
The scale of the military infrastructure and presence of so many troops in Berwick 
meant that conflict and tension was bound to be a by-product of actions to enhance 
and maintain the permanent garrison. Such problems arose regularly from the middle 
of the century but do not appear to have subverted the long-term relationship between 
town and garrison. Through a combination of conflict management by the authorities 
in London, and the ability of the town to back up its claims with facts, many of these 
disputes were resolved quickly and without lasting effects. Even when more obstinate 
men such as Mr. Dowse caused discord, the central administration seemed able to 
satisfactorily mediate the situation. The political elite in London were willing to 
investigate complaints from the civilian population of Berwick. There is little doubt 
143 Ibid., Undated, 1712. 
144 Ibid., November 1707. 
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that this was due in part to the central government's need to maintain positive 
relations with towns such as Berwick, which hosted permanent garrison forces. 
V. Issues of Payment and Distribution. 
Disagreements over military land use within towns such as Berwick were part of local 
civil-military relations during this period. However, there was a more serious and 
persistent source of tension lurking beneath the surface of civil-military relations in 
the eighteenth century. This chronic problem was the physical and financial burden 
placed on towns by the billeting process. It was one that would not be resolved as 
easily as those that dealt with walls and buildings. For much of the eighteenth century 
it had a lasting effect on relations between garrisoned towns in North-East England 
and the commanders and administrators of the army. Army personnel largely became 
unwitting participants in a conflict whose origins and parameters ran much deeper 
than the simple interaction between soldiers and civilians. For the most part, the 
army's rank-and-file were victims of the inept system that paid and supported them. 
The army insisted that bills for quartering and supply be paid in full or, if this was 
impossible, that certificates guaranteeing the money be issued by officers. 148 The 
Rules and Articles outlined certain procedures that were to be followed to ensure that 
civilian-owned accommodation was paid for. 149 These regulations were often 
reinforced by royal declarations that reminded officers and men of their duties to pay 
citizens for food and shelter as well as observe discipline in quarters. 150 Despite such 
good intentions it was often the administrative hierarchy of the army, as well as their 
political masters in London, who were responsible for the financial and logistical 
problems created by garrisons and billeting. As will be discussed below, communities 
regularly found themselves supporting their garrisons in times of need. Certain 
sectors of the population, in particular local merchants and innkeepers, incurred long 
standing debts from loans, or through officers not settling bills for quarters and 
148 In particular look at Article 30, which deals specifically with paying for quarters: PRO WO 72/2, 
Rules and Articles, 1722. 
149 Ibid. 
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subsistence upon leaving a town. They were widely resentful that the burden of 
billeting `nasty, dirty soldiers' was placed squarely on their shoulders. 15' Even as late 
as 1794 the Secretary at War described billeting as `an old abuse [whereby] the 
soldiers of the state were not provided at the expense of the state but at the cost of a 
particular class of inhabitant. ' 152 
Once again Berwick's role as a garrison town meant that in the period before the 
completion of its barracks large numbers of troops were billeted in the area. As a 
result it was particularly vulnerable to the inability of regiments to pay for their 
quarters. This was especially true during the tumultuous period immediately 
following the Glorious Revolution. The military and political dislocation caused by 
the events of 1688 meant that bills were left unpaid and the arrears owed to soldiers 
for pay and subsistence grew at an alarming rate. At the start of 1689 the government 
had arrears to the army of nearly £80,000.153 However, the debt quickly increased and 
by 1 May 1690 money owing had risen to over £194,000.154 In the North East this 
crisis engendered itself in the debts owed by the military for quarters and other 
contracts. 
In January 1689 Major Nott, a junior commander in the Berwick garrison, informed 
the mayor that his unit was in terrible financial troubles, having exhausted their 
meagre funds. 155 The council quickly endorsed Nott's request for money to erase two 
weeks of arrears and maintain the soldiers' further subsistence. 156 Without such 
money the garrison might cease to function in an effective manner. So grave was the 
situation that the town even intended to express their concern to the King. In a 
petition they planned to inform him of the state of the garrison and of the debt held by 
the town from quartering soldiers. 157 The leaders were particularly concerned that 
they were still owed `great sums of money' by former garrisons. ' 58 Additionally, they 
agreed to express their fears of the consequences for the town, should they not receive 
151 Childs, British Army of William III, 93. 
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some remedy from London. The loan and the petition did little to alleviate the 
immediate financial crisis facing the garrison. Within four days of the first loan the 
corporation was informed that Nott had requested a further £50 be lent until the 
officers of the garrison could get remittances from London. 159 Fortunately, an 
influential Berwick burgess named Mr. Lisely agreed to loan the major the additional 
£50, with the stipulation that this money was to be returned in three months with `all 
requisite interest. ' 1 60 
This response, and those that followed later in the seventeenth century, may have been 
heavily influenced by the serious disturbances that erupted in the town during the 
previous month. In December `several soldiers... assembled themselves together in 
the public marketplace' where they acted in a `riotous and tumultuous manner. '161 
The troops had not been paid for some time and were so desperate that they seized 
free quarters from the townsfolk. 162 The town's leaders knew that if nothing was done 
to alleviate the pressures caused by the failure of the military finance system there 
could be a return to this dangerous unruliness. 
The unrest of December and the loans that were provided in January only marked the 
beginning of several years of problems for the town. Stung by repeated requests for 
financial assistance, and already heavily burdened with military personnel, Berwick's 
quarters were pushed to breaking point in March 1689. The garrison commander, Sir 
John Lesley, announced plans to house an additional regiment of dragoons in the town 
which elicited serious opposition amongst civic leaders. 163 The town's ruling council 
demanded that the mayor and aldermen inform the colonel of the town's inability to 
house any further troops. It was seen as their job to prevent additional troops from 
being sent to Berwick, `or that some other course be taken to ease the town by 
quartering them in adjacent towns and villages. "64 This entreaty appears to have 
fallen on deaf ears. The next month the council received orders to not only 
158 Ibid. 
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accommodate the dragoon regiment but also a regiment each of foot and horse in the 
town and adjacent areas. 165 
The fears of Berwick's population were soon realised as by late May of that year 
Lieutenant-Colonel Heyford, the commander of the dragoons in the garrison, had 
approached the mayor to request funds to support his men. 166 Since the troops had not 
been paid for over one month Heyford requested, `that the said soldiers and their 
horses might have food and maintenance. ' 1 67 Unfortunately, the town could not 
acquiesce to this request as they felt that such a loan would be too heavy a burden on 
the local burgesses. Despite this rejection from local leaders the officer was able to 
secure the necessary funds. Once again a private citizen, this time named Mr. Edward 
Nealson, lent the town £200 for this purpose upon Heyford's promise that repayment 
would come from the first money the regiment received. 168 The generosity of the 
town was further tested by the lieutenant-colonel, when in June his regiment was 
ordered to march from Berwick, having been relieved by Colonel Beveridge's 
Regiment of Foot. Repeating earlier requests, Heyford went cap-in-hand to the 
council requesting an additional £100 to assist him in paying the cost of the troops' 
quarters, as well as the arrears that they owed the town's inhabitants. 169 Once again 
the request was denied, and once again Mr. Neaslon came to the rescue agreeing to 
loan the necessary funds. 170 
This drain on Berwick's resources continued long after the departure of f eyford's 
dragoons. Many of the succeeding regiments found themselves in a similar position, 
requiring financial and logistical support from the civilian population of Berwick. For 
example, during 1690 the lieutenant governor of the garrison requested that the 
council provide money to support troops whose pay was expected to be two weeks 
late. '7' In the summer of 1695 the town's innkeepers were again forced to provide 
money for the upkeep of Colonel Beaumont's regiment for a period of nearly three 
165 Ibid., 25 April 1689. 
166 Ibid., 20 May 1689. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., 7 June 1689. 
170 Ibid. 
130 
months. 172 To the benefit of the garrison, they were able to pay off one month of 
arrears in August. However, by September the corporation was complaining that 
money was still not forthcoming from London to allow the garrison to discharge all of 
its debt to the town. ' 73 Despite a very positive letter to the guild from `one of our 
Parliamentary burgesses' in November, stating that the government was getting ready 
to clear the debts of garrisons in England, the town's problems were far from over. 
174 
Four months later `the whole body of the guild made a general complaint that by 
decay of their trade and their long subsisting this garrison for thirty-two weeks, are no 
longer able to subsist the same. ' 175 It was not until early July that Major Moncall of 
Sir John Jacob's regiment arrived in town with subsistence money to pay arrears and 
bills up to January. 176 This was not before the resilient generosity of the town was 
again stretched to breaking point and 60 of the garrison were turned out of their billets 
onto the streets. '77 This resulted in 40 of these homeless soldiers promptly deserting 
the regiment. '78 
In February 1697, there were additional complaints about the amount of money owed 
to the town for supporting the troops in garrison during the previous year. 179 
Furthermore, on 11 March 1697 five companies of Colonel Churchill's regiment 
arrived at the garrison and almost immediately complained about the fact that they had 
no money. 180 This led to a request that the innkeepers allow the troops credit totalling 
three shillings per week (two for food, one for drink), until such time as money 
arrived to discharge the debt. 181 Despite the trouble, inconvenience and hardship that 
earlier sponsorship had created within Berwick, and the legacy of unpaid debts, the 
guild seems to have agreed without much argument. 182 As a consequence of their 
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continued support for the soldiers, the following year Berwick's leaders were forced to 
send yet another petition to London. This time the members of the guild made direct 
links between the decline of the town's trade and prosperity, and their repeated 
attempts to help clothe and support resident soldiers. 183 
The army often made attempts to repay loans for subsistence as quickly as possible. 
Unfortunately, for some in Berwick this did not always prove easy. Often it could be 
years before such liabilities were paid back by the central government. The day after 
Christmas 1693 the mayor reported that the governor of the garrison, Richard Levison, 
had informed him that £200 had been made available by the War Office to pay the 
town's debts, incurred in assisting troops of Colonel Beveridge's regiment. 18' It must 
be remembered that this regiment had arrived in Berwick during June 1689. This 
meant that it had taken nearly four years for those arrears to be cleared. In one 
extreme case Berwick's leaders were forced to write a letter of protest to their 
Members of Parliament in 1697 to collect sums owed to them for clothing and 
quartering a regiment of soldiers in 1677.185 By 1705 it was estimated that the town 
was in debt to the tune of £1705 going back to the incidents of 1689.186 As late as 
1719 the guild members were protesting about a £3000 debt for the support of Lionel 
Waldron's `Purple' regiment that remained unsettled from 1679.187 Much of this 
money was owed to publicans, or had been paid to publicans by the town in order to 
cover unpaid bills. From 1696 the government attempted to make some reductions in 
the arrears outstanding to these communities. Orders were drafted instructing all 
regiments to draw up their accounts for their quarters. '88 The War Office demanded 
that commanders complete accounts and instructed them to ensure that officers be 
kept with their units to prevent `disorders they are informed are daily committed in 
this country by the soldiers, in the absence of their officers. '189 
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Unfortunately the War Office's attempts to put its own financial house in order did 
not succeed widely in the North East. During December 1705 the authorities were so 
heavily burdened that they actually agreed to a plan for magistrates to billet soldiers in 
private houses. 190 The problem became so acute that in the autumn of 1706 Berwick's 
mayor dispatched a letter to the town's two parliamentary representatives, Samuel 
Ogle and Jonathan Hutchinson. 19' It supported the alehouse keepers of the town who 
were mounting great opposition to him because of the pressures placed upon them by 
having to quarter soldiers. The letter described how billeting had created `a great 
many poor and starving families that are at this instant groaning under their burden of 
six and eight soldiers a piece. ' 192 An important characteristic of this letter is that it 
represents the first time either the guild or the mayor mentions the need for Berwick to 
have permanent barracks built within the town. The consistent requests for support by 
officers, and the growing socio-economic problems caused by mounting public debts, 
led members of the town hierarchy to express the need for larger purpose-built 
facilities. Their assertion was that the status quo could not be maintained, and if 
Berwick were to continue to play host to so many troops some solution was 
required. 193 In the intervening three years the same concerns persisted, manifesting 
themselves in a vicious circle. In 1709 the guild described how 
the case of alehouse keepers in town being represented to this 
guild to be very lamentable with respect to their quartering the 
soldiers sent here, above what they are able insomuch that 
several persons that formerly sold ale, on which their livelihood 
chiefly depended, have been obliged to leave the trade by which 
those that still use it are daily more burdened. 194 
While David Brenchley believes that these assertions may have been exaggerated it is 
clear from guild records that the burdens of billeting were having a negative effect on 
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the town. ' 95 Despite these problems Berwick never refused to take what they felt was 
their fair share of soldiers, and there appears to have been little resistance from 
publicans and innkeepers to the soldiers themselves. 196 This was especially true in 
times of crisis such as the Jacobite rebellion of 1715 when town leaders agreed to 
quarter as many troops as General Carpenter required, even offering to place them in 
private homes and businesses once the public accommodation was full. 
197 However, 
in all of their protests to the government the mayor and burgesses complained that the 
burden on them was oppressive, especially considering that past debts, such as that 
from 1679, were still outstanding. 
Despite continued complications in getting past debts cleared, the era of almost 
continuous entreaties by the army to the town for subsistence money appears to have 
ended with the official opening of the town's new barracks in 1719.198 Similarly, the 
complaints against unpaid bills, and the inequities of billeting declined dramatically in 
this period. This is not to say that the new military quarters put a complete end to the 
almost parasitic relationship that existed between Berwick and its military population. 
For instance, as the country quickly mobilised for war in 1757, Berwick found itself 
inundated with soldiers. 
Many of these were stationed in the town to prevent or counter a possible invasion of 
northern Britain by French forces. The ability of the corporation to quarter more 
troops was quickly brought into question when the mayor declared that `all the public 
houses are full of soldiers and the barracks cannot at present take in more. "99 The 
desperate situation resulted in Berwick's officials using questionable billeting 
practices. The mayor and the bailiffs complained to the guild that `they have been 
lately threatened to be sued by several butchers, bakers, meat sellers and others within 
this borough for billeting soldiers upon them. 200 These threats do not seem to have 
had much impact on the mayor and his assistants. In 1763 the country was flooded 
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198 This does not include continued attempts by the town after 1719 to recover debts from before this 
period. BTRO B 9/1/138,2 February 1719. 
199 BTRO GB 1/17/265,18 February 1757. 
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with demobilising regiments returning from overseas. As before the landlords in 
Berwick complained that the public houses of the town were very poor due to the 
`oppression' visited upon them by `several regiments halting in this town at the same 
time. , 201 Such was the problem that members of the town's council once again 
suggested that a proportion of the soldiers who were marching through should be 
quartered on butchers, bakers and meat sellers `in order to ease those persons who 
keep such public houses. '202 
The hardships that billeting and garrisoning brought to the civilian population were 
not exclusive to Berwick, although it seems to have suffered disproportionately. On 
more than one occasion Newcastle found itself at the centre of a dilemma over the 
pressures of quartering soldiers. At this time Newcastle did not have a permanent 
garrison like Berwick or permanent barracks like Tynemouth203 As a result the town 
only periodically experienced the extreme financial and logistical pressures created by 
billeting. 
The distribution of military units was an issue that occasionally ignited local passion. 
The preponderance of these troops were quartered in Newcastle's All Saints and St 
Nicholas's parishes, placing a significant burden on the inhabitants of these districts. 
Even when the number of troops in the town was not overwhelming, the distribution 
of billets was often uneven. Such a disparity was illustrated at the quarter sessions 
held in Newcastle during April 1704. At this meeting 30 of the town's publicans 
complained that they were bearing an unfair burden of the quartering. 04 Their main 
objection was that with over 400 public houses in and around the town, they had had 
two or three soldiers billeted upon each of their businesses for up to 18 weeks. 205 This 
had the effect of creating `great oppression and injury', and they were requesting that 
troops be more evenly billeted throughout Newcastle and the surrounding area. 06 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., 1/18/188-9,6 May 1763. 
202 Ibid. 
203 PRO WO 1/973/1139, William Whitmore to Barrington, 10 April 1757. These were expanded and 
improved from 1758 and Tynemouth became a perpetual garrison from 1770. 
204 TWAS QS/NC/1/3,26 April 1704. 
205 Ibid. 
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The inadequacies of the army pay system caused problems for local inhabitants during 
the crisis of 1745. At this time the corporation was forced to lend £600 to Lieutenant 
Colonel La Rocque's regiment `being disappointed of money to pay the regiment. '207 
The unusual state of affairs in 1745 contributed to this problem, as thousands of 
troops poured into Newcastle at short notice to counter the Jacobite invasion of 
England208 Nonetheless, it still remained the case that a regimental commander was 
forced to go to the town council, cap-in-hand, in order to ensure that his men were fed 
and bills were paid. In turn the leaders of Newcastle had to lend cash to the troops to 
ensure their good behaviour, äs well as the solvency of the local publicans and 
innkeepers. On this occasion it made sense to acquiesce to the needs of army 
commanders. The town's population would need a fed, clothed and housed army 
should it be required to defend the city against the Jacobite army. 
Some of the smaller environs in the hinterland around Newcastle suffered fates similar 
to those larger towns with permanent garrisons. In the summer of 1704 the 
inhabitants of Hexham made protests to the Secretary at War concerning a full troop 
of dragoons that had arrived in the town expecting quarters. 209 While the actual 
number of soldiers amounted to no more than 100 men with horses, the town felt that 
they were being forced to take more than their fair share. 210 In some senses this 
observation was justifiable. The billeting census of 1686 listed Hexham as having 
only 41 guest beds and berths for 53 horses. 21 1 It is unlikely that these facilities 
increased in the intervening 18 years to a point that would allow a whole troop of 
dragoons to be easily quartered there. The protestations of local inhabitants seems to 
have been further justified by the response of Samuel Lynn (a clerk at the War Office) 
to the officer at Hexham. 212 He ordered that at least half of the troop stationed in 
Hexham should be quartered at Haltwhistle and Beltingham, while also instructing the 
officer to obey his original orders outlining a similar dispersal. 213 The financial 
burden of hosting soldiers in the town was once again on the agenda during the 
206 Ibid. 
207 TWAS MD/NC/2/5/52,14 October 1745. 
208 This subject is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 7. 
209 PRO WO 4/3/28, Samuel Lynn to the Officer-in-Chief with the Troop at Ilexham, 10 June 1704. 210 This is an estimate taken from the Guards and Garrison Establishments for 1704. PRO WO 24/33. 211 PRO WO 30/48/139-43. 
212 PRO WO 4/3/28,10 June 1704. 
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midsummer quarter sessions of 1761. During this meeting the judges ordered that a 
local innkeeper by the name of William Lee be paid the sum of £3 6s 3d as 
compensation for unpaid bills in supplying coals, straw and other goods to soldiers 
billeted upon him that year. 214 
On rare occasions even Tynemouth, with its barracks, experienced problems 
supporting its garrison. During January 1704 a company of invalids housed at 
Tynemouth was due £440 9d for their pay from 26 March to 24 October 1703.215 It 
turned out that the inhabitants of Shields and Tynemouth had been supporting these 
troops at their own expense since 25 March. 216 In a petition to the Lord High 
Treasurer by local officials it was stated that these `old and helpless' invalid soldiers 
were not the only group that had to be supported. 217 They were also supporting `many 
families of the soldiers], who were a great burden to the parish' and were thus 
`praying for relief from the government. 218 
Such was the problem throughout England that in 1756 the government in London 
created a committee to investigate the numerous complaints about billeting. As was 
the case in the north, the majority of this disapproval surrounded the expense `that in 
consequence of such additional charges many had been obliged to shut up their 
[public] houses. '219 Existing records from central government sources reinforce the 
idea that financial loss was the main fear of local communities involved in billeting 
and garrisoning. Nearly every one of the 130 assorted petitions from innkeepers 
across the country, contained in a box of unnumbered War Office papers, focused on 
the financial burden of billeting rather than the behaviour of soldiers. 220 For example, 
at the end of May 1760 the innkeepers of Durham complained that in the four months 
up to that point the Cleveland battalion of the North Yorkshire Militia had been 
213 Ibid. 
214 MRO QSO 9/470,15 July 1761. 
215 BL Add. MSS 38,711/10, War Office Correspondence, Vol. 18,1704. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Calendar of Treasury Papers, 87/122, 'about November 16th' 1703/4. 
218 Ibid. 
219 PRO WO 26/35/5-7,2 March 1756. 
220 PRO WO 40/3. This is a collection of petitions from innkeepers to the Secretary at War between 
1759 and 1809. 
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quartered in the town. 221 They also stated that in that time another 8,000 troops of 
various regiments had passed through the city. 222 The petition went on to state that 
this had created a situation in which `the innkeepers have already suffered 
exceedingly, in so much that within those few weeks eight or ten persons who kept 
public houses have been forced to shut up their houses. '223 
There is little doubt that Durham and other medium-sized towns suffered from the 
financial and logistical stresses of billeting. However, pressures could reach extremes 
in smaller, isolated towns located along the army's marching routes. Such was the 
case in the village of Burton where the inhabitants found themselves in the most 
unfortunate circumstances. Their main grievance was that the government had 
ordered them to billet as many as 300 soldiers at one time in a community with only 
120 residents and five inns and public houses. 224 The demand they made to the 
Secretary at War was simple enough, either provide financial relief or remove Burton 
from the official marching routes. 225 In fact many of the region's small villages felt 
the burdens of billeting due to their role in supporting the marches of regiments about 
the county. For example, in May and June of 1689, Colonel Beveridge's regiment 
stayed overnight in villages such as Kirkby Steven, Bishop Auckland, Alnwick and 
Belford while on its march to Berwick. 226 This meant that as many as 435 men would 
have required lodgings for the evening in these places. 227 In 1686 the small town of 
Alnwick had just 95 beds. 228 Therefore, it is easy to see the pressures that a sudden 
influx of nearly four times the town's vacancy rate would have on resources even if 
many of the soldiers were forced to sleep in tents, sheds and barns. 
221 Ibid., 31 May 1760. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid., 22 March 1800. 
225 Ibid. 
226 PRO WO 5/5/158, Marching Orders 1688-90. 
227 PRO WO 24/9, Guards and Garrisons 1689; PRO WO 5/5/158. The regiment was probably not at 
its full strength of 876. Additionally the regiment was ordered to march in two divisions, two days 
apart. WO 5/5/158. 
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VI. Positive Impacts 
The discussion so far has focused on the negative aspects of garrisons and billets. 
However, there were many instances in which the army played positive roles in the 
daily life of North-East towns. Soldiers performed duties that were additional to their 
military role, which directly or indirectly benefited the livelihood of the region. These 
impacts could be social, economic and even military. 
An example of how the army contributed to local infrastructure can be observed in 
1765. In late May the officers commanding the garrison at Berwick were given 
permission to use troops of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers quartered there, and other 
soldiers from Carlisle and Newcastle, to assist in building a bridge at Coldstream. 29 
While the bridge was mainly-for military use, its existence could only help to improve 
the trade and communications infrastructure of the region surrounding the town. 
Similarly, the repair and construction of military buildings throughout the North East 
not only assured the continued security of the region but also created a market for 
local skilled tradesmen and merchants. 230 
Soldiers could also be mobilised to counter threats to civilian lives and property that 
had nothing to do with violent mobs or invading armies. During July 1750 officers 
and soldiers of Lord Ancram's regiment were instrumental in helping the citizens of 
Newcastle to battle a large fire near the Tyne Bridge. 231 So ferocious was the 
conflagration that it threatened to consume the whole of the Sandgate district. 232 if 
not for the actions of the local population, in co-operation with the troops, the £10,000 
of damage could have been much more serious. 233 Similarly, in March 1773 
Berwick's town council expressed their gratitude to Major John Bird, and his fellow 
228 PRO WO 30/48/139. . 229 PRO WO 4/77/70-1, Barrington to Officer Commanding H. M. Garrison at Berwick, 29 May 1765. 
In particular, the officer required a party of soldiers consisting of one sergeant and 12 privates from 
Newcastle, one sergeant and ten privates from Carlisle, and one corporal and eight privates from 
Berwick. 
230 Economic and security benefits will be discussed below. 
231 The exact date was July 24th; John Sykes (ed. ), Local Records of Northumberland and Durham. 





officers in the 19th Regiment of Foot, `for their ready and effectual aid and assistance 
in extinguishing the fire in Church Street, and for their civilities shown to the 
town. '234 So impressed was the town that they even agreed to award ten guineas to 
the soldiers who assisted in putting out the fire, `as a gratuity for the good behaviour 
which they showed by their activity and diligence during the time of the fire. '235 Just 
four years later, officers and men of the resident Independent Company received the 
appreciation of the town for assisting in suppressing another fire in Castlegate. 
236 
There were tangible economic benefits to having the army in a town. 237 John Childs 
believes that during the reign of William III many people in garrison towns such as 
Berwick depended absolutely on the commerce of the soldiers. 238 In fact he asserts 
that it was this economic link that played a part in the motivation of Berwick's leaders 
to support financially pressed soldiers in the late seventeenth century. 
239 The 
importance of soldiers to the local economy in Berwick is supported by events in 
1768. During this year the garrison was reduced considerably, resulting in a request 
from the town to have the number of troops housed in the barracks increased. 240 
When they had money, there is little doubt that the considerable spending power of 
large bodies of soldiers was welcomed by local storekeepers and publicans. 24' 
The army also required clothing, food, drink and fuel, as well as new and repaired 
equipment. Much of this was supplied locally. 242 In 1721 Berwick's innkeepers and 
merchants supplied the new barracks with utensils and cooking equipment. 243 The 
barracks also required staff such as Mrs Greive, who as `Barracks Mistress' co- 
ordinated a team of local women in cleaning and maintaining the facilities. 244 In 
234 BTRO GB 1/19/85-6,5 March 1773. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid., 1/19/235-6,3 September 1777. 
237 Douet, British Barracks, 33. 
238 Childs, Army of William III, 98. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 144. 
241 Ibid. 
242 It is important to note that in some English towns large concentrations of soldiers occasionally 
caused food shortages, prices rises and even riots. 
243 BTRO GB 1/15/100,24 May 1721. 
244 BTRO B/2/4/481-2,21 September 1750. Unfortunately, Mrs Greive appears to have been a less 
than efficient barracks mistress. In this entry she was chastised by the Alderman for failing to keep the 
barracks fit for habitation by five companies of Colonel Howard's regiment stationed in the town. 
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addition to this officers often required servants and attendants to maintain their 
personal belongings and to tend to personal affairs. Furthermore, the building and 
repairing of military buildings also had a noticeable impact. Most of the contracts to 
build the barracks at Berwick and Tynemoblh went to local merchants, and provided 
employment to the region's skilled labourers. During October 1717 a local freeman of 
Berwick named John Tully was given permission to use the town's moor to grow hay 
for the 600,000 bricks to be used in the construction of the barracks. 245 This must 
have represented one of the single largest orders given to local bricklayers during the 
entire eighteenth century. 246 While the above examples concentrate on Berwick they 
are fairly generic for all towns that had a regular army presence. There is no reason to 
suggest that other North-East communities such as Newcastle and Morpeth did not 
benefit the way Berwick did. An experience similar to Berwick's would have 
occurred in Tynemouth at the time of the expansion and improvement of their 
barracks and defences in mid-century. 
Soldiers also played less obvious, but equally beneficial, economic roles within local 
communities. This was especially true of invalid troops who tended remain in one 
place for a long period of time. Due to the easy nature of their garrison duty these 
troops had much more time for integration with the civilian population. It was not 
unusual for invalid and even regular soldiers to use their spare time to practice civilian 
trades or assist local farmers with the harvest. 247 James Douet believes that in 
England's garrison towns it was commonplace for soldiers to engage in part-time 
work whether it was legal or illegal. 248 John Childs supports this conclusion believing 
that `moonlighting must have been the norm rather than the exception' in garrison 
towns 249 For a time the government actually encouraged such enterprise by issuing 
instructions that `private soldiers may be permitted to work at their trades, in the 
several garrisons' about the country. 250 However, as the century progressed, this 
attitude does not appear to have been universally popular. In 1757 Thomas Clark, an 
invalid solider resident in Berwick, was presented to the quarter sessions charged with 
245 BTRO GB 1/15/25,4 October 1717. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 143. 
248 Douet, British Barracks, 39. 
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`keeping an open shop' in the Churchgate quarter of the town. 51 He was 
subsequently ordered to close down his fledgling business. 252 Importantly, this casual 
labour may have helped to bridge the rift that often existed between the different 
lifestyles and experiences of civilians and soldiers. 253 
Members of the army were also involved in many of the public celebrations and 
thanksgiving events that occurred throughout the century. This was certainly true of 
events that marked the anniversary of a royal coronation or birthday. On 11 June 
1735 General Core's regiment was at the centre of the festivities surrounding the 
anniversary of George II's ascent to the throne. In Newcastle the mayor gave money 
to the soldiers quartered there who marched and fired their muskets between drinks to 
the health of the King. 254 At the same time the officers from the regiment were guests 
at a `grand entertainment' hosted by members of the council and local grandees? SS In 
fact units of the army or the militia were a central part of every major occasion in 
Berwick and Newcastle throughout the period. Beyond this, officers and enlisted men 
also demonstrated martial skills and discharged celebratory volleys upon receiving 
good news from the world's battlefields. 256 This was certainly true during the Seven 
Years War when a succession of military victories led to public celebrations 
throughout the region. 257 However, such public demonstrations did not have to 
revolve around great military victories or regal anniversaries. In 1762 units of the 
army and militia fired public salutes to recognise Queen Charlotte having given birth 
to the heir to Britain's throne. 258 These ceremonies saw civilians and soldiers engaged 
in positive interaction. 
The most notable and obvious benefit provided by the presence of the military in the 
towns and countryside of the North East was the heightened level of security from 
250 PRO WO 4/1/48, Secretary at War to Sir John Reresby, 1 March 1686. 
251 BTRO C8/2,18 April 1757. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Childs, The British Army of William 111,117. 
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256 It has been suggested that as the eighteenth century progressed, the veneration of the army for its 
military successes increased as part of a slowly emergent British patriotic identity. For more on this 




internal and external threats. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, troops acted as a 
nascent police force, subduing smuggling and conveying and guarding prisoners. 
Furthermore, they assisted in maintaining public order. Although this often brought 
them into open conflict with some local civilians, their actions helped to maintain 
order and ensure the economic and social peace of a region often rocked by labour 
unrest. While this tended to benefit those with interests in the maintenance of the 
status quo, riot duty was central to the well being of the region. Certainly local 
leaders in Tynemouth were aware of the military and security benefits of having entire 
regiments permanently stationed in the castle's barracks. 259 
Most importantly for this strategically important region of England, the garrisons at 
Berwick, Newcastle and other places countered repeated threats of foreign invasion 
during the endemic wars of the period. If this benefit was not already obvious to the 
populace, then the role of the army in the North East during the 1715 and 1745 
Jacobite rebellions made it plainly clear. In 1715 the army acted to turn back a 
threatened invasion from Scotland. Similarly, a party of soldiers from Berwick, 
assisted by armed townsmen, `retook Holy Island' from the Jacobite force that had 
occupied it. 260 The group was rewarded with a gift of the King's share of brandy that 
had been seized from the ship that had conveyed the invaders to the island. 26' During 
the rebellion of 1745 thousands of soldiers were stationed in the region and helped, 
not only to repel the Jacobite invasion, but reinforce the resolve of the local 
community by providing a sense of security at a very anxious moment. As will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7, this represented the highpoint of local public 
appreciation for the army and its soldiers. 
259 Ibid, 238. 
259 PRO WO 1/990, Lt. Col. David Wedderbum to Lord Barrington, 20 August 1769. They also 
recognised the financial benefits. 
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The presence of soldiers, whether in permanent garrisons or temporary billets, 
exposed the population of the North East to a wide variety of experiences with the 
army. The very nature of the way in which troops were quartered meant that 
interaction between military personnel and civilians was regular and sustained. Even 
Berwick, whose permanent barracks reduced the visibility of the forces after 1719, 
had a strong and lasting relationship with the soldiers. 262 Because soldiers lived 
within local communities, in some ways they became a part of it. They integrated 
with, and contributed to the community in a variety of ways. This does not mean that 
civilians necessarily saw the soldier as one of their own, or as total equals, but rather 
as a familiar part of daily life. 
In any close relationship such as that experienced by the army and civilian society, 
personal relationships were important. Since the army was a male preserve sexual 
politics were particularly relevant. Unfortunately, flaws and gaps in the region's 
archival record for this period mean that little specific detail can be extracted to shed 
light on the way in which romantic or sexual relations developed between garrisoned 
soldiers and local women. Marriages occurred, and increased during periods of war, 
but it is hard to determine specific conclusions from the material available. One thing 
that does become apparent is the tension and concern that was generated in the 
garrison town of Berwick by the issue of bastardy. The role of the soldier in this 
social problem was considerable in the early part of the century, before the building of 
barracks in 1719 eased the crisis. Whether through legitimate relationships or 
prostitutes, bastards were both a financial burden and a moral concern in Berwick. 
While there is evidence to suggest that soldiers were responsible for fathering bastard 
children throughout the region the problem seems to have been especially troublesome 
in Berwick. 
Apart from bastardy, the maintenance of the region's military infrastructure seems to 
have generated tension amongst the army and civilians. Much of this was engendered 
in political conflicts related to the jurisdiction of engineers and officers over public 
land and the improvement of military buildings. Fortunately, the majority of these 
disagreements seem to have been solved with a minimal amount of negative residue. 
Local officials in the region's towns were conscious of their rights and jurisdictions 
and were not afraid to use the avenues of protest available to them to resolve 
problems. This was especially true of the leadership of Berwick which had experience 
262 Brenchley, A Place by Itself, 137. 
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with this kind of conflict throughout the century. The examples available tend to 
illustrate that the government in London was also willing to utilise its political power 
to reinforce civilian authority over the military and contribute to ending these conflicts 
quickly. The War Office did not hesitate to pull officers and Ordnance engineers into 
line if it felt that a community's interests had been violated. Ministers and 
administrative grandees also recognised that the protests of garrison communities 
needed to be taken seriously if the government was to count on the continued support 
and goodwill of these towns. 
Unfortunately, the central government was unable to deal as efficiently with the 
problems that arose from billeting and quartering. During the disruption of the 
Glorious Revolution and the financial crisis of 1696-7, as well as the first two decades 
of the eighteenth century, the short-comings of the army pay and finance systems 
placed great pressures on North-East communities. Towns such as Berwick and 
Tynemouth were often required to subsidise soldiers' living and subsistence costs out 
of their own pockets. This generated a great deal of anger amongst the local 
population. However, there is little evidence to suggest that consternation over the 
financial burden of billeting was directed towards soldiers themselves. Rather the 
dissent was ultimately placed at the foot of the government in London. Nevertheless, 
the situation became so desperate on occasions that soldiers eventually suffered at the 
hands of the local population. Even though a great deal of stress and anxiety swept 
the North East over this issue, civilians were often prepared to assist the soldiers in a 
number of ways. Berwick and Tynemouth, with their considerable garrisons and 
relatively small civilian populations, made great efforts to ensure that money was 
supplied to subsist and house soldiers in need. Cynically, it could be argued that the 
motivation for such generosity was fear that a hungry and penniless soldiery could 
turn on the local population such as they did in Berwick during 1689.263 
However, there appears to have been a genuine concern on behalf of the civilians to 
the plight of the soldiers, coupled with a realisation of the impact such situations had 
on the local economy. John Childs believes that `common humanity towards the 
underpaid and starving soldiery, as well as economic necessity, probably lay at the 
root of the goodwill' shown to soldiers in the late seventeenth century. 264 There is no 
reason to suggest that this was still not the case in the early eighteenth century. In fact 
it is surprising that the strain caused by billeting did not produce more lasting and 
entrenched problems for civil-military relations. 265 Andrew Coleby has argued that 
263 BTRO GB 1/13.14 December 1689. 
264 Childs, The British Army of William III, 98. 
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145 
the nature of civil-military relations differed between communities that played host to 
soldiers on a regular basis, and those that were visited by regiments on rare 
occasions. 266 In particular, he believes that those societies with a permanent or regular 
military presence were more accepting of the soldiers than localities whose 
experiences were based on short-term interaction. This may help to explain the level 
of support afforded to soldiers in need. As the eighteenth century passed the financial 
problems of the army eased. This seems to have helped alleviate some of the pressure 
that was underpinning civil-military relations in region's towns. Additionally, the 
completion of Berwick's barracks in 1719 helped to lessen that town's particular 
dilemma. Unfortunately, the burden that billeting and the distribution of forces placed 
on landlords and innkeepers continued unabated into the nineteenth century. 
Billeting and garrisons caused a myriad of problems for many local communities, but 
there were also clear benefits associated with the presence of soldiers. As has already 
been suggested, many garrison communities had very close economic links to their 
military populations. The army, for all of its financial problems in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, represented a huge source of public 
expenditure and created employment opportunities throughout the region. Similarly, 
soldiers often contributed directly to the local economy by undertaking civilian jobs 
and engaging in commerce. At the same time the army assisted the civilian 
population during emergencies such as major fires, and actively participated in many 
public celebrations and ceremonies. This included celebrations of military victories. 
Most importantly for the North East was the part that the army exercised in 
guaranteeing an element of regional security, social peace and protection from 
external threats. 
266 Andrew Coleby, 'Military-Civilian Relations on the Solent 1651-1689. ' The Historical Journal 29 
(4) (1986) 958. 
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Chapter 5 
Men Behaving Badly? 
Soldier Criminality and Civil-Military Relations. 
`They disturb markets and fairs, rob men on the 
highway, ravish women, breaking houses in the night 
and enforcing men to ransom themselves, killing men 
that have assisted constables that have come to keep 
the peace. ' 
Sir Walter Erle, 8 April 1628' 
I. - Introduction. 
The issue of interactions between soldiers, the army and civilians in the North East is 
central to this work. As Chapter 4 has illustrated this intercourse came in a number of 
ways and exerted a myriad of forces, both positive and negative, upon the relationship 
that existed between the army and North-East society. However, any discussion of 
civil-military relations must look at the role of the soldiery in criminal activity in the 
region. Such was the reputation of the army for involvement in flagitious and anti- 
social behaviour that it has led many to believe that the army was a breeding ground 
for unlawful activity. Similarly, the impression that towns hosting regiments were 
subject to unusually high levels of crime must be addressed. Gwenda Morgan and 
Peter Rushton indicate that soldiers based in the North East "rapidly became an 
irritant... and contributed to their share of theft, rapine and homicide. "2 The frequency 
and pattern of crimes committed by soldiers against the civilian population could 
weigh heavily on the relationship between these two groups. On the other hand it is 
equally important to analyse the types of crimes perpetrated against the soldiery by 
civilians. By doing this it may be possible to uncover some underlying sources of 
civil-military tensions within the North East. 
1 Quoted in: Paul Christianson, `Arguments on Billeting and Martial Law in the Parliament of 1628. ' 
The Historical Journal 37 (3) (1994) 548. 
147 
Despite its role in eighteenth-century Britain, and increasing interest amongst 
historians in the subject of crime, the specific role of the army in crime has had little 
in the way of detailed analysis. Many studies develop issues of eighteenth-century 
military criminality in Britain through reference to accounts given by government 
officials, army officers and other contemporary observers. It is important that these 
interpretations are subjected to deeper and more complete analysis to see if they truly 
reflect the reality of the time or represent personalised views of this topic. Some 
historians including Arthur Gilbert, Stephen R. Conway and John Childs have 
produced works specifically dealing with the issue of criminality within the armed 
forces during the eighteenth century. 4 While being important works themselves, many 
of these studies relate strictly to justice and malfeasance in the army or navy. As such 
they are not concerned with the wider implications of soldier criminality on civil- 
military relations or British society. 5 In terms of the specific impact of soldier 
criminality on civil-military relations in North-East England, nothing comprehensive 
has been written for the eighteenth century. What treatment has been given to the 
subject is entrenched within wider studies of regional criminality and localities. 6 To 
truly understand the impact of soldier criminality on this relationship one must ask 
several questions of the archival evidence. These include whether the army accounted 
for a disproportionate number of certain crimes, as well as the type of felonies that 
2 Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law: The Problem of Law Enforcement in 
North-East England (London: UCL Press, 1998), 202. 
3 Examples of this approach can be found in: Ian R. Christie, Stress and Stability in Late Eighteenth- 
Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Victor E. Neuburg, `The British Army in the 
Eighteenth Century. ' Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research, 61 (1983) 38-47. 
°I refer to Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John D Byrn, Crime and Punishment in the Royal 
Navy. Discipline on the Leeward Islands Station 1784-1812 (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1989); John 
Childs, `War, Crime Waves and the English Army in the Late Seventeenth Century. ' War and 
Socie , 
15 (2) (1997) 1-17; Arthur Gilbert, 'Military and Civilian Justice in Eighteenth Century 
England: An Assessment. ' Journal of British Studies 17 (1978) 41-65 and: 'The Regimental Courts 
Martial in the Eighteenth-Century British Army. ' Albion 8 (1976) 50-66; N. A. M. Rodger, The 
Wooden World. An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986) and: 
'Stragglers and Deserters From the Royal Navy During the Seven Years War. ' Bulletin of the 
Institute for Historical Research 57 (135) (1984) 56-79; Stephen Conway, `The Recruitment of 
Criminals into the British Army, 1775-81. ' BIHR 58 (1985) 46-58; Silvia Frey, 'Courts and Cats: 
British Military Justice in the Eighteenth Century. ' Military Affairs 43 (1979) 5-11. 
s Childs and Brumwell link criminality to issues of civil-military relations. Childs, `War, Crime Waves 
and the English Army'; Brumwell, Redcoats. 
6 These are: Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in the North East, c. 1650-1720, (Ph. D Thesis, 
University of the Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001); David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick upon 
Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997); 
Morgan and Rushton, Rogues. Thieves and the Rule of Law. 
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were committed, and how much this lawbreaking mirrored what was occurring in 
civilian criminal trends? 
11. Frameworks, Themes and Analysis 
At this point it is important to discuss the way in which crimes and soldiers' criminal 
activity will be analysed and applied within this chapter. First, all cases of crime have 
been calculated by the individuals tried for the crime rather than the number of cases 
brought before the courts. This has been done to show the actual numbers of people 
charged. Often soldiers and civilians committed crimes, not as individuals, but in a 
group. This is particularly true of more serious crimes such as assaults and robberies. 
For example, in 1745 two soldiers were charged with a robbery upon a Mr. Thomas 
Dodds, and in the following year five women assaulted Ann Rowday in Newcastle. 7 
From this it is easy to observe why it is essential to distinguish the individuals 
involved. Looking strictly at the number of crimes might not express the true level or 
nature of soldiers' involvement in criminal activity, or its effect on civilians within the 
local community. 
Secondly, certain activity that appears in criminal records, such as regional quarter 
sessions, has been consciously omitted from the statistics. This has been done due to 
the fact that their inclusion would not fairly represent the involvement of both 
civilians and military personnel. For the most part, these infractions include 
misdemeanours that soldiers were normally not involved in. They tended to be 
`quality of life' issues within the town and included things like the illegal setting up of 
stalls in the streets, the piling of dirt and rubbish before a house, possession of 
dangerous overhanging walls and chimneys, and letting swine run free in the streets. 
As such their inclusion would be misrepresentative of the true level of soldier's 
participation in crime, making it appear less than it should be. In a similar fashion 
other minor personal crimes such as practising a trade without apprenticeship or 
7 PRO ASSI 45/23/1/19h-m, 49d-g; Newcastle Courant, 1745; TWAS QS/NC/1/7/24b, Easter Sessions 
1746. 
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illegally using common fields have not been included. 8 The intention of this chapter 
is to analyse what I consider to be `mainstream' crimes in which soldiers participated .9 
It is hoped that by adopting this process one can project a more accurate, uncluttered 
and less subjective analysis of soldiers' involvement in criminal activity. Finally, a 
crime committed by a soldier is only recorded as such when the source material gives 
direct indication, through a description of the crime or individual, that the perpetrator 
is a military person. I have consciously avoided making speculations about whether or 
not someone `might be' a soldier if there is no archival evidence to support such 
conclusions. 
There are some problems with trying to gauge the exact levels of crime within the 
eighteenth-century North East, and many are related to the nature of the archival 
sources available. 10 There are a number of specific examples at the local and national 
levels that highlight the problems inherent in this form of analysis. The holdings of 
the Assizes of the Northern Circuit have, in places, some serious defects. 
" For 
example, there are no records in the period 1700-6, and this is followed by a seventeen 
year block (1707-1723) in which only the case records for Yorkshire remain in 
existence. 12 A similar situation exists for 1725,1727 and 1730-1733. Additionally 
the records for 1693-1698 as well as 1724,1726, and 1728-9 are very weak. This 
effectively means that with the exception of 1699 there is almost a forty-year period in 
which the assize records give us little or no detail about crimes in the North East. 
Further illustrations of this problem can be seen in the quarter sessions holdings of the 
Berwick Record Office. These records contain major gaps between 1717 and 1740, to 
the point that there is almost no information for criminal cases. 13 For this reason it is 
certain that the totals given for crimes committed in Berwick fall short of the actual 
numbers brought before the court. It is possible to fill in some of these gaps by 
utilising quarter session examinations, however, after 1772 records of criminal cases 
8 Although rioting was considered a criminal offence this topic will be discussed in detail in Chapte 6. 
9 These crimes will include murder, theft, robbery, assault, fraud, sedition and rape. 
10 For additional discussion of the problems inherent in calculating and quantifying eighteenth-century 
crime see: Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Theives and the Rule of Law, 47-50. 
11 PRO ASSI 45/15/2-38/1, Northern Circuit Assize Records 1688-1793. 
12 It appears as though the records for Northumbria, Cumberland and Westmorland have been 
completely lost. 
13 These records are: BRO C8/1-4a, Quarter Sessions Books, 7 July 1694 to 26 April 1805. 
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are limited. 14 
Probably the weakest sets of criminal records are those dealing with the city of 
Newcastle upon Tyne. 15 The quarter sessions papers, which usually hold the most 
useful detail of cases, are very discontinuous, including 67 years between 1688 and 
1793 where there are no records at all. 16 Unfortunately, even for those years that still 
remain, the information available is in poor condition with some documents being 
wholly unreadable. In fact the documents in this class, up to 1742, were so poor that 
no information could be taken from them. ' 7 Again, as with Berwick, some of these 
gaps were filled by using alternative sources, such as quarter sessions order books. ' 8 
These volumes provide lists of all people tried for crimes, including their occupations 
and the offences they were charged with. 19 However, very often these sources do not 
include the detail one would like. There are additional resources that can be used to 
help fill the gaps in the archival record. In particular, local newspapers such as the 
Newcastle Courant and the Newcastle Journal are excellent tools for supplementing 
primary sources 2° The trials and executions of soldiers charged with crimes were 
often described within such periodicals, even if no supporting case record remains in 
national or regional archival sources. 
III. Crime and the Rule of Law in the North East. 
While this is primarily a study of civil-military relations it is important to briefly put 
this chapter into a wider context by looking at the nature of crime in the eighteenth 
century, particularly in the North East. Looking at the trends that dominated civilian 
criminality during this period will be important when comparing this activity to that 
undertaken by the British soldiery. It will allow one to determine whether or not 
14 BRO C15/14-16, Quarter Sessions Records, Misc., Examinations, 1700-1789. 
15 In particular TWAS QS/NC/35-104. 
16 The missing years are: 1688-92,1696,1698-1715,1717-18,1720-7,1729-42,1751,1754-5,1757- 
61,1763-6,1769-70,1781,1786,1788-90. 
'7 TWAS QS/NC/35-47. Quarter Sessions Papers, 1693-1742. 
18 TWAS QS/NC/1/3-8, Quarter Sessions Order Books, 9 October 1700 to 28 April 1802. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Complete sets of these newspapers are available on microfilm from both the Robinson Library, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne, and the Local Studies Section at Newcastle Central Library. 
151 
soldiers were disproportionately represented in the crime statistics of the period and 
whether they were prone to certain types of infractions. 
At a regional level the English legal system was presided over by a complex 
organisation of courts, magistrates and government officials. 21 At the head of this 
system was the Lord Lieutenant. Appointed by the monarch and generally charged 
with command over the county's militia, he was also responsible for the appointment 
of local men to the Commissions of the Peace. 22 Although appointed by the Lord 
Lieutenant, the Lord Chancellor in London had ultimate control over a region's legal 
officials, possessing the authority to dismiss any justice believed to be involved in 
what Norman Landau refers to as `approbrious conduct'. 23 These justices of the 
peace, or magistrates as they were also known, tended to be men of some social 
standing and wealth and were responsible for all aspects of dispensing justice within 
the jurisdiction of their court. 24 The bulk of their duties did not involve overseeing 
criminal trials, but focused more on daily concerns such as the granting of licenses to 
public houses, the maintenance of gaols, the repair of roads and bridges and 
overseeing petitions to the Poor Law. 25 
The main body through which the justices exerted their power was the Court of 
Quarter Sessions. 26 It was the primary and supreme authority within the county. This 
court was not an arbitrary legal body, but rather embraced the key philosophy of trial 
by jury and was representative of the local legal establishment. 7 The jury was a body 
of local people whom, more often than not, originated from the skilled trades and the 
21 For a very detailed analysis of the various county organisations please see: Sidney & Beatrice Webb, 
The Parish and the County (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1906) 
22 Clive Emsley, Policing and Its Context 1750-1870 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983) 22. 
23 Norman Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los Angeles, University of California Press, 
1984) 125,128-9 
24 This was especially true in Newcastle where many magistrates had personal business interests in the 
coal trade. Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 200; The jurisdiction of the 
quarter sessions courts in the North East tended to be an entire county. 
2$ The court was also responsible for the annual appointment of constables, petty constables and bailiffs 
who assisting the justices in carrying out the provisions of warrants, arresting criminals and generally 
enforcing the law. 
26 As the name suggests the court met four times annually during Epiphany (January), Easter (April), 
Midsummer (July) and Michaelmas (October). 
27 Normally every justice within its jurisdiction as well as sheriffs, bailiffs, constables, petty constables, 
and coroners were expected to attend the sessions. 
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middle classes28 Magistrates presiding over the quarter sessions could deal with 
criminal infractions as varied as theft, assault, vagrancy and poaching, while imposing 
sentences on guilty parties ranging from fines to public whippings and even 
transportation. 9 Linked to these proceedings were the petty sessions, also chaired by 
the justices of the county, but not answerable to any other county court. Unlike the 
quarter sessions the petty sessions only required the attendance of two justices to make 
a quorum. The courts were called together to deal with petty crimes and 
misdemeanours, some poor law cases and other county issues. 
While the quarter and petty sessions were the primary instrument of the law within the 
county, the assize court was a central body, controlled from London, that had wide- 
ranging powers to deal with criminal trials in the counties. The assizes was the only 
court operating within the counties which could impose the death penalty or sentences 
involving transportation for life. 30 Because of this it tended to sit in judgement of the 
most serious crimes including major assaults, murder, rape and highway robbery. The 
court was constituted in much the same way as the quarter sessions and local justices 
and legal officers were expected to attend. The major difference was that the court 
was presided over by judicial representatives of the King's Bench. Unlike the quarter 
sessions, the assizes did not associate themselves with a single zone of legal 
jurisdiction, but rather held responsibility for a specific region of the country. The 
Assizes of the Northern Circuit, as it was known, was charged with hearing cases 
within a huge geographical zone that encompassed Newcastle, Northumberland, 
Cumberland, Yorkshire and Westmoreland 31 The only places inside this jurisdiction 
28 The jury lists for the Newcastle quarter sessions of 1744 contain 48 men including 18 merchants, 2 
tailors, 4 cordwainers, 1 baker, 1 brewer, 3 saddlers, 2 dyers, 5 smiths, 2 weavers, 4 carpenters and 6 
surgeons. TWAS QS/NC/50/2/1-2, Midsummer 1744. 
29 Quarter sessions could not sentence people to transportation for life. This was the strict purview of 
the assize courts. The decisions of the sessions could be reviewed and overturned by the judges sitting 
on the King's Bench in London. 
30 Records of the assize courts for the entire county can be found at the Public Records Office. The 
relevant records for Northumberland are: PRO ASSI 41,42,44,45. 
3' The rotation of the assize court normally took it from Yorkshire to Newcastle (where 
Northumberland's assizes were also held) and finally to Carlisle (for Cumberland and Westmorland). 
Morgan and Rushton, Rogues. Thieves and the Rule of Law, 19. 
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that were exempt from the power of the assize courts were Durham and Berwick upon 
Tweed 32 
This surprisingly representative judicial system supported what Douglas Hay has 
referred to as `one of the bloodiest criminal codes in Europe. '33 Death was a common 
punishment for relatively minor offences, and in the period after the Glorious 
Revolution parliament passed so many capital statutes that soon every type of theft 
and malicious damage could be punished by death. Hanging was a popular 
punishment for serious crimes such as murder, rape and theft, while whipping was 
commonly used for misdemeanours. Most executions and whippings took place in 
public where large crowds often came to watch. 
4 Surprisingly, these types of 
punishments appear to have been used sparingly in the North East. There were just 73 
known executions in the region (including Berwick) from 1718 until the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, while Northumberland normally witnessed one whipping every 
one or two years. 35 The endemic use of transportation after 1718 was another form of 
violence, this time psychological, which uprooted the criminal and sent them to an 
unknown and often harsh life in the American colonies. 
36 
Naturally, criminal activity was not uniform throughout the century as it evolved and 
changed, influenced as it was by economics, politics and shifts within society itself. 37 
For example, it has been observed that thefts increased at times when the supply of 
key foodstuffs was limited and subject to drastic price inflation. 8 This is certainly 
32 Durham had its own assize court due to its role as a 'County Palatinate'. A royal charter of 1604 
gave Berwick control over its own legal affairs allowing quarter sessions courts wider judicial powers, 
roughly equal to the of the assize courts. David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 69,79-80 
33 Douglas Hay, 'Property, Authority and the Criminal Law. ' In: Hay, Linebaugh, et. al., Albion's Fatal 
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin Books, 1975) 19. 
34 While meant to be a deterrent to crime the actual effect on public criminality is debatable. Between 
two-thirds and four-fifths of all whippings in the North East were public in the eighteenth century. 
Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law, 134. 
33 Ibid., 135,140. 
36 Ibid., 61,73,154. At Newcastle's assizes transportation accounted for half of all convictions for 
theft. 
37 A good example of this can be found in the debate surrounding the nature of violence in early-modem 
society. Susan Dwyer Amussen, 'Punishment, Discipline, and Power: The Social Meanings of Violence 
in Early-Modem England. ' Journal of British Studies 34 (1995) 1-34; J. A. Sharpe, 'The History of 
Violence in England: Some Observations. ' Past and Present 108 (1985) 206-15; Lawrence Stone, 
'Interpersonal Violence in English Society 1300-1980' Past and Present 101 (1983) 22-33. 
38 Douglas Hay, `War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth Century: The Record of the English Courts. ' 
Past and Present 95 (1982) 128-9. 
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true of Northumberland during the period of dearth around 1756, when thefts 
increased by 40 % during the year. 39 J. M. Beattie supports this argument when he 
highlights the fact that property crime appears to have declined during times of war as 
huge numbers of men were enlisted into the army. 40 Similarly, crime rates seem to 
have increased at the end of conflicts as thousands of men were discharged from the 
army. 41 While it is possible to detect national and even regional trends in statistics for 
property crime, similar tendencies might not be present in infractions such as rape, 
assault and murder. These were crimes of passion and tended not to be affected by 
wider social, economic or political influences. 
The North East shared many common traits with the rest of the country when it came 
to criminal activity. Most importantly was the fact that trends in crime, and especially 
those related to property crimes, followed national variations. Nevertheless, recent 
historiography has suggested that the region was, in many ways, more law abiding 
than other areas of the country. 42 With the exception of a few unusual years, there is 
no evidence to suggest that crime rates in the region were ever going to threaten the 
fabric of society. The rate of reported crimes for Berwick was extremely low with 
only 415 people coming before the town's quarter sessions between 1694 and 1793 43 
Similarly, existing records for the city of Newcastle show 2,829 crimes being tried 
before various courts between 1700 and 1793.4 Minor thefts and assaults made up 
the bulk of illegal activity in the region. Assault accounted for 43% of crimes in the 
entire region, while theft was the most common infraction representing almost half 
(48%) of all crimes brought before the courts 45 Together these account for 
approximately 90% of all the criminal activity dealt with by the assizes and regional 
quarter sessions. At the same time very serious crimes such as rape and murder 
39 MRO QSO/9. 
40 J. M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986) 215. 
In particular he identifies troughs in the years 1739-48,1756-63,1776-82,1793-1815. 
41 For discussion on this see Childs, `War, Crime Waves and the English Army. ' The role of the 
disbanded soldier in crime within the North East will be dealt with in greater detail below. 
42 Morgan and Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. This is the only large-scale study of 
crime in North-East England during the eighteenth century. 
43 A detailed breakdown of criminality can be found in Table 5.2 (Section V) below. 
44 For crimes in Newcastle see Table 5.3 below. It is likely that flaws in the records mean this number 
is much higher. 
45 See Table 5.2. 
155 
proved to be exceptionally rare. 46 In Northumberland, Newcastle and Berwick 
criminal records uncover only 81 cases of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter 
and just 37 incidents of rape. 47 
IV. A Conflict of Interest: The Army and the Jurisdiction of Common Law. 
Before looking specifically at soldier's criminality in the North East it is important to 
observe the legal context in which such transgressions took place. During the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries a distinct jurisdictional separation between 
the civilian and military criminal codes evolved. This development had an important 
effect on civil-military relations. The land forces continued to possess their own laws 
and judicial systems, in the form of martial law and the court martial. However, the 
army found itself increasingly answerable to the common law that protected civilian 
society and property. Offences committed against civilians, or those that broke the 
common law, gradually became the responsibility of civilian courts. At the same 
time, crimes committed against army personnel or military regulations were still to be 
dealt with in the court martial system. 
Before William III's ascension to the throne there had been a mixture of confusion 
and outright ambivalence towards a system that placed soldiers on trial in civilian 
courts. However, this was not due entirely to the failings of the government in 
London. As early as the 1670's administrators such as the Duke of Monmouth were 
issuing orders to officers demanding that troops under their control, accused of crimes 
against the populace, be delivered over to the civilian authorities for trial 48 Some 
officers were not sure what crimes this covered, while others simply refused to accept 
having their soldiers tried by civil courts. Many military leaders believed that 
common law courts were unfair and prejudiced against the army. The problem 
46 These categories also include attempted rape, attempted murder and manslaughter. 47 See Table 5.4: Soldiers As a Proportion of All Crimes (All North East) 1688-1793, and Table 5.2: 
Soldiers as a Proportion of All Crimes: Berwick, 1688-1793. A more general discussion of crime in 
eighteenth-century Berwick can be found in: David Brenchley, A Place By Itself 
48 Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD) Charles II, 124, April 17 1679. In particular, this order is 
for the delivery of four soldiers to the mayor of Southampton who have been accused of a robbery and 
assault on three customs officers in Titchfield. 
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became so widespread that, as Sir Francis North noted in February 1681, a `great 
observation is made that the soldiers pretend to be exempt from the civil 
magistrates. '49 This confusion was exacerbated by the actions of James II. 
In 1685 James II, ignoring the advice of the Secretary at War, William Blathwayt, felt 
it necessary to have all legal business involving the army referred to a weekly court 
martial held at Horse Guards in Whitehall 50 The Judge Advocate General, George 
Clark, concluded that in doing this James had altered the accepted legal status of the 
army. 51 In turn this facilitated the belief amongst some officers that they were beyond 
the jurisdiction of the common law and thus distinct from civilian society. 52 It also 
added fuel to the accusation that James was attempting to protect the army from 
civilian control and bring it into his sphere of influence. 
The confusing distinctions between the civilian and military law were legally clarified 
after the Glorious Revolution with the passing of annual Mutiny Acts and Articles of 
War. In the tradition of the 1688 revolution these rules unambiguously outlined the 
jurisdiction that the civilian legal authorities had over the army in terms of trying 
alleged crimes. It specifically noted that soldiers guilty of crimes against civilians or 
private property should be delivered `to the Civil Magistrate so soon as applied to. '53 
This position was further reinforced when parliament issued legislation in 1719 
establishing that soldiers were to be punished under the common law for crimes 
against civilians or their property. 54 It also went on to state that soldiers could not be 
liable for any subsequent punishment by a court martial for the same crime, save being 
cashiered from the service. 55 This helped to entrench the supremacy of civilian law 
over the martial legal code in cases where military personnel perpetrated crimes 
against the public. It also had the effect of removing the blanket of secrecy 
49 CSPD, Charles II, 182-3, February 25 1681. 
50 John Childs, The Army, James II, and the Glorious Revolution (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980) 
91. 
51 Ibid, 91-94 
52 Ibid., 
53 PRO WO 72/2. This particular extract was taken from Article 16 of the 1721 Articles of War. 
sa Mark A. Thompson, A Constitutional History of England, 1642-1801. Volume 4 (London: Methuen 
& Company, 1938) 296. 
55 Ibid. 
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surrounding the trials of soldiers that had existed in the closed-off world of the court 
martial. Now civilians could hear and read accounts of the crimes that soldiers 
exacted upon the population 56 
Despite the existence of such legislation, jurisdictional wrangling between civilian 
governments and the military continued long after these laws were in place. Luckily 
the problem does not appear to have been an overtly serious one in the North East, and 
the post-revolutionary clarification seems to have been largely obeyed. Nevertheless, 
in Berwick the question of jurisdiction was subject to occasional confusion well into 
the eighteenth century. In April 1731, a serious dispute arose between officers of Lord 
Cadogan's regiment in the garrison and the leaders of the town over the legal status of 
soldiers who had committed crimes against civilians. The mayor of Berwick 
reiterated the powers of the magistracy to arrest and try soldiers in common courts. 7 
However, the officers concerned pretended `that the civil magistrates have not a power 
to call before them any of the soldiery in case of offences... without an application 
first made to the commanding officer. '58 
Such were the negative feelings engendered by this conflict that officers of the 
garrison were accused by the town's businessmen of attempting to influence soldiers 
not to buy goods from the burgesses who had supported the mayor. 59 Since it 
appeared that the town was to suffer as a result, and that the garrison would not back 
down, it was agreed to send a letter of petition to London. 0 However, in an attempt 
to end any further conflict the mayor called a meeting between himself and the 
officers of the garrison a few days later. At this parley the mayor informed them of 
the town's letter to the government in London 61 This seems to have tipped the scales 
in favour of the mayor and his followers. Almost immediately the officers agreed that 
they `would no longer insist upon it that the civil magistrate had no power over their 
sb Reports of the trials, sentencing and executions were often reported in the major newspapers of the 
region. These are mainly the Newcastle Courant and the Newcastle Journal. 




61 Ibid., 1/16/89,28 April 1731 
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soldiers in criminal matters without the concurrence of their officers'. 
62 They also 
made a further concession that they would `give out orders to their soldiers that they 
might be at liberty to spend their money in what houses they saw fit. '63 It seems that 
the threat posed by the letter to London was enough to make the officers give up their 
resistance before incurring the wrath of the government and the War Office. Whether 
this sudden change of heart is a sign of complicity by Cadogen's officers is not 
known. 
V. The Usual Suspects? Trends in Soldier Criminality Within Civilian 
Society. 
Like their civilian counterparts, members of the army were involved in a wide variety 
of criminal activities. Soldiers committed rapes, participated in killings, stole animals 
and other goods, and engaged in fraud such as illegal coining and bigamy. It is not 
really the variegated talents of the army's criminals that are of interest to this study. 
However, it is necessary to analyse where troops tended to focus their iniquitous 
energies to see if these men were prone to particular forms of criminality. These 
trends may provide an insight into the effects that nefarious soldiers had on the 




Table 5.1: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes, 
Nnrth»mher1 and_ 16RR-1793M 
Crime Soldiers Total Crimes % Soldiers % Civilians 
Assault 9 1110 0.7% 99.3% 
Theft 4 1173 0.4% 99.6% 
Rae 1 16 6.3% 93.7% 
Robbery" 3 130 2.3% 72.8% 
Sedition 0 5 0.0% 100.0% 
Murder 3 34 8.8% 91.2% 
Fraud 0 68 0.0% 100.0% 
Totals 20 2536 0.9% 99.1% 
Table 52: Soldiers as a Pronortion of Identifiable Crimes. Berwick, 1688-1793. 
Crime Soldiers Total Crimes % Soldiers % Civilians 
Assault 3 230 1.3 98.7 
Theft 4 122 3.3 96.7 
Rape 1 7 14.3 85.7 
Robbery 0 18 0.00 100.0 
Sedition 0 0 0.00 100.0 
Murder 3 8 37.5 62.5 
Fraud 0 30 0.00 100.0 
Totals 11 415 2.7 97.3 
Table 5.3: Soldiers as a Proportion of Identifiable Crimes, Newcastle, 1700-1793 
Crime Soldiers Total Crimes % Soldiers % Civilians 
Assault 5 1130 0.4% 99.6% 
Theft 16 1484 0.7% 99.3% 
Rape 0 14 0.0% 100.0% 
Robbe 16 41 39.0% 61.0% 
Sedition 2 8 25.0% 75.0% 
Murder 8 39 20.5% 79.5% 
Fraud 2 113 1.8% 98.2% 
Totals 49 2829 1.7% 98.3% 
64 Please note that the following tables do not include miscellaneous or unknown crimes committed by 
soldiers or civilians. For a complete list of all soldier crimes please see Tables 5.5 & 5.6. 
65 This charge includes any cases of stealing private or public property from a house, store, market stall 
or other buildings. It also includes crimes where the theft was committed after a forceful entry. 
66 This category also includes attempted rapes. 
67 Robbery refers to the taking of money or private property directly from one or more persons rather 
than from a house or store. It may also include an assault of the victim(s) with the aim of taking their 
property. A similar distinction between robbery and theft is employed in: J Bath, Violence and Violent 
Crime in the North East, 271. 
68 This also includes attempted murder where it is specifically stated in the court records. 
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Sold. Total Sold. Total Sold. Civ. 
Assault 3 230 14 2240 17 2470 0.6% 99.4% 
Theft 4 122 20 2657 24 2779 0.7% 99.3% 
Rape 1 7 1 30 2 37 5.4% 94.6% 
Robbery 0 18 19 171 19 189 11.6% 88.4% 
Sedition 0 0 2 13 2 13 15.3% 84.7% 
Murder 3 8 11 73 14 81 17.2% 82.8% 
Fraud 0 30 2 181 2 211 0.9% 99: 1% 
Total 11 415 69 5365 80 5780 1.4% 98.6% 
Table 5.5: All Crimes Committed by Soldiers (All Jurisdictions), 1688-179372 
Crime Newcastle Northumb Berwick Total 
Assault 5 9 3 17 
Theft 16 4 4 24 
Rape 0 1 1 2 
Robbery 16 3 0 19 
Sedition 2 0 0 2 
Murder 8 3 3 14 
Fraud 2 0 0 2 
Unknown 2 0 2 4 
Total 51 20 13 84 
% Total 60.7 23.8 15.5 
Table 5.6: Soldiers' Crimes by Rank, 1688-1793.73 
Crime Private N. C. O. Officer Totals 
Assault 16 0 1 17 
Theft 22 2 0 24 
Rape 1 0 1 2 
Robbery 18 1 0 19 
Sedition 2 0 0 2 
Murder 10 1 3 14 
Fraud 2 0 0 2 
Unknown 4 0 0 4 
Totals 75 4 5 84 
% of Totals 89.3 4.7 6.0 
69 These totals include records from all regional quarter sessions as well as the Assizes for the Northern 
Circuit. 
70 All crimes attributed to soldiers 
" Total of all crimes in this category including civilians and soldiers 
72 This includes any crimes for which the category is unknown. 
73 This is calculated by individual soldiers tried rather than number of crimes committed. 
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Tnh1e S_7- Snlcliers' Crimes In War and Peace. 
Dates Event Crimes Date Event Crimes 
1688-1697 War 7 1739-1748 War 9 
1698-1701 Peace 0 1749-1755 Peace 10 
1702-1713 War 2 1756-1763 War 15 
1714-1717 Peace 1 1764-1774 Peace 17 
1718-1720 War 1 1775-1783 War 12 
1721-1738 Peace 2 1784-1792 Peace 8 
Table 5.8: Sentences of Soldiers Tried for Crimes, 1688-1793. 
Sentence Number % of Total 
Acquitted 14 16.6 
Death 5 5.9 
Whipped & Drummed Out of Regiment 5 
74 5.9 
Guilty but No Sentence 5 5.9 
Transportation: i) 7 Years 








Death but Reprieved to Transportation 4 4.7 
Guilty but Pardoned 2 2.4 
Gaol 1 Year) 1 1.2 
Unknown Result 43 51.2 
Total 84 99.7 
An analysis of regional criminal records and those of the assize courts highlights the 
level of army involvement in regional criminality. Of all the crimes that fall into the 
categories used in Table 5.4,80 (1.4%) were committed by men specifically noted as 
being soldiers, militiamen or invalid troops in the North East. 76 The total number of 
crimes by soldiers in the region is actually slightly higher at 84, but four of these 
violations (two each in Newcastle and Berwick) cannot be classified so they were not 
included in the calculations in Table 5.4 h7 Nevertheless, these missing figures have 
little impact on the overall representative percentages of army crime within the region. 
In terms of individual population centres, a similar trend emerges. Soldiers make up 
1.7% of the total crime in Newcastle and less than I% in the county of 
74 Three of the punishments were for the same theft. Two of the whippings were of 400 lashes and the 
third was 800 lashes, Newcastle Courant, 2932,3 March 1750. 
75 Two transported for seven years and two for 14 years. 
76 See above. 
77 Table 5.6 lists all crimes, even those that cannot be categorised, for the entire region. 
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Northumberland. 78 Berwick has the highest rate of soldier criminality accounting for 
2.7% of all violations. 79 It is immediately noticeable that these figures, although not 
complete, illustrate the level to which troops were involved in local crimes. It does 
not appear that soldiers were disproportionately responsible for crime in the North 
East. This is supported by recent scholarship that suggests the rate of criminal activity 
by soldiers was probably comparable to civilians of the same social status. 80 
It is interesting to note that in absolute terms there is a similar trend present in crimes 
committed by both civilians and soldiers. 8' Crimes that are most numerous amongst 
civilians tended to be most common for the army as well. For example, in civilian 
society theft is the most numerous violation followed by assault, fraud and robbery. 82 
At the same time soldiers most frequently perpetrated the crimes of robbery, theft and 
assault. 83 There are only two serious exceptions in this model. The first is that fraud, 
while being the third most popular civilian crime, is very rare amongst the rank and 
file of the army with only two cases recorded. 84 In terms of robbery the opposite is 
true. In civilian society it ranks only fourth in the number of cases reported, but it is 
the army's most numerous offence. 85 Despite these two examples, the top five crimes 
in both the civilian and military populations match up four out of five times, if not in 
the exact same ranking. While this indicates some synergy in criminal trends between 
civilians and soldiers, looking at the rate of military crimes as a proportion of all 
regional criminality, highlights some intrinsic differences. It is these distinctions 
which paint an interesting picture of the nature of soldier criminality and its impact on 
North-East society. 
'8 See tables 5.1 and 5.3 above. 
79 See table 5.2. 
80 John Childs, `War, Crime Waves and the English Army. ' 7. He also notes that 'unless drunk or 
provoked, soldiers were not demonstrably more lawless than other social groups. ' 
81 Table 5.4 
82 42.7% of all civilian crimes were thefts and 48% assaults. 
83 Assault accounted for 21.25% of crimes committed by soldiers, while theft represents 30%. 
84 These include one count of counterfeiting and one of bigamy. PRO ASSI 45/23/4/11 b-h, 10 January 
1748 and PRO ASSI 45/34/4/220,5 April 1783, respectively. Bigamy has been included in this 
category due to its fraudulent nature. 
85 Of crimes committed by soldiers, robbery was 23.75%, while it only represented 3.26% of civilian 
cases. 
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As was mentioned earlier, theft was the second most frequent crime amongst soldiers. 
However, when participation in this category is measured as a proportion of all thefts 
in the North East, it represents a minuscule 0.7%. In these terms theft comes second 
to last as a contribution to all crimes in the region. At the same time offences such as 
robbery and murder not only play a major role in the actual numbers of crimes tried 
but also a much greater part in terms of their proportionality within society. For 
example the number of soldiers tried for murder and manslaughter was just 14 but 
accounted for 17.2% of all such infractions committed in the region. Similarly, 
soldiers committed 11.6% of all robberies. 
There is one final consideration to be made when looking at wider trends within 
solider criminality. While the absolute number of crimes committed by soldiers was 
low, as measured by the number of soldiers charged f the number that were found 
guilty was even less. Of the 44 trials of soldiers uncovered for the century, where the 
verdict of the court can be traced to surviving records, 14 were acquitted outright. 86 
This represents almost 32% of such cases, and more than 16% of all crimes where 
soldiers were charged, regardless of outcome. It would also appear that soldiers found 
guilty of serious crimes were afforded the same consideration as civilians when it 
came to the remission of sentences. Nearly half of those originally sentenced to death 
had that judgement reduced to transportation of either seven or fourteen years. 
Likewise, two men found culpable by the courts received pardons from the crown for 
their transgressions. One of these was a bigamist named William Younge, and the 
other was John Brown of the 70th Regiment of Foot, found guilty of murder in 1776.87 
Unfortunately, it has been difficult to determine the fates of nearly half of the soldiers 
put on trial due to gaps in the historical record. For this reason it may be that 
conviction rates were higher. 
86 See Table 5.8. 
87 PRO ASSI 45/32/2/34-7,27 June 1776. 
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VI. Theft 
While soldiers accounted for a tiny proportion of thefts in North-East society, 
numerically it was the most common crime committed by the army. This reinforces 
the prominent role that theft played in the criminality of the civilian population. 
Furthermore, the vast majority of cases involved the stealing of small amounts of 
personal or household goods such as clothes, cloth, silver spoons, pocket watches and 
small trinkets of little value. 88 One can clearly observe this by analysing the records 
of soldiers tried for their involvement in thefts. 
The first instance appears in 1688 when Charles Ross was brought before the 
assizes. 89 After this there is a large gap with no mention of another case until 1733.90 
However, from this date there is a regular supply of records illustrating soldier's 
involvement in thefts. In 1749 an unnamed private was tried for stealing spoons, and 
during March of 1750 two soldiers from General Ancram's regiment were judged 
guilty of stealing a small amount of goods from a shop stall in Newcastle. 91 Just one 
month later Lord Ancram suffered another loss when George Porter was sentenced to 
800 lashes and drummed out of the regiment for a like offence. 92 Two years later 
Richard Knowles was accused of breaking into several shops and stealing numerous 
items including 14 shillings in coin and several pairs of shoes. 3 Similarly, in 
Newcastle during 1755 a private and a grenadier from Folliet's Regiment of Foot 
were arrested and tried for breaking into shops and taking away five shirts, trousers, 
stockings, one waistcoat, some aprons and five pairs of shoes. 94 Soldiers also faced 
88 In 1784 three privates from the 68`h Regiment of Foot were accused of stealing a pocket-watch from 
Michael Thwaites of Coxlodge, where they were billeted at the time of the theft: PRO ASSI 
45/35/1/149-50. 
89 PRO ASSI 45/15/2. 
90 William Johnston was sentenced to seven years transportation for burgling a Newcastle shop. 
Newcastle Courant, 433,12 august 1733. This gap in the records may be due in part to the gaps in the 
assize records in this period. 
91 Newcastle Journal, 527,10 July 1749; Newcastle Courant, 2932,22 April 1750. Both were given 
400 lashes and drummed out of the regiment. 
92 Newcastle Courant, 2932,22 April 1750. 
93 PRO ASSI 45/24/4/80-2,7 April 1752. 
94 Ibid., 45/25/4/48,16 October 1755. 
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the courts in Newcastle and Berwick during 1762 and 1764 respectively. 95 Certainly, 
theft seems to have been a fairly regular offence throughout the century. 96 
In the summer of 1765 clothing played a central role in a richly detailed theft trial. 
During August, Robert and Elizabeth Hall of Newcastle testified how they had found 
a consignment of their clothing in the possession of two soldiers from the 6`h 
Regiment of Foot then stationed at Newcastle. 97 The stolen goods included five linen 
shirts, six linen shifts, one linen sheet, a waistcoat and two tablecloths. 98 The soldiers 
were exposed by Elizabeth Cook, another local resident, who had heard of the theft 
and became suspicious when some of the soldiers came into her shop trying to sell 
several shifts of linen. 99 At first both soldiers denied the charge stating that they had 
found a bundle containing these goods in a ditch at Gateshead while picking nettles. '°° 
Later, one of the thieves, Paul Bampton, confessed that he and Daniel Parnell had 
passed the clothes on a washing line while walking from Gallowgate to the Town 
Moor. 101 The same evening the two soldiers returned to the house where they stole 
the goods. In 1775 William Clapham and Thomas Stanford were charged with 
stealing two pairs of leather shoes worth ten shillings. 102 Other items found on the 
person of Stanford included a piece of leather garter, four large buckle brushes and a 
number of pins. 103 Both of these incidents highlight the low intensity inherent in the 
majority of thefts committed by soldiers in the North East. 
Theft of physically large items, or those of great value, was very rare but it did occur 
The largest item recorded stolen by soldiers was livestock, but this was just a single 
case. In 1766 Richard Furber and three other accomplices, all of the 7th Regiment of 
95 In 1762 Private William Vasey of the 32"d Regiment of Foot was sentenced to seven years 
transportation ASSI 45/26/6/48g-1; Newcastle Journal, 1212,14 July 1762. In 1762 Thomas Fitzgerald 
of the 25`h Regiment of Foot was tried at Berwick for stealing a silver watch. BTRO C 15115,19 April 
1764. 
96 Beyond those mentioned above, trial records or newspaper reports exist for 1765,1766,1768,1775, 
1778,1784,1787,1790. 
97 The complete account of this case can be found in PRO ASSI 45/28/1/lb-g, 5 August 1765. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
10° Ibid., 45/28/1/1 f. 
101 Ibid. 
102 BTRO C 8/1,24 April 1775. 
103 Ibid., 19 April 1775. 
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Foot, were tried for stealing sheep from a field near South Gosforth in Newcastle. 104 
However, it was never their intention to transport the animals any great distance. The 
thieves not only took the sheep but they also killed and butchered them, most likely 
for personal consumption or to sell on. 105 In terms of money there is only one case in 
which a soldier is accused of stealing currency in any great amount. In 1768 a 
recruiting sergeant named Miller `late of the town and county of Newcastle upon 
Tyne' was charged with stealing a bag of money from the barroom of a local 
publican. 106 The bag contained the sum of £44,8s ,a small 
fortune in the eighteenth 
century. ' 07 
A soldier's lifestyle made the theft of large items impractical, as he was too exposed 
to the scrutiny of his officers and comrades. Soldiers possessed little privacy, and as 
such they were unable to conceal large or overtly valuable items. At the same time a 
soldier on the march would not be able to transport a physically cumbersome item. 
This may be part of the motivation for sticking to small pieces that they could 
exchange for cash, food or drink, or retain as personal possessions. Furthermore, theft 
tended to be opportunistic in nature and limited to taking property that was readily at 
hand, as can be attested to by the small number of soldiers charged with house- 
breaking. 108 
On a few occasions soldiers not only committed thefts but they also seem to have 
supported and facilitated such criminal activity. Ann Lee and Hannah Steel were 
accused of stealing £7 in silver and one shilling in gold from a public house in 
Newcastle's Sandgate. 109 Testimony to the assize court indicates that they were in a 
room in the house, with a soldier named Francis Ansell, when the money went 
missing. ' 10 During their testimonies both Lee and Steel admitted to the theft, but Steel 
stated that she immediately passed the loot to Ansell. 1 11 Likewise, in 1780 an 
unnamed soldier was accused of creating a distraction that allowed his acquaintance 
104 PRO ASSI 45/28/1/43b-m, 26 July 1766. 
105 Ibid., 45/28/1/43e. 
106 Ibid., 45/29/1/122, exact date unknown. 
107 Ibid. 
108 In 1755 two privates were charged with breaking into a Newcastle shop. PRO ASSI 45/25/4/48. 109 Ibid., 45/25/3/65a-b, 9 April 1755. 
110 Ibid., 45/25/3/65a. 
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Elizabeth Bell to steal a watch and 15 guineas from Peter Nasehill., 12 In her 
confession Bell testified to the fact that the soldier, a sergeant from the 25th Regiment 
of Foot, had nbt taken part in the theft. Instead, he made a great amount of noise 
when he came crashing into the room, giving her the time to take these items. 
' 13 
VII. Violent Crimes: Rape, Robbery, Assault and Murder 
An interesting and somewhat worrying trend is the soldier's apparent propensity for 
criminal activity that contained an element of violence. While violent crime makes up 
a large proportion of the total number of civilian crimes (48%) it represents 65% of 
violations by soldiers. 114 The two most serious violent crimes are murder and 
robbery, and these represent the fourth and second most common soldier crimes 
respectively. As mentioned above, while the absolute numbers of offences may have 
been low, soldiers tend to be disproportionately represented compared to civilians. 15 
Soldiers accounted for nearly 17% of the individuals charged for murder and 12% of 
those tried for robbery in the North East. This situation is even more pronounced 
when one looks at the individual communities concerned. Troops stationed in 
Newcastle for example, make up more than 20% of murder trials, while those in 
Berwick represented in excess of 37%. 116 This is vastly out of proportion to other 
crimes such as assault and theft, and is extremely high if one considers that such 
activity far outstripped the relative presence of army units in the region. 
In terms of robbery these percentages are as high as 46% in Newcastle, but are 
surprisingly rare in the jurisdiction of Northumberland (2.3%) and non-existent in 
Berwick (0%). This differs greatly from the observations of Joanna Bath who notes 
that the absence of military men from robbery in the period 1650-1720 is surprising. 117 
111 Ibid., 45/25/3165b. 
112 Ibid., 45/34/1/7, exact date unknown, 1780. 
113 Ibid., 45/34/l/8. 
114 An interesting treatment of the phenomenon of violence and violent crime in North-East society 
can be found in: Bath, Violence and Violent Crime. 
115 Records exist for 14 soldiers involved in murder and 19 soldiers committing robberies. 
116 See Tables 5.2 and 5.3 above. 
117 Bath, Violence and Violent Crime, 276. Her conclusion is that robberies may have been limited due 
to the tighter controls placed on the army. 
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In fact the first recorded account of robbery in my analysis does not occur until 
1745. ' 18 A major factor behind this trend could be the nature of robbery. As has been 
discussed previously the charge of robbery, as defined in this chapter, relates to crimes 
in which one or more people are stopped while going about their business and forced 
to part with their possessions. In some respects this could be thought of as being 
similar to `highway robbery', although this definition is wrought with Victorian 
notions of romanticism. The heavily travelled but fairly isolated spaces around 
Newcastle, and in particular the Town Moor and Shields Road, offered a fertile area in 
which to engage in such activities. This is not to say that robbers were not beyond 
committing such crimes in crowded areas. In August of 1770 a new recruit in the 17th 
Regiment of Foot was accused of robbing a fellow soldier at knifepoint in the middle 
of a Newcastle street. 119 
Unlike Newcastle, Berwick was a garrison town, which after the completion of its 
barracks in 1719 did not rely heavily on billeting to house soldiers. As a result the 
troops were mainly kept within the walls of the town and normally secured in 
purpose-built accommodation. This seems to have assisted in preventing soldiers 
from taking advantage of the region's isolated roads for the purpose of robbery. 
Northumberland, on the other hand, was a rural area possessing few major population 
centres but profuse with solitary areas that provided the perfect environment for 
committing robbery. 120 This may be one of the reasons behind the high number of 
civilian robberies in the region. 12' However, garrisons in this area tended to be much 
smaller and more dispersed than those at Tynemouth, Newcastle and Berwick so there 
were fewer soldiers available to commit such crimes. 
Of the ten cases of robbery listed in the records eight were clear cases of `highway' 
robbery while the other two occurred within the confines of Newcastle's city walls. ' 22 
Additionally, of these ten cases half were committed by more than one soldier. It is 
1'a The case of George Dowdy. PRO ASSI 45/23/1/19h-m 
119 Ibid., 45129/3/136c-e, 20 August 1770. 
120 The major towns of Northumberland were Hexham and Morpeth. 
121 There were 130 men tried for robbery in Northumberland while there were only 18 in Berwick and 
41 in and around Newcastle. 
122 There were 19 soldiers tried for these crimes. Cases for robbery exist for 1745,1748,1756,1759, 
1770,1773,1776,1780,081 and 1788. 
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possible that the group characteristic common in robberies by soldiers was related to 
the communal nature of a soldiers' life. Whether committed by a group, or by an 
individual, robbery of this kind tended to be inherently violent. The crime was one of 
compulsion where soldiers forced individuals to relinquish their personal possessions, 
often through the use beatings, knives, swords and pistols. 
The intrinsic violence of robberies can be illustrated in the vicious treatment meted 
out to a young Newcastle woman in 1756. During September she was attacked by a 
pair of soldiers while on the road across Gateshead Fell. The men were attempting to 
steal her clothes, but unable to do so they threw the woman into a nearby open coal pit 
that was nearly 20 yards deep. 123 She was only rescued after lying in the pit for seven 
days. 124 In 1759 two soldiers robbed William Maddison of Byker near the Turnpike 
Bridge on the Shields Road. 125 One of the soldiers struck the victim on the head with 
the butt of his sword. Once on the ground the man was beaten severely, before having 
his pockets searched for loot. ' 26 Later in the century Andrew Mackenzie and Bernard 
Reay, two privates stationed in Newcastle with the 70th Regiment of Foot, subjected 
their victim to brutal violence. 127 On 8 January 1776 the two soldiers approached 
George Temple, a bricklayer from North Shields, who was making his way to 
Newcastle along the high road from North Shields. Reay and Mackenzie stopped 
Temple, and with their bayonets in hand, demanded his money. 128 When the man 
would not immediately comply he was beaten, cut and thrown to the ground, at which 
point the two soldiers emptied his pockets of two pence and a silver watch. As if this 
were not enough, they removed Temple's breeches and dragged him down the road, 
before throwing him into a ditch. 129 
All of the above examples are of soldiers robbing in pairs. However, soldiers were 
not just brazen and violent when they attacked travellers in numbers. Evidence of this 
can be found in the testimony given by Joseph Hall, a private of General Guise's 
123 John Sykes, Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, Newcastle upon Tyne and Berwick 
upon Tweed, Vol. 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 202. 
'24 Ibid. 
125 PRO ASSI 45/26/3160b-c, 18 April 1759. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., 45/32/2/103-5, January 1776. 
128 Ibid. 
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regiment. 130 In August of 1765 he went out on a highway near Newcastle (probably 
the Shields Road) with the intent of robbing people there. When a post chaise drove 
by he jumped out in front of it and fired his pistol at the driver in an attempt to stop 
the carriage. Fortunately, the gun misfired and the ball missed the driver, but the blast 
damaged his face. 13' Later, when Hall was apprehended by two men near Three Mile 
Bridge, he shot at them as well, but again the pistol misfired. 132 Such was the blatant 
disregard for life displayed by Hall that he was actually charged with attempted 
murder and sentenced to death for his crimes. ' 33 Similarly, John Grey of Morpeth 
described how he was robbed by a lone soldier on the highway between Alnwick and 
Morpeth. 134 During the robbery William Tennant, a private of the 25`h Regiment of 
Foot, savagely beat Grey for no apparent reason to the point that the man feared he 
would be killed. 135 
As noted previously, robbery was not strictly limited to the isolated roads and byways 
of the region. Robbery could happen within the walls of a major population centre 
such as Newcastle, although incidents of this are rare. The first recorded case 
occurred in early August 1760 when Charles Stacey and John Portsmouth, both 
privates in the Royal Volunteer Regiment of Foot, attempted to rob two gentlemen 
and two ladies on the common footpath in the yard of St. John's church. 136 Stacey 
attested to the fact that he and some comrades had been drinking in the Bull's Head 
public house on Newcastle's Westgate Road. 137 On their way home at about 11 p. m. 
he and Portsmouth were accosted by the two gentlemen, James Clark and George 
Errington. Stacey admitted that he had knocked Errington down in the melee, but that 
they were not there to rob. 138 However, James Clark testified that the two soldiers 
approached the group and assaulted him. One of the soldiers, most likely Stacey, 
129 Ibid., 45/32/2/105. 
130 Ibid., 45/28/1/28b-e, 5 August 1765; Newcastle Journal, 1369,12 August 1765. 
131 Ibid., 45/28/1/28b, 5 August 1765. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid., 45/28/1/28e. 
134 Ibid., 45/34/2/70,6 December 1780. The crime took place on 2 December 1780. 
135 Ibid., 
136 Ibid., 45/26/4/59j-1,4 August 1760. 
137 Ibid., 45/26/4/59j. 
138 Ibid. 
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stood back to draw his sword, at which time Clark fled. 139 The soldier pursued him 
for a while but then gave up his chase and returned to the churchyard., 40 
Errington describes how the two soldiers threw him to the ground and beat him as 
they demanded money. When they realised Errington had none they fled . 
141 It turns 
out that Stacey had been so afraid of being caught and tried for this crime that he 
absented his unit when they marched out of the town, and had actually been 
apprehended as a deserter in the first instance. 142 In the second and only other 
recorded incident of robbery within a northern population centre, a local yeoman by 
the name of William Mackie was accused of brandishing a knife to a soldier named 
Joseph Ward and robbing him of 14 pence after drinking with him in a pub. 143 What 
is interesting about this case is the fact that Mackie was described as `a recruit of the 
said regiment. ' 144 The fact that he was listed as a yeoman in the court records would 
indicate that his enlistment took place not long before the robbery, and possibly before 
he had been officially enlisted as a soldier. 
It may appear that some cases of robbery were opportunistic, but in reality many 
soldiers planned to go out and commit these crimes. In 1756 soldiers agreed to meet 
on Newcastle's town moor and rob anyone who came across them. 145 In a similar 
fashion, William Henderson of the 19`h Regiment of Foot, testified that one of his 
colleagues had planned to go robbing. 146 On the evening of 18 April 1759, Henderson 
was approached by Private James Barber who suggested that the two of them should 
leave their quarters and head to the Shields Road to rob people who came across 
them. 147 Several years later a private soldier by the name of John Smith stated how 
his accomplice James Quinton had first made the proposition that they go to the moor 
`to try [and] get some money', a clear reference to robbery. 148 Further evidence exists 
139 Ibid., 45/26/4/59k. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., 45/26/4/591 
142 Ibid., 45/26/4/59j 
143 Ibid., 45/2913/13c-d, 20 August 1770 
wa Ibid., 45/29/3113d. 
las Ibid., 45/26/l/56g, 28 December 1756 
146 Ibid., 45/26/3/60/b, 18 April 1759. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid., 45/31/1/277,16 February 1773. 
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which gives the impression that some soldiers had a familiarity with this crime. On a 
few occasions in the eighteenth century it emerges that individuals or groups of 
soldiers committed robberies on more than one occasion. In some instances the 
soldiers took on the appearance of a criminal gang, supplementing their meagre wages 
through this practice. 
In August of 1757 three privates were tried for robbing `a man [James Robson] on the 
Shields Road near the Easburn Bridge of a silver watch and four shillings and seven 
pence' during December 1756.149 The soldiers had stopped him on his horse and 
threatened him with bayonets until he handed over the booty. 150 As the justices took 
statements from the accused soldiers it became apparent that this had not been their 
only dalliance with such criminal activity. One of the soldiers, William Horton, 
admitted that Robson had been only one of a number of victims whom he, Joyce Garth 
and Samuel Plant had robbed north east of the town. 15' Just the previous Saturday 
evening (11 December) the three had stolen six shillings from another man near the 
Turnpike Road leading across the Town Moor. 152 A few days before this they took 
three pence and a penknife from a woman walking on the same road going through 
Heaton towards North Shields. '53 
Pervasive and unprovoked violence, as well as a general lack of empathy towards their 
victims, is fairly typical of robberies committed by soldiers in the North East. The 
traditional image of gentlemen robbers such as Dick Turpin is a popular myth 
engendered by Victorian romanticism. Almost every robbery executed by members of 
the armed forces included direct assaults, or brutish and realistic threats of it. These 
actions were normally taken with the assistance of military props such as bayonets, 
swords and even pistols. Furthermore, most soldiers were so bold that they often 
committed these crimes while dressed in their regimental uniforms. In fact it is 
because soldiers were so conspicuous that the victims were often able to identify their 
attackers. One of the many examples of this is the case of Joyce Garth, who robbed 






James Robson in December of 1756, and who was identified by his uniform, despite 
trying to conceal it beneath a large grey coat. '54 
While robbery made up a large share of the total number of crimes committed by 
soldiers, as well as a high proportion of such crimes, murder was even more 
problematic. This was, and still is, the ultimate violent crime. As has been alluded to 
earlier the ratio of murder, attempted murder and manslaughter for which the army 
was responsible far exceeds that for robbery. Between 1688 and 1793 nine cases were 
tried, involving 14 soldiers. '55 
In May 1752 a brawl between a member of General Guise's Highlanders and a group 
of Newcastle men led to the death of a local civilian at the hands of a soldier. At 
about 10 p. m. a group of men became involved in an exchange of words with Ewan 
Macdonald, a recent recruit to Guise's regiment, who was billeted in a Bigg Market 
public house. 156 The argument grew into a brawl. At some point the men left the pub 
but Macdonald followed them out into the street. The soldier grabbed one of the men, 
a cooper by the name of Robert Parker, and `wickedly stabbed him with a knife in the 
neck, in so desperate a manner that he [Parker] died immediately. ' 157 If this were not 
enough Macdonald returned to the public house and broke another man's arm before 
being carried off to the guard-house by a file of musketeers. 158 Eventually, 
Macdonald was convicted of `wilful murder' and was executed on Newcastle's town 
moor on 28 September 1752, aged just 19.159 1 
The most detailed archival records that exist for such a murder case surround an 
incident during the summer of 1767. Late one night in August two local men named 
Michael Addison and John Hutton were walking home from a public house in 
Newcastle's Bigg Market when they were attacked without provocation by three 
154 Ibid., 4512611/56f, 27 December 1756. 
iss Four murder cases (seven soldiers), two attempted murder (four soldiers), three manslaughter cases 
(three soldiers). 
156 Sykes, Local Records, 202. 
157 Ibid. 
iss Ibid. 
159 Ibid., 202-3. His body was taken to the Surgeon's Hall and `dissected and anatomised. ' 
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drummers of the 4`h Regiment of Foot. 160 In the ensuing melee Hutton was struck, 
and slumped to the ground. Addison and some other onlookers dragged the 
unconscious man back to his home where he later died. 16' The surgeon who attended 
the victim stated to the court that he believed that the man's skull had been `fractured 
from one ear to the other' and that he died as a result of these injuries. 162 Naturally, 
the drummers' recollection of the events was slightly different. One of the party, John 
Bowden, stated how he and his three comrades had been drinking in a pub named the 
Flying Horse near the Quayside. As they were making their way up to the `high part 
of the town' they passed the two civilians, whom he describes as being drunk, and 
words were exchanged. 163 Hutton then pushed one of the drummers, named William 
Pearce, who responded by striking the civilian on the head before walking off. 164 
There is little to indicate that the drummers knew they had played a role in the man's 
death as the original complaint filed against the four men was for common assault. '65 
It was not until later that they were charged with Hutton's murder. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that under the circumstances the men were found guilty of manslaughter 
and sentenced to be branded for this crime. '66 
In this incident soldiers and civilians came into confrontation with one another, which 
in turn led to violence that resulted in the death of a civilian. This is a rather 
interesting trend that runs through a number of murder, attempted murder and 
manslaughter cases in this period. It also points to the dangerous mix of soldiers, 
civilians and alcohol. 167 Another such incident took place in the early morning of 26 
June 1776 in Newcastle's Sandgate district. John Brown, a private with the 70th 
Regiment of Foot, was involved in a disturbance that left a man dead, and himself 
facing trial for murder. 168 A civilian witness named Robert Clark stated to the court 
that he was in a public house in the Sandgate area when-he heard a commotion coming 
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from the street outside. 169 When he looked outside he saw two soldiers in the street, 
one with a drawn sword in his hand. Clark described how the soldier with the sword, 
most likely John Brown, proceeded to strike a woman and a man with the weapon 
before running away. 170 Unfortunately, Clark's account is not of great value as it does 
not mention what precipitated the incident. 
On the other hand Barbara Forester, a local resident, expanded on what Clark had 
described. She attested to the fact that she was awoken between 2: 00 a. m. and 3: 00 
a. m. by the chaos on the street outside. Looking out of her upper floor window she 
observed two civilian men from a larger group grabbing the smaller of the two 
soldiers, throwing him to the ground and subjecting him to a fierce beating. 171 
Another witness, Robert Mackenzie, gives a much clearer picture of the events in 
question. Like Forester, he was awoken by the noise in the street and observed the 
whole incident from his window. Mackenzie states that he saw a group of drunken 
keelmen arguing with, and verbally abusing the two soldiers, the taller of whom he 
identified as Brown. 172 Feeling threatened by the men, Private Brown told them to 
`stand-off', which they refused to do. To protect himself and his comrade he drew his 
sword, and when the keelmen fled he gave chase. 173 
While he was away a small number of the men returned, and proceeded to beat the 
smaller soldier, as alluded to by Barbara Forester. 174 When Brown returned the 
keelmen followed and resumed the taunts and threats of physical abuse. Again he 
brandished his sword and gave chase to the civilians. Tragically, on his way back 
from this latest pursuit Brown bumped into an innocent bystander named John 
Moncaster. Mistaking him for one of his comrade's assailants, Brown struck the man 
over the head with his sword, killing him. ' 75 In this case it does not appear as if the 
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court was willing to take the taunting and assaults into account as Brown was found 
guilty of murder. 176 Luckily for him, however, he was later pardoned for his crime. 
These deadly confrontations were not limited to the large population centres such as 
Newcastle. In 1759 death was once again the consequence of fighting between 
civilians and soldiers, and once again alcohol was involved. However, unlike other 
previous incidents, it did not involve private soldiers or drummers but officers from 
Berwick's garrison. In the late evening of 12 May, Lieutenant Henry Goddard was on 
his way down Church Street when he was approached by a local resident named 
Thomas Smith while. Without any provocation Smith knocked Goddard's hat off of 
his head. '77 When the officer expressed his displeasure at this Smith struck him in the 
face. Almost instantly two other men, who appear to have been associates of the 
attacker, set upon the lieutenant. '78 Witnessing the incident, a drummer named John 
Burke ran into the Ewe and Lamb public house in Church Street screaming `murder', 
alerting the soldiers inside. 179 
It was at this point that several men, including a sergeant by the name of 
Copperthwaite, spilled out of the pub to assist Goddard. Unfortunately, Thomas 
Smith was slain in the resulting melee, possibly by Sergeant Copperthwaite, who 
during the brawl had run up and felled Smith with a blow to the head. 180 However, 
the exact details of who killed the civilian remain unclear as the sergeant clearly states 
in his testimony that when he emerged from the pub Smith was already lying prostrate 
in the street. 18' More importantly, it must be recognised that this was not a 
premeditated killing by soldiers. Rather, it was a fight started by civilians that led to 
the unfortunate death of Thomas Smith. Evidence of its accidental nature is 
reinforced by the fact that Lieutenant Goddard requested a surgeon to help the injured 
man, and immediately reported the whole incident to Major Beauclerk, the 
176 Ibid., 45/32/2/37. 






commanding officer of the garrison. ' 82 Subsequently, both Copperthwaite and 
Lieutenant Goddard appear to have been acquitted of Smith's murder. 
In 1761 John Ince, a soldier in General Lampton's Regiment of Foot, found himself 
charged with manslaughter in similar circumstances. ' 83 The soldier was in the yard of 
his billet in Morpeth exercising his officer's dogs when the landlord's father, John 
Watson, walked up and fiercely struck one of the dogs across the back. 184 When 
challenged by Ince about his actions, the old man became irate and began to hit the 
soldier with a stick. A struggle ensued in which Watson fell over and Ince appears to 
have kicked him while he was on the ground. 185 The fight continued inside the house 
with Watson continuously hitting the soldier with the stick and demanding to know 
why Ince had thrown him to the floor and struck him. 186 The landlord's servant, 
Elizabeth Robinson, testified that after the scuffle eventually petered out Watson went 
upstairs to his bed where he was reported to have vomited and died within an hour. 187 
There does not appear to have been any malicious intent on the part of Private Ince 
whom several witnesses saw laughing at the old man and treating the incident like a 
game. This is supported by Robinson's statement in which she described how 
the soldier threatened to lay him [Watson] aback of the 
fire but this examinant is in the belief that the soldier 
said these words to lay the old man's passion and out of 
no ill intention that the soldier said so to hurt him or do 
him any harm. ' 88 
It would seem that many cases in which soldiers were charged with murder or 
manslaughter share a common theme. With the exception of the fore-mentioned 
soldier who was charged with attempted murder while robbing a post chaise, few 
seem to have premeditated their crimes or killed out of uncontrolled frenzy. There is 
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some indication that one of the murders committed earlier in the century may have 
been malicious but the evidence is not wholly conclusive. In late November 1755 an 
anonymous soldier was charged with the murder of a Newcastle pitman named 
William Methuen. The account in the Newcastle Journal reports that the man was 
bayoneted to death. 189 However, apart from this isolated incident, the available 
evidence suggests that a majority of the cases for murder, manslaughter or attempted 
murder seem to have arisen out of random confrontations between soldiers and 
members of the public. Exactly who incited these affrays is not always clear, although 
in two of the cases described above it highly likely that civilians were the instigators. 
John Childs has noted that the relative unpopularity of the army in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries meant that the public sometimes baited and taunted 
soldiers, who tended to react violently. 190 It is not impossible that this, combined with 
alcohol, was behind many of these incidents. 
It is necessary to look at other forms of violent crime such as assault, in order to 
observe if there is a common theme in the way soldiers and civilians interacted. 
Importantly, it must be remembered that the term `assault' in this study refers to 
incidents in which soldiers laid hands on, or beat civilians. Any assaults that led to 
the death of a civilian, and those that were committed during robberies, are 
categorised separately and dealt with above. Assaults, fights and other physical 
confrontations accounted for more than 20% (12 cases involving 14 individuals) of all 
infractions by soldiers. However, they represented less than I% of all assaults in the 
region once civilians have been factored in. 
One of the most serious attacks linked to a soldier occurred late in the seventeenth 
century. During October 1697 the master gunner of Tynemouth Barracks, Michael 
Heweth, was accused of severely beating Mary Upshalon of Killingworth while she 
worked in a field near Wallsend. 19' Not only did he subject the woman to a fierce and 
unprovoked thrashing, he allegedly ordered his servant, Thomas Man, to drive over 
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her with a horse. ' 92 This charge was brought despite the support of Henry Villiers, the 
governor of Tynemouth Barracks, who attested to the fact that he `had [Heweth] under 
[his] command this twenty years and never knew him to carry himself uncivilly. ' 193 
An equally intense and unsavoury assault occurred nine years later to another woman 
from the area around the barracks. In May of 1706 Jane Pickering was subjected to a 
severe beating from David Scotland, a gunner from Clifford's Fort. 194 This does not 
appear to have been the first time that Scotland had attacked people associated with 
this woman. It was reported by Samuel Penny, Pickering's master, that not long 
before this assault the gunner broke through the doors of his house and then verbally 
and physically assaulted him. 195 When asked by Penny why he had done this Scotland 
arrogantly replied `that he [Scotland] was a young man [and] as he [Penny] was old he 
would beat out his brains. ' 196 The gunner's violent tendencies surfaced again in the 
month that this trial took place. On 9 July a yeoman from Tynemouth Castle went 
into Clifford's Fort where he was confronted by Scotland who 
without provocation in a furious manner fell upon him 
and beat him both with head, hands and feet, and swore 
that if he had his bayonet he would stab him to the 
heart. 197 
By their very nature assaults were violent, but few were carried out with the intensity 
and malice displayed by David Scotland and Michael Heweth. Scotland's case seems 
to be particularly unusual and one that was related in part to his seemingly disturbed 
personality. While dramatic, the above examples are exceptional when taken within 
the context of the general trend for assaults. 
More typical was the case of the aptly named Cornelius Bashford, a private soldier in 
Major Robert Dalziel's regiment. He was accused of trying to wound a man with his 
sword during a disturbance outside a Newcastle public house owned by Cuthbert 
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Lambert. 198 His comrade, Sergeant John Roberts, attested to the fact that at about 2 
a. m. there was a noise at the window of the pub at which point Bashford disappeared 
outside. Roberts followed the soldier outside, where he saw Bashford, sword in hand, 
arguing with a drunk man named John Rea. ' 99 Sometime during the confrontation 
Rea was wounded, and publicly accused Bashford. If a wound was inflicted on the 
civilian then it could not have been too serious as the soldier only faced charges for 
assault. In 1693 Thomas Carr of Northumberland described how William Wake and 
two other unidentified soldiers attacked him on Morpeth Bridge while he was on his 
way to Newcastle. Wake accused Carr of being an `affidavid man saying that he 
would be revenged upon him for it. '200 He also challenged Can to draw his sword, 
but before he could do so Wake and his accomplices seized the man and delivered a 
severe blow to his head. They then threatened to do harm to all of his friends and 
family before fleeing the scene. 201 
In the second half of the century Lieutenant Saville of Lord Beauclerk's regiment was 
tried for assaulting a Newcastle man, Edward Purchase, with his sword. 202 However, 
the trial papers show a different story that led to the lieutenant being acquitted of any 
wrongdoing. 203 The officer had been drinking heavily with Purchase and another man 
named Rickerby at an inn. All three men were considerably drunk at the time of the 
incident. During the evening Saville exited the room, leaving his sword on the 
windowsill. 204 By the time he had returned, Purchase had been stabbed with the 
sword and suspicion naturally fell on Saville. Luckily a series of relatively sober 
witnesses, which included three employees of the inn, told of how there had been no 
quarrel or violence between the officer and Edward Purchase. 205 It turned out that 
while Saville had been out of the room Rickerby had picked up the sword and began 
playing with it and it was then that Purchase was stabbed. 206 It would appear that no 
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charges were laid against Rickerby, as in his testimony Purchase admitted that he was 
too drunk to remember anything, but regardless did not believe `the said wound was 
given through any quarrel, malice or evil intent whatsoever. 207 The reason why 
Lieutenant Saville had been tried is unknown. However, this case and that of 
Bashford reinforce the dangerous combination of drink, violence and weaponry that 
appears to have typified many assault and murder cases involving soldiers. 
A problem exists with analysing rape as a crime in that there are very few cases in the 
existing records for the region. Members of the army were only ever charged in two 
incidents. In fact only two men were convicted of rape in the region between 1718 
and 1800.208 Such low numbers may have been due in part to the difficulty that many 
women had in proving rape and gaining credible witnesses. Likewise, many women 
were subjected to intense prejudice when complaining of rape. 209 This may have 
influenced the fact that the two military personnel tried for rape accounted for a 
disproportional 5.5% of rapes regionally. The two incidents were isolated, taking 
place 40 years apart, in two towns separated by a great distance. The first rape 
occurred in Berwick during early May of 1751, when a private soldier named Joseph 
Scott was found guilty of illegally `gaining carnal knowledge' of a local woman 
named Mary Moscrop210 The court ordered that Scott be returned to his place of 
origin before being transported to the place of his execution scheduled for 20 August 
1751. 
The second case occurred near the end of the century. In August of 1791 John Quinn, 
a lieutenant in the 37th Regiment of Foot stationed at Tynemouth Barracks, was tried 
for raping Elizabeth Wilkinson of North Shields 211 It was alleged he had locked the 
girl in his room at the barracks before forcing wine into her mouth, dragging her onto 
the bed by her throat and raping her twice. 212 After this he cruelly offered Elizabeth 
five shillings for her torments and threatened to have her arrested and sent to Scotland 
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if she told anyone. 213 At the trial Wilkinson's employer testified that upon inspection 
Elizabeth appeared `assaulted and bothered' after the reported incident. 214 Based on 
this information Lieutenant Quinn was arrested by a constable from North Shields, but 
he escaped while being transported to Morpeth215 Despite the offer of a £5 reward 
and a description of the crime being published in the `Hue and Cry' it appears that the 
officer was never re-apprehended. 216 
VIII. The Other Side of the Coin: Soldiers as Victims. 
Earlier it was noted that much of the violence resulting in civilian deaths was a 
consequence of confrontation between soldiers and civilians. These run-ins were 
irregular incidents, and soldiers were not always the instigators. On occasions the 
troops were forced to defend themselves against aggressive civilians. This points to 
the fact that a portion of soldier criminality was the result of action instigated by 
civilians. At the same time soldiers could also be the direct target of civilian criminal 
activity. This came in many different guises, from the innocuous, to more serious 
instances in which troops were subjected to unprovoked attacks. 
Such was the experience of Private Harguy of General Blakeney's regiment stationed 
in Berwick. On his way home to the barracks late on the evening of 19 November 
1740, local mason Alexander Brown set upon him. 217 So intense was the beating that 
Harguy feared he would lose his life. Fortunately for him, a crowd of local people 
and some soldiers from the guardhouse came to his aid and apprehended Brown 
before he could inflict any serious damage. 218 There is no mention of the reason 
behind the assault and no motive can be discerned. To all intents and purposes it 
seems to have been a random attack. In 1758 Private William Delany from the 64`h 
Regiment of Foot was stabbed in the groin by a local man named Edward Riddle. 219 
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Unlike the beating of Harguy, this stabbing arose from a very brief confrontation on a 
Newcastle street. Delany described how he was walking along the street when Riddle 
stabbed him for no reason. On the other hand Riddle claims to have been walking 
peacefully down Newgate Street when two soldiers knocked him down in passing. 220 
Like so many of these cases it is often hard to determine who actually initiated the 
confrontation that led to the assault. 
In late July 1777 a militiaman in the North Yorkshire Regiment, named Mark Hudson, 
was confronted with a similar situation while on duty in Newcastle. He was on guard 
at the lodgings of Ralph Milbank, colonel of the regiment, and stated that he heard a 
man scream for help. 21 Hudson ran to the sound and saw Herbert Kent, a private in 
the Northumberland Militia, lying on the ground being beaten by five or six men. 222 
Attempting to do his duty and keep the peace, as well as assist his comrade, Hudson 
fixed his bayonet and approached the group of men. When he demanded they desist 
from their actions the men grabbed Hudson, threw him to the ground and beat him 
before stealing his weapon. 223 The private was quite fortunate that he did not suffer 
much worse considering they had possession of his bayonet and musket. It would 
appear that Hudson had been the unfortunate victim of circumstance. Again, the 
reason for the group's assault on Herbert Kent is unknown. 
Such mistreatment of soldiers did not always manifest itself physically, and at times 
troops could face serious verbal abuse. Some of this torment coincided with events in 
which the army or militia had been in widespread confrontation with the civilian 
population. The assault on the militiaman in 1777 occurred at a time when the 
military was assisting local authorities with a particularly fierce naval press on 
Tyneside and Wearside. 224 Similarly, the Hexham militia riots of 1761 appear to have 
contributed to a serious verbal assault against soldiers in the town. Not long after the 
deadly riot several people heard a local man named William Alnwick publicly 
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damning the king `and all his soldiers. '225 Not content with this outburst, Alnwick 
then ran into one of the town's lodging houses and threatened to bum all of the 
soldiers to ashes 226 This led to nervous members of the garrison informing the town 
guard who took the precaution of apprehending the man. 227 
In 1702 Robert Cook of Berwick threatened to kill Sergeant Stark of the garrison 
there. After paying a six shilling fine he was eventually released by the authorities. 228 
More ominously, in 1712 local inhabitants Peter How and Ralph Bolton were tried for 
uttering seditious words that they hoped would `raise differences twixt town and 
garrison' in Berwick. 229 For reasons not present in the documentary evidence, these 
two men were prepared to take extensive risks in order to upset the relationship 
between the army and the town. These incidents are unusual and their motivation is 
not clear since the existing records do not go into great detail. However, the 1702 
incident came at a time when tension between Berwick and the garrison was high due 
to the pressures being exerted on the town by intense billeting. 
On occasions incidents against soldiers could come in interesting and unusual forms. 
In November 1741 a number of soldiers stationed in Berwick were subjected to sexual 
molestation by a local baker named John Rule. John Oxley, a private in the garrison, 
described how he met Rule at his bakery and later met him in the Black Box public 
house where they enjoyed a number of drinks together. 230 On their way home at the 
end of the night, Rule began to fondle Oxley and enquired as to the soldier's 
willingness to partake in `sodomitical' practices. 31 Further evidence against the 
baker was provided by Sergeant Francis Compton, who told of how he was privy to 
Rule's passion for men in uniform. On the previous Wednesday, while patrolling the 
town's ramparts, he was approached by Rule, who began making pleasant 
conversation with him. 32 Soon after this Rule put his hand `upon this examinants 
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privates on the outside of his breeches. '233 Fortunately, Compton managed to extract 
himself from the situation without recourse to any physical violence. Surprisingly, 
Rule was not being tried for his actions towards these two soldiers. Oxley and 
Compton were actually providing supporting evidence against the man for another 
crime. This was an earlier, more serious sexual assault on Thomas Winter, who was 
also a soldier in the garrison. Rule was said to have `beat, wound and ill-treat 
[Winter] with an intent to that most horrid detestable and sodomitical crime. . . called 
buggery. '234 
The important point to take from these examples, both civilian and military, is the fact 
that soldiers were occasionally subject to hostility and violence. More importantly, 
the occurrence of such confrontations appears to have been irregular and apparently 
random. At the same time many of the incidents occurred at times when the army was 
involved in operational duties against the local population, such as anti-riot duty and 
supporting naval impressment. As such these situations do not point to a widespread 
undercurrent of violent hostility towards soldiers based in the North East. However, it 
must also be recognised that many of the accounts do not have enough detail to shed 
light on the exact causes of the confrontations. 
IX. The Problem of Disbanded Soldiers. 
One area where historians argue that military personnel had a direct impact upon 
society was the extent to which disbanded soldiers participated in criminal activity at 
the end of wars. As has been mentioned above, Beattie argues that the end of a war 
brought a sudden increase in the number of people being charged for property 
crimes235 He also directly links this to the fact that soldiers accounted for much of 
this criminal activity, stating that the `large numbers of disreputable men' who entered 
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the army became unaccustomed to ordinary labour and were unwilling to take it up 
again when they returned home. 236 Similarly, Tobias Smollet observed that 
all the gaols in England were filled with the refuse of 
the army and navy, which having been dismissed at the 
peace [of 1748], and either adverse to labour, or 
excluded from employment had naturally preyed upon 
the commonwealth. 37 
This sentiment is reinforced by Douglas Hay, who believes that many soldiers 
returning home from wars had little option but to steal and engage in other criminal 
activity to support themselves. 238 Certainly, the examples he provides seem to support 
this supposition. Hay explains that in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years 
War. the rate of criminal convictions in the country almost quadrupled. 239 This was 
followed by a halving of the conviction rate during the American War of 
Independence and a five-fold increase at the outbreak of peace. 240 It has also been 
observed that crime rates after the Nine Years War may have been influenced by the 
mass discharge of men from the army. However, there is a note of caution in this 
analysis, which notes that the perceived high level of crime by ex-soldiers remains in 
debate 241 For example, it is hard to discern whether fear of a crime wave was behind 
the decision by Newcastle's leaders in 1699 to make £16 11 s 7d available to 
disbanded soldiers 242 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that disbanded soldiers 
played some role in the fluctuation of crime rates throughout the century. 
On this point David Brenchley states that there is no evidence in Berwick to back up 
claims, such as those made by Beattie or Smollett, that the end of wars created 
massive increases in crime. 243 In fact, he believes that his evidence for theft, which 
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was the largest post-war crime, points towards the fact that Berwick did not follow 
this wider trend. 244 By looking at the quarter sessions and assize records for the year 
in which peace broke out, as well as the years immediately before and during the 
century's wars, one can observe the relative validity of Brenchley's thesis. Table 5.9 
notes that during the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence, 
similar trends emerge. At the end of both conflicts the crime rate remains fairly 
constant with the preceding years. The lack of crimes between 1760,1761 and 1779 
can be attributed to a general lack of archival records rather than a massive fall in 
crimes. In both cases the actual rate of crimes is noticeably less than when they 
reached their wartime peak. Whether this has anything to do with the fact that war 
took so many disreputable men out of local society, who failed to return, is impossible 
to say. 
Table 5.9: Cases of Murder, Rape, Theft and Assault by Males. 1756-64,1775-84.45 
Seven Year War American War of Independ ence 
Year Crimes Year Crimes Year Crimes Year Crimes 
1755 29 1760 4 1775 45 1780 20 
1756 30 1761 0 1776 38 1781 21 
1757 35 1762 18 1777 34 1782 27 
1758 37 1763 22 1778 34 1783 30 
1759 27 1764 24 1779 16 1784 28 
The impression that disbanded soldiers did not necessarily account for large 
proportions of local crime is given further weight by the archival sources. 246 In all of 
the records available for the region only four of the people charged with crimes are 
alluded to as having been recently demobilised from the army. Similarly, unless they 
are listed as `old soldiers' it is nearly impossible to determine if other men charged 
with crimes around the close of wars had military experience. Making such 
suppositions is dangerous. 
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In October of 1689 two Irishmen named Geddy Murfew and Jeremiah Lion were 
arrested and examined near Dublin, charged with assaulting a blacksmith in the 
village of Brampton. 247 Their statements reveal that the two men had been soldiers in 
Ireland and had been brought over to England in 1688. It is likely that they were 
Catholic Irish soldiers imported by James II to oppose the landings of William's 
forces. This is alluded to by the fact that the argument that led to the assault started 
after Geddy Murfew publicly declared himself for James. 248 During the tempestuous 
period immediately following the Glorious Revolution their unit was disbanded, and 
Murfew declared that he `had been a beggar upon the country ever since the late King 
went away. '249 On their way back to Ireland they passed through the village where the 
incident took place. 
In 1784 Duncan Wright was sentenced to death and executed for his involvement with 
a `house-breaking' gang operating in Durham and Tyneside. 250 The condemned man 
had been a veteran of the 73rd Regiment of Foot, which had been disbanded in July of 
the previous year. It appears that since that time he had turned his hand to theft, 
robbery and other anti-social activities. 251 Such was the reputation of Wright and his 
accomplices that the court described how he had `belonged to a gang which has long 
pestered this neighbourhood', and how community leaders were deeply indebted to 
the local magistrate, Sir Henry George Liddell, for his arrest. 252 John Whitfield was 
also a former soldier from Colonel Hale's Regiment of Light Dragoons253 Like 
Wright he took the skills learned as a trooper and utilised them in his new career as a 
highway robber. The authorities seized him after he wounded a man during an 
attempted robbery on the highway between Carlisle and Hexham. 254 
247 PRO ASSI 45/15/4/63-5,25 October 1689. 
249 Ibid., 45/15/4/65 
249 Ibid. 




253 PRO ASSI 45/29/2/90-2,1769. 
254 Ibid., 45/29/2/91. 
He was killed at a public mass execution held in late 
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X. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the criminal activity of soldiers in the North East during the 
eighteenth century. In doing so it has highlighted a number of interesting 
characteristics and trends. When considering this it is important to take into account 
the large gaps in the assize and quarter sessions records. It is possible that the 
fragmentary evidence has hidden additional examples of soldier's transgressions 
against the law. 255 Importantly, an attempt has been made to fill these holes, as much 
as possible, by looking at other sources such as local newspapers and town council 
records. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the impact that this problem has on the study 
of crime in the North East during the early-modern period. 
Discerning long-term trends or `change over time' in soldier criminality throughout 
the century is difficult. This is due in part to the aforementioned gaps in the archival 
records. For example, the amount of criminal activity recorded during the early part 
of the eighteenth century is very low, but this is a consequence of the poor state of 
records before 1740. Similarly, it may appear that soldier crimes increase in regularity 
as the century progresses, however, this is due in part to the increased survival of 
criminal and trial records, as well as better record keeping. Despite the vagaries of 
source material there are no extended periods when a crime does not appear in the 
archival records or the local newspapers. In addition to this there do not appear to be 
any periods when crimes by soldiers are concentrated. Those records that do exist are 
spread fairly evenly throughout the century. At the same time the involvement of 
militiamen in local crimes increases from 1760 when militia battalions began playing 
a more prominent role within the North East. 256 Also surprising is the fact that the 
building of the barracks in Berwick and their expansion at Tynemouth does not seem 
to have done much to curb the offences of soldiers. There is only one surviving trial 
record for Berwick before the opening of the barracks in 1719, and crime in 
Tynemouth, while limited, occurred throughout the century. Concurrently, the role of 
253 At the same time the gaps in the records would result in missing civilian crimes. 256 Units of the militia, particularly the North Yorkshire Militia, were present in the region almost 
constantly after 1760. For more on the subject of the militia see: Robert Bell Turnton, The History of 
the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees: Patrick and Shotton, 1973); J. R. Western, The En lish 
Militia in the Eighteenth Century (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1956). 
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invalid soldiers within Berwick meant that they were much more prominent in crime 
statistics than in other regional population centres such as Hexham, Newcastle and 
Morpeth. 
The surviving evidence points to the fact that the role of the soldier in the region's 
criminal activity was not overly significant. The general impression for much of the 
period is one of the army contributing its fair share of offences within the North East. 
However, at no time in the century is there an indication that the rate of this criminal 
activity persisted at disproportionate levels for extended periods. 
Determining trends in the characteristics of soldier's crime is slightly easier than 
predicting tendencies in the rates of offences. Immediately apparent is how soldiers 
exhibit some strong similarities to civilians in their choice of crimes. This is 
particularly true of the large numbers of thefts uncovered. Theft was the most 
common civilian crime, as was the case with army personnel. Despite this the 
contribution of soldiers to the overall rate of theft was low due to the sheer number of 
civilian thefts. The same holds true of assaults, which were common in both civilian 
and military criminal statistics. More importantly, there is an ominous feature of 
solider malfeasance that differs noticeably from trends found in the types of offences 
committed by civilians. Existing records highlight the propensity of soldiers to 
involve themselves in crimes that exhibit a high level of violence. As a result soldiers 
appear to have committed a disproportionate level of offences such as robbery and 
murder. These extremely violent crimes account for over 41 % of all soldiers tried 
before the region's courts. 257 When combined with charges of assault and rape, 
violent crime was a factor in 65% of the 80 trials involving soldiers during this period. 
This compares with 48% of civilians brought before the courts. 
One may ask why soldiers would be so prone to rob. This may be explained by the 
poverty of soldiers, the isolation that the region provided, and the access men had to 
weapons. A different characteristic emerges when one looks at the motivation of 
soldiers to commit murder and assault, which is directly linked to issues of civil- 
257 This is 33 (19 robberies and 14 murders) of 80 soldiers tried for the categories of crimes present in 
Table 5.4. 
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military relations in the region. The majority of charges for assault, murder and 
manslaughter found in the records arise from fights and confrontations between 
groups of soldiers and civilians. Very often these deadly affrays were fuelled by 
alcohol and regularly started in or near drinking establishments late in the evening. 
This is not surprising considering the reputation of the army for drinking and the 
amount of time that billeted soldiers spent in public houses. Joanna Bath has noted 
that alehouses focused aggression to outsiders and that drinking could escalate 
tensions and prejudices towards physical conflict. 258 Similarly, Chapter 2 has noted 
how the poverty of Newcastle's keelmen assisted in breeding a culture of drunkenness 
and violence. Any conclusion as to who was responsible for starting most of this 
trouble is normally hard to discern. However, some very detailed court records, 
combined with decisions to acquit or sentence soldiers, help to highlight the fact that 
both soldiers and civilians were to blame. Nevertheless, it is apparent that soldiers 
were often easily led into confrontations with civilians and tended to react with a 
disproportionate amount of force. This could be the reason why so many civilians 
were killed in these fights. 
258 Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime, 193. 
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Chapter 6 
Public Order, the Army and Civil-Military Relations 
'No matter whether their coats be red or brown, they 
had been called in aid of the laws, not to subvert them 
or to overturn the constitution, but to preserve both. ' 
Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice 
House of Lords, 19th June, 1780. ' 
I. Introduction. 
One of the army's most important roles during the eighteenth century was that of 
policing and the maintenance of public order. Its involvement in the curtailment of 
smuggling, collection of taxes, escorting of prisoners, and the suppression of rioting in 
the North East affords a unique insight into the nature of regional civil-military 
relations. Despite traditional fears of the standing army, local leaders relied more 
heavily on the armed forces as the eighteenth century progressed. In an atmosphere of 
increasing trepidation over possible revolts, outbreaks of repeated unrest, Jacobite 
threats, and the need to guarantee the revenue of the nation, the army became a 
centrepiece of domestic state policy. Although not strictly a tool of social control, the 
army, and increasingly the militia, evolved into a force that could stand between 
factious mobs and the ruling oligarchy. At the same time it helped to safeguard the 
trade and revenues essential to the survival of a state frequently at war. 
On a more elementary and parochial level these duties formed an important 
constituent of the military's relationship with the North East's citizenry, bringing the 
common soldier face to face with civilians. Naturally these tasks were often 
characterised by varying levels of tension and confrontation between troops and 
ordinary people. Another consequence was that the contact between the two groups 
was often very intimate, and the implications long-lasting. Additionally, the army 
often found itself encroaching into situations where perceptions of the civilian's 
I Quote taken from Parliamentary History, Vol 21,1780-1, p. 690. Here Lord Mansfield was 
supporting the use of large numbers of troops to quell the 1780 Gordon Riots. 
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actions differed depending on what side a person was on. What the authorities 
believed to be criminal, disruptive and rebellious activity was often seen by the `mob' 
as legitimate action focused on achieving goals important to their wellbeing. For 
example, participation in, or support for, smuggling was often deeply ingrained in 
local economies. At the same time rioting often embraced issues that were very 
important and personal to the local inhabitants. These included the supply of food, 
protection of wages and working conditions and freedom from government coercion 
such as selection for militia service. 2 Therefore, the actions of the military were 
bound to have a direct and tangible effect upon civil-military relations in the North 
East. 
The role of the army as a de-facto police force throughout the eighteenth century arose 
from the fact that Britain largely retreated from the idea of regular and structured state 
policing. Many were willing to risk the dangers of popular insurrection and a lack of 
formal public policing in order to prevent a return to Stuart or Cromwellian 
centralism, or even the establishment of Bourbon style despotism. 3 Nevertheless, as 
the century progressed increasing numbers of political leaders began to gradually but 
reluctantly acknowledge the benefits of policing. It was not until the nineteenth 
century, long after the establishment of police offices at Middlesex in 1792 and 
Wapping in 1798, that large towns and cities would possess an effective method for 
maintaining public order and internal security other than the military. 4 Berwick was 
the exception to this rule in the North East, when in 1710 the town council created a 
force of eight watchmen to patrol the town at night. 5 Regardless of this, the army 
played a vital role supporting national and local authorities, helping to augment their 
ability to enforce English common law, government policy and local interests. 
2 The issue of public resistance to recruitment and impressment is dealt with in Chapter 3. 
3 Walter James Shelton, English Hunger and Industrial Disorders (London: Macmillian Press, 1973) 
102. 
4 Clive Emsley, `Detection and Prevention: The Old English Police and the New 1700-1900. ' historical 
Social Research 37 (1986) 73-4. 
s David Brenchley, A Place by Itself. Berwick upon Tweed in the Eighteenth Century (Berwick upon 
Tweed: Berwick upon Tweed Civic Society, 1997) 205; Joanna Bath, Violence and Violent Crime in 
the North East, c. 1650-1720. PhD Thesis (University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2001) 291. 
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Beyond combating smugglers and rioters, soldiers performed a whole battery of 
mundane and less essential duties. Within the region's towns this included posting 
guards at town gates and patrolling the streets at night. Similarly, officers and soldiers 
were regularly involved in other operations that supported the daily operations of the 
state administration, but did not involve widespread maintenance of public order. 
Soldiers were used extensively to escort pay wagons and tax collectors, convey 
civilian and military prisoners, protect the mail and assist the officers of customs and 
excise in the suppression of smuggling. 6 Other tasks were less regular and only 
undertaken when a specific situation arose. This was the case in 1709 when troops in 
Berwick and Tynemouth were ordered to enforce quarantines on ships arriving from 
the Baltic, where an outbreak of plague had occurred.? 
II. Smuggling 
The army, although involved from the early eighteenth century, was not thought of as 
the obvious choice for anti-smuggling duties. 8 Due to the limited finances available to 
fund such operations there could be little in the way of a full-time force of 
professional civil servants to do this job. As a result the posts of Riding Officers, who 
controlled the anti-bootlegging operations of a loose organisation of land guards, 
tended to be filled by local apothecaries, brewers and other small businessmen. 
Unfortunately, the land guard and riding officers proved to be largely impotent in the 
face of widespread and organised smuggling. Chronic corruption and incompetence 
further hindered their performance. Some were not beyond falsifying records, 
confiscating `stolen goods' for personal use, misappropriating funds and even working 
with smuggling gangs, procuring money and their own personal safety in return for 
6 James Hayes, The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army 1714-1763 
M. A. Thesis (University of London, 1956) 21; John Childs, The British Army of William III 1689- 
1702 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987) 178. 
7 PRO WO 4/9/206-7,1 October 1709. This was an extremely severe plague which killed one-third of 
the population of East Prussia, as well as hundreds of thousands of Poles and Danes. 
8 As early as 1699 the Commanders of Customs submitted a request to the Treasury for funds to 
establish such a guard for north-west England covering the coast from Beaumaris to Carlisle. Calendar 
of Treasury Papers, Vol. 65, p. 16,12 December 1699. 
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safe passage. 9 Those who had not been bought or directly threatened 
into complicity 
often refused to confront the larger operators for fear of reprisals. In 1746 
General 
Hawley expressed frustration at the fact that Sussex customs officers were afraid to 
do 
their duty `upon account of the insolence of the smugglers, and apprehension of being 
abused by them. "° Under such circumstances the government was forced to 
look 
towards more effective, well-armed and centralised methods to assist in the fight 
against this troublesome banditti. 
From the time of their widespread implementation in support of customs officers, 
anti-smuggling operations accounted for a sizeable portion of the home 
establishment's duties. It has been calculated that between spring 1737 and spring 
1743 General Handysyde's 16`h Regiment of Foot spent close to 17% of its time 
engaged in such operations. ' Similarly, between spring 1738 and the summer of 
1742, the 23d Regiment of Foot under Colonel Peer allotted nearly one-quarter of 
their time to patrolling the coast searching for bootleggers. 12 While this may not seem 
substantial it must be remembered that both regiments were in billets or on the march 
for almost two-thirds of the time. 13 Therefore these anti-smuggling duties represented 
one of the most intensive `active' duties for soldiers stationed on, or near, Britain's 
coasts. 
The reason for this is simple. Throughout the eighteenth century illegal importation 
of goods into England was a serious matter for regional leaders and the London 
government who relied on excise taxes for a large portion of their revenue. 14 The high 
level of bootlegging can be observed in the fact that during 1784 it was estimated that 
9 Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1989) 
190. 
10 PRO PC 1/5/111/5-7,5 December 1746. 
11 J. A. Houlding, `Fit For Service' The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981) 1-2. 
12 Ibid. The exact percentage is 23%. 
13 Ibid. 
14 From 1700-1800 the amount of national income raised through customs duties was substantial, 
ranging from as high as 28% (1715-1740) to a low of 20 % (1740-1755). These numbers are averages 
centred on 5 year periods. Geoffrey Holmes, The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and Early 
Georgian Britain 1660-1722 (Harlow: Longman Publishing, 1993) 433; Geoffey Holmes & Daniel 
Szechi, The Age of Oligarchy. Pre-industrial Britain 1722-1783 (Harlow. Longman Publishing, 1993) 
369. 
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only one-third of the tea consumed in the country had been legally imported. 15 
Witnesses appearing before parliamentary committee's on smuggling estimated that 
more than 3,000,000 pounds of tea had been smuggled annually into the country in the 
first half of the century. This accounted for more than three times the amount 
imported legally. 16 Furthermore, Paul Muskett has estimated that between 1723 and 
1733 close to 251,320 pounds of tea and 652,927 gallons of brandy had been seized in 
Kent and Sussex alone. '? If Samuel Wilson's estimate that `not one pound in twenty 
of run tea is seized' is near the truth then the effect of smuggling must have been 
considerable. ' 8 
Despite a vast coastline dotted with small coves, beaches and mudflats, the level of 
smuggling in the North East was considerably less than that afflicting other regions of 
England such as on the south coast. The reasons for this are twofold. The first factor 
is the relative remoteness of England's northern counties from the ports of France and 
Portugal, from whence the vast majority of smuggled goods in England originated. It 
was simply easier to smuggle large consignments across the narrow English Channel 
and land them only a few miles from the densely populated areas in and around 
London. The second reason for the smaller scale of smuggling in the region has 
something to do with the relatively small and dispersed rural populations of the 
northern counties. Thus the market for smuggled goods was modest and large 
organised operations were generally unnecessary. A further reason why this activity 
may not have been widespread was due to the presence of two armed excise cutters 
stationed on the Tyne. 19 These acted as serious deterrents, and few were brazen 
enough to try landing contraband in the region. Finally, a dearth of evidence, rather 
than an actual absence of activity, may be a contributing factor. Records for the city 
of Newcastle are erratic and there are no entries that directly refer to smuggling on any 
15 Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment, 179. 
16 Commons Journal, Vol. XXV (1745-50), 104-5; Cal Winslow, 'Sussex Smugglers' in: Douglas Hay 
et al., Albion's Fatal Tree. Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Penguin Books 
Ltd., 1975) 124-5. 
17 Paul Muskett, 'Military Operations Against Smuggling in Kent and Sussex, 1698-1750. ' Journal of 
the Society for Army Historical Research 52 (1972) 101. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Gwenda Morgan & Pete Rushton, Rogues, Thieves and the Rule of Law. The Problem of Law 
Enforcement in North-East England (London: U. C. L. Press, 1997) 60. 
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scale to 1793.20 Berwick upon Tweed is also unusually weak in this area, with just a 
single customs book from 1760 surviving in its archives. 21 
Most of the available evidence for the region points to piece-meal smuggling with few 
large organised gangs like on the south coast. For example, in 1699 Thomas Bolton 
was charged with smuggling small amounts of salt into the region. 22 Similarly, in 
1778 William Lawson of Sunderland was arrested and impressed into naval service 
upon confirmation that he was involved in smuggling between Berwick, Scotland and 
Gottenburg in Sweden. 23 The records indicate that Lawson was a small, opportunistic 
operator rather than a member of a widely known smuggling gang. 24 
This is not to say that on occasions bootlegging could not be substantial and even 
highly organised. In 1784 the Commissioner of the Excise at Bishop Auckland in 
County Durham complained that `smuggling is carried out in that part of the Kingdom 
to a very great degree', especially from Scotland. 25 Similarly, the customs agent at 
Whitby expressed his concerns when he observed that smugglers on the neighbouring 
coast `carry on their pernicious practices in a very daring manner, landing their goods 
under the protection of a numerous body of men armed with firearms and bayonets. '26 
It was the smuggling of liquor, and in particular brandy, that seems to have been the 
most serious affliction in the region throughout the eighteenth century. It was also the 
type that appears to have attracted the organised criminal syndicates 27 
The severity of illegal spirits was apparent from the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. In 1702 William Wood of Morpeth had 132 bottles of illicit brandy taken 
from him by excise officers. 28 While this only equates to approximately 30 gallons it 
was still a sizeable quantity for a single man to have in his possession. During April 
1721 it was declared to the quarter sessions in Northumberland that `several great 
20 This is: TWAS MD/NC/2/7, Calendar of Common Council Book, Newcastle. 
21 David Brenchley, A Place By Itself, 29. 
22 MRO QSB 11/44, April 1699. 
23 PRO ADM 1/1498,1 March 1778. 
24 Ibid. 
25 PRO WO 40/26, Commissioner of Excise to Sir George Younge, 12 March 1784. 
26 Ibid., 26 November 1794. 
27 The popularity of smuggling liquor appears to have been a national problem. 
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quantities of brandy and wine are very often unlawfully run in several parts along the 
coast in this county to the great prejudice of His Majesty's Customs. '29 This was the 
fault of a gang who were smuggling brandy around Killingworth. 30 Two customs men 
who encountered these smugglers reported that the leader, Robert Motlay, was 
supported by so many accomplices that they could not apprehend him at that time. 31 
Additionally, a local man who testified to the quarter sessions explained how he was 
asked by Motlay to carry two half-anchors of brandy from North Shields to 
Killingworth. Upon his arrival he met with another six men carrying the same 
amounts, indicating the scale of the operation 32 The largest single impoundment 
mentioned in archival sources occurred in the last year of this study. In 1793 customs 
officials seized 22 barrels of spirits from smugglers heading from the Northumberland 
town of Bulmer to the West Coast 33 
On one occasion local officials appear to have uncovered an extensive arms- 
smuggling ring. In 1703 a man named Henry Mohill was apprehended near 
Tynemouth when he was caught in possession of sword blades and firearms. 34 During 
his interrogation it became apparent that the man had brought the weapons over from 
Rotterdam with the intention of selling them locally. 35 Soon after this another 
individual was arrested after more blades were found in his North Shields home, while 
a group of fishermen handed over thirty sword blades which they had found hidden on 
the beach near North Shields. 36 It became apparent that this operation was more 
insidious than Mr Mohill was willing to admit. On 8 January 1703 Colonel Villiers, 
the commander of the barracks at Tynemouth, was instructed to employ his men to 
`seize and secure' the captain of the ship responsible for delivering the weapons, as 
well as capture and detain `the Scotch and Irish soldiers which were on board her. '37 
28 MRO QSB 17/2,4 July 1702. 
29 MRO QSB 55/116,19 April 1721. 
30 Ibid., 55/116-9,19 April 1721. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 55/117. 
33 Newcastle Chronicle, 1494,16 February 1793. 
34 MRO QSB 20/15,12 January 1703. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 20/16,12 January 1703. 
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Importantly, this represents the first recorded case of the army being employed to deal 
with smuggling in the region. 
Soldiers in the North East do not appear to have been employed in the suppression of 
smuggling to the extent that they were in Yorkshire or the south of the country. While 
there is little doubt that they played a role in such activity, explicit mention of these 
duties is limited in local and central records. There are just two entries in existing 
regional sources which clearly mention soldiers assisting excise officers in their 
duties. During the first year of the eighteenth century a customs officer named Joseph 
Simpson threatened to call on the assistance of dragoons when resisted by two men 
thought to be smuggling corn 38 Additionally, there was the previously mentioned 
incident in 1703 when the garrison at Tynemouth was asked to combat the illegal 
importation of arms. 39 However, there appears to have been more need or willingness 
to employ soldiers in combating bootlegging later in the century. For example, during 
1793 the commanding officer of the 57th Regiment of Foot at Tynemouth barracks 
was asked to provide 20 private men and one subaltern to quarter at Hartlepool for 
anti-smuggling duties 40 This represents the first serious request for soldiers during 
the century, but marks the start of a series of orders carrying on into the nineteenth 
century. Despite this, the situation in the North East never resembled the south coast 
where `a guerrilla war between the smugglers of Sussex and Kent and the. officers of 
government' existed 41 
III. Military Intervention: The Law, The Constitution and The Government 
It is important to briefly discuss the constitutional and administrative framework in 
which the army and militia worked while on riot duty, if one is to gain a true 
appreciation of how this role affected civil-military relations in the North East. From 
early in the century the government in London stressed that the military forces 
38 MRO QSB 13/67,17 July 1700. 
39 Ibid., 20/15-6,12 January 1703. 
40 PRO WO 5/68/341, M. Lewis to Commanding Officer 57th Foot at Tynemouth Barracks, 23 January 
1793. 
41 Winslow, `Sussex Smugglers' 119. 
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available for fighting tumults were to be placed strictly under the control of civilian 
authorities 42 In part this arose from the time of Charles II and James II when these 
monarchs used the army to enforce government orders and to reinforce their position 
within the state. 43 As a result the central government, in the form of the Secretary at 
War and Secretary of State, exercised a surprisingly small amount of this direct power 
over the army in this respect. Their main duty was to permit military units to march to 
the scene of a riot in order to assist the regional authorities there, once those 
authorities had sent written requests to London. Only when riots erupted in London 
and the immediate region, and threatened them directly, did ministers and senior 
administrators become fully involved 44 
Like so many other aspects of the military's involvement in the North East the real 
power over the use of military force against rioters was left in the hands of local 
magistrates. 45 As a result, for most of the eighteenth centuryjustices of the peace had 
the power not only to shape the judicial institutions in their localities, but also to exert 
a great deal of influence over the course of events during riots 46 The piece of 
legislation that allowed the local magistracy to deal with unrest in their geographical 
jurisdiction, and employ military force if deemed necessary, was the Riot Act of 
1715.47 
This was one of the first laws enacted by the new Hanoverian regime, and was 
strongly influenced by the need to allay fears engendered by the threat of disaffected 
and rebellious Jacobites 48 This document gave legal definition to what constituted a 
42 This is part of the wider issue of the relationship between central and local governments and the 
gradual acceptance of a standing army. For more on this see Chapter 2. 
43 Stanley H. Palmer, `Calling Out the Troops. The Military, the Law and Public Order in England 
1650-1850. ' JSAHR 56 (1978) 201. 
44 Examples of this include the Gordon Riots of 1780, as well as the 1765 weaver's riots which 
menaced the Houses of Parliament. Christopher Hibbert, King Mob. The Story of Lord George Gordon 
and the Riots of 1780 (London: Longman's Green & Company 1958); Sir John Fortesque (ed. ), The 
Correspondence of King George the Third. From 1760 to December 1783 Vol.! (London, 1927) 94-7. 
45 Magistrates were also responsible for overseeing recruitment, impressment activities, billeting and 
matters concerning crimes committed by soldiers against civilians. 
46 Norma Landau, The Justices of the Peace 1679-1760 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1984) 278. 
47 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 5. 
48 Richard Vogler, Reading the Riot Act. The Magistracy, the Police and the Army in Civil Disorder 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) 1. 
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riot and when such an event was taking place. The act itself deemed any 12 or more 
people gathered together in an unruly fashion to be a riotous assembly. If this crowd 
did not disperse within one hour of the act being read publicly by a magistrate, the 
members of the mob were considered to be committing a felony under the common 
law, and thus open to prosecution. In declaring rioters criminals the Riot Act gave 
justices the freedom and legitimacy to use more extreme methods to control public 
order. Because of this a magistrate could order the arrest of the rioters, call upon the 
army or militia to intervene on his behalf, and even order them to fire on non- 
compliant civilians. A further implication was that soldiers were `indemnified' for 
any injury, death or damage that might arise as a result of their actions 49 Similarly, 
by making rioting a statutory offence, the Riot Act allowed a punishment of death to 
be inflicted on civilians found guilty of rioting. 5° 
While the Riot Act gave local judicial authorities the power to deal with unrest, the 
process of getting the assistance of the army in such cases was less straightforward. 
From the time of the Glorious Revolution up to the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the ability of magistrates to call on the services of the army was governed by a lengthy 
and inefficient procedure. Regional authorities had been obliged to send a formal 
application for military assistance to London. There it was considered, and if 
approved, marching orders were issued to the detachment nearest to the unrest. This 
worked well in the southern counties because of their immediacy to the capital. 
However, for the counties on the northern periphery replies to successful applications 
could take more than a week to reach troops, and longer for those troops to arrive on 
the scene. 51 For instance, on 23 June 1710 the authorities in Newcastle had appealed 
to the Secretary of State for troops to help calm local unrest, but the first units did not 
arrive in the city until the second week of July. 52 
49 Gilmour, Riots. Risings and Revolution. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century England 
(London: Hutchinson Publications, 1992) 140. 
50 Sir Charles Grant Robertson, Select Statutes, Cases and Documents to Illustrate En lish 
Constitutional History, 1660-1832 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1904) 196. 
51 The issuing and re-issuing of orders by the Secretary at War during the riots of 1740 led to troops 
arriving in Stockton on Tees almost 20 days after the start of disturbances there. PRO SP 36/50/425- 
31, SP 36/51/28,61-92; Tom Sowler, The History of the Town and Borough of Stockton on Tees 
(Stockton on Tees: Teesside Museums and Art Galleries Department, 1972) 114-16. 
52 PRO SP 34/12/141,170,23 June 1740 and II July 1710 respectively. The exact date of the troop's 
arrival is simply stated as the Saturday before the 11th of July. 
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It was not until the middle of the century that there was a rationalisation of this 
complex system. Reacting to the widespread rioting of 1755 and 1756, Lord 
Barrington, the Secretary at War (1755-61 and 1765-78), introduced a number of 
changes that assisted in reducing the time it took to get troops to the scene of a 
disturbance. 53 Barrington realised that procedures must be simplified in order to 
facilitate the more efficient dispersal of troops to areas experiencing uprisings. 54 His 
first act was to eliminate the Secretary of State from the decision-making process. 
Barrington's next innovation came in the face of the tumultuous food riots of 1756. 
The Secretary at War understood all too well that such unrest could quickly spread 
from one place to another and that quite often officers believed that orders to suppress 
riots in one place did not give them the power to do so in neighbouring jurisdictions. 55 
Thus he began the precedent of issuing general orders to units to assist magistrates 
whenever called upon to do so. This new measure persisted for the remainder of the 
century, illustrated by the fact that in 1766 he ordered the 1t Dragoon Guards at York 
to be ready to answer any `application being made to you by the civil magistrates' for 
assistance during unrest 56 
With these gradual changes to official policy the magistrates had, by 1768, established 
what Vogler calls their `unfettered personal right to call upon and deploy the military 
forces of the crown' without prior sanction of parliament, or other central or local 
institutions 57 Now the bureaucrats in London, through the issuing of these standing 
orders, became little more than a legitimating body for the use of the military and the 
ultimate check against the misuse of the army in this role. Because of this, justices 
could exercise much more personal power over the decision to use troops, as they no 
longer had to rely on the verification of London. In its place the common law, as well 
as the complex reality of local relationships faced by the magistrates, helped to temper 
any real attempt at the over-enthusiastic use of military force against the civilian 
population. 
53 Because of this, many serious riots had gone unchecked while orders were sent to army units. 
54 Tony Hayter (ed. ) An Eighteenth Century Secretary at War. The Papers of William Viscount 
Barrington (London: The Bodley Head, 1988) 214-16. 
55 Ibid., 215 
56 PRO WO 40/17, Barrington to Officer Commanding 1' Dragoon Guards at York, 29 January 1766. 
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As mentioned earlier, the army was placed strictly under the aegis of civilian authority 
when it was assisting local officials. Similar to anti-smuggling operations, troops 
were held responsible for their actions under the common law. As such, officers or 
soldiers could quickly find themselves being charged with assault, manslaughter or 
even murder if their behaviour was deemed excessive. It was made clear to all those 
involved in such business that their job was to preserve the public peace and not to 
`repel force with force unless it shall be found absolutely necessary, or being 
thereunto required by the said civil magistrates. '58 This created a situation in which 
officers would often refuse to act until they received specific authorisation from the 
magistrate. 59 Even then a lack of official guidance and explanation of the various 
powers and jurisdictions within the Riot Act caused a great deal of confusion and 
concern about who could act and when. In 1740 William Williamson, a Durham 
magistrate, expressed his quandary as to whether he possessed the power to order the 
troops to fire, despite the officers declaring that they were prepared to do so on his 
command. 60 Similarly, these problems occasionally led to uncertainty amongst 
officers as to what the army could and could not do to disperse crowds. 61 No doubt 
this was due in part to the fear of being held responsible for deaths and injuries if the 
army was deemed to have reacted with indiscretion. 
This uncertainty increasingly engendered itself within the army as a clear distaste for 
anti-riot duties 62 Some of this negativity arose from a genuine feeling of unease at 
using soldiers against British civilians. Many political leaders in the capital shared 
this attitude. Lord Barrington, the Secretary at War, publicly derided riot duty as `a 
most odious service which nothing but necessity can justify. '63 Many in society 
echoed these sentiments believing that using military power to suppress riots was not 
57 Vogler, Reading the Riot Act, 12. 
58 PRO WO 5/48/276, Secretary at War to Officer commanding forces at Newcastle upon Tyne, 13 
March 1761. 
59 PRO SP 36/51/28-9, William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 10 June 1740. 
60 Ibid., 36/51/92, William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 15 June 1740. 
61 Tony 1-iayter, The Army and the Crowd in Mid-Georgian England (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman 
and Letterfield, 1978) 30. 
62 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier in the Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press) 56. 
63 PRO WO 4/83/316-17, Barrington to Lord Weymouth (Secretary of State), 18 April 1768. 
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in the spirit of the English constitution. M In the late summer of 1765 Lord Barrington 
reinforced this point in a communication to the leaders of Newcastle. In it he 
reminded them of the dangers of using the military too often to disperse crowds. 
Barrington noted that `frequent use of soldiers to suppress civil commotions has an 
evident tendency to introduce military government, than which there cannot be a more 
horrible evil in a state. '65 Regardless of such feelings from all sectors of society the 
army, and increasingly the militia, continued to be used in this way well into the 
nineteenth century. 
If a magistrate were able to calm the crowd then usually the involvement of soldiers 
would not be required. But if the crowd became restless then the simple presence of 
the army might be enough to prevent or curb violent tendencies. This occurred during 
the 1740 riots in Newcastle where an initial outburst of destructive violence was 
ended by the arrival of troops. However, in cases where the unrest of the mob grew 
and began to show increased signs of violence, the military might be called on to take 
a more active role, as was the case in Newcastle during 1710 and Hexham in 1761. 
According to Tony Hayter this role falls into four main functional categories: control, 
defence, limited offence and unlimited offence. 66 These categories ranged from 
simply being present in the area where the crowd was (control), to unfettered 
engagement of rioters with swords and muskets (unlimited offence). 67 While it is 
clear that Hayter's typology accurately describes the various modes in which forces 
responded to riots, it is important to recognise that these categories are not totally 
exclusive to each other, and that there was often transition from one to the next. 
For example, near Berwick in 1756 a unit of invalid troops initially accompanied 
magistrates to help control rioters 68 When the mob became unruly the soldiers 
moved to `defence', protecting themselves by firing over the rioter's heads while 
64 Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, 11-12 
65 PRO WO 4/379-8 1, Barrington to Matthew Ridley, Williams Lambe and Sir Walter Blackett, 26 
August 1765. 
66 Hayter, The Army and the Crowd, 167-182. 
67 A good example of the use of limited and unlimited offence against rioters is illustrated in the 1780 
Gordon Riots. Christopher Hibbert, King Mob. 
68 PRO SP 36/136/162-3, Justices and Mayor of Berwick upon Tweed to William Pitt, 28 December 
1756. 
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beginning a limited retreat 69 When it became clear the crowd was not going to back 
down the invalids escalated to meet their force with direct musket fire that wounded at 
least one man. 7° Similar, but more tragic, was the way in which militia units acted in 
Hexham during the riots there in 1761.7' The militiamen were clearly there in a 
defensive role to protect the town hall and those drawing the militia ballot. As the 
crowd became more aggressive and unruly, eventually attacking the troops, the latter 
responded with `limited' offence, killing a number of the rioters. 72 Despite these 
examples, unlimited offence was never used by the regular army, militia or invalids 
while on riot duty in the North East. 
IV. The Characteristics of Rioting in the North East. 
Rioting was endemic in many parts of eighteenth-century Britain. In fact Roy Porter 
described it as being `as English as plum pudding. '73 George Rude has estimated that 
there may have been as many as 275 disturbances of the peace in the sixty-five years 
between 1735 and 1800.74 In the North East there were 12 serious outbreaks of unrest 
during the period of this work, as well as a number of smaller, scattered incidents. 75 
However, at no time during the eighteenth century did this rioting come to embrace a 
revolutionary ideology that would threaten to overturn the established order in Britain. 
The vast majority of rioters were only interested in achieving limited goals. 
Moreover, rioting in this period was more ritualistic than overtly rebellious. Common 
elements such as processions, speeches and petitions permeated most gatherings and 
added a certain amount of legitimacy to the actions of the crowd. 
These disturbances focused on what Ian Gilmour refers to as `defensive aggression' 
aimed at obtaining limited goals such as cheaper food prices, improved employment 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 This event will be discussed in more detail below. 
72 A brief and narrative account of this riot can be found in: H. T. Dickinson, `The Hexham Militia Riot 
of 1761' Bulletin of the Durham County Local History Society 22(1978)22-6. 
73 As quoted in: Mark Harrison, Crowds and History: Mass Phenomena in English Towns 1790-1835 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 22. 
74 George Rude, The Crowd in History 1730-1848 (London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1964) 35-36. 
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contracts or freedom from impressment. 76 Developing this theory, it could be 
logically argued that most rioting in the eighteenth century was a conservative and 
reactionary response to unusual or immediate changes in socio-economic norms, 
rather than a long-term development of radical or revolutionary fervour. This 
conceptualisation of mass action is supported by many post-war social historians such 
as George Rude, E. J. Hobsbawm, R. B. Rose and E. P. Thompson. 77 The experience 
of the North East supports this interpretation of Gilmour's thesis in that all the tumults 
in the region were aimed at the satisfaction of local grievances by local groups. 
Furthermore, these incidents occurred in response to quickly developing local stimuli, 
even if these were triggered by wider national concerns. 
The riots that took place in northern towns during 1689,1740,1756,1765 and 1791 
were, in whole or in part, concerned with obtaining affordable foodstuffs. 
Disturbances occurring in 1710,1738, and 1783, and in parts those of 1765 and 1793, 
focused on working conditions. Smaller tumults in 1768,1760 and 1769, as well as 
that of 1793, focused on issues as disparate as sailors wages and the opposition to 
naval impressment. These eruptions of public anxiety had one thing in common; at 
their core they placed an emphasis on indigenous concerns. Even the Hexham riot of 
1761 had elements of local interest at its heart. It was an attempt by workers from 
Newcastle, Gateshead and Northumberland to oppose a widely distrusted and 
nationally imposed militia balloting system. However, it made no attempt to expand 
its strategic aims beyond protecting local people. 
The literature concerning rioting in the region under study is considerable. 78 
However, much of this writing does not put the role of the army into a wider socio- 
75 Section V below will deal with those riots in which the army or militia were directly involved. 
76 Ian Gilmour, Riots Rising and Revolution, 245. For further discussion on the debate over the 
organisation, composition and motivation of crowds see: Mark Harrison, Crowds and History: 
Christopher Hibbert, King Mob, 61 ff; George Rude, The Crowd in History; E. P. Thompson, `The 
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. ' Past and Present 50 (1971) 77-136. 
77 A general discussion of their ideas can be found in: Harrison, Crowds and History. More detailed 
treatments for the eighteenth century are located in: Rude, The Crowd and History: E. P. Thompson, 
`The Moral Economy. ' 
78 This includes: H. T. Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riot. '; Joyce Ellis, 'Urban Conflict and Popular 
Violence. The Guildhall Riots of 1740 in Newcastle upon Tyne. ' International Review of Social 
History 25 (3) (1980) 332-49; and to a lesser extent 'A Dynamic Society: Social Relations in Newcastle 
upon Tyne 1660-1760. ' In: Peter Clark (ed. ) The Transformation of English Provincial Towns 
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political context nor does it comment on its impact upon civil-military relations. 
Rather, it sees the army as a functional component of a largely socio-economic 
problem. 79 This is not to say that there is a total dearth of material in this area. Some 
authors have dealt directly with the role of the military in the suppression of civil 
unrest, but not specifically in the north. 80 Despite this there is a need to mesh the 
discussion on northern rioting with the material concerning the involvement of the 
military. This will show how such events affected the development of civil-military 
relations. 
First however, one must take a look at the characteristics of rioting in the north to 
observe whether or not it is similar to, or distinct from, other regions of the country. 
Like smuggling in this period, rioting in the north of England differed from 
experiences in central and southern parts of the country. The most notable difference 
is the relatively low number of food related disturbances. Rude has stated that of the 
275 riots he had uncovered between 1730 and 1800, almost two-thirds were related to 
the issue of comestibles. 8' This does not fit well with the situation that existed in the 
north. Newcastle upon Tyne did not experience its first true food riot of the century 
until 1740, when much of the region was enflamed by high prices and shortages. 
Between this date and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War the city 
witnessed just two additional food-associated tumults in 1765 and 1791, the latter of 
which was very limited in scope. Similarly, Berwick upon Tweed faced only two 
disturbances related to the price of foodstuffs, the first being a very limited period of 
unrest in 1689 and the second in 1756. In all, subsistence riots accounted for just 40% 
of all disturbances in the region between 1688 and 1793. 
(London: Hutchinson and Company Ltd., 1984) 190-227; Norman McCord, 'Some Labour Troubles of 
the 1790's in North-East England. ' International Review of Social History 13 (1968) 366-83; Morgan 
and Rushton, Rogues Thieves and the Rule of Law, in particular chapter 9 'Law and Order', 191-214. 
79 This is certainly true of Joyce Ellis, `Urban Conflict and Popular and Violence. ' as well as HT 
Dickinson, 'The Hexham Militia Riots. ' 
80 Examples of such work include: Anthony Babington, Military Intervention in Britain. From the 
Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident (London: Routledge, 1990); Clive Emsley, `The Military and 
Popular Disorder in England, 1790-1801' Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 61 
(1983-4) 10-21,96-112; Tony Hayter, The Army and the Crowd; Stanley Palmer, 'Calling Out the 
Troops. '; Richard Vogler, Reading the Riot Act. 
81 Rude, The Crowd in History, 35-6. 
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Much of this was due to the agricultural productivity of the region and the reliance of 
the population on non-traditional grain products such as rye and oats that were not 
widely consumed in other parts of England. 82 As a consequence the local population 
was much less dependent on grain imports. Furthermore, many of the major centres 
in the north were often located near the coast and large ports, therefore supply routes 
were easily established and maintained in those rare periods of dearth. 83 Additionally, 
it appears that magistrates and other local officials were very pro-active in ensuring 
the supply of grain through limiting exports and guaranteeing prices. 84 These factors 
help to explain why, with the exception of 1740 and 1756, it appears as if the north 
was relatively well insulated from the widespread disturbances that engulfed large 
parts of England during 1727-9,1734-40,1756-7,1760,1766-8,1772-3 and 1783.85 
Even the unrest that blocked the Tyne in 1765 was largely isolated from the causes of 
the extensive food rioting that gripped southern England in 1766. While there were 
some concerns over food prices, it was focused more on the labour politics of local 
keelmen. 
Another major difference between unrest in the North East and that found in other 
parts of the country, and in particular London, was the lack of religious or political 
rioting. This is even more surprising when one considers the religious mix of the 
region and its role in the Jacobite conflagrations of 1715 and 1745. In many cities, 
and again especially in London, it was not unusual for crowds to take to the streets 
over `political' or `religious' issues. The extreme nature of this political strife can be 
clearly observed in the support that the Duke of Newcastle gave to loyalist societies 
during the turmoil of 1715.86 Northern population centres experienced nothing 
similar to this. Even election riots, which were not uncommon in many larger towns, 
82 For more on this subject please see Chapter 2 and: D. J. Rowe, `The North East. ' In: F. M. L. 
Thompson (ed. ) The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750-1950. Volume I: Regions and 
Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
83 John Stevenson, Popular Disturbances in England 1700-1870 (London: Longman Publishing, 1979) 
98. 
84 Walter James Shelton, English Hunger and Industrial Disorders (London: The Macmillan Press, 
1973) 57. 
85 For an excellent analysis of the distribution of rioting of all types in the eighteenth century see: 
Andrew Charlesworth (ed. ) An Atlas of Rural Protest in Britain 1584-1900 (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 
1983). 
86 James L. Fitts, `Newcastle's Mob. ' Albion 5 (1973) 41-9. 
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were all but non-existent in the region. 87 It could be argued that the 1689 Sandhill riot 
in Newcastle was a political or even religiously motivated riot, as it was a clear 
expression of loyalty to the new Protestant monarchy. 88 While in some senses this is 
correct, it is debatable whether this disorder was either overtly religious or political in 
nature. Despite this, it still remains the only case of unrest that can be interpreted as 
being linked, although only marginally, to non-parochial issues of polity or religious 
dogma. 
One area in which the north resembled other parts of the country was in the sheer 
numbers of people who could come together to protest. In 1710 a crowd of more than 
1,600 striking keelmen took to the streets in Newcastle, and thirty years later `very 
great numbers' attacked and destroyed the city's Guildhall. 89 In 1761 as many as 
5,000 were involved in the bloody affray in Hexham, while four years later 4,000 
pitmen were reported to be committing various outrages during their strike 90 The size 
of these crowds can be attributed, in many ways, to the fact that much of the region's 
economy was primarily focused on coal. Newcastle's population of keelmen 
numbered nearly 1,500 at the beginning of the century and formed a close-knit 
community living mainly in the cramped Sandhill district of the city. 91 As the century 
progressed this sector of the town's society grew considerably. Added to this was the 
large population of colliers and coal hauliers, who like the keelmen were actively and 
widely involved in many of the region's disturbances. Almost all those involved in 
the sacking of the Guildhall in 1740 and the strike of 1710 were keelmen or members 
of their families. Similarly, the mob at Hexham was in large part from the same 
professions, and many of the troubles later in the century were led by keelmen and 
colliers. The size and inter-relation of the coal industry's workforce meant that it 
87 This arises much from the fact that in the eighteenth century elections for many of the seats in this 
region were infrequent. For example, in Newcastle there were no contested parliamentary elections 
from 1741 until 1774, helping to maintain a form of electoral peace: W. A. Speck, 'Northumberland 
Elections in the Eighteenth Century. ' Northern History 28(1992)164-175. 
88 This incident will be discussed in Section V below. 
89 PRO SP 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710; PRO SP 36/51/127, 
Cuthbert Fenwick to Duke of Newcastle, 20 June 1740. 
90 Ibid., 36/51/28-/9. William Williamson to Lord Bishop of Durham, 10 June 1740; Robert Bell 
Turton, The History of the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 44; CSPD, 
1760-5,599, J. B. Ridley to the Earl of Northumberland, 13 September 1765. 
91 P. M. Horsley, Eighteenth Century Newcastle (Newcastle upon Tyne: Oriel Press Ltd., 1971) 228. 
For a more detailed discussion of North-East society in this period please refer to chapter 2. 
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often behaved as a large and united force that actively engaged in public protest and 
direct action. 
V. Street Fighting Men: Military Intervention in North-East Rioting. 
It is important to distinguish between riots that impacted on associations between the 
army and society, and those that did not. For this reason only those incidents of unrest 
in which military forces and civilian crowds came into contact will be analysed in this 
section. Incidents in which the magistrates and their assistants managed to mollify the 
anger of the crowd, or disperse them without assistance of troops, are surplus to this 
study. In addition, riots involving the military will be analysed by category (food, 
industrial, etc. ) rather than by the order in which they occurred. This approach has 
been taken so that the characteristics of various types of riots, and how the army and 
militia interacted with the civilian population and local political and legal officials, 
can be better understood. The first of these categories is food rioting. 
Although food rioting was not as widespread in the north as it was in other parts of the 
country, its desperate nature meant that it was not always possible for provincial 
powers to deal with it unilaterally. Because of this the army, or related forces such as 
the militia and invalids, were called in to deal with crowds in all but one incident of 
disorder directly related to the shortage or price of foodstuffs 92 As discussed earlier, 
food rioting could often be very serious and violent because of the distressed and 
determined mindset of the people involved. Furthermore, many civilians judged the 
goals of food riots to be just. For this reason the local justices and town leaders were 
often quick to make sure that provision was made for foodstuffs, and to ensure that 
military forces were in place to prevent any escalation or expansion of crowd action. 
Unfortunately, these attempts failed in 1740, leading to the worst food rioting seen in 
the region during the eighteenth century. 
92 The exception is the above-mentioned riot of 1791, which was ended by magistrates creating a 
subscription for the poor. 
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In many ways this event typified the eighteenth-century riot. It involved widespread 
urban unrest directed at achieving specific objectives, as well as the destruction of the 
symbols of local authority. This time the objective was affordable prices for grain and 
the symbol was the town's Guildhall. It came during a period of heavy rains in the 
autumn and summer of 1739, combined with an unusually harsh winter. In 
Newcastle's case this situation was further exacerbated by long frosts that brought the 
North East's economic life to a series of abrupt standstills. Additional complications 
arose when abnormal spring winds pinned much of Newcastle's vital colliery fleet in 
the harbour at Tynemouth. 93 As a result many workers in the coal trade, especially the 
keelmen, became temporarily unemployed at a time when food prices rose by about 
100% within the first six months of 1740.94 Such a rise was unusual for the local 
population. The productive agricultural terrain in the city's hinterland helped to keep 
grain prices relatively stable for much of the century. Such a dramatic rise may have 
created additional panic and concern because of its rarity, thus adding to the 
desperation and determination of the crowd. 95 
On 20 June 1740 the mayor, Cuthbert Fenwick, reported to the Duke of Newcastle 
that 
The pitmen employed in the neighbouring collieries, on pretence of the 
high price of corn, assembled there yesterday in a very great numbers and 
behaved in a most riotous manner breaking open the granaries of several 
corn merchants, forcing into the houses of private other persons, stopping 
the corn carriages passing through the streets and carrying off great 
quantities of corn. 96 
Similar events were being played out in neighbouring communities. In Sunderland a 
mob broke into a malt loft on the rumour of grain being stored there, and in Stockton 
93 Joyce Ellis, `The Guildhall Riots of 1740, ' 333. The outbreak of war with Spain in December of 
1739 also effected trade through embargoes, the threat of the naval press and the presence of privateers. 
94 David Levine & Keith Wrightson, The Making of an Industrial Society. Whickham 1500-1765 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 382-3. In particular it is noted that the price of rye and oats, a 
local staple grain, doubled in this period. 
95 Ellis, `The Guildhall Riots of 1740, ' 335. 
96 PRO SP 36/51/127, Cuthbert Fenwick to Duke of Newcastle, 20 June 1740. 
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on Tees, crowds rampaged through the streets in protest against the price and 
continued exportation of corn. 97 The situation in Sunderland remained ungovernable 
despite attempts by the local magistrates to placate the mob. This led to magistrates 
asking for a formal petition to be drawn up requesting troops to help suppress the 
rioters 98 Similarly, in Newcastle local magistrates were making efforts to negotiate 
with the crowd, actively attempting to guarantee the protesters an affordable and 
stable supply of grain. However, this came to no avail and every day larger numbers 
quit their work and joined in the protests. 99 Then on 26 June an official went out from 
the Guildhall, where the mayor and aldermen were meeting, to announce that the poor 
would be supplied with grain from a ship tied up on the quayside. Notwithstanding, 
the swelling crowd reacted negatively to this entreat, attacking the messenger and 
severely wounding him. 
In response to this unexpected and unfolding crisis a detachment of armed gentlemen 
from the city's trained band opened fire, killing one protester and wounding several 
others. 1°° The enraged crowd recovered quickly from this assault and gave chase to 
the armed men, who fled for the safety of the Guildhall. The riotous mob surrounded 
the building and subsequently launched a furious attack against it. The level of 
damage to the building was considerable. Doors were forced open, windows 
smashed, furniture broken, town records thrown out of windows and the guns of the 
town guard seized and wrecked. 1°' This in itself demonstrates how rioting crowds 
were not attempting any revolutionary action, but rather the satisfaction of limited and 
definable goals. A rebellious crowd would surely welcome the opportunity to obtain 
weapons, yet these rioters destroyed those held by the town. During this orgy of 
destruction some of the attackers managed to liberate between £1,400 and £1,600 
from the town's chest, possibly with the intention of distributing it to the crowd 
97 For the Sunderland incident see: PRO SP 36/51/132, Fairless Smith to John Hedworth, 20 June 
1740; In the case of Stockton refer to: PRO SP 36/50/425-432 and PRO SP 36/51/28-9,61-92; For 
more on the Stockton riot see: Sowler, A History of Stockton on Tees. 
98 The actual request was for 2 companies of foot: PRO SP 36/51/140, Petition of the Inhabitants of 
Sunderland, 23 June 1740. 
99 This included pitmen from Heaton and colliers from Whickham. Levine & Wrightson, Making of an 
Industrial Society, 383. 
100 John Sykes, Local Records of Northumberland and Durham, Newcastle upon Tyne. and Berwick 
upon Tweed Vol. 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 162-3. 
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outside. 102 It has been estimated that the entire cost of the damage to the corporation, 
including the theft of the money, may have been in excess of £4,000.03 
One might ask why the crowd was able to perform such enormities against the town's 
authority, and why the army was not in a position to help before the crowd got out of 
control. The reason was that no troops were on hand to help suppress the crowds as 
coincidentally, the regiment of dragoons stationed in Newcastle had been ordered to 
march from the city on the eve of the unrest to perform riot duty elsewhere. 104 This 
meant that the closest military support the local magistrates could count on was based 
in Berwick. Unfortunately for Newcastle's authorities, three companies of Major 
General Howard's Regiment of Dragoons marched into town at eight o'clock in the 
evening, only hours after the building had been sacked. 105 The soldiers may have 
been too late to prevent the violence on the quayside but they did manage to curb the 
continuing violence of small bands of armed rioters who wandered about the streets 
threatening local inhabitants and breaking into houses. The men of Howard's 
regiment also managed to disperse a smaller hostile crowd and arrest 40 of its 
members. 106 It appears as if the very presence of the soldiery was enough to cause a 
cessation of the tumult. From this point there is no further mention of conflict 
between the soldiers and civilians, nor a resurgence of serious unrest in Newcastle. 
Such was the relief of the authorities for the timely intervention of the armed forces 
that gifts were given to the officers and men of Howard's dragoons who had attended 
the unrest. After the riot had ended the members of the city's governing council 
motioned to present Captain Marmaduke Sowle, the commander of the three 
companies, with a gold box worth 50 guineas `for his ready and speedy march to the 
101 TWAS 394/13/69-70,81,89; PRO SP 36/51/198, Cuthbert Fenwick to Secretary of State, 27 June 
1740. 
102 PRO SP 36/51/198, Cuthbert Fenwick to Secretary of State, 27 June 1740; PRO SP 36/51/200, 
James Bell to the Postmaster General, 27 June 1740. 
103 Sykes, Local Records. 163. This does not include the immeasurable damage done to the city's 
historical records. 
104 Detachments of Howard's regiment were being sent to Stockton as early as 29 May 1740 and 
marching orders continued until the end of June. PRO WO 5/34/93,125,29 May 1740. 
105 Ibid., 5/34/123-4,19 June 1740. These units had been issued marching orders on 19 June in order 
to assist parts of County Durham where unrest had already broken out, but were later directed to assist 
in Newcastle as well. 
106 Horsley, Eighteenth-Century Newcastle, 10. 
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relief of this town on the 26th June last. "°7 Even the regular soldiers of Sowle's 
detachment were not immune from the generosity of Newcastle's administrators. It 
was ordered that each dragoon present at the riot should receive an equal share of a 30 
guinea cash prize. )08 The council's altruism may have been due to the belief that 
without the army the innocent inhabitants would `have been plundered and their 
houses destroyed by the rioters. "09 Certainly the level of violence displayed by the 
rioters before the arrival of the troops adds weight to this observation. The 
presentation of such awards demonstrates how members of the local elite appreciated 
the crucial role the army played in protecting them from outbreaks of rebellion that 
might threaten their interests. It also further illustrates the level to which these forces 
supported the interests of both regional and national governments, while also 
protecting the personal and property rights of a wide cross-section of civilian society. 
The only other incidents of food rioting came in 1756 and 1765. In late December 
1756 it was reported that there had been riots `in Berwick and northern parts of the 
County of Durham, called Norham and Island Shires which border Berwick. ' 1° 
These disturbances were clearly related to issues of food supply and prices. However, 
the local authorities said that they could not understand such a reaction as the price of 
corn and meal was the same as in most places in England. "' They also stressed the 
fact that the town's corporation had done much to provide the poor with oatmeal at an 
6easy-rate'. 1 12 Fear over inflated prices may have arisen due to the large bounties 
being offered for the exportation of grains to Holland during this period. Petitions 
from Newcastle, Liverpool and Bristol all called for a halt to such a practice in case 
the continued outward movement of grain from the region resulted in a price rise that 
put foodstuffs out of reach of the regular people. 113 
107 TWAS MD/NC/2/4/532, Lt. Charles Fielding and Ensign Hewitt, who served with Sowle, were 
awarded silver plates of 40 and 30 guineas respectively. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
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Despite the pleas of the local councils and guilds for an end to the export, the unrest 
intensified. This led to a detachment from the four invalid companies stationed in 
Berwick being ordered to Tweedmouth to deal with riots that had spread there on 27 
December. ' 14 Magistrates attempted to calm the situation and negotiate with the 
angry civilians. However, the intensity of the disquiet increased to the point where 
they were forced to read the riot act and call for the assistance of the invalids. Three 
of the infantry and one of the justices were injured by a shower of rocks thrown by the 
increasingly agitated crowd. ' 15 The mob became so threatening that the troops and 
civilian officials were forced to retreat, temporarily turning and presenting their guns 
to hold off the crowd. 16 This failed to have the desired effect and the invalids were 
forced to fire three volleys over the heads of the rioters, and finally directly into them, 
wounding one of the agitators. 117 
Even with such vigorous action by the authorities the rioting continued and even 
intensified, to the horror of Berwick's leaders. Regardless of fact that the invalids 
were proving ineffective in suppressing the rioters, many in Berwick felt the regular 
troops in the garrison should be kept within the walls of the town to keep order 
there. 1 18 For this reason the mayor and justices requested assistance from the 
government in London in the form of additional regular troops. The War Office 
responded by issuing marching orders to two companies of Lord Charles Manners' 
Regiment of Foot at Newcastle to assist the justices at Tweedmouth, Spittal and 
Ord. ' 19 It appears that eventually the riots subsided. Nevertheless, the whole incident 
illustrates the extent to which civilians would go to protect their interests, as well as 
the reliance of local governing bodies on military forces to keep order. It also 
reinforces the fact that the auxiliary forces were rarely able or willing to combat 
rioters as effectively as the regular army. 
1 14 PRO WO 5/44/102, Barrington to Major Brown at Berwick, 1 February 1757. 




118 PRO WO 5/44/58-9, To the Commanding Officer of Colonel Lord Manner's Regiment of Foot at 
Newcastle, 31 December 1756. 
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The latent fear of many leaders, that disorder would escalate if army units were not 
immediately present, was justified in the late summer and early autumn of 1765. At 
this time the Tyne was gripped by violent strikes led by colliers who refused to work 
while the price of corn and other costs of living remained high. 120 Like much violence 
during industrial strikes, the men began breaking equipment at their mines and issuing 
threats of further damage should the authorities not meet their demands. ' 21 Once 
again the leaders of Newcastle feared that unless the military were quickly called in, 
the crowd's action could evolve to a point where it would be impossible to control the 
situation peacefully. The requests for troops to be sent to the town were quickly 
acknowledged by the War Office. By late August three troops of the 1St Dragoon 
Guards were marching to the district to join the several companies of foot and invalids 
already stationed in Newcastle. 122 Again it appears as though the arrival of such a 
substantial body of armed soldiers was enough to dampen the ambition of the mob. 
While substantial violence and damage had been directed at the collier's places of 
employment, and large numbers of rioters had been arrested by the justices, there 
appears to have been no serious conflicts between the soldiers sent to restore order 
and the striking colliers. 
The most consistent and frequent form of rioting was related to issues directly or 
indirectly affecting working conditions in the coal industry. It was not unusual for 
strikes and protests by workers, mainly of the coal and maritime trades, to escalate 
into civil unrest. Such disorder occurred several times over the century, the most 
serious being in 1710,1738,1765,1783 and 1793. On many occasions the army was 
called into quell such unrest as the critical flow of coal to London could be all but 
stopped if coal miners or keelmen decided on long-term work stoppages. 
Unfortunately for the soldiers, the local labour force, and especially the keelmen, 
proved to be more vociferous in the defence of their rights than many other sectors of 
society. As mentioned previously, the sheer numbers of men employed in the trade 
and the close-knit nature of these communities, meant striking crowds could be large, 
120 PRO WO 4/77/289, C. D. Oyly to Sir Walter Blackett, 6 August 1765. 
121 PRO SP 37/4/210-12, Matthew Ridley (Mayor of Newcastle) to Duke of Newcastle, 12 September 
1765. 
122 PRO WO 4/77/379-8 1, Barrington to Matthew Ridley, William Lambe and Sir Walter Blackett, 26 
August 1765. 
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organised and daunting. For this reason many of these tumults involved active 
aggression by the civilians against the military. However, this resistance and violence 
was not aimed at the institution of the army. Rather it manifested itself as a defence of 
the keelmen's collective rights against wider economic issues, as well as the coercive 
power of local business interests. The army was the unfortunate instrument of this 
power. 
In late June and early July 1710 the army and local militia were called upon to face 
such a strike, led by a large body of keelmen. These disturbances were part of a wider 
period of industrial action by the same constituency dating back to 1709. However, 
they were now exacerbated by a period of nation-wide convulsions over food prices 
and shortages brought about by a harsh winter. 123 Despite the influence of these 
factors, this riot was not primarily concerned with such issues. The keelmen had 
walked away from their boats over their employer's misappropriation of funds that 
had specifically been set aside for the new Keelman's Hospital. 124 They exacted the 
maximum pressure possible on their employers and the local authorities by stopping 
all keels from navigating the river. This effectively brought the shipment of coal to a 
halt and severely hindered river trade. 125 If the men on these vessels would not 
volunteer to stop and join the protest, the strikers were not beyond physically seizing 
the boats and forcing them to the shore. 126 Such actions became a regular fixture of 
keelmen's strikes throughout the eighteenth century. The sudden halt of the coal trade 
bit deep, not only with the colliery owners in and around Newcastle, but in fuel- 
hungry London. This threat to the city's economic life-blood and the capital's supply 
of coal ensured the regular and active involvement of military forces. 
As early as 23 June the city authorities had raised their militia in a desperate attempt 
to break the blockade of the river and force the keelmen back to work. Though the 
mayor and justices could count on the support of eight companies of men, they 
complained that not only was this insufficient to face the estimated 1,600 keelmen, 
123 John Sykes, Local Records, 130. 
124 T. S. Ashton & J. Sykes, The Coal Industry of the Eighteenth Century (London: Methuen & 
Company Ltd., 1955) 116. 
125 TWAS 394/3,2 November 1711. 
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but the troops were `in the whole new and undisciplined. '127 Additionally, the 
authorities soon realised that their initial concessions over casual wage demands were 
not going to keep the crowds from the street. Beyond this, the mayor believed that the 
militia would have no real effect upon the large number of Scots present in the 
Newcastle coal trade, and that only the `sight of the regular forces' would compel 
them to end their disruptive influence and leave the region. 128 The situation was such 
that on the evening of 23 June Nicholas Ridley, Newcastle's deputy mayor, informed 
the Secretary of State that he and the town's officers believed that the assistance of 
`eight companies of regular troops with our own horse may be able to disperse and 
suppress the rioters and free the navigation. '129 
From the early part of July soldiers were pouring into the town and by 21 July the 
whole of the Earl of Ilay's regiment had entered Newcastle. 130 Not coincidentally, this 
marked the time when the troubles ended and the keelmen returned to work, lifting 
their blockade of the river. 131 Once again, although the army was employed directly 
in the suppression of the riot and the arresting of rioters, there, is little real evidence to 
point towards violent conflict between the two sides. It appears that the keelmen were 
determined to remain on strike in the face of the county's trained bands and militia, 
whose ability to enforce order was questionable. However with the arrival of the 
greater part of an infantry regiment the rioters became much more open to negotiation 
with the justices and city authorities. As was the case with the unrest of 1740, the 
appearance of well-trained regular forces on the streets of Newcastle caused the unity 
and conviction of the mob to waver, eventually leading to its relatively peaceful 
dispersal. Unfortunately, the militia was unable to command the same level of respect 
during the tragic events of 1761. 
During March 1761 the small town of Hexham was the scene of a violent 
confrontation between a mob of nearly 5,000 civilians and units of the North 
126 Such was the case with the keel of John Grant who was by 'force and violence' compelled to 
surrender the boat after being stopped and boarded by about 30 men. TWAS 394/3,10 July 1710. 
127 PRO SP 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710. 
128 Ibid., 34/12/162, Johnathan Rodham to Sir John Delaval, 6 July 1710. 
129 Ibid., 34/12/141, Nicholas Ridley to Secretary of State, 23 June 1710 
130 PRO WO 5/16/173,27 June 1710. 
131 PRO SP 34/12/192, From Johnathan Rodham, 21 July 1710. 
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Yorkshire militia. The majority of the mob once again consisted of employees from 
the North East's coal industry. Unlike 1710 or 1740, this would prove to be the 
bloodiest incident of rioting in the region during the eighteenth century. Ironically 
this battle with the militia was actually the result of public hostility to the 
implementation of the new Militia Act. 132 There were a wide range of issues behind 
this opposition including the compulsive nature of the balloting process, trepidation at 
the prospect of mass conscription for long-term service, and an erroneous fear of 
being subjected to dreaded military law. Others misconstrued that they would be 
required to spend long periods outside of their counties, or would even be sent to 
stations overseas. Some simply did not favour serving in the militia or objected to the 
system whereby those with access to money could purchase a substitute to do their 
duty. 133 Many of these grievances were founded on rumour, confusion and ignorance 
about the provisions of the Militia Act. 
The battle that erupted on 9 March 1761 was not a unilateral uprising by the local 
population. Rather it was the culmination of a series of disturbances, led primarily by 
a large crowd of Tyneside's colliers and keelmen. The initial impetus for opposition 
came when notices were published in February 1761 requesting that petty constables 
in Northumberland and Durham counties draw up lists of any men between the ages 
of 18 and 50 eligible to serve in the militia. 134 It was not long before disturbances 
broke out all over County Durham. The most serious of these occurred on 28 
February when a collection of nearly 1,000 angry, unruly and well organised protesters 
gathered in Gateshead after drawing up a petition opposing any new balloting for the 
militia. 135 The gentlemen of the town succumbed to the pressure from the crowd and 
agreed not to ballot there, principally due to the fact that they actually required very 
few men from that area to complete their quotas. 136 
132 There was widespread dissent and rioting throughout the country over the Act from its inception in 
1757. 
133 Duty was two years for those over 35 and three years for those under 35. Robert Bell Turnton, A 
History of the North York Militia (Stockton on Tees, Patrick and Shotton, 1973) 38. 




Misinterpreting their success at Gateshead as a commitment by the county gentlemen 
not to ballot for the militia anywhere, the population were enraged by attempts to hold 
similar ballots in Northumberland the following month. On 2 March another large 
crowd, consisting mainly of Tyneside colliers, seized and destroyed all the lists and 
books concerning the militia from constables at Morpeth. The next day this was 
repeated in the village of Willingham 20 miles away. 137 At this point the county 
authorities had become extremely alarmed by what appeared to be a growing state of 
unrest amongst the labouring classes in the region. They legitimately feared a 
recurrence of the general disorder that gripped Yorkshire in 1757. Wary that this 
opposition might continue during the balloting scheduled for Hexham on 9 March, 
local leaders ordered two companies of the North Yorkshire Militia, then stationed at 
Newcastle, `to march... for Hexham, in order to put a stop to riotous assemblies 
intended to be held there on Monday, to obstruct the deputy-lieutenants balloting for 
the militia. '138 Permission was also given by the Secretary at War to allow additional 
military units to be marched from York to assist the authorities of Durham, Newcastle 
and Northumberland. 139 
Despite the overt military presence, scores of people flowed into Hexham and by mid- 
day there were nearly 5,000 civilians gathered in the square outside the Sessions 
House. Within the next hour the situation deteriorated considerably as a magistrate 
read the Riot Act to no effect. At approximately one o'clock in the afternoon the 
growing tension spilled over. The crowd launched an attack on the militia drawn up 
in lines in front of the building where the balloting was taking place. 140 At some point 
in the confusion rioters shot two soldiers, most likely with guns that they had seized 
from other troops during the fighting. 141 It was at this time that justices realised the 
seriousness of the situation and ordered the militiamen to shoot. The fire from the 
massed ranks of militiamen into the tightly packed civilians proved devastating. At 
137 Ibid. 
138 Quoted from the diary of William Allen in: Sykes, Local Records, 232. 
139 PRO WO 5/48/275-7,13 March 1761. These orders are good examples of the new freedom given 
to magistrates to order military forces to help quash rioting. The Secretary at War ordered that the 
commander `cause such detachments to be made from time to time ... on application made to you by the Civil Magistrates. ' 
140 Turnton, North York Militia, 45. 
141 Ibid., 45. 
221 
least 18 rioters were killed in the first few volleys. The actual number of deaths is still 
open to debate, however it is likely that as many as 40 to 50 people may have been 
slaughtered, with many more wounded. 142 
The incident had a devastating effect upon the relationship between the North York 
Militia and the civilians of the entire region. Such a violent response, despite being 
instigated by the crowd, became a byword for the evils of policing with soldiers. Such 
was the legacy of the events in 1761 that 33 years later, when the troops from the 
regiment were ordered from Newcastle to help suppress a serious mutiny in Glasgow, 
the North Yorkshire Militia still held the nickname `the Hexham Butchers. '143 Like 
`Kirke's Lambs' of 1710, the presence of these units at the scenes of violent unrest 
had a lasting impact on public perceptions. There is little doubt that the militia's 
involvement in the unfortunate incident at Hexham did much to taint, not only the 
North Yorkshire regiment's reputation, but that of all military forces in the region. It 
is also possible that this negative image was entrenched by the continued association 
of the North Yorkshire Militia with attempts by the authorities in Newcastle and 
Sunderland to quell violent uprisings by keelmen and sailors, especially in 1783 and 
1793. 
The uprisings of 1793, while more prolonged in origin and less bloody than the 
Hexham incident, shared some similar characteristics. The most important similarity 
was the direct and violent conflict between soldiers and crowds of angry civilians. 
Tension and unrest had been building from November 1792, when workers on the 
Tyne went on strike to protest the rising cost of living and the decline in the real value 
of their wages. In late winter and early spring a number of separate but somewhat 
related disturbances erupted amongst the keelmen, pitmen and sailors of Shields, 
Sunderland and Newcastle. Carrying on from this, in late January and early February 
1793 a striking force of nearly 1,000 keelmen and their families gathered at Newcastle 
142 Gentleman's Magazine reported 42 dead and 48 wounded: Gentleman's Ma agzine 31,138; A 
lawyer from Ilexham named Armstrong claimed 101 casualties including 52 dead: II. T. Dickinson, 
`Ilexham Militia Riot' 5; A letter from the Earl of Iloldernesse to Lord Ligioner reports the deaths of 
21 rioters with 'a great many wounded': CSPD 1760-5, Earl of IIoldernesse to Lord Ligioner, 12 March 
1761; Turton admits that many more than 21 could have died as there are reports of dead people being 
found in the fields after the riot was over. Turton, North York Militia, 43-5. 
143 Turton, North York Militia, 59-60. 
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in order to protect themselves from the naval press. Despite what Norman McCord 
refers to as a fairly mild tradition of pressing in the region before 1793, the impress 
service hit the North East with a vengeance at the outbreak of war in that year. '44 
This, coupled with the dislocating economic effects of war with France and the related 
rise in commodity prices, helped to elevate local antagonism to the impress service to 
dangerous levels. 145 This resentment and frustration was best described in a 
threatening letter delivered to the lieutenant of the impress service at Sunderland. It 
warned that, `your gang had better take care of themselves for if they do not we will 
take care of them and very soon. We fully design that we will destroy them and very 
soon. '"46 
At the same time, keelmen from Shields and Sunderland had walked out of their jobs, 
complaining about their pay conditions. Relations in the area were further strained in 
the face of claims by local authorities that this group was already earning enough 
money. 147 With the threat of a blockaded Tyne and an inactive port, the leaders and 
magistrates of Newcastle began a build-up of military forces in the region. Two 
companies of the 6`" Regiment of Dragoons based at York were ordered to 
Sunderland, while the remainder of the regiment was instructed to march from Whitby 
to Newcastle. 148 The authorities had learned much from a century of strikes and riots 
by the same elements of North-East society. It was hoped that a quick show of 
overwhelming force would cause the strikers to waver, and even force them back to 
work without the outbreak of rioting. 149 Unfortunately, this time the presence of 
soldiers and the impress service did little to assuage the crowd's anger. In fact it 
possibly agitated them to even greater action. 
Many in authority began to believe that by using the press gangs to deal with the 
rioters they could quickly force the mob to disperse and return to work. Initially it 
144 McCord & Brewster, `Some Labour Troubles, ' 367,377. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Copy of a letter to the Lieutenant of the Impress service in Sunderland contained in: 110 42/24/351- 
4, James Rudman to Henry Dundas, 4 February 1793. 
147 Ibid., 42/24/328-9, Thomas Sanderson to William l3urdon, 1 February 1793. 
148 PRO WO 5/68/367,383,11 February 1793 & 15 February 1793. 
149 This included the arrival, on 15 November, of the frigate I I. M. S. hind. McCord, `Some Labour 
Troubles, ' 370. 
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appeared as though this method would meet with some success. '5° However, since 
many had originally struck in opposition to the press, its employment against the 
workers eventually helped to galvanise resistance. A further problem was now 
preoccupying the authorities, as it had done in previous riots in the region. There was 
growing concern about the ability and motivation of the Durham and Northumberland 
militias to deal with the expanding crisis. Some suggested that it would be best to 
withdraw these units and bring in those from counties `not so easy attached. '"5' 
Such trepidation surrounding the reliability of the militia was well founded as 
throughout the century regional leaders around Britain had discovered that very often 
militiamen would refuse to act against people they could easily associate and 
sympathise with. It was hoped that a regiment from another county would be less 
easily swayed and thus more prepared to -act, as had been illustrated during the 1761 
Hexham riots. By 13 February the dreaded North Yorkshire Militia had arrived in 
Newcastle but the authorities were still concerned that they did not have sufficient 
forces to control the situation. 152 Further, it appears that the new troops were little 
better than the other militiamen as `four-fifths of them [were] so undisciplined as not 
to be much depended upon. '"53 
From that time the rioting increased in intensity, driven on by the mob's resistance to 
the press gangs and determination to make employers meet their wage demands. On 
18 February the situation reached its worst and most violent point during an incident 
at Sunderland. Constables from that town, backed by three troops of dragoons, 
attempted to arrest seven keelmen suspected of assaulting several people during 
earlier disturbances there. The men were seized, handcuffed and sent off to the gaol 
with the dragoons and a complement of foot soldiers acting as an escort. 154 On the 
way the troops were subjected to a shower of bricks, stones and tiles as a large gang of 
keelmen attempted to free their comrades from captivity. '55 One soldier was seriously 
150 PRO 110 42/24/365-6, Charles Brandling to Rowland Burton, 5 February 1793. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid., 42/23/756-7, John Runciman to Henry Dundas, 14 February 1793. 
153 Ibid., The outbreak of war meant that by this time many of the new militiamen brought in to 
augment the existing regiments had not been fully trained 
154 Ibid., 42/24/538, Thomas Sanderson to an unknown person, 18 February 1793. 
155 Ibid. 
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hurt when his horse fell on him, and the flying debris injured more. The magistrate 
read the Riot Act but the assault continued and eventually the soldiers came under 
such pressure that they were forced to fire their weapons. Using a traditional tactic, 
aimed at minimising casualties, the troops fired over the heads of the rioters. '56 
The unrest around the Tyne and the Wear continued for several more days, as the 
keelmen on both rivers continued to resist the press and demand the release of their 
colleagues. However, with the persistent use of the press gangs and the support of a 
large contingent of regular forces, the strikes and riots began to slowly abate. Patrols 
of horse and foot soldiers were moving about the riverside and the collieries scaring 
keelmen and pitmen back to work. 157 Backed by the protection of regular troops, the 
magistrates were now finding it much easier to negotiate with small groups of 
workers, and were convincing growing numbers to return to their places of 
employment. They even managed to get the keelmen on the Tyne to remove a 
blockade of keels that they had set up on 23 February. 158 By the following day it was 
being reported that many of the keels and their crews that had been part of the 
blockade were loading up and sailing. The atmosphere was described as `now joy and 
gladness except those families who have relatives in the gaol. '159 Despite their 
determination and fierce opposition to the authorities, the entire workforce returned to 
their employment without any serious gains in their wages. Although this did not 
mark a complete end to the labour troubles in this region, and resistance to the press 
continued throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century, the worst was over. 
The 1793 riots stand as the clearest example of how important the military was to the 
maintenance of public order and how powerless the justices were to stop serious 
unrest without them. As with many cases during the eighteenth century, the militia 
proved to be largely ineffective, and it fell on regular troops to restore order. The 
presence of the soldiers helped to undermine the resolve of the crowd. Having the 
army in support also afforded the magistrates an opportunity to negotiate with crowds 
that might otherwise have been unruly. Furthermore, the army patrolled the region 
156 McCord, `Some Labour Troubles. ' 375; PRO 110 42/24/538. 
157 PRO HO 42/23/772-4,23 February 1793. 
158 Ibid., 42/24/700, Mr. Cooper to Richard Burton, 24 February 1793. 
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and saw to it that the established peace was maintained while ensuring that those who 
had agreed to return to work did so. There is little doubt that without the involvement 
of the army the situation on Tyneside would have deteriorated further and eventually 
escalated out of the local authority's control. 
It is important to be cautious about seeing soldiers simply as the instruments of state 
sponsored repression. They could also take an active part in civil unrest. There are 
two separate incidents of disorder in which soldiers played a leading role. Again, 
unlike much of the remainder of the country, these incidents reveal a uniqueness 
inherent in the military experience of the area. Both of these uprisings occurred 
immediately after the Glorious Revolution, which affected their characteristics as well 
as the impact they had on civil-military relations. For the army, the period 
immediately after the revolution of 1688 was one of uncertainty, shortages and 
divided loyalties. Turmoil and dislocation in the administration led to long periods in 
which the army's pay was not forthcoming, especially to units located in England's 
peripheral regions. From this sprang the inability of officers to obtain the funds 
necessary to pay soldiers and keep accounts for housing and food. Such a situation 
was bound to cause high levels of tension between the civilian and military 
populations, and this is exactly what occurred in Berwick in 1688 and 1689. 
In mid-December 1688 the town's authorities reported on a disturbance in which 
several soldiers and other inhabitants of this town having in a riotous and 
tumultuous manner assembled themselves together appeared in the public 
marketplace about two of the clock this afternoon, where they behaved 
themselves very insolently committing several enormities... 160 
Unpaid soldiers quartered in the town had seized free quarter from the inhabitants. 161 
This incident created fears amongst Berwick's burgesses that continued `quarrelling of 
the soldiers and townsmen with one another' could have serious negative 
159 Ibid. 
160 BTRO GB 1/13,14 December 1688. 
161 John Childs, The British Army of William III, 9. 
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repercussions for the town. 162 Anxiety became so pronounced that the authorities 
ordered constables to enforce a form of curfew where civilians and soldiers were to be 
kept off the streets after dark on pain of arrest. 163 Further outrages were prevented by 
Berwick's mayor who agreed to support the garrison until funds could be secured 
from London to meet the troop's outstanding pay. '64 This was done partly out of fear 
of what might happen if these circumstances were repeated, and out of a communal 
empathy for the conditions experienced by the men. 165 It is clear that regardless of 
the solution civil-military relations were strained by these events, if only in the 
medium term. However, the continued problem that began in 1689 carried on into the 
eighteenth century and helped to galvanise the town's leadership in pressing for the 
construction of new barracks. 
The disturbance in Newcastle during 1689, while also directly related to the events of 
the Glorious Revolution, was entirely different from what was happening in Berwick. 
There was no protest over lack of pay, nor any fighting between civilians and the 
soldiery. It was unique in the fact that it represented the only riot in the north of 
England, up to the French Revolution, that was political in nature and contained no 
strong connection with parochial interests. Rather, the disturbance was a clear attempt 
by local army officers to express their support for the new regime in London, while 
also stirring up pro-Protestant and pro-Williamite sympathies in the town. The 
incident erupted when an angry crowd gathered in the Sandhill district of the city on 
the evening of 11 May 1689. Once in place, the crowd proceeded to pull down a large 
equestrian statue of James lI that had been recently erected there. 166 The mob then 
dragged the figure of the deposed king across the quay and tipped it unceremoniously 
into the Tyne. 167 
162 BTRO GB 1/13,14 December 1688. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Childs, The British Army of William 111,9. 
165 BTRO GB 1/13,20 May 1689. This whole issue of the financial and logistical pressure placed on 
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Some historical accounts have portrayed this event as being perpetrated and led by 
civilians, however archival evidence discredits this view. 168 Entries in the Calendar of 
State Papers Domestic for this period point to the officers and soldiers of Colonel 
Heyford's Regiment of Royal Dragoons as the actual culprits. 169 Seven witnesses 
giving depositions before the mayor of Newcastle attest to the fact that members of 
the army had played a key role in the destruction of James' statue, and the 
disturbances that ensued. Thomas Bowles stated that Colonel Heyford, an army 
conspirator from the previous year, announced in a Sandhill coffee-house that he had 
ordered the removal of James' effigy. 170 Bowles further testified that later on in the 
evening two soldiers entered the coffee-house and informed Heyford that the deed had 
been done. At that point the colonel paid the two soldiers some money. '71 Other 
witnesses described how Captain Killigrew, one of Heyford's deputies, climbed up on 
the base of the statue and inflamed the growing crowd with anti-Stuart rhetoric and 
the distribution of money. Next, several soldiers placed a rope around the neck of the 
statue, and with the assistance of some civilians, pulled it down. The mob then 
proceeded to beat it with sticks and hurl stones as it was dragged to its watery grave. 
172 
As has been mentioned above, this whole series of events was a clear attempt by the 
officers of the Royal Dragoons to express and reinforce their claims of loyalty to the 
new monarch, to whom they had defected only a year earlier. Further, by gaining the 
support of the crowd through rhetoric and monetary incentives, both Colonel l leyford 
and Captain Killigrew had legitimated their actions by transforming the disturbance 
into a popular civilian movement. They also helped to firmly establish Newcastle as a 
pro-Williamite centre. 173 Most importantly for this study, however, is the fact that this 
riot presents an incident where soldiers and civilians worked together. Such riotous 
168 In particular, Sykes and Charlton make no mention of the role of the army. I Iowever, the 
participation of the army is noted in John Childs, *The British Army of William 111,23. 
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many still felt it was vulnerable to pro-Jacobite sympathies because of its large catholic population and 
proximity to Scotland. 
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co-operation would not happen again in the North East for the remainder of the 
period. 
VI. Conclusion. 
The maintenance of public order in the eighteenth century was an intensely unpopular, 
and at times, violent business for both the army and militia. Many officers and 
civilian political leaders saw riot control as a particularly repulsive duty. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a proper police force the army, and later the militia, 
evolved into the state's principal instrument for the enforcement of central and local 
authority. Smuggling threatened government excise revenue and trade while rioting in 
the North East endangered the vital supply of coal and the flow of other trade goods. 
There was a contiguous anxiety related to the possibility of rebellious activity within 
society, whether it was the threat of popish Jacobites or the challenge of French 
revolutionary radicalism. Reinforcing this were local leaders in the North East who 
had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in the face of stem and organised 
opposition. 174 Therefore, as the century progressed, the use of the military to suppress 
civil unrest, control criminal activity, and guarantee the flow of goods and revenues, 
had become an integral part of government policy and a common feature of life in the 
North East. 
While soldiers undertook duties aimed at opposing smuggling in the North East it 
never took on the same significance, intensity or ferocity as that experienced in other 
parts of the country. On the other hand the effect of rioting on the relationship 
between the army and society was not as limited, nor as ambiguous. In their role as 
maintainers of public order soldiers came face to face with angry, dispossessed and 
determined civilians. The foundations of this protest lay in the public's reactions to 
sharp changes to the region's socio-economic status quo or opposition to perceived 
interference in civilian's lives by local and national governments. This is especially 
true of issues focusing on wages, work conditions, impressment into military service 
and the availability of reasonably priced food. The importance of such issues meant 
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that those involved felt that their actions were justified and essential for personal and 
public wellbeing. 
In many ways the army and militia were acting as extensions of the magistrate's legal 
authority to ensure continued peace and order within society. The armed forces 
represented a barrier that the crowds had to overcome if they were to achieve the 
objectives of their protest. Therefore, the resistance of civilians to the intervention of 
soldiers does not appear to have been grounded in a public endeavour to engage in 
civic combat with the military. Rather, it represented an attempt by civilians to 
achieve their goals by pushing past the barrier posed by the troops. 175 Even the 
violence of the 1761 militia riots was not focused against the militia itself, but towards 
the selection process and terms of service. It is more than likely that the mobs were 
attacking the symbols of authority, not the individual soldier. Despite such intense 
antagonism being characteristic in the region's unrest, riots were relatively bloodless. 
This is particularly apparent when one considers similar events in other parts of the 
country. With the exception of the deadly confrontation in Hexham during 1761, the 
army or militia shot or killed very few protesters. Similarly, the arrival of regular 
troops often quietened the mobs, while militia and other irregular units normally 
struggled to maintain order. 
Even though the army was not the target of protestors, their involvement in riot 
control often influenced the course of local civil-military relations. The intensity of 
local protest and the cohesiveness of the region's labour force meant that units present 
at serious rioting could be branded for their role. Stephen Brumwell has noted that 
while the idea of a standing army gained acceptance amongst the elite, its involvement 
in riot duty further undermined the army's popularity with the general population. 176 
As late as the 1790s the `Hexham Butchers' of the North Yorkshire Militia were still 
enjoying the notoriety of their actions in 1761. Nevertheless, the role of the militia 
and the army in the maintenance of public order does not appear to have had a wholly 
negative impact on civil-military relations. This is most noticeable when one 
174 Most local leaders and magistrates had interests in the coal trade. For more on this see Chapter 2. 
175 This perception is shared by J. M. Brereton, The British Soldier. A Social History From 1661 to the 
Present Day (London: The Bodley Head, 1986) 43. 
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considers the way in which the army supported the interests of local political leaders 
and businessmen. This group was all too aware of the important role the troops 
played and were often very grateful for their assistance, to the point where their 
regular employment of the army came to the attention of the Secretary at War. On one 
occasion this `most odious service' even resulted in rare public platitudes and 
generous gifts being directed towards the soldiers and their officers. 177 
176 Brumwell, Redcoats, 55-6. 
177 PRO WO 4/83/316-17, Barrington to Lord Weymouth (Secretary of State), 18 April 1768. In 
particular I refer to the gifts given to soldiers for helping to suppress the 1740 riot in Newcastle. 
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Chapter 7 
The Crucible of the '45 
`All the regiments were encamped on 
Newcastle Town-moor where they were 
visited by many thousands of people from 
various parts of the country. ' 
Anon. 1745' 
I. Introduction 
It would be remiss to conduct a study of civil-military relations in North-East England 
during the eighteenth century without dealing directly with the momentous events that 
swept Britain in 1745. The extraordinary nature of this episode and the sheer scale of 
the military presence in the region dictates that the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 should 
be dealt with separately. Additionally, it provides an excellent opportunity to assess 
how the army was received by North-East society in times of great crisis, utilising the 
various themes dealt with previously in this study. Chapter 6 illustrated that in times 
of local crisis and unrest the presence of the army was openly encouraged, welcomed 
and even rewarded by civic leaders and some residents. At the same time the army 
faced opposition, from parts of the general population, towards its role in operations 
to combat these crises. This was true not just of rioting, but also of anti-smuggling 
and assistance with impressment activities. It is important to assess whether the 
unique threat posed by the 1745 rebellion changed people's attitudes. Did all sectors 
of society accept and honour the presence of these forces, or was the reaction similar 
to that described in previous chapters? Were local leaders keen to secure and 
accommodate troops whose presence would help ensure the maintenance of the socio- 
political status quo? 
' As quoted in: John Sykes, Local Records. Volume 1 (Stockton on Tees: Patrick & Shotton, 1973) 
175. 
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II. Preparing for Invasion: North-East Papists and the Military Build-up 
In Chapter 2 it was stated that the North East was an important element in the 
domestic security of England in the eighteenth century. This is clearly illustrated by 
the role that the region played in 1745 rebellion. The events of this year placed 
Newcastle and Berwick at the centre of the struggle between the Protestant crown and 
Charles Edward Stuart, the Jacobite pretender. It was feared that the rebel army 
would make its way down the east coast and secure the important bases of Berwick 
and Newcastle, where a French army allied to the Jacobites could land. The Pretender 
saw the reduction of Newcastle as key to dominance over northern England and to the 
success of his plans. 2 This perception of the region's place within the rebel's grand 
strategy influenced the events that were to follow. The eventual decision to march on 
Carlisle was not an attempt to avoid the North East, but rather an attempt to draw the 
forces amassed at Newcastle out into the open where they could be engaged in battle. 
The belief that the Jacobites would choose this part of the country to make their entry 
into England was not just based on military analysis. A remnant of Jacobite 
sympathies remained present in the region after the Glorious Revolution and the 
defeat of the earlier rebellions in 1715 and 1718. Previous to this there appears to 
have been a specific vein of pro-Jacobite sympathy amongst some of the North East's 
aristocracy and gentry. This involved some of the region's most popular and 
prestigious families including those of Sir James Fenwick, Lord Derwentwater and 
Edward Clavering, who were all to be executed for their involvement in papist 
intrigues against the throne. 3 Similarly, there was a fear that the large and 
tempestuous population of keelmen resident on Tyneside, many of whom were Scots, 
would be favourable to a restoration of the Stuart monarchy. In fact, during the 
rebellion a conspiracy was uncovered involving a number of keelmen who were 
plotting to help recruit local people for the Jacobite army and seize money and 
weapons. This in itself is surprising as during the 1715 rebellion the keelmen 
expressed great amounts of zeal for the Protestant cause, raising nearly 700 volunteers 
2 Frank McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745 (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983) 
11. 
3 Norman McCord & Richard Thompson, The Northern Counties From 1000 AD (Harlow, Essex: 
Longman, 1998) 157-8. 
4 F. J. McLynn, `Newcastle and the Jacobite Rising of 1745. ' Journal of Local Studies. 2 (1) (1982) 62. 
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for armed service. 5 Thus it was both a fear and a hope on both sides that the many 
Catholics would rise up and assist the invaders. 
As it turned out, this proved to be unrealistic due in part to the fact that the scattered 
supporters of the rebellion were unlikely to act with the region swarming with troops, 
and the invading army changing direction to Carlisle. Furthermore, the threat of a 
mass rising by disaffected Catholics proved to be a misplaced anxiety, not just in the 
North East, but throughout England. It has been estimated that during the period in 
which the Jacobite army was south of the Scottish border only 300 Englishmen joined 
its ranks from all counties. One author estimates that just three men from 
Northumberland joined the invaders. 7 
Following the humiliating defeat at Prestonpans the government imminently expected 
the arrival of the Jacobite army in the North East. For the reasons mentioned above, 
Newcastle was chosen as the place to make a stand. It was hoped that by sending an 
army to the city, reinforced by units from Flanders, and backed up by a small force at 
Berwick, they could deter a direct assault on Tyneside. Similarly, it would allow the 
government time to arrange their forces before the Jacobites penetrated too far into 
England. To facilitate these plans General Wade was ordered to march northward in 
late September with an army that would eventually consist of more than 10,000 men. 
Additionally, the Duke of Cumberland was ordered to immediately dispatch eight 
regiments of foot and three regiments of dragoons to England from Flanders, which 
were to `proceed directly by sea to Newcastle. '8 
Just over one week later, in early October, the Duke of Newcastle was reporting that 
eight regiments from Flanders were soon to land in England and make their way to 
Newcastle .9 Similarly, Colonel Huske reported in early October that Newcastle had 
$ Sykes, Local Records, 135. 
6 Linda Colley, Britons, Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Vintage Books, 1996) 86. 
7 Ian Gilmour, Riot, Risings and Revolutions. Governance and Violence in Eighteenth-Century 
England (London: Hutchinson Publications, 1992) 110. 
8 Duke of Newcastle to Viscount Irwin at Whitehall, September 28 1745, Historical Manuscripts 
Commission, Reports on MSS. in Various Collections, Vol. 8, pg. 107. 9 Ibid., 110. Duke of Newcastle to Viscount Irwin, October 7 1745. 
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received ten additional companies totalling 500 men and he was expecting the 
imminent arrival of a Dutch regiment under the command of Colonel La Rocque. 
10 
There they would hopefully link up with the army that was assembling in the region. 
Unfortunately, General Wade's march north was not progressing as quickly as had 
been hoped. By 18 October, almost 20 days after orders were first issued, General 
Wade had managed to march his forces up to Doncaster, where they camped for two 
days. At this point the army was anything but imposing, having only 4,955 men from 
three British and five Dutch regiments. " It was hoped that the march from Doncaster 
would proceed more quickly. 
The force planned to leave Doncaster on 21 and 22 October in two columns and arrive 
in Newcastle on 29 and 31 October respectively. On its route to the north the army 
would process through a number of small towns and villages including Ferry Bridge, 
Wetherby, Borough Bridge, Northallerton, Darlington, Perry Hill, and Chester-le- 
Street. 12 On the same day that Wade made it to Doncaster, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Howard arrived at Tynemouth Barracks on board a transport with five companies of 
his regiment. They had sailed from Williamstadt, but unfortunately a large number of 
the men had contracted a severe illness during the journey over. 13 Just two days later 
an additional force of five companies from Lord Ligioner's Regiment of Foot, along 
with an additional seven battalions of invalids and 12 gunners, had arrived by 
transports at Holy Island. 14 
By the time that the various elements of the army had gathered in the North East it 
numbered some 11,300 men, many of whom were to be quartered in and around the 
major towns of the region. 15 The list of troops under Wade's command during late 
1745 included four squadrons of cavalry, three regiments of dragoons, eight regiments 
of foot, fourteen additional companies of foot, four Dutch regiments, fifteen battalions 
10 PRO SP 36/70/110-2, Colonel John Huske to Secretary of State, 4 October 1745. 11 Ibid., 36/72/40,25-31 October 1745. 
12 Ibid., 36/72/39,25-31 October 1745; F. J. McLynn, The Jacobite Army in England 1745. The Final 
Campaign (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1983) 6. He states that by late October Wade had 
arrived at Newcastle with 8,000 of these men. 
13 PRO SP 36/72/103, Lt. Colonel Howard to Secretary of State, 20 October 1745. 14 Ibid., 36/72/103, Handasyde to Secretary of State, 22 October 1745. 15 Entire regiments were stationed at Alnwick, Morpeth, Berwick, Newcastle and Tynemouth. Richard 
Milnes to Viscount Irwin, December 27 1745, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Report on MSS. in 
Various Collections, Vol 8, pg. 159 
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from Flanders and four companies of Brockle's Regiment of Foot. 16 These forces 
were stationed in Newcastle, Alnwick, Berwick, Sunderland, Tynemouth and South 
Shields. 
III. With Open Arms? The Civilian Response 
In Chapter 2 it has been shown that the region regularly played host to sizeable 
numbers of soldiers. However, nothing throughout the century would compare to the 
size of the army that descended on the North East in 1745. Within a few weeks the 
military presence went from a few companies of soldiers to an army that was 
equivalent to about 45% of the entire population of Newcastle. '? British, Dutch and 
German troops swarmed about major towns and their hinterlands, filling public 
houses and barns and covering the immediate countryside with tents. There had 
rarely been such a concentrated interaction between civilians and the military in the 
North East. Even the number of soldiers sent to combat the relatively low-key 
rebellion of 1715 could not compete with those witnessed thirty years later. 18 Despite 
the potential for trouble during the autumn and winter of 1745, these two contrasting 
populations appear to have co-existed peacefully and co-operated with each other. 
Civilians volunteered to help patrol and defend their towns, provided the troops with 
accommodation, food and money, and assisted in improving defences. 
Much of this co-operation may have been due to the fact that the seriousness of the 
situation in 1745 was not lost on the population. The locals knew that the British 
army had been defeated in Scotland and that the Jacobites were expected to march 
south. Any remaining doubts would have been erased by the arrival of thousands of 
battle-hardened troops in October. This may have provoked the welling-up of civic 
pride that led to hundreds of men volunteering to join armed groups to assist in the 
patrol and defence of their towns. Such activity was undertaken quickly in Berwick, 
which expected to be the first settlement attacked by any army invading the North 
16 PRO SP 36/70/215,6 October 1745. 
17 This is estimating the population of Newcastle tobe 24-25,000 in 1745. In 1750 it is listed as 
25,000. Jeremy Gregory & John Stevenson, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Eighteenth 
Century 1688-1820 (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2000) 290. 
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East. As early as September the Mayor of Berwick reported to the Secretary of State 
that he had taken 750 local men and organised them into parties of 50 men each. 
These were not conscripts but rather those who had `voluntarily associated themselves 
for the defence of their civil and religious rights. '19 Even with the region facing such 
a crisis, previous experience shows that conscription and impressment into the army 
would not have been tolerated. Eventually, the number of volunteers in Berwick 
would total 1,000 men organised into 15 companies. 20 This is a considerable 
proportion of the town's male population when one considers that at the end of the 
eighteenth century there were just 8,000 inhabitants there. 
The situation in Newcastle was much the same. When Colonel Huske arrived in the 
town in early October local magistrates and civil leaders were embroiled in improving 
the defences of the town. As many as 300 local men had been armed and ordered to 
mount a guard. So many men had come forward to volunteer for these groups that 
Colonel Huske believed the town would soon run out of firearms and informed 
London that he required a great deal more to form all of the volunteers into units. 21 
Smaller towns such as Morpeth did their best to contribute to the defence of their 
localities. On 30 October the 180 volunteers that had been raised and paid for by the 
town and local gentlemen formed up with their weapons in the marketplace. 22 
There appears to have been a history of support against the threat of Jacobite forces. 
During the 1715 rebellion, when a small force of local and Scottish insurgents 
terrorised the towns of Northumberland, over 700 men had volunteered to be armed 
for the defence of Newcastle. Additionally, the Tyneside keelmen offered another 
700 men to be ready at 30 minutes notice. 23 This last fact was of particular comfort to 
the authorities of Newcastle, who feared the large Scottish presence within the 
keelmen's community. 
18 Sykes lists the forces that arrived under General Carpenter as consisting of two regiments of foot and 
slightly more than three full regiments of dragoons: Sykes, Local Records, 135. 19 PRO SP 36/68/124, John Watson to Secretary of State, 18 September 1745. 20 Sykes, Local Records, 173. 
21 PRO SP 36/70/110-2, Col. John Huske to Secretary of State, 4 October 1745; Sykes believes that the 
number of volunteers may have been in the thousands, Sykes, Local Records, 171. 22 Sykes, Local Records, 174; For the same in County Durham please see: I. A. Carson Ritchie, "The 
Durham Association Regiment, 1745. " JSAHR, 34 (1956) 106-119. 
23 Sykes, Local Records, 135. 
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Unfortunately, the eagerness of the local population to enter into temporary military 
service was not matched by the quality of the defences that protected the towns. In 
Newcastle initial surveys of the town's walls and gates proved that they were in a 
serious state of decay and that repairs would be needed to shore them up. With help 
from local craftsmen and workers, the ages of decay were partially reversed while the 
gates of the town were sealed up to await the arrival of Bonnie Prince Charlie and his 
forces. 24 As was the case with Newcastle, the physical defences of Berwick were less 
than impressive. Upon inspection Colonel Handasyde described the town's 
formidable but ageing walls and outer casements as a `heap of ruins'. 25 However, he 
did compliment the garrison's commander, Colonel Cope, for having the foresight to 
gather together soldiers and local inhabitants to begin vital repairs on the town's 
defences. But the physical fortifications were not the only problem. The colonel also 
found fault with the number of soldiers present in the town. He believed that it was 
essential to reinforce the garrison with at least a full regiment of foot soldiers, as the 
garrison present in Berwick at that time was not sufficient by half. 26 This was despite 
the aforementioned efforts of many local men to arrange themselves into volunteer 
units. The enthusiasm of the civilian population to participate in defending their 
homes was no substitute for well-armed and well-trained regulars. 
The public response to the actual arrival of the troops does not appear to have been 
negative. In fact, the townspeople seem to have welcomed the soldiers. John Wesley 
stated how the `inhabitants greeted their deliverers with joy. '27 This warm reception 
may have been the result of a number of factors. Wesley's observation indicates that 
the presence of Wade's army boosted the town's morale and added to a general sense 
of security and liberation from fear. Considering the perceived threat the Jacobite 
army posed to Newcastle, the soldiers and their officers would have been widely 
popular. Related to this is the fact that the presence of the army, despite its size, did 
not create a sudden surge in the prices of foodstuffs. In other times during the 
century, large concentrations of military manpower within a small geographical area 
24 TWAS MD/NC/2/5/45,7 September 1745. 
25 PRO SP 36/72/27, Colonel Handasyde to Secretary of State, 19 October 1745. 26 Ibid. 
27 McLynn, 'Newcastle and the Jacobite Rising. ' 62-3. 
238 
caused food prices to rise dramatically. 28 This often caused tension between soldiers 
and civilians, and could even lead to rioting by one or both groups. Luckily the North 
East's agricultural capacity was sufficient to cope with most demands, to the point 
that it exported large amounts of grain to other regions of England and even to the 
Baltic. 
In terms of accommodation it would appear that the local authorities attempted as best 
as possible to house all of the soldiers stationed within their jurisdictions. There is no 
mention in the archival sources of officers complaining about a lack of housing. It is 
not surprising that Berwick was able to billet the few regiments that were based 
within the town's walls. The neighbourhood had a history of military occupancy, and 
after 1719, had purpose built barracks to house large numbers of troops. This did not 
stop eager entrepreneurs trying to take advantage of the flood of potential business. A 
local man named James Hood was brought before the town's quarter sessions charged 
with taking it upon himself to billet troops without the permission of the town 
magistrates. 29 Whether he did this out of a willingness to help or simply to make 
some extra money is hard to determine. 
Newcastle, home to the vast majority of troops, had no facilities similar to that at 
Berwick until the very end of the eighteenth century. There were barracks at 
Tynemouth but these would not be in a sufficient condition until a programme of 
repairs and expansion was undertaken later in the century. This made the effort to 
provide shelter for the troops camped in and near the town all the more impressive. 
While Newcastle was a relatively large town it did not have enough rooms in public 
houses for the thousands of soldiers who needed them. In an unusual show of 
solidarity and good will, the magistrates and inhabitants allowed men to be quartered 
in public halls, malting houses, empty buildings and even private residences. During 
this period of crisis civilians were willing to temporarily restrict their rights in order to 
assist their own protection. At other times in the century attempts to house soldiers in 
private buildings created firestorms of protest. 30 
28 Frank McLynn, Crime and Punishment in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Routledge, 1989) 
334. 
29 BTRO C/8/2,13 January 1745. 
30 In 1757 magistrates in Berwick faced lawsuits from several butchers, bakers and other store owners 
for billeting soldiers in their properties: BTRO GB 1/17/265,26 September 1759. 
239 
The succour that towns provided in this time of crisis included capital in addition to 
housing and food. In Chapter 3 it was shown that supporting populations of soldiers 
could, and often did, cause financial pressures on local communities. This was 
especially true earlier in the century when the monetary crisis within the army left 
many towns such as Berwick supplying their resident soldiers with large sums of 
money and credit. The money was often used to pay soldiers' wages and purchase 
provisions for regiments whose allowances had not arrived from London. While this 
problem tended to be concentrated in the late part of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries, times of extreme crisis could see regiments fall severely short of 
money. Such was the case in 1745 when Lieutenant Colonel La Rocque's regiment 
found itself in dire financial straits `being disappointed of money to pay the 
regiment. 01 In response to this problem the corporation of Newcastle very 
generously agreed to supply the substantial sum of £600 to the regiment for 
subsistence and pay until such time as London could supply them with their 
backdated pay. 32 While this was partly motivated by goodwill, there is little doubt 
that the corporation would have been concerned at having large numbers of hungry 
and disaffected soldiers within its midst at such a crucial time. 
The role of the local authorities in supplying funds to assist the military went beyond 
making up the shortfalls of money from London for food and shelter. The councils of 
Berwick and Newcastle placed considerable sums of money in the hands of army and 
militia officers to assist in mounting guards and patrols of the towns. The corporation 
governing Newcastle ordered 40 shillings be paid every day to any Captain on duty to 
facilitate and defray the costs of mounting a guard. 33 Beyond this the council also 
made 15 shillings per day available `to each Captain of His Majesty's forces upon 
duty for a Captain's guard towards their refreshment. '34 The political authorities were 
not only attempting to raise men but to ensure that they took some responsibility for 
the proper functioning of the units that would protect them from the Jacobite army. 
31 TWAS MD/NC/2/5/52,14 October 1745. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 2/5/47-8,7 October 1745. 
34 Ibid. 
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IV. The Reaction of the Army 
Civilians and political leaders of the various towns in the region appear to have 
reacted in a positive fashion to the presence of such large concentrations of soldiers. 
However, as has been shown in previous chapters, the soldiers themselves had a very 
important role in developing relationships between themselves and civilians. It could 
be assumed that the general goodwill and assistance afforded the various regiments 
was proof enough of the tractable behaviour of the troops. However, one must 
remember the unusual atmosphere present during this period. The population of the 
North East was genuinely afraid of the possibility of an assault by the Jacobite army. 
Therefore, the need for security may have made civilians more tolerant towards 
crimes and other outrages committed by soldiers. It has been clearly illustrated that 
the army was not at the root of all local problems. Despite this, with such large 
numbers of troops present, it is necessary to look at their actual conduct within the 
contexts of themes discussed in earlier sections of this study. This will show whether 
the civilians' kind disposition to the soldiers was genuine, resulted simply from fear 
of the invading Jacobite army, or was an attempt to placate the large numbers of 
soldiers from committing criminal and violent acts against the local population. 
One of the few areas in which obvious tensions and ill feelings emerged was over the 
presence of foreign troops. This phenomenon was focused in Newcastle where the 
vast majority of the non-English forces were based under General Wade. Almost half 
of the soldiers stationed there consisted of troops from Holland and the German states. 
Their insolence and general unwillingness to co-operate with local civilians and 
community leaders led to widespread condemnation. 5 This was not the first time that 
Dutch soldiers based in the region had been the cause of tension with civilians. 
Troops from Holland had been stationed in Newcastle during the first Jacobite 
rebellion in 1715, and they were present on and off until the conclusion of the next 
uprising in 1718. In October 1715 a group of Dutch dragoons in Newcastle hatched a 
plan to plunder the town. It was only the actions of the English garrison that 
35 McLynn, The Jacobite Army, 47. 
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prevented this from occurring. 36 The existence of continued ambivalence between 
foreign soldiers and local civilians is supported by the fact that not long after the 1745 
rebellion Dutch troops were the subject of similar accusations in nearby Stockton on 
Tees. So bad was the public feeling against these men that upon their departure in 
early 1746 one local commentator stated how the town had got `happily rid of their 
nauseous company. 37 
Despite the huge swelling in the number of soldiers in Newcastle, Berwick and the 
surrounding region, the soldiery's participation in crimes against civilians does not 
appear to have increased to the level that one would expect. Just three soldiers were 
brought before the justices of the Northern Circuit Assizes in that year and none 
appeared before quarter sessions. All the men were charged with the armed robbery 
of local civilians in the area of Newcastle. 38 This is extraordinary considering the 
sheer numbers of soldiers present. What is very unusual is that in one case, that of 
Corporal Joseph Franklin, an individual perpetrated the robbery. 9 It was quite rare 
for soldiers to commit such offences without the assistance of others. Similar 
unaccompanied acts were perpetrated on only two previous occasions in the century. 
Fortunately for Franklin, he was eventually acquitted of his crime. The other incident, 
which involved two private soldiers from General Handasyde's regiment, reinforces 
the characteristics of robbery committed by soldiers as discussed in Chapter 5. It was 
an opportunist attack, with a small element of pre-meditation, upon an unsuspecting 
male victim 40 Furthermore, the incident involved the administration of some limited 
violence to achieve its goals. The man who actually committed the act, George 
Dowdy, was sentenced to death for his actions, while his accomplice James Holmes 
was found not guilty. 41 Luckily for Dowdy his sentence was eventually commuted to 
transportation to America for 14 years. 
There is a fourth soldier, John Board, who may have been involved in criminal 
activities. A number of depositions from the period record his name and the fact that 
36 The troops are said to have been Swiss but it is very likely that they are actually Dutch: Sykes, Local 
Records, 138. 
37 Tom Sowler (ed. ), A History of the Town and Borough of Stockton on Tees (Teesside: Museums and 
Art Galleries Department, 1972) 117. 
38 PRO ASSI 45123/1/19h-m. 
39 Ibid., 45/23/l/25b-d. 
40 Ibid., 45/23/1/19h-m. 
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he was a private from Handasyde's regiment which was stationed in Newcastle at the 
time of the rebellion. 2 Two civilians attested to the fact that John Board had been 
billeted at the inn of one William Jersey on 22 December, but neither could confirm 
his whereabouts between 3 p. m. and 10 p. m. on that day. 43 While there is no actual 
description of the soldier committing a crime, his appearance in the records in this 
manner indicates this to be very likely. In most other cases where soldiers and 
civilians are tried for crimes their whereabouts during the time of the offence are often 
key to a conviction or acquittal. Unfortunately, little of this case remains so there is 
no indication of what crime John Board was accused of and whether he was guilty or 
not. Since there is no mention of an execution around this date it is very possible that 
the soldier was acquitted, or that it was a less serious crime for which transportation 
or gaol was the usual punishment. 
While there were only three criminal cases in the entire region, involving four 
soldiers, there were surprisingly no cases of bastardy that can be directly attributed to 
soldiers. There is one case in Berwick during 1745 but it is recorded that the birth 
took place on 16 January, almost ten months before troops began massing in the 
region. 4 This is particularly surprising considering how the town had struggled with 
this phenomenon in the early part of the century. The completion of the barracks in 
1719 helped to lessen the rate of soldier related bastardy, but with the influx of 
soldiers into all towns one would have expected an increase in cases. Once again this 
trend may point to the limitations that the army's war footing placed on the freedom 
of soldiers to cavort with local women. Beyond this there appears to have been little 
in the way of negative or positive incidents occurring between civilians and soldiers 
quartered in the region. There are no cases of fighting between soldiers and civilians, 
no incidents of drunken rowdiness, and no other apparent forms of conflict or tension. 
In terms of the topics discussed in this thesis it could be said that the behaviour of 
soldiers in the region during 1745 was uneventful. Apart from the isolated incidents 
mentioned above the attitude of the soldiers towards the local population seems to 
have been largely benign. In part, much of this good comportment can be attributed 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 45/23/1/3f-g, 31 December 1745. 
43 Ibid., The civilians were James Burdon and William Jersey. 
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to the circumstances the country found itself in. This was not simply a large garrison 
force residing in a town before marching out of the region to another station. In all 
respects it was an army constituted to fight a war on British soil against an aggressive 
invading enemy. Due to its `war footing' this force was subject to the same laws as 
those units fighting on the continent or in the colonies. The strict laws governing the 
army, and to a lesser extent the civilian population, assisted in regulating the massive 
number of armed men in the camps about the towns and in the surrounding 
countryside. It helped to enforce discipline and ensured that officers were present 
with their units. This in turn fostered an atmosphere of control in which soldier's 
actions were restricted to a certain extent. 
At the same time the camps themselves played a key role in lessening the possible 
impact that Wade's forces would have on the region's towns. Despite the fact that 
many regiments were sent to population centres, it was important to ensure that the 
force did not become too dispersed. This could undermine discipline as well as affect 
the army's ability to march at short notice to meet a concerted Jacobite invasion. For 
this reason the largest portion of the army was encamped in and around Newcastle, 
the region's largest defensible town with easy access to the sea. However, Newcastle 
could never be expected to accommodate the numbers of troops that were marching 
into Tyneside in September and October 1745. For this reason, the main body of 
Wade's army was camped in field tents on the town moor. At the time of the 1745 
rebellion this area of the town lay directly outside the confines of the town walls. 
Camp life, combined with the observance of military discipline, prevented most 
military personnel from entering the walls of the town. Therefore, the actual number 
of troops stationed in the city, while large, was probably not vast. This meant that the 
opportunities for theft and robbery were limited, and the contact between soldier and 
civilian was constrained. 
V. Conclusion 
The peculiar events of 1745 necessitated one of the largest military build-ups the 
North East had ever witnessed. Thousands of soldiers poured into Newcastle and the 
surrounding region, filling all of the available accommodation. Similarly, a huge 
44 BTRO C15/14,23 January 1745. 
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component of General Wade's force was encamped on Newcastle's town moor. This 
unique concentration of military forces affords an opportunity to test some of the 
theories set out in other chapters, albeit under extreme conditions. The reaction of the 
local population to the arrival of such large numbers of soldiers allows some insight 
into the way in which the armed forces were perceived in this period. Similarly, the 
behaviour of the soldiers, assembled in the numbers they were, would expose whether 
the conclusions of previous chapters are accurate. If this is the case then negative 
incidents such as crimes, the birth of bastards and confrontations would not increase 
substantially. 
The British units present in the region appear to have been well disciplined and there 
were no major confrontations between soldiers and civilians. Similarly, the number 
of crimes committed by members of the army against civilians was completely 
disproportionate to the number of troops within the region. The only major problem 
appears to have been the relative dislike that existed between the inhabitants of 
Newcastle and the foreign soldiers based there. Nevertheless, this appears to have 
been a relatively unimportant conflict in which the civilian population's suffering and 
loss was limited. If any major incidents arose out of this tension they have not 
survived in local records beyond a few anecdotal remarks. 
It is certain that the manner in which the army was managed on this occasion 
influenced its conduct. Despite this, the lack of major incidents reinforces the belief 
that the army was not universally despised in the North East. It also illustrates the 
fact that soldiers did not regularly take part in actions that would damage relations 
with the civilian population. Nevertheless, it is misleading to give the impression that 
all was well in the relationship between the army and civilians. As has been shown in 
previous chapters, tensions existed, crimes were committed and civilians expressed 
resistance to the military. What this chapter has reinforced is the fact that such 
occurrences were quite rare, even at times when vast numbers of soldiers were present 
in the region. 
The civilian population appears to have greeted soldiers arriving in the region with 
enthusiasm, and even some level of affection. Many immersed themselves in 
assisting the army and local authorities in preparing their towns for a possible assault 
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by the rebels. Large numbers of men volunteered to take up arms, and council 
members freely offered money to help support soldiers and fund patrols. 
Additionally, private houses and public buildings were opened without resistance to 
house the legions of infantrymen flooding into the towns. If one considers the 
widespread opposition to the pressures of billeting during much of the century, the 
almost complete absence of complaints by civilians against these unparalleled 
pressures is remarkable. 
While it may appear cynical, it is almost certain that the exceptional tolerance and 
kindness shown by the local population during 1745 was due in part to the unusual 
events of that year. It seems that civilian society was somewhat selfish in their 
attitude towards the army. In times of crisis, such as major riots, support from local 
officials was always high. On the other hand, the actions of the army in such 
situations engendered varying levels of support and obstruction within the general 
population. Such action often caused a decline in civil-military relations as the army 
clashed, actively or passively, with members of the local population. The major 
difference in 1745 was that the Jacobite rebels were perceived as threatening all 
elements of society who supported the existing Protestant political establishment. The 
danger posed to the region by the imminent invasion may have mitigated the reaction 
of the local civilian population to the presence of such numbers of troops 45 The 
whole region was consumed with the fear that the rebel army to the north might 
attempt to seize Newcastle, Berwick and other parts of the North East. This fact 
helped to unite society while at the same time elevated the rank and file of the 
gathering army to the status of saviours. The local inhabitants knew that if they were 
to repel the Jacobites it would be crucial to have a large body of troops who were well 
disposed to the civilian population. However, these factors should not diminish the 
extraordinarily positive state of civil-military relations in the North East during 1745. 
45 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 54. He notes that a similar rise in public esteem of the army and 





This thesis has investigated the nature of civil-military relations in north-east England 
during the eighteenth century. I have chosen not to focus on the study of civil- 
military relations as a construct of regional and national political, economic and 
administrative structures. Rather, this study is more interested in the daily 
interactions that existed between local civilian society and the military. The aim of 
this approach is to observe the way in which soldiers and members of the public co- 
existed. In doing so, a picture can be formed of how civil-military relations were 
developed and maintained in this region. One can also gauge how the army's duties, 
and the actions of individual soldiers, influenced public perceptions of, and attitudes 
towards, the land forces. Additionally, it is possible to analyse whether local public 
resistance to the army and its duties was the result of a popular undercurrent of hatred 
for the military, or the product of other socio-economic and political concerns. 
The eighteenth-century British army was an increasingly representative institution. 
Despite this, and the growing acceptance of a standing army, it was never truly 
popular or widely appreciated. Even the notoriety afforded the armed forces after its 
great victories was short lived. ' Soldiers may have lived amongst the population, and 
there may have been growing familiarity with the military as the century progressed, 
but they were always one step apart from society. On the one hand the army was 
feared for its potential to assist ambitious monarchs in establishing authoritarian rule. 
On the other hand the rank and file were publicised as the insolent and drunken 
sweepings of British society, poorly paid and subject to brutal discipline. It is no 
wonder that soldiering remained a low-caste, unpopular and marginal occupation in 
eighteenth-century Britain. 
' Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas. 1755-1763 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 54. On the other hand the popularity of the navy grew throughout 
the century. 
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The North East has proved to be an interesting locality in which to investigate the 
issue of civil-military relations. A sparsely populated area of Britain, far away from 
the political nexus of London, it was strategically important to the whole country. For 
the first half of the century it stood as a buffer against the Jacobite threat from 
Scotland. However, its defences protected Britain from foreign invasion throughout 
the period. At the same time Newcastle and its environs were economically 
significant, not least because the region supplied much of London's requirements for 
coal. In addition, the region's close links to the sea meant it was a key location for 
shipbuilding and related industries. Equally important was the role it played as a 
`nursery' for the sailors who manned Britain's navy. The tightly knit communities of 
keelmen and colliers contributed notably to the character of the North East. They 
were highly organised and vociferous defendants of their communal rights. As such, 
this segment of North-East society contributed disproportionately to public unrest in 
the region. Similarly, the leadership of the region had a direct interest in the coal 
trade. Many of the large families who dominated local political and economic life 
were involved in the production and shipping of coal. These factors combined to 
influence the role of the army in the region, and particularly in Newcastle. 
What the previous chapters have shown is that the interactions between the army and 
civilian society were diverse and complex, both in their origins and their effects on 
civil-military relations. Additionally, it has been illustrated that in the eighteenth 
century the army played an important role in the daily life of the general population. 
This was particularly true in towns like Berwick that supported permanent garrisons. 
What becomes apparent is that the army was not simply a mechanism that ensured the 
state's monopoly over the means of employing large-scale violence against foreign 
competitors. It was also an instrument that the central government in London, in co- 
operation with regional leaders, utilised to support state policy and revenue collection, 
as well as maintain order amongst the population. In an era when organised police 
forces were non-existent, rioting was endemic, and threats to internal security were 
rife, the army and the militia were the only true institutions that the government could 
employ to secure the British state. 
The role of the army as policeman and protector, and the preponderance of billeting 
and garrisoning, ensured that officers and men spent a great deal of their time 
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amongst their civilian counterparts. This greatly influenced the course and 
development of civil-military relations on a number of levels. While these 
interactions impacted upon local and central government relationships, their 
consequences were also felt at a much more basic level. The political elite in London 
could order troops to combat riots, enforce customs laws, or impress idle men into the 
army, but it was the rank-and-file that carried out these orders. They faced the angry 
crowds, confronted dangerous smugglers and carried away reluctant recruits. For this 
reason the private soldier was at the sharp end of government policy and law 
enforcement. 
The opposition these duties generated amongst the general population was most acute 
when soldiers confronted rioters. In this role both the army and militia were acting as 
the representatives of the authority and interests of central and local government. The 
troops recognised how odious and unpopular their duties were, often exercising great 
care to ensure that violence and bloodshed was kept to a minimum. The violence that 
occasionally erupted between soldiers and the local population was a consequence of 
the fact that anti-rioting forces represented a barrier that needed to be overcome if the 
crowd was to achieve its goals. Likewise, public resistance to impressment was not 
directed specifically at soldiers, or necessarily the institution they represented. It was 
aimed mainly at the incredibly unpopular practice and process of compulsory 
enlistment. Unfortunately, military personnel sometimes endured the wrath of local 
civilians who were trying to protect friends and family from enlistment or recapture. 
Rarely in these situations could the individual infantryman or dragoon do much to 
deflect or cause this collective anger. However, through their daily conduct soldiers 
could influence the course of civil-military relations and public perceptions of the 
army. Despite a reputation for violence, crime and misbehaviour there is little 
evidence to suggest that soldiers based in the region contributed more than their `fair 
share' of crime. Less favourable is evidence suggesting that soldiers were 
disproportionately represented in very violent and brash crimes such as highway 
robbery, murder and manslaughter. However, it must be recognised that these 
incidents were infrequent in the context of the entire eighteenth century. Equally 
interesting is the fact that surviving evidence suggests that many of the civilian deaths 
caused by soldiers' criminal actions were accidental and unpremeditated. Often they 
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were the result of drink-fuelled brawls between civilians and soldiers. While it is 
difficult to apportion blame in every incident it is apparent that both sides were 
responsible for instigating such confrontations. Nevertheless, it has been observed 
that in such circumstances soldiers tended to react to civilian antagonism with a 
disproportionate level of ferocity and violence. 
While there were difficulties in the relationship between soldiers, civilians and local 
officials within the North East it is inaccurate to say all interactions were 
characterised by tension, hatred and fractiousness. With the exception of quashing 
unrest, and soldier's involvement in bastardy, much of the strain on civil-military 
relations in the region resulted from other factors. Mainly these were jurisdictional 
misunderstandings and tensions arising from procedures that governed major military 
processes such as impressment and billeting. In the case of Berwick this stress was a 
product of two factors. The most significant of these was the population's frustration 
with the financial burdens that billeting imposed on the community. Rarely did local 
publicans or political leaders complain specifically about the behaviour of soldiers. 
More often than not their anger was focused upon unpaid bills and the costs of 
supporting soldiers in garrison. 
These anxieties were mirrored in other regional towns but the situation was never on a 
par with that experienced in Berwick. Nevertheless, local government and civilians 
did much to assist the soldiers in their time of need. Some may have feared the 
presence of large numbers of disaffected and unpaid soldiers in their midst but 
empathy, as much as trepidation, motivated people to help. Fortunately, . the 
construction of purpose-built barracks in 1719 eased tensions and lowered the rate of 
bastardy. Regardless, this tension was replaced by repeated conflicts focused on the 
actions of military officials trying to make improvements to the region's military 
infrastructure. 
The problems mentioned above never became unmanageable because the region's 
civic leaders, aware of their rights, were prepared to forward their complaints to the 
central government in London. At the same time the administrators at the War Office 
tended to listen to grievances from civic leaders, and if necessary, took action against 
offending officers. Officials were conscious of the effect that such differences of 
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opinion could have on local communities and that good relations were essential in 
facilitating the maintenance of garrison populations. Such necessities helped to 
increase the chances that civilian complaints were listened to and dealt with in a 
reasonable manner. At the same time the War Office, by exercising its role as 
arbitrator between the army and society, was enforcing the supremacy of civilian 
government over the army. This was particularly important in Britain where the very 
existence of a standing army was the subject of so much public debate and anger. 
One problem with covering any wide-ranging historical topic over a long 
chronological period is getting an idea for how things changed over time. Therefore, 
it is necessary to briefly discuss how civil-military relations changed between the 
Glorious Revolution and the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. 2 Importantly, 
civilian control over the army became more entrenched during the century, helping to 
ease fears over the existence of a standing army. In the regions this was increasingly 
embodied in the power exercised by the magistracy over the armed forces. This 
evolution impacted on almost every aspect of military life in the North East, from 
recruitment and impressment to billeting and riot control. It was also part of a wider 
devolution of power from the centre to the regions in relation to local social and 
welfare issues. In parallel there was a direct attempt to bring the army more under the 
control of the common law in cases where soldiers committed offences against 
civilians and private property. By the early part of the century this had largely 
succeeded and civilian checks on the army had been widely entrenched. 
In terms of recruitment, the widespread employment of vagrants, criminals and 
debtors as soldiers eased as the century progressed. At the same time the utilisation of 
army impressment declined in importance until it finally disappeared after 1779. 
Nevertheless, poor pay and the poor public image of soldiering did little to improve 
the perception of army service. Recruits were hard to find and desertion from the 
ranks continued to be endemic throughout the period. After 1757 the reformed militia 
made a noticeable change to the military presence in the North East. While the 
regular army still played a major role in the region the militia was increasingly 
employed on many duties including rioting and anti-smuggling. Unfortunately, their 
2A discussion of the changes inherent in the army during this period can be found in Chapter 2. 
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competence in these tasks was often lacking. In fact, throughout the century it proved 
necessary to call on the assistance of regular troops to combat the unrest caused by an 
increasingly defiant and organised labour force. By the end of the period strikes and 
riots on Tyneside and Wearside had become a regular occurrence. This 
intensification of anti-riot duty probably helped to undermine the army and militia's 
relationship with the civilian population. 
The criminal activity of soldiers continued unabated throughout the century. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5 determining any long-term trends in the rates of crime is hard 
due to gaps in the source material. The indication that crime amongst the soldiery 
increased as the century progressed can be attributed to an improvement in the 
survivability of archival sources and more detailed record keeping. In addition, the 
increase in invalids and militiamen in accounts of trials does not necessarily prove an 
expansion of military criminality in the second half of the century. Rather, it relates 
directly to the increased and more regular presence of these forces within the North 
East. 
In many ways this work has asked as many questions as it has answered. However, 
what it has shown is the complexity of civil-military relations and the way that 
interactions of soldiers and civilians influenced associations at many levels within 
eighteenth-century Britain. Despite a voluminous body of historiography it is 
surprising that there have been few attempts to analyse the place held by the army in 
eighteenth-century British society, let alone construct a comprehensive social history 
of this remarkable institution. I hope that this study has gone some way to addressing 




Establishments of Land Forces in Britain and the Plantations 
1689-1793. ' 
Year Establishment Notes 
1686-88 20,970 WO 24/8 
1689 13,615 WO 24/9 
1690 22,848 WO 24/13 Includes General and Staff Officers 
1691-3 N/A N/A 
1694 65,220 WO 24/21 End of Nine Years War. 
1695-8 N/A N/A 
1699 8,082 WO 24/22 Reduction of army by parliament. 
1700 - 7,878 WO 24/23 
1701 39,470 WO 24/26 Includes general & staff officers 
1702 18,072 WO 24/28 
1703 13,396 WO 24/33 Includes garrisons and invalids 
1704 6,723 Does not include garrisons, invalids etc. 
1705 10,406 WO 24/38 Excludes a regiment 'for sea service. 
1706 N/A N/A 
1707 N/A N/A 
1708 12,365 WO 24/45 
1709 12,375 WO 24/49 
1710 15,727 WO 24/55 Excludes 12 companies of invalids (59- 
122 each)7 
1711 N/A N/A 
1 Sources: PRO WO 24/26-316. Establishments of Guards, Garrisons and Land Forces 1701-1756; 
PRO SP 41/7/353 (1732) and PRO SP 41/3-29 (1702-1782); BL Add. MSS 33,046/23 Duke of 
Newcastle's Military Papers (17th Century-1755). 
2 PRO WO 24/13. General and Staff Officers include men such as the Captain General, Paymaster & 
Quartermaster Generals, as well as aides and staffs. 3 On 9 December 1698 Parliament decided "That all land forces of England, in English pay exceeding 
7,000 (and those consisting of His Majesty's natural-born subjects) be forthwith paid and disbanded. " 
This also included sending William's beloved Dutch guards back to the continent. Cobbett's 
Parliamentary History of England, Vol. 5 (1688-1702) 1191-2. 4 Up to 1707 Scotland is on a different military establishment so its troops do not appear in the totals. 
S The large disparity between the numbers for 1702-3 and 1701-2 (21,668 men) could be due, in part, to 
the 16 foot regiments of 859 (13,744) and 2 foot regiments of 835 (1670) men that appear on the 1701- 
2 establishment but do not appear in the next year. It is possible that these regiments were raised in 
1701 and then sent over to Flanders in the next year, thus not appearing on the home establishment: 
PRO WO 24/26,28. 
6 PRO SP 41/3/14. This is only an abstract of effective men (5,542 privates, 1,181 commissioned 
officers & N. C. O. 's) according to a muster commencing 25 April and ending 24 June 1704. However, 
there are 558 men "wanting to complete", bringing the total to 7,281. The vast majority of British 
troops were in Holland at this point (three regiments of horse, three regiments of dragoons & 15 
regiments of foot). Troops in England made up of four troops and one regiment of Horse Guards and 
Grenadier Guards, two regiments of dragoons and five regiments of foot: PRO SP 41/3/25. 
7 If one is to average the size on these companies at 90 men each (59+122/2) and multiply it by the 12 
companies, this accounts for 1,086 men. Added to the establishment it would total 16,813 men. 
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1712 N/A N/A 
1713 8,892 WO 24/68 
1714 11,285 WO 24/70,73 Inc. 12 company's invalids (South 
Britain) 
1715 37,947 WO 24/798 
1716 33,380 WO 24/82 
1717 16,814 WO 24/86 4 regiments dragoons +8 foot 
disbanded1° 
1718 12,828 WO 24/92 6 regiments dragoons, 6 foot disband" 
1719 12,435 WO 24/95 
1720 15,019 WO 24/97 
1721 14,904 WO 24/101 
1722 14,872 WO 24/104 
1723 18,876 WO 24/109 
1724 18,876 WO 24/112 
1725 18,515 WO 24/115 
1726 18,515 WO 24/121 
1727 26,441 WO 24/127 
1728 23,055 WO 24/133 
1729 23,055 WO 24/140 
1730 18,374 WO 24/145 
1731 18,364 WO 24/149 
1732 18,004 WO 24/153 
1733 18,317 WO 24/157 
1734 18,367 WO 24/161 
1735 26,105 WO 24/167 
1736 18,351 WO 24/171 
1737 18,360 WO 24/175 
1738 18,368 WO 24/178 
1739 18,312 WO 24/181 
1740 29,696 WO 24/190 War of Austrian Succession 
commences, to 1748. 
1741 35,401 WO 24/195 Raising new regiments for war 
1742 36,216 WO 24/204 
1743 24,264 WO 24/215 
1744 19,839 WO 24/223 New raised regiments to Flanders etc. 
1745 16,403 WO 24/233 
1746 49,531 WO 24/246 Regiments in to Fight Jacobites. 12 
8 Sudden increase of establishment in England probably caused by return of regiments from theatres of 
war after the cessation of hostilities, who have yet to be reduced or disbanded. There are in fact 25 foot 
regiments listed on the establishment accounting for 17,645 men: PRO WO 24/79. 
9 There are still the 25 regiments of foot mentioned above but it appears as if the 19 regiments of 
dragoons have been reduced from 9,443 to 5,643 men. There are further reductions in the Royal 
Regiment of Horse Guards (781 to 445) and H. M. 's Own Regiment of Horse (747 to 427). Total 
reduction of 4,852: PRO WO 24/ 79,82. 
10 PRO WO 24/86. Establishments, 25th December 1717. 
11 Ibid., 24/92,25th December 1718. 
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1747 33,690 WO 24/259 Units back to theatre of war 
1748 50,599 WO 24/271 War ends & regiments return to 
England. 
1749 19,522 WO 24/279 Mass discharge of soldiers 
1750 19,648 WO 24/287 Inc. general officers & garrison staffs 
1751 19,670 WO 24/291 
1752 19,648 WO 24/295 
1753 19,670 WO 24/299 
1754 19,670 WO 24/303 
1755 21,125 WO 24/309 
1756 39,715 WO 24/316 Commencement of Seven Years War 
1757 50,606 WO 24/328 
1758 54,639 WO 24/339 
1759 29,652/50,332 WO 24/351 
1760 57,292 WO 24/363 
1761 55,392 WO 24/380 Excludes Scotland. 13 
1762 64,659 WO 24/394 
1763 59,724/18,079 25/12/1762 to 24/4/1763 & 25/4/1763 to 24/12/63 
1764 17,085 WO 24/423 
1765 14,964 WO 24/429 
1766 17,704 WO 24/434 
1767 16,918 WO 24/439 
1768 17,226 WO 24/444 
1769 17,649 WO 24/450 
1770 18,183 WO 24/455 
1771 18,175 WO 24/460 
1772 18,044 WO 24/464 
1773 17,592 WO 24/468 
1774 18,563 WO 24/473 
1775 18,086 WO 24/478 1 regiment of foot less than 1774 
1776 21,294 WO 24/482 
1777 21,276 WO 24/487 
1778 21,800 WO 24/491 
1779 32,651 WO 24/496 
1780 35,656 WO 24/501 
1781 40,317 WO 24/506 
1782 41,440 WO 24/513 
1783 51,741 WO 24/520 From 24/4 many regiments disbanded 
or reduced 
12 This force consists of 34 battalions of infantry and 22 squadrons of cavalry and dragoons, including 
Hessian (6 battalions, 8 squadrons) and Dutch (8 battalions) troops. Many of these units were brought 
over from Flanders as the seriousness of the rebellion in Scotland became apparent in October and 
November 1745: PRO SP 41/16,24 December 1745. 
13 Of this total there are still 7,098 men wanting to complete the establishment. 6,488 are from the 
regiments & companies of foot who lost 3,174 men in draughts for foreign service the previous year, 
and of this a further 2,040 are required by the Independent Companies of Foot: BL Add. MSS 
33,048/26-7,79. 
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1784 18,062 WO 24/529 
1785 18,334 WO 24/534 
1786 17,925 WO 24/539 
1787 17,849 WO 24/544 
1788 18,368 WO 24/549 
1789 17,654 WO 24/554 
1790 17,654 WO 24/558 
1791 17,219 WO 24/563 
1792 23,603 WO 24/568 
1793 18,049 WO 24/574 
25(, 
Appendix B 
Military Service As Substitute for Criminal Punishment: 1747-621 
Branch of Service 
Year 
Total 
Pardoned Army Navy Marines 
Not 
Specified2 
1747-55 2 0 2 0 0 
1756 14 11 0 1 2 
1757 2 0 1 0 1 
1758 16 5 8 0 3 
1759 8 4 2 2 0 
1760 2 1 0 l 0 
1761 127 107 12 0 8 
1762 63 59 4 0 0 
Totals: 234 187 29 4 14 
% Total 1 00% 79.9 12.4 1.7 5.9 
Sources: PRO SP 44/95-8, State Papers Domestic-Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants. SP 
44/R5 (1747-56); SP 44/96 (Jan. I757-Aug. 1760); SP 44/87 (Feb. 176I-Apr. 1766); SP 44; 99 (1761-67). 
I his includes men given the opportunity to serve in either the navy or the army. 
It is possible that after 1760 criminals were still enrolled in the marine regiments however from this 
date there are no orders directing them to specifically do so. 
4 Of these, six were specifically told that if they joined the tinny it must be with an overseas regiment 
otherwise they would have to enlist in the navy. 
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Appendix C 















1756 0 1 8' 2 Il 
1757 0 0 0 0 0 
1758 1 0 0 4 5 
1759 0 0 3 1 4 
1760 0 0 0 1 1 
1761 43 36 2 26 107 
1762 7 49 1 2 59 
Totals 51 86 14 36 187 
% Total 27.3% 45.9% 7.5% 19.2% 99.9% 
5 Sources: PRO SP 44/95-9. State Papers Domestic, Criminal: Correspondence and Warrants. ("I' 
44/85 (1747-56); SP 44/96 (Jan. 1757-Aug. 1760), SP 44/97 (Feb. 1761-Apr. 1766), SP 44/88 (1761- 
1767). 
`' Six of these irren were enlisted in Charles Ottway's 35th Regiment of Foot. SP 44/85/491,493. 
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